
International Standard



6551

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Petroleum liquids and gases — Fidelity and security of dynamic measurement — Cabled transmission of electric and/or electronic pulsed data

Liquides et gaz de pétrole — Fidélité et sécurité des mesures dynamiques — Systèmes de transmission par câbles de données, sous forme d'impulsions électriques et/ou électroniques

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards institutes (ISO member bodies). The work of developing International Standards is carried out through ISO technical committees. Every member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been set up has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.

Draft International Standards adopted by the technical committees are circulated to the member bodies for approval before their acceptance as International Standards by the ISO Council.

International Standard ISO 6551 was developed by Technical Committee ISO/TC 28, *Petroleum products*, and was circulated to the member bodies in May 1981.

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It has been approved by the member bodies of the following countries :

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Austria	Italy	Spain
Brazil	Japan	Sweden
Canada	Korea, Rep. of	Switzerland
Egypt, Arab Rep. of	Mexico	Turkey
France	Netherlands	United Kingdom
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India	Poland	
Iran	Romania	

No member body expressed disapproval of the document.

Petroleum liquids and gases — Fidelity and security of dynamic measurement — Cabled transmission of electric and/or electronic pulsed data

0 Introduction

0.1 Quantitative measurements are required at many stages in production, transportation, refining and marketing of petroleum and its products. They form the basis of royalty, fiscal and custody transfer accounting and provide the means of stock and loss control.

The use of agreed standardized measurement equipment and procedures obviates disputes over quantities, enabling these to be determined with an accuracy mutually acceptable to all parties to a transaction and at the most economical cost for the method of measurement selected.

0.2 During the last decade there has been a rapid increase in the use of electrical or electronic data-transmission systems designed to facilitate the determination of physical quantities such as length, mass, volume, etc.

Such systems can be vulnerable to disturbances arising from the environment in which they are used, and also from functional failures, all or any of which may affect the integrity of the resulting measurement.

The purpose of this International Standard is to assist manufacturers and users of electrical or electronic pulsed data-transmission systems used in the metering of fluids to meet certain criteria for the design, installation, use and maintenance of such equipment. The object is to establish and maintain the credibility of indicated data against influences acting to impair the fidelity of the system.

0.3 This International Standard recommends solutions for fidelity and security problems which constitute good practice in this field at this time, but it is not claimed that the recommendations are wholly comprehensive.

The recommendations are, however, considered to be practicable, and to satisfy the immediate needs of industries associated with meter proving and the metering of hydrocar-

bons and hydrocarbon products in the bulk commercial, royalty metering, revenue accounting and custody transfer fields in general.

0.4 It is not intended that these recommendations should act to inhibit technological progress in the industry, and therefore amendments may be introduced as and when required.

The principles may be applied to the metering of solids.

0.5 Clauses have been included on safety and other precautions that constitute good practice.

Although every care is taken to include such clauses wherever necessary, it is impossible to cover all contingencies. In the designing of measurement and sampling operations, attention should also be given to general codes of safe practice for petroleum operations. The operator or other user of this measurement standard should work according to accepted safe practices and comply with all relevant regulatory requirements.

0.6 This International Standard is recommended for general adoption but it must therefore be read and interpreted in conjunction with legal metrology (weights and measures), safety and other regulations in force in a particular country in which it is intended to apply it.¹⁾

1 Scope and field of application

1.1 General

This International Standard establishes guidelines for ensuring the fidelity and security of pulsed data cabled transmission systems utilized for the metering of fluids (see the note), a main objective being to ensure the integrity of the primary indication (see 2.2.5).

NOTE — Compliance with the requirements of this International Standard does not increase the basic precision of measurement, either in the electrical or electronic section of the system, or in the overall system which includes the meter(s).

1) In the case of marine applications, the safety requirements of the appropriate Ship Classification Society will apply. This includes offshore production facilities for which a Society has been appointed as the Certifying Authority for the compliance of the installation with official safety standards.

1.2 Levels of security

1.2.1 In order to achieve different levels of security (see the note and clause 3) which can be applied to such systems, criteria and recommendations for the design, installation, use and maintenance of the relevant equipment are laid down.

