

## **ISO/IEC TS 30168**

Edition 1.0 2024-05

# TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION



Internet of Things (IoT) – Generic trust anchor application programming interface for industrial IoT devices

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ISO/IEC TS 30168:2024





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## INTERNET OF THINGS (IoT) – GENERIC TRUST ANCHOR APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACE FOR INDUSTRIAL IOT DEVICES

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ISO/IEC TS 30168 has been prepared by subcommittee 41: Internet of Things and Digital Twin, of IEC technical committee JTC 1: Information technology. It is a Technical Specification.

This document contains attached files in the form of GTA API C header files and a secure element provider template that are cited in Annex A and Clause G.6. These files are intended to be used as a complement and do not form an integral part of the publication.

The text of this Technical Specification is based on the following documents:

Draft	Report on voting
JTC1-SC41/388/DTS	JTC1-SC41/413/RVDTS

Full information on the voting for its approval can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

The language used for the development of this Technical Specification is English.

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#### INTRODUCTION

Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices face increasing security requirements. This insight is especially important as more and more devices become connected directly or indirectly to the Internet. It is essential that IIoT devices are prepared to perform secure communications for service interaction, monitoring, and control.

However, security is often still observed as rather complex by implementers and integrators. This perception often results in realization obstacles when the integration and use of security mechanisms and secure elements (SE) is wanted.

This document provides a versatile application programming interface (API) for security to allow a generic integration of SEs into IIoT devices. The API is vendor independent and also independent regarding the SE technology being deployed. This approach simplifies redesign for different SEs and supports software-hardware co-design for security. SEs offering different security properties facilitate the selection of an SE according to the intended use, protection goals, and other boundary conditions. The API aims at achieving high-level abstraction profiles for security services and mechanisms to avoid typical low-level interoperability complexity and implementation failures. Requirements and architectural constraints from IIoT applications shape the final design of the API and its usability.

The resulting API facilitates the security-by-design defined integration of security components within IIoT components on a large scale. The time-to-market for secured devices is accelerated. Stakeholders will benefit from higher security levels being available for lower prices. Application of updates and continuous improvements of security along the lifecycle of products and systems are facilitated.

The following stakeholders and their corresponding interests play a role for the generic trust anchor application programming interface (GTA API) definition:

- Manufacturers and users of industrial equipment
   Scalable use of adequate (hardware-based) security technologies depending on required security, multivendor support, migration strategy, or long-term suitability.
  - Software developers
    - Increased robustness due to use of a unified API. Ease of use for developers without dedicated security expertise.
  - Manufacturers of security ICs or ICs offering security functions
     Promote use of hardware-based trust anchor technologies for IIoT devices.
  - Conformity Assessment Bodies

## INTERNET OF THINGS (IoT) – GENERIC TRUST ANCHOR APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACE FOR INDUSTRIAL IOT DEVICES

#### 1 Scope

This document specifies a generic application programming interface (API) for the integration of SEs within Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices. It considers needs from industrial usage scenarios and applications. This document also provides guidance for implementation, testing, and conformity validation.

#### 2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEEE Std 802-2014, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Overview and Architecture

IETF RFC 1035, P. Mockapetris, "Domain names – implementation and specification", November 1987, available at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035 [viewed 2023-08-29]

IETF RFC 1779, S. Kille, "A String Representation of Distinguished Names", March 1995, available at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1779 [viewed 2023-08-29]

IETF RFC 4122, P. Leach, M. Mealling, and R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", July 2005, available at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122 [viewed 2023-08-29]

IETF RFC 8446, E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", August 2018, available at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446 [viewed 2023-08-29]

#### 3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- IEC Electropedia: available at https://www.electropedia.org/
- ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://www.iso.org/obp

#### 3.1

#### attack

attempt to gain access to an information processing system in order to produce damage

Note 1 to entry: The damage can be, for example, destruction, disclosure, alteration, unauthorized use.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-171:2019, 171-08-12]

#### 3.2

### generic trust anchor application programming interface GTA API

set of well-defined methods, functions, routines, or commands for application software to facilitate the programming languages use of cryptographic or protected resources from an SE that is used as trust anchor

#### 3.3

#### IoT device

entity of an IoT system that interacts and communicates with the physical world through sensing or actuating

Note 1 to entry: Industrial IoT device is an IoT device which is intended for use by qualified and experience personnel in a controlled manufacturing or processing environment.

