

# TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION



**Cybersecurity aspects of devices used for power metering and monitoring,  
power quality monitoring, data collection and analysis**

IEC TS 63383:2022

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## INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**CYBERSECURITY ASPECTS OF DEVICES USED  
FOR POWER METERING AND MONITORING, POWER QUALITY  
MONITORING, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS**

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The text of this Technical Specification is based on the following documents:

Draft	Report on voting
85/832/DTS	85/839/RVDTS

Full information on the voting for its approval can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

The language used for the development of this Technical Specification is English.

This document was drafted in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, and developed in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1 and ISO/IEC Directives, IEC Supplement, available at [www.iec.ch/members\\_experts/refdocs](http://www.iec.ch/members_experts/refdocs). The main document types developed by IEC are described in greater detail at [www.iec.ch/publications](http://www.iec.ch/publications).

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## INTRODUCTION

This publication can be regarded as a generic document to be referenced for cybersecurity aspects within other TC 85 publications. It contains general information for measuring equipment and related systems used in low-voltage applications for which cybersecurity can be a concern.

The growing use of measuring devices (e.g. power metering and monitoring devices as defined in IEC 61557-12:2018), power quality instruments (defined in IEC 62586-1:2017) and data collection, gathering and analysis devices (e.g. gateways, energy servers, as defined in IEC 62974-1:2017) is being accompanied by a growing increase in cybersecurity risks. This is enhanced by the growing use of interconnected devices in electrical installations.

Thus, maintenance of an acceptable information level for devices and environmental policy should be considered by facility managers to limit the risks. To keep the largest freedom of innovation, good practices when designing devices to withstand cybersecurity threats during its whole lifecycle are preferably based on a risk assessment approach.

This document uses British spelling.

This document follows IEC Guide 120:2018.

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# CYBERSECURITY ASPECTS OF DEVICES USED FOR POWER METERING AND MONITORING, POWER QUALITY MONITORING, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

## 1 Scope

This document deals with cybersecurity related to measuring devices (PMD according to IEC 61557-12 and PQI according to IEC 62586-1) and devices for data collection (devices according to IEC 62974-1) that are intended to be installed in restricted access areas.

This document deals with cybersecurity aspects (e.g. device hardening or device resilience) of device(s) used for power metering and monitoring, power quality monitoring, data collection and analysis, but does not cover requirements for organisational cybersecurity (e.g. end-user security policy).

NOTE Organisational cybersecurity is essential for trustworthy operation of the device(s).

This document is a first attempt to develop awareness by manufacturers and other relevant stakeholders about cybersecurity aspects and provide basic guidance for achieving the appropriate security mitigation against vulnerabilities to security threats:

- in coherence with device/system approaches described in relevant standards such as IEC 62443 (all parts) and ISO/IEC 27001,
- based on generic system use-cases.

This document does not cover billing meters covered by the IEC 62053-2x set of standards.

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## 2 Normative references

There are no normative references in this document.

## 3 Terms, definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- IEC Electropedia: available at <http://www.electropedia.org/>
- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <http://www.iso.org/obp>

### 3.1 Definitions related to cybersecurity

#### 3.1.1 assets

entities that the owner of a component presumably places value upon

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.2, modified – In the definition, "TOE" has been replaced with "component".]

### 3.1.2

#### **attack**

attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use of an asset

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.2]

### 3.1.3

#### **attack vector**

path or means by which an attacker can gain access to a device in order to generate an attack

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27032:2012, 4.10, modified – In the definition, "computer or network server" replaced with "device" and "deliver a malicious outcome" with "generate an attack".]

### 3.1.4

#### **authenticity**

property that an entity is what it claims to be

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.6]

### 3.1.5

#### **availability**

property of being accessible and usable on demand by an authorized entity

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.7]

### 3.1.6

#### **component**

smallest selectable set of elements on which requirements may be based

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.12] <https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/d4ea4e89-ba2d-4c8a-9988-e5ff8cc1f4de/iec-ts-63383-2022>

### 3.1.7

#### **confidentiality**

property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.10]

### 3.1.8

#### **control**

measure that is modifying the risk

Note 1 to entry: Controls include any process, policy, device, practice, or other actions which modify risk.

Note 2 to entry: It is possible that controls do not always exert the intended or assumed modifying effect.

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.14]

### **3.1.9 countermeasure**

action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can be taken

Note 1 to entry: Other terms such as "measures", "means", "controls" or "mitigations", are also used in other standards instead of "countermeasures".

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.33, modified – The Note has been deleted and a new Note to entry has been added.]

### **3.1.10 cybersecurity**

actions required to preclude unauthorized use of, denial of service to, modifications to, disclosure of, loss of revenue from, or destruction of critical systems or informational assets

Note 1 to entry: The objective is to reduce the risk of causing personal injury or endangering public health, losing public or consumer confidence, disclosing sensitive assets, failing to protect business assets or failing to comply with regulations. These concepts are applied to any system in the production process and include both stand-alone and networked components. Communications between systems may be either through internal messaging or by any human or machine interfaces that authenticate, operate, control, or exchange data with any of these control systems. Cybersecurity includes the concepts of identification, authentication, accountability, authorization, availability, and privacy.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.36]

### **3.1.11 debug interface**

physical interface used by the manufacturer to communicate with the device during development or to perform triage of issues with the device and that is not used as part of the consumer-facing functionality

EXAMPLE: Test points, UART, SWD, JTAG

[SOURCE: ETSI EN 303 645:2020 V2.1.0]

### **3.1.12 device hardening**

improvement of device ability to withstand a cyberattack by reducing the likelihood of success of an attack

### **3.1.13 element**

indivisible statement of a security need

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.24]

### **3.1.14 event**

occurrence or change of a particular set of circumstances

Note 1 to entry: An event can be one or more occurrences and can have several causes.

Note 2 to entry: An event can consist of something not happening.

Note 3 to entry: An event can sometimes be referred to as an "incident" or "accident".

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.21]

**3.1.15**

**information security**

preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information

Note 1 to entry: In addition, other properties, such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability can also be involved.

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.28]

**3.1.16**

**integrity**

property of accuracy and completeness

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.36]

**3.1.17**

**level of risk**

magnitude of a risk expressed in terms of the combination of consequences and their likelihood

[SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009, modified – "or combination of risks," has been deleted.]

**3.1.18**

**likelihood**

chance of something happening

[SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009]

**3.1.19**

**non-repudiation**

ability to prove the occurrence of a claimed event or action and its originating entities

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.48]

**3.1.20**

**operational environment**

environment in which a component is operated

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.48, modified – In the definition, "the TOE" has been replaced with "a component".]

**3.1.21**

**organisational security policy**

set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines for an organisation

Note 1 to entry: A policy may pertain to a specific operational environment.

**3.1.22**

**reliability**

property of consistent intended behaviour and results

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.55]

**3.1.23**

**threat**

potential cause of an unwanted incident, which can result in harm to a system or organisation

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.74]