

TECHNICAL REPORT



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Industrial-process measurement, control and automation – Smart
manufacturing –
Part 3: Challenges for cybersecurity
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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**INDUSTRIAL-PROCESS MEASUREMENT, CONTROL
AND AUTOMATION – SMART MANUFACTURING –****Part 3: Challenges for cybersecurity**

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Draft	Report on voting
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Full information on the voting for its approval can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

The language used for the development of this Technical Report is English.

This document was drafted in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, and developed in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1 and ISO/IEC Directives, IEC Supplement, available at www.iec.ch/members_experts/refdocs. The main document types developed by IEC are described in greater detail at www.iec.ch/standardsdev/publications.

A list of all parts in the IEC 63283 series, published under the general title *Industrial-process measurement, control and automation – Smart Manufacturing*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under webstore.iec.ch in the data related to the specific document. At this date, the document will be

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- withdrawn,
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INTRODUCTION

Smart Manufacturing comes with many new challenges to cybersecurity. It starts from architectural paradigm shifts combining many valuable assets (design, production planning, engineering, supply chain management, etc.) currently enclosed into dedicated systems into one system. Many stakeholders need to cooperate and exchange information. This is enabled by the application of new information technologies such as industrial internet-of-things (IIoT), edge technology, machine learning, wireless communications and new production technologies as additive manufacturing, exposure of data belonging to contracting parties.

From the point of view of cybersecurity increasing digitalization, tight networking and interconnectivity, usage of standard IT technologies, etc., increase the attack surface and could enable new types of attack. This puts the protection goals integrity and availability of the production system, as well as confidentiality of data involved in the production process at risk. Examples are counterfeiting, loss of know-how or intellectual property, leaking of key performance indicators.

This Technical Report contains smart manufacturing challenges for cybersecurity, i.e., it identifies issues that need to be addressed/fulfilled by smart manufacturing systems in order to ensure their security.

Cybersecurity is a concern for any kind of production method such as:

- discrete manufacturing;
- continuous production;
- batch production.

The tasks of the IEC 65 WG 23 taskforce cybersecurity are:

- review smart manufacturing use cases to find cybersecurity relevant scenarios and requirements;
- if necessary, propose additional smart manufacturing use cases showing potential cybersecurity issues;
- develop a list of smart manufacturing requirements that are necessary to provide cybersecurity in smart manufacturing components, systems, design, integration, and operation and maintenance;
- propose possibilities for smart manufacturing specific profiling in order to simplify application of IEC 62443 (all parts).

This report is limited to cybersecurity related impacts of smart manufacturing. Other requirements for smart manufacturing systems such as safety and reliability are left to be addressed in future reports. However, cybersecurity needs to consider and address safety issues triggered by security attacks.

The initial use case analysis constitutes a bottom-up approach intended to gain a better understanding of the topic. The provided use cases are not necessarily exhaustive. A top-down approach for a generic smart manufacturing model is aimed for in the future.

INDUSTRIAL-PROCESS MEASUREMENT, CONTROL AND AUTOMATION – SMART MANUFACTURING –

Part 3: Challenges for cybersecurity

1 Scope

This part of IEC 63283 identifies challenges which apply to the engineering of a smart manufacturing facility related to cybersecurity.

NOTE Cybersecurity challenges and how to deal with them can impose constraints on the engineering of the smart manufacturing system.

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 62443 (all parts), *Security for industrial automation and control systems*

3 Terms, definitions, abbreviated terms and acronyms

3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- IEC Electropedia: available at <http://www.electropedia.org/>
- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <http://www.iso.org/obp>

NOTE The definitions are fully aligned with IEC TR 63283-1¹ (65/683/DTR).

3.1.1 access

ability and means to communicate with or otherwise interact with a system in order to use system resources

Note 1 to entry: Access may involve physical access (authorization to be allowed physically in an area, possession of a physical key lock, PIN code, or access card or biometric attributes that allow access) or logical access (authorization to log in to a system and application, through a combination of logical and physical means).