Note 2 to entry: For example, industrial uses are smart manufacturing, robot, energy, automobile, transportation, building, and so on. Such an entity can interact with digital twins or asset administration shells of other entities.

Note 3 to entry: An entity can be the combination of the device and a simple sensor. The device comes with a GTA API instance. The sensor does not have an intelligent control unit and does not come with its own GTA API instance.

Note 4 to entry: Industrial IoT devices are not limited to sensor or actuator. Industrial IoT devices include embedded devices such as smart sensor/actuator, programmable logic controller (PLC), edge device (for example, Industrial PC) but not limited to sensor and actuator.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-741:2020, 741-02-04, modified – The original Note to entry has been replaced with Notes explaining the use of the term in an industrial context.]

#### 3.4

#### know-how protection 111182//S12110 2110 S.Ifeh. 21

measures supporting the protection against extraction of knowledge or expertise represented by software or other intellectual property from a device

#### 3.5

#### personality

set of trusted information and cryptographic key material that is used by an application in a specific security context

Note 1 to entry: A personality typically includes the device's own cryptographic material like private keys, secret keys, own public key certificates. A personality can also include information required to establish trust towards partners.

Note 2 to entry: A personality is used within the scope of a specific application. A device can use different personalities in different application contexts.

#### 3.6

#### public key certificate

set of data that uniquely identifies an entity, contains the public key of the entity, and is digitally signed by a trusted party to bind the public key to the entity

#### 3.7

#### secure element

#### SE

component capable of securely hosting functionalities or confidential and cryptographic data or both in accordance with well-defined rules and security requirements

Note 1 to entry: A typical solution for an SE is a one chip microcontroller.

Note 2 to entry: Cryptographic keys are an example of confidential and cryptographic data.

Note 3 to entry: An SE can be realized as pure software component to support future migration to a hardware SE.

Note 4 to entry: An SE can provide special physical protection features such as tamper protection.

#### 3.8

#### side-channel analysis

exploitation of the fact that the instantaneous side-channels emitted by a cryptographic device depends on the data it processes and on the operation it performs to retrieve secret parameters

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 17825:2024, 3.9]

#### 3.9

#### trust anchor

essential security capability that, by definition, must be trusted

Note 1 to entry: A trust anchor can provide provisions to protect the integrity and confidentiality of functions and related information that are required by an application.

Note 2 to entry: The security capability to achieve protection can be provided with an SE. The SE can provide functionality for, for example, secure generation and use of cryptographic key material, and tamper-protected storage of public key certificates.

Note 3 to entry: Data sets, for example, public key certificates starting a certification path, require additional protection against manipulation to be considered as trust anchor. This additional protection can be achieved by, for example, storage in a shielded location.

#### 4 Abbreviated terms

AES Advanced Encryption Standard

ASN.1 Abstract Syntax Notation One

CA Certification Authority

CERT Computer Emergency Response Team

CHAP Challenge handshake authentication protocol

CO Component DUCUINEIL

DCP Discovery and basic Configuration Protocol
DER Distinguished Encoding Rules

DH Diffie-Hellman

DNS Domain Name System

DSS Digital Signature Scheme

DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security

EC Elliptic Curve

EK Endorsement Key

ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

FGPA Field Programmable Gate Array

GDS Generic Discovery Service
HSM Hardware Security Module

IACS Industrial automation and control system
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

IDevID Initial Device Identifier

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IP Internet Protocol

IPC Industrial Personal Computer
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6