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Security for industrial automation and control systems – Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners

Sécurité des systèmes d'automatisation et de commande industrielles – Partie 2-1: Exigences de programme de sécurité pour les propriétaires d'actif IACS

IEC 62443-2-1:2024

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

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SECURITY FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS -

Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners

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IEC 62443-2-1 has been prepared by IEC technical committee 65: Industrial process measurement, control and automation, in collaboration with the liaison ISA99: ISA committee on Security for industrial automation and control systems. It is an International Standard.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2010. This edition constitutes a technical revision.

This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:

- a) revised requirement structure into SP elements (SPEs),
- b) revised requirements to eliminate duplication of an information security management system (ISMS), and
- c) defined a maturity model for evaluating requirements.

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Draft	Report on voting
65/1044/FDIS	65/1053/RVD

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INTRODUCTION

This document is the part of the IEC 62443 series that contains security requirements for industrial automation and control system (IACS) asset owners. In the context of this document, asset owner also includes the operator of the IACS. Its requirements focus on cybersecurity and allow security capabilities that meet them to be provided as a combination of technical, physical, process and compensating security measures.

Cybersecurity is an increasingly important topic in modern organizations. The term cybersecurity is generally used to describe the set of security measures or practices taken to protect a computer or computer system against unauthorized access or attack. In IACS, the most significant concerns include unwanted access or attacks resulting in the IACS not performing the correct functions in the required timeframe.

A very common engineering approach when faced with a challenging problem is to break the problem into smaller pieces and address each piece in a disciplined manner. This approach is a sound one for addressing cybersecurity risks with IACS. However, a frequent mistake is to deal with cybersecurity one system at a time. Cybersecurity is a much larger challenge that should address all IACS components as well as the policies, procedures, practices and personnel that surround and utilize those IACS. Implementing such a wide-ranging management system can require a cultural change within the organization.

Addressing cybersecurity on an organization-wide basis can seem like a daunting task. There is no simple cookbook for security, nor is there a one-size-fits-all set of security practices. Absolute security can be achievable but is probably undesirable because of the loss of functionality that would be necessary to achieve this near perfect state. Security is a balance of risk versus cost.

Each situation will be different. In some situations, the risk can be related to health, safety and environmental (HSE) factors rather than purely economic impact. The risk can have an unrecoverable consequence rather than a temporary financial setback. Therefore, a predetermined set of mandatory security practices can either be overly restrictive and likely quite costly to implement or be insufficient to address the risk.

This document supports the need to address cybersecurity for an IACS in operation by providing requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining and continually improving an IACS security program (SP). These requirements, when implemented conscientiously, provide security capabilities whose purpose is to reduce IACS security risks to a tolerable level. These requirements are written to be implementation independent, allowing asset owners to select approaches most suitable to their needs. IEC 62443-3-2 [1] describes the methodology for addressing cybersecurity risks in an IACS system design and that assists in the identification of risks and the selection of appropriate security requirements and associated capabilities for an IACS SP.

Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products are often not ruggedized or rigorously engineered enough for IACS environments, where they can introduce additional vulnerabilities and threats to the IACS.

Numbers in square brackets refer to the Bibliography.

When COTS technologies are used in an IACS, they are often configured to meet IACS specific functional needs and operational constraints. For example, security event handling in COTS products may be configured differently for IACS applications than they are for traditional information technology (IT) applications. Typical COTS equipment is designed for environments where the primary objective is the protection of information. In an IACS environment, the primary objectives are the protection of the HSE of the facility and the minimization of the operational and business impact on facility operation. COTS technologies can be applied to IACS applications, but the risks associated with using these technologies need to be understood by the asset owner.

Some organizations can attempt to use pre-existing IT and business cybersecurity solutions to address security for IACS without understanding the consequences. While many of these solutions can be applied to IACS, it is important to apply them correctly to eliminate inadvertent and undesired consequences. For example, in an IACS, availability may have a higher priority than confidentiality, as opposed to typical IT applications.

Asset owners may wish to apply their IACS SP across the organization to address the organization needs and objectives, security requirements, business and work processes, as well as the organization size and structure. All of these influencing factors are dynamic and will likely change over time. Thus, the adoption of an IACS SP is a strategic decision for the organization.

The effectiveness of an IACS SP is often enhanced through coordination or integration with the organization's processes and overall information security management system (ISMS). For example, security can be added to the organization supply chain processes to require security in the design of processes, systems and controls. It is also expected that IACS SP will be scaled in accordance with the needs of the IACS and the organization.

Document Preview

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SECURITY FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS -

Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners

1 Scope

This part of IEC 62443 specifies asset owner security program (SP) policy and procedure requirements for an industrial automation and control system (IACS) in operation. This document uses the broad definition and scope of what constitutes an IACS as described in IEC TS 62443-1-1. In the context of this document, asset owner also includes the operator of the IACS.