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.1]

¹ Under preparation. Stage at the time of publication: IEC/DECPUB 63283-1:2022.

3.1.2**access control**

protection of system resources against unauthorized access; a process by which use of system resources is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted by only authorized entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems) according to that policy

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.2]

3.1.3**administrator**

user role whose responsibilities include controlling access to and implementing security policies for a system

3.1.4**asset**

entity owned by or under the custodial duties of an organization, which has either a perceived or actual value to the organization

3.1.5**attack**

assault on a system that derives from an intelligent threat – i.e., an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security services and violate the security policy of a system

Note 1 to entry: There are different commonly recognized classes of attack:

- a) An "active attack" attempts to alter system resources or affect their operation.
- b) A "passive attack" attempts to learn or make use of information from the system but does not affect system resources.
- c) An "inside attack" is an attack initiated by an entity inside the security perimeter (an "insider") – i.e., an entity that is authorized to access system resources but uses them in a way not approved by those who granted the authorization.
- d) An "outside attack" is initiated from outside the perimeter, by an unauthorized or illegitimate user of the system (including an insider attacking from outside the security perimeter). Potential outside attackers range from amateur pranksters to organized criminals, international terrorists, and hostile governments.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.9]

3.1.6**attribute**

property or characteristic of an entity

[SOURCE: IEC TR 62390:2005, 3.1.3]

3.1.7**audit log**

traceable record that requires a higher level of integrity protection than provided by typical event logs

Note 1 to entry: Audit logs are used to protect against claims that repudiate responsibility for an action.

3.1.8**authenticate**

verify the identity of a user, user device, or other entity, or the integrity of data stored, transmitted, or otherwise exposed to unauthorized modification in an information system, or to establish the validity of a transmission

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.12]

3.1.9 authentication

security measure designed to establish the validity of a transmission, message, or originator, or a means of verifying an individual's authorization to receive specific categories of information

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.13]

3.1.10 authorization

right or permission that is granted to a system entity to access a system resource

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.14]

3.1.11 availability

ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under given conditions at a given instant or over a given time interval, assuming that the required external resources are provided

Note 1 to entry: This ability depends on the combined aspects of the reliability performance, the maintainability performance and the maintenance support performance.

Note 2 to entry: Required external resources, other than maintenance resources do not affect the availability performance of the item.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.16, modified – (performance) removed after the term.]

3.1.12 batch production

production process where products or components are produced in batches and where each separate batch consists of a number of the same products or components

[SOURCE: EN 14943:2005]

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3.1.13 conduit

logical grouping of communication assets that protects the security of the channels it contains

Note 1 to entry: This is analogous to the way that a physical conduit protects cables from physical damage.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.27]

3.1.14 confidentiality

assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, processes, or devices

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.28]

3.1.15 continuous production

production that is running at a steady rate

[SOURCE: ISO 2859-3:2005, 3.1.1, modified – The word "running" has been added and the Note has been deleted.]

3.1.16 cybersecurity

actions required to preclude unauthorized use of, denial of service to, modifications to, disclosure of, loss of revenue from, or destruction of critical systems or informational assets

Note 1 to entry: The objective is to reduce the risk of causing personal injury or endangering public health, losing public or consumer confidence, disclosing sensitive assets, failing to protect business assets or failing to comply with regulations. These concepts are applied to any system in the production process and include both stand-alone and networked components. Communications between systems may be either through internal messaging or by any human or machine interfaces that authenticate, operate, control, or exchange data with any of these control systems. Cybersecurity includes the concepts of identification, authentication, accountability, authorization, availability, and privacy.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.36]

3.1.17

data confidentiality

property that information is not made available or disclosed to any unauthorized system entity, including unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.37]

3.1.18

data integrity

property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner

Note 1 to entry: This term deals with constancy of and confidence in data values, not with the information that the values represent or the trustworthiness of the source of the values.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.38]

3.1.19

denial of service

prevention or interruption of authorized access to a system resource or the delaying of system operations and functions