NOTE — The levels of security are designated E to A, from the lowest to the highest order of security respectively.

For the majority of applications, the lower levels are considered to be adequate and at the time of the publication of this International Standard, there is no known system for which Level A security is considered to be a necessity.

1.2.2 This International Standard does not define which levels of security are to be used for a particular system application.

1.3 Safety and regulatory requirements

1.3.1 Regulatory requirements, including those for safety, are not specifically covered in detail but certain general cautionary notes on safety are included for guidance (see the note).

NOTE — Compliance with this International Standard in no way absolves manufacturers and users of systems and equipment from meeting all relevant legal metrology (weights and measures), safety and other regulations applicable in the country in which it is intended to use a system. Special attention is drawn to 0.5 and 0.6 of the Introduction.

2 Definitions

2.1 In preparing this glossary, the following two principles have been followed :

- a) To select for definition the minimum of basic terms used in the text and to apply to them an unequivocal meaning. It is recommended that these standardized terms, as defined, should be used in the context of the application of this International Standard.
- b) To exclude other terms used in the text which are adequately defined elsewhere, or the meanings of which are self-evident.

2.2 For the purpose of this International Standard, the following definitions shall apply.

2.2.1 **fidelity** : The exactitude with which the primary indication reproduces the inherent precision of the measurement.

2.2.2 **flow (rate or quantity) transducer** : A device for converting the indication of flow (rate or quantity) to a usable output.

2.2.3 **totalizer** : A device which sums the indications of an indicating device; it may or may not be resettable to zero (see 4.4).

2.2.4 **noise** : Unwanted signals which may impair fidelity, and which occur for periods exceeding 0,2 s.

2.2.5 **primary indication** : The combination of the transducer(s) output(s), the transmission cabling, the signal conditioning, processing and scaling, and the indicator with or without totalizer and their readings, the whole of which produces the final reference for the transaction.

2.2.6 **secondary indication (auxiliary or ancillary indication)** : Any equipment which separately or in combination provides indication of the quantity measured, but which does not form part of the primary indication.

2.2.7 **security** : The state or means of ensuring fidelity. The degree or level of security given by a minimum basic arrangement, can be increased by additional equipment.

2.2.8 **transients** : Disturbances having a duration of 0,2 s or less.

2.2.9 **pulse transmitter** : A device for converting the output from a transducer into a pulsed signal of low source impedance over the full operating frequency range (with pre-amplification if necessary).

2.2.10 **unrevealed error** : Any lack of fidelity outside the prescribed limits of error, including errors caused by functional failure and by external influences.

3 Levels of security

3.1 Designation of security levels

In this International Standard, five levels of security are identified and designated, of which *Level E* represents the minimum acceptable level. Typical examples of these five levels are shown diagrammatically in figures 1 to 5, and are described below.

3.1.1 Level E

Error reduction is achieved solely by correctly installed apparatus of good quality.

This is a straightforward scaler totalizer system.

3.1.2 Level D

Manual error monitoring at specified intervals by methods of comparison.

This level of security is intended to give protection against functional errors and failures and is a method of verification by manual action. It has the means for checking the read-out visually against an independent totalizing system.

3.1.3 Level C

Automatic error monitoring and error indication at specified intervals by methods of comparison.

This level of security is intended to give protection against functional errors and failures and this may be achieved by design methods acceptable to an approving authority (if appropriate). The time intervals for error monitoring are subject to revision in the light of experience gained.

3.1.4 Level B

Continuous monitoring, error indication and alarm signalling by methods of comparison.

This level of security is intended to give *warning* of transients and other spurious influences, supply borne and radiated, in addition to functional errors and failures.

3.1.5 Level A

Continuous *verification* and *correction* by methods of comparison. Errors must be signalled even though they are corrected.

This level of security is intended to give *protection* against transients and other spurious influences, supply borne and radiated, in addition to functional errors and failures.

For this level of security, alternative transmission lines following two different routes should be provided, together with batteries for back-up power supply.