This document recognizes that the lifespan of an IACS can exceed twenty years, and that many legacy systems contain hardware and software that are no longer supported. Therefore, the SP for most legacy systems addresses only a subset of the requirements defined in this document. For example, if IACS or component software is no longer supported, security patching requirements cannot be met. Similarly, backup software for many older systems is not available for all components of the IACS. This document does not specify that an IACS has these technical requirements. This document states that the asset owner needs to have policies and procedures around these types of requirements. In the case where an asset owner has legacy systems that do not have the native technical capabilities, compensating security measures can be part of the policies and procedures specified in this document.

This document also recognizes that not all requirements specified in this document apply to all IACSs. For example, requirements associated with certain technology (such as wireless) or functions (such as remote access) will not apply to IACSs that do not include these technologies or functions. Similarly, not all malware protection requirements apply to systems for which malware protection software is not available for any of their devices. Therefore, this document states that the asset owner needs to identify the IACS security requirements that are applicable to its IACSs in their specific operating environments.

The elements of an IACS SP described in this document define required security capabilities that apply to the secure operation of an IACS. Although the asset owner is ultimately accountable for the secure operation of an IACS, implementation of these security capabilities often includes support from its service providers and product suppliers. For this reason, this document provides guidance for an asset owner when stating security requirements for their service providers and product suppliers, referencing other parts of the IEC 62443 series.

Figure 1 illustrates the roles and responsibilities of the asset owner, service provider(s) and product supplier(s) of an IACS and their relationships to each other and to the Automation Solution. The Automation Solution is a technical solution implementing the control/safety and complementary functions necessary for the IACS. It is composed of hardware and software components that have been installed and configured to operate in the IACS. The IACS is a combination of the Automation Solution and the organizational measures necessary for its design, deployment, operation and maintenance.

Some of these capabilities rely on the appropriate application of integration maintenance capabilities defined in IEC 62443-2-4 [2] and technical security capabilities defined in IEC 62443-3-3 [3] and IEC 62443-4-2 [4].




Figure 1 – Roles and responsibilities in the IEC 62443 series

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 1-1: Terminology, concepts and models

3 Terms, definitions, abbreviated terms and conventions

3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in IEC TS 62443-1-1 and the following apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- IEC Electropedia: available at https://www.electropedia.org/
- ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://www.iso.org/obp

3.1.1

access right

permission to access system resources or privilege to execute system functions

Note 1 to entry: Permissions are generally rights to access resources such as data and executable files, while privileges are generally rights to execute function calls provided by the operating system (OS).

3.1.2

asset owner

organizational role ultimately accountable for one or more IACS

Note 1 to entry: Used in place of the generic word end user to provide differentiation.

Note 2 to entry: In the context of this document, asset owner also includes the operator of the IACS.

[SOURCE IEC 62443-3-3:2013, 3.1.2, modified – Changed in definition "individual or company responsible" into "organizational role ultimately accountable" to reflect role; in Note 1 to entry changed "The term "asset owner" is used" into "Used"; removed Note 2 to entry; in Note 3 to entry changed "this standard, an asset owner" into "this document, asset owner".]

3.1.3

Automation Solution

control system and any complementary hardware and software components that have been installed and configured to operate in an IACS

Note 1 to entry: Automation Solution is used as a proper noun in this document.

Note 2 to entry: The difference between the control system and the Automation Solution is that the control system is incorporated into the Automation Solution design (for example, a specific number of workstations, controllers and devices in a specific configuration), which is then implemented. The resulting configuration is referred to as the Automation Solution.

Note 3 to entry: The Automation Solution can be comprised of components from multiple suppliers, including the product supplier of the control system.

3.1.4

compensating security measure/lec/6d05192d-b6db-40f0-a2f8-5590756de374/lec-62443-2-1-2024

security measure employed in lieu of or in addition to inherent security capabilities to satisfy one or more security requirements

EXAMPLE 1 (Component-level) A locked cabinet around a controller that does not have sufficient cyber access control security measures.

EXAMPLE 2 (Control system/zone-level) Physical access control (guards, gates and guns) to protect a control room to restrict access to a group of known personnel to compensate for the technical requirement for personnel to be uniquely identified by the IACS.

EXAMPLE 3 (Component-level) A product supplier's programmable logic controller (PLC) cannot meet the access control capabilities from an asset owner, so the product supplier puts a firewall in front of the PLC and sells it as a system.

3.1.5

consultant

subcontractor that provides expert advice or guidance to their clients, such as product suppliers, integration and maintenance service providers and asset owners

3.1.6

device

asset incorporating one or more processors with the capability of sending or receiving data/control to or from another asset

EXAMPLES Controllers, human-machine interfaces (HMIs), PLCs, remote terminal units (RTUs), transmitters, actuators, valves, network switches, etc.