



**SLOVENSKI STANDARD**  
**SIST EN 300 392-7 V2.1.1:2003**  
**01-december-2003**

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**Prizemni snopovni radio (TETRA) – Govor in podatki (V+D) – 7. del: Varnost**

Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 7: Security

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# ETSI EN 300 392-7 V2.1.1 (2001-02)

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*European Standard (Telecommunications series)*

## **Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 7: Security**

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Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.

## Foreword

This European Standard (Telecommunications series) has been produced by ETSI Project Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA).

The present document had been submitted to Public Enquiry as ETS 300 392-7. During the processing for Vote it was converted into an EN.

The present document is part 7 of a multi-part deliverable covering the Voice plus Data (V+D), as identified below:

- Part 1: "General network design";
- Part 2: "Air Interface (AI)";
- Part 3: "Interworking at the Inter-System Interface (ISI)";
- Part 4: "Gateways basic operation";
- Part 5: "Peripheral Equipment Interface (PEI)";
- Part 6: "Line connected Station (LS)";
- Part 7: "Security";**
- Part 9: "General requirements for supplementary services";
- Part 10: "Supplementary services stage 1";
- Part 11: "Supplementary services stage 2";
- Part 12: "Supplementary services stage 3";
- Part 13: "SDL model of the Air Interface (AI)";
- Part 14: "Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) proforma specification";
- Part 15: "TETRA frequency bands, duplex spacings and channel numbering".

### National transposition dates

Date of adoption of this EN:	9 February 2001
Date of latest announcement of this EN (doa):	31 May 2001
Date of latest publication of new National Standard or endorsement of this EN (dop/e):	30 November 2001
Date of withdrawal of any conflicting National Standard (dow):	30 November 2001

# 1 Scope

The present document defines the Terrestrial Trunked Radio system (TETRA) supporting Voice plus Data (V+D). It specifies the air interface, the inter-working between TETRA systems and to other systems via gateways, the terminal equipment interface on the mobile station, the connection of line stations to the infrastructure, the security aspects in TETRA networks, the management services offered to the operator, the performance objectives, and the supplementary services that come in addition to the basic and teleservices.

The present document describes the security mechanisms in TETRA V+D. It provides mechanisms for confidentiality of control signalling and user speech and data at the air interface, authentication and key management mechanisms for the air interface, and end-to-end confidentiality mechanisms between users.

## 1.1 Security classes

TETRA security is defined in terms of class. Each class has associated features that are mandatory or optional and are summarized in table 1.

**Table 1: Summary of Security features in TETRA by class**

Class	Authentication Clause 4	OTAR Clause 4	Encryption Clause 6	Enable-Disable Clause 5	End-to-end Clause 7
1	O	-	-	M	O
2	O	O	M	M	O
3	M	M	M	M	O
NOTE:	M = Mandatory; O = Optional; - = Does not apply				

The present document describes a system in which all signalling and traffic within that system comply with the same security class. However signalling permits more than one security class to be supported concurrently within an SwMI, and movements between these classes are described in the present document. The SwMI shall control the state of AI encryption.

An MS may support one, several, or all security classes. Each cell may support at any one time one of the following options:

- class 1 only;
- class 2 only;
- class 2 and class 1;
- class 3 only; or
- class 3 and class 1.

Class 2 and class 3 are not permitted to be supported at the same time in any cell.

## 1.2 Document layout

Clause 4 describes the authentication and key management mechanisms for the TETRA air interface. The following two authentication services have been specified for the air-interface in ETR 086-3 [4], based on a threat analysis:

- authentication of a user by the TETRA infrastructure;
- authentication of the TETRA infrastructure by a user.

Clause 5 describes the mechanisms and protocol for enable and disable of both the mobile station equipment and the mobile station user's subscription.

Air interface encryption may be provided as an option in TETRA. Where employed, clause 6 describes the confidentiality mechanisms using encryption on the air interface, for circuit mode speech, circuit mode data, packet data and control information. Clause 6 describes both encryption mechanisms and mobility procedures. It also details the protocol concerning control of encryption at the air interface.

Clause 7 describes the end-to-end confidentiality for V+D. End-to-end confidentiality can be established between two users or a group of users. In clause 7 the logical part of the interface to the encryption mechanism is described. Electrical and physical aspects of this interface are not described, nor are the encryption algorithms and keys for end-to-end confidentiality described.

The present document does not address the detail handling of protocol errors or any protocol mechanisms when TETRA is operating in a degraded mode. These issues are implementation specific and therefore fall outside the scope of the TETRA standardization effort.

The detail description of the Authentication Centre is outside the scope of the present document.

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## 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies.

- [1] ETSI ETS 300 392-1: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 1: General network design".
- [2] ETSI EN 300 392-2 (V2.3.1): "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 2: Air Interface (AI)".
- [3] ETSI ETS 300 392-7 (1996): "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 7: Security".
- [4] ETSI ETR 086-3: "Trans European Trunked Radio (TETRA) systems; Technical requirements specification; Part 3: Security aspects".
- [5] ISO 7498-2: "Information processing systems - Open Systems Interconnection - Basic Reference Model - Part 2: Security Architecture".
- [6] ETSI ETS 300 395-1: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Speech codec for full-rate traffic channel; Part 1: General description of speech functions".
- [7] ETSI ETS 300 812: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Security aspects; Subscriber Identity Module to Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) interface".
- [8] ETSI ETS 300 396-6: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Direct Mode Operation (DMO); Part 6: Security".
- [9] ETSI ETS 300 392-2: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 2: Air Interface (AI)".