Note 1 to entry: In the context of industrial automation and control systems, denial of service can refer to loss of process function, not just loss of data communications.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.42]

3.1.20

device

independent physical entity capable of performing one or more specified functions in a particular context and delimited by its interfaces

[SOURCE: IEC 61804-2:2018, 3.1.18]

3.1.21

digital signature

result of a cryptographic transformation of data which, when properly implemented, provides the services of origin authentication, data integrity, and signer non-repudiation

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.43]

3.1.22

discrete manufacturing

method of manufacturing where products are manufactured in a non-continuous manner, e.g. automobiles, appliances, computers

[SOURCE: EN 14943:2005]

3.1.23**entity**

thing (physical or non-physical) having a distinct existence

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 20924:2021, 3.1.18]

3.1.24**functional requirement**

specification of a behaviour that a solution or part of a solution shall perform

3.1.25**host**

computer that is attached to a communication sub-network or inter-network and can use services provided by the network to exchange data with other attached systems

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.56]

3.1.26**Identifier****ID**

information that unambiguously distinguishes one entity from other entities in a given identity context

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-741: 2020, 741-01-21]

3.1.27**impact**

evaluated consequence of a particular event

Note 1 to entry: Impact may be expressed in terms of numbers of injuries and/or fatalities, extent of environmental damage and/or magnitude of losses such as property damage, material loss, loss of intellectual property, lost production, market share loss, and recovery costs.

3.1.28**incident**

event that is not part of the expected operation of a system or service that causes, or may cause, an interruption to, or a reduction in, the quality of the service provided by the control system

3.1.29**industrial automation and control systems****IACS**

collection of personnel, hardware, and software that can affect or influence the safe, secure, and reliable operation of an industrial process

Note 1 to entry: These systems include, but are not limited to:

- industrial control systems, including distributed control systems (DCSs), programmable logic controllers (PLCs), remote terminal units (RTUs), intelligent electronic devices, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), networked electronic sensing and control, and monitoring and diagnostic systems. (In this context, process control systems include basic process control system and safety-instrumented system (SIS) functions, whether they are physically separate or integrated.)
- associated information systems such as advanced or multivariable control, online optimizers, dedicated equipment monitors, graphical interfaces, process historians, manufacturing execution systems, and plant information management systems.
- associated internal, human, network, or machine interfaces used to provide control, safety, and manufacturing operations functionality to continuous, batch, discrete, and other processes.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.57]

**3.1.30
manufacturing**

all life cycle activities and procedures involved in the design, production, and support of manufacturing systems and of manufactured products

**3.1.31
nonrepudiation**

security service that provides protection against false denial of involvement in a communication

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.72]

**3.1.32
privilege**

authorization or set of authorizations to perform specific functions, especially in the context of a computer operating system

EXAMPLE Functions that are controlled through the use of privilege include acknowledging alarms, changing setpoints, modifying control algorithms.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.78]

**3.1.33
process**

set of activities performed with a set of resources to realize an objective within a specified timeline

[SOURCE: ISO 22400-1:2014, 2.1.8]

**3.1.34
product**

result of labour or of a natural or industrial process

[SOURCE: IEC 61360-1:2017, 3.1.23]
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**3.1.35
public key certificate**

set of data that uniquely identifies an entity, contains the entity's public key, and is digitally signed by a trusted party, thereby binding the public key to the entity

**3.1.36
resilience**

ability of an IACS organization, process entity or system, to resist being affected by disruptions

**3.1.37
risk**

combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm

**3.1.38
risk assessment**

process that systematically identifies potential vulnerabilities to valuable system resources and threats to those resources, quantifies loss exposures and consequences based on probability of occurrence, and (optionally) recommends how to allocate resources to countermeasures to minimize total exposure

Note 1 to entry: Types of resources include physical, logical and human.

Note 2 to entry: Risk assessments are often combined with vulnerability assessments to identify vulnerabilities and quantify the associated risk. They are carried out initially and periodically to reflect changes in the organization's risk tolerance, vulnerabilities, procedures, personnel and technological changes.