3.2 General note on security levels

3.2.1 A metering system may comprise sections having the same or different levels of security. Figures 1 to 5 show typical functional arrangements of modules required to achieve the specified levels of security.

3.2.2 In the examples, emphasis has been placed on the transmission system as this is considered to be the most vulnerable area of the whole.

3.2.3 Security for the scaler totalizer is not illustrated and is considered to be acceptable to *Level E* for the majority of applications.

It may, however, be considered necessary in some circumstances to duplicate the scaler and/or the totalizer section.

3.2.4 The factors contributing to the integrity of the functions are considered in clauses 4 to 8.

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


Figure 1 – Typical functional arrangement for pulse security system

Level E. The diagram illustrates a simple system with no built-in provisions for error monitoring. Only good quality components and sub-units, correctly installed, will lead to confidence in the security of the system. The use of a pre-amplifier transmitter to drive the transmission line is considered beneficial for the majority of applications, as is the provision of signal conditioning. The system, though simple, does not differ in hardware quality from more secure systems using the same elements. (Note that the modules and functions shown in full are essential. Those shown dotted are optional.)




Figure 2 – Typical functional arrangement for pulse security system

Level D. The diagram illustrates a simple system with means of making a periodic manual assessment of security. The secondary readout may be permanent or temporary, local or remote. Manual comparison made during a periodic check will monitor the integrity of the transmission and totalizer elements. It may be less convenient than the provisions of Level C as the system may have to be stopped for readings to be taken. Overall security is mainly inferred from the performance during the error monitoring period. (Note that the modules and functions shown in full are essential. Those shown dotted are optional. The modules and functions boxed in double line indicate the difference from Level E).





Figure 3 — Typical functional arrangement for pulse security system

Level C. The diagram illustrates a dual transmission system with a dual pulse comparator of simple design. If the pulses delivered become numerically out of step, warning will be given by the comparator (differential counter). Level C security will be defeated by other disturbances dealt with by higher level security systems, e.g. simultaneous interference superimposed on both channels will not be detected because a numerical difference between channels is not caused. It is intended that this form of error monitoring is carried out periodically, the monitoring equipment may thus be shared with other metering systems. Level C security is inferred from the results obtained during the monitoring period. (Note that the modules and functions shown in full are essential. Those shown dotted are optional. The modules and functions boxed in double line indicated the difference from Level D.)



Function	Flow measurement	Supplies low impedance signals over full operating frequency range channel "A" and "B" pulses to differ in phase and/or frequency Preamplifier	Transmission of signal (see 6.1 and 6.2)	Amplification and frequency range limiting, pulse shaping, common mode interference rejection	Continuous comparison of pulse trains for number, frequency, phase and sequence	Continuous error indication alarm	Conversion of pulse counts to readout units Alarm if frequency falls outside the set limits Rate readout	Quantity readout
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Figure 4 – Typical functional arrangement for pulse security system

Level B. The diagram illustrates a dual transmission system with a dual pulse comparator in which the pulse trains are continuously monitored for number, frequency, phase and sequence and any irregularity is indicated. Simultaneous interfering pulses must be detected and indicated. Alarm is given if pulses are lost or gained on either channel. (Note that the modules and functions shown in full are essential. Those shown dotted are optional. The modules and functions boxed in double line indicate the difference from Level C.)




Figure 5 — Typical functional arrangement for pulse security system

Level A. The diagram illustrates a dual transmission system protected both against dynamic faults arising from monitoring of the duplicated pulses and by static tests of the electrical integrity of the transmission circuits. The system should still operate as a Level E system if one of the transmission channels fails. An incidental advantage of Level A is its ability to detect some mechanical faults in the transducer. Simultaneous pulses caused by symmetrical interference are automatically rejected and do not influence the system. Alarm will be given in all circumstances when impaired pulses are received by the comparator. It may be desirable to provide redundancy in one or all of the elements shown. (Note that the modules and functions shown in full are essential. Those shown dotted are optional. The modules and functions boxed in double line indicate the difference from Level B.)