## 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations

### 3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document the following terms and definitions apply:

**Authentication Code (AC):** (short) sequence to be entered by the user into the MS that may be used in addition to the UAK to generate K with algorithm TB3

**Authentication Key (K):** primary secret, the knowledge of which has to be demonstrated for authentication

**CCK Identity (CCK-Id):** distributed with the CCK. It serves the identification of the key within an LA and the protection against replay of old keys

**cipher key:** value that is used to determine the transformation of plain text to cipher text in a cryptographic algorithm

**cipher text:** data produced through the use of encipherment. The semantic content of the resulting data is not available (see ISO 7498-2 [5])

**class:** see security class

**Common Cipher Key (CCK):** cipher key that is generated by the infrastructure to protect group addressed signalling and traffic. CCK is also used to protection of SSI identities (ESI) in layer 2

**decipherment:** reversal of a corresponding reversible encipherment (see ISO 7498-2 [5])

**Derived Cipher Key (DCK):** DCK is generated during authentication for use in protection of individually addressed signalling and traffic

**derived key:** sequence of symbols that controls the KSG inside the end-to-end encryption unit and that is derived from the cipher key

**encipherment:** cryptographic transformation of data to produce cipher text (see ISO 7498-2 [5])

**Encryption Cipher Key (ECK):** cipher key that is used as input to the encryption algorithm. This key is derived from one of SCK, DCK, MGCK or CCK and modified using an algorithm by the broadcast data of the serving cell

**encryption mode:** choice between static (SCK) and dynamic (DCK/CCK) encipherment

**encryption state:** encryption on or off

**end-to-end encryption:** encryption within or at the source end system, with the corresponding decryption occurring only within or at the destination end system

**Extended Group Session Key for OTAR (EGSKO):** cipher key used for distribution of keys to groups of users

**Fallback SCK:** key used by class 3 system when operating in class 2, for example in a fault or fallback situation

**flywheel:** mechanism to keep the KSG in the receiving terminal synchronized with the KSG in the transmitting terminal in case synchronization data is not received correctly

**Group Cipher Key (GCK):** cipher key known by the infrastructure and MS to protect group addressed signalling and traffic. Not used directly at the air interface but modified by CCK or SCK to give a Modified Group Cipher Key (MGCK)

**Group Session Key for OTAR (GSKO):** cipher key used to derive EGSKO for the distribution of keys to groups of users

**Initialization Value (IV):** sequence of symbols that initializes the KSG inside the encryption unit

**key stream:** pseudo random stream of symbols that is generated by a KSG for encipherment and decipherment

**Key Stream Generator (KSG):** cryptographic algorithm which produces a stream of binary digits which can be used for encipherment and decipherment. The initial state of the KSG is determined by the initialization value

**Key Stream Segment (KSS):** key stream of arbitrary length

**Location Area id (LA-id):** unique identifier within an SwMI of a location area

**Manipulation Flag (MF):** used to indicate that a sealed cipher key (CCK, SCK or GCK) has been incorrectly recovered

**Modified Group Cipher Key (MGCK):** cipher key known by the infrastructure and MS to protect group addressed signalling and traffic that is composed algorithmically from either CCK and GCK, or SCK and GCK

**Over The Air Re-keying (OTAR):** method by which the SwMI can transfer secret keys securely to terminals

**Personal Identification Number (PIN):** entered by the user into the MS and used to authenticate the user to the MS

**plain text:** un-encrypted source data. The semantic content is available

**proprietary algorithm:** algorithm which is the intellectual property of a legal entity

**Random Challenge (RAND1, RAND2):** random value generated by the infrastructure to authenticate a user or in an MS to authenticate the infrastructure, respectively

**Random Seed (RS):** random value used to derive a session authentication key from the authentication key

**Random seed for OTAR (RSO):** random value used to derive a session key for OTAR from a user's authentication key

**Registered Area (RA):** collection of location areas (LA) to which the MS may perform cell re-selection without need for explicit invocation of the registration protocol

**Response (RES1, RES2):** value calculated in the MS from RAND1 and the KS' to prove the authenticity of a user to the infrastructure or by the infrastructure from RAND2 and the KS to prove its authenticity to a user, respectively

**SCK-set:** collective term for the group of 32 SCK associated with each ITSI

**Security class 1, 2 or 3:** classification of terminal and SwMI encryption and authentication support. Class 1: no encryption, may use authentication; Class 2: SCK encryption, ESI with SCK, may use authentication; Class 3: DCK encryption, ESI with CCK, authentication

**Sealed Common Cipher Key (SCCK):** common cipher key cryptographically sealed with a particular user's derived cipher key

**Sealed Group Cipher Key (SGCK):** group cipher key cryptographically sealed with a particular user's derived cipher key

**Sealed Static Cipher Key (SSCK):** static cipher key cryptographically sealed with a particular user's secret key

**Session Authentication Key (KS, KS')::** generated from the authentication key and a random seed for authentication. It has a more limited lifetime than the authentication key and can be stored in less secure places and forwarded to visited networks

**Session Key for OTAR (KSO):** derived from a user's authentication key and a random seed for OTAR. KSO is used to protect the transfer of the Static Cipher Key

**Static Cipher Key (SCK):** predetermined cipher key that may be used to provide confidentiality in class 2 systems with a corresponding algorithm

**Synchronization value:** sequence of symbols that is transmitted to the receiving terminal to synchronize the EKSG in the receiving terminal with the EKSG in the transmitting terminal. The sequence may also contain identification of end-to-end encryption algorithm and the used encryption key

**synchronous stream cipher:** encryption method in which a cipher text symbol completely represents the corresponding plain text symbol. The encryption is based on a key stream that is independent of the cipher text. In order to synchronize the KSGs in the transmitting and the receiving terminal synchronization data is transmitted separately

**TETRA algorithm:** mathematical description of a cryptographic process used for either of the security processes authentication or encryption