



**SLOVENSKI STANDARD**  
**SIST-TS CEN/TS 14383-3:2005**

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**Preprečevanje kriminala – Urbanistično planiranje in projektiranje – 3. del:  
Stanovanja**

Prevention of crime - Urban planning and building design - Part 3: Dwellings

Vorbeugende Kriminalitätsbekämpfung - Stadt- und Gebäudeplanung - Teil 3:  
Wohnungen

Prévention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conception des bâtiments - Partie 3 :  
Logements

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION  
SPÉCIFICATION TECHNIQUE  
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**CEN/TS 14383-3**

October 2005

ICS 91.040.30; 13.310

English Version

Prevention of crime - Urban planning and building design - Part  
3: Dwellings

Prévention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conception  
des bâtiments - Partie 3 : Logements

Vorbeugende Kriminalitätsbekämpfung - Stadt- und  
Gebäudeplanung - Teil 3: Wohnungen

This Technical Specification (CEN/TS) was approved by CEN on 24 April 2005 for provisional application.

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## Foreword

This CEN Technical Specification (CEN/TS 14383-3:2005) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 325 “Prevention of crime by urban planing design”, the secretariat of which is held by SNV.

The status of Technical Specification was proposed to give all countries the opportunity to compare experiences and to harmonise procedures. In particular, the guidance given in the Annexes needs to be tested in use to establish realistic security levels.

This Technical Specification is one of a series for “The prevention of crime by urban planning and building design”, that consists of the following parts:

Part 1 – Definitions of specific terms

Part 2 – Urban planning

Part 3 – Dwellings

Part 4 – Shops and offices

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## CEN/TS 14383-3:2005 (E)

## Introduction

In considering security measures aimed at preventing crime and antisocial behaviour and the fear of crime in residential areas, one of the most difficult tasks is determining the type and level of the threat (e.g. vandalism, burglary, aggression) and the scope of measures to be taken in order to reduce it.

The causes of crime have been researched for many years. There are many factors that can influence the possibility of an offence being committed or not. Certain factors, for example socio-economic conditions are beyond the remit of this standard. Other factors such as neighbourhood layout and building design can be considered along with more specific reference to target-hardening measures.

Three basic criminological approaches have been adopted: Rational Choice, Routine Activities and Defensible Space.

- a) Rational Choice states that potential offenders will normally undertake their own risk assessment before deciding to commit a crime. They will consider the chances of being seen, the ease of entry and the chance of escape without detection.
- b) The Routine Activities theory assumes that for an offence to take place there need to be three factors present: a motivated offender, a suitable target or victim and a lack of capable guardian. To prevent a crime it is necessary to alter the influence of one of these factors. For example, an offender can be demotivated by increasing the level of surveillance or by making access more difficult. A target can also be made less attractive by increasing security or removing escape routes. Similarly, the presence or influence of a capable guardian, either real or implied, can assist in creating a sense of neighbourliness.
- c) The Defensible Space theory applies to the different levels of acceptance that exist for people to legitimately be in different types of space. Everyone has a right to be in a public space, such as a street, but they do not have the right to be in the garden of another person's dwelling, which is a private space. It is equally important to differentiate and distinguish public space from semi-public and semi-private space, to make it possible to use either formal or informal social control over those spaces in ways that prevent crime and antisocial behaviour developing or progressing unhindered.

Most offences are committed because perpetrators enjoy opportunities: easy access, hiding places, absence of demarcation between public and private space, poor lighting and/or favourable landscaping. By understanding the motivation of potential offenders and counterbalancing it by specific physical security measures combined with real or symbolic design elements, this Technical Specification aims to assist designers, planners, estate managers and stakeholders in the area of crime prevention to:

- a) Define the protection measures most appropriate to the site.
- b) Influence decisions relating to building design, the layout of the site, landscaping, and other related details in order to make dwellings attractive and safe for inhabitants and unattractive targets for potential offenders.

In residential areas with either individual dwellings and/or residential blocks, the purpose is not only to protect properties against burglary but also to prevent access by unwanted visitors, the illegal appropriation of space, degradation of the environment and to fight fear of crime.

The design of the built environment can also influence individual perceptions of fear of crime (e.g. in dark footpaths), as perceptions of crime often exceed the reality.

Recommendations relating to the planning of new and existing urban areas, ranging from a few streets to a city centre, an industrial estate, or a large open space for public use, are given in ENV 14383-2.

## 1 Scope

This Technical Specification gives guidance and recommendations for reducing the risk of crimes against people and property in dwellings and their immediate surroundings through planning and design. It covers new and existing dwellings, in single or multiple units.

## 2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

prEN 14383-1, *Prevention of crime - Urban planning and building design - Part 1: Definitions of specific terms*

## 3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this Technical Specification, the terms and definitions given in prEN 14383-1 apply.

## 4 Objectives and methodology

### 4.1 General

While it is important to consider individual buildings in detail, it is also essential to be aware of the influence exerted by the design and layout of the neighbourhood. This is sometimes referred to as the 'Meso' level and includes road layout, infrastructure and location of facilities. Town planners, designers, developers and professionals with crime prevention expertise should be involved as a design team, to ensure that designing out crime factors are taken into account in the early stages of the planning process.

The joint approach should consider the various factors that can reduce the opportunity to commit crime. Some of the most important factors are ownership, human presence and conflict minimisation.

The design and layout of public space in the neighbourhood should encourage local residents to regard it as their own and take responsibility for it. If this can be achieved, crime and antisocial behaviour are less likely to occur, or continue without local people reacting to it.

**NOTE** One of the strongest prevention factors for potential offenders is the risk of being seen and identified, which is why human presence and natural surveillance are so important. These factors are easier to achieve with mixed usage as this can prolong liveliness and movement throughout an extended period of the day. Street furniture should be designed to enable good sight lines and provide wide natural surveillance. Equally access to buildings should front onto public space for the same reason.

Fear of crime, whether justified or perceived, should be considered and the design of the environment should take this into account. Any design feature that could possibly give rise to a potential conflict situation should be avoided. Safe and integrated options for pedestrians and/or cyclists should be included and give a feeling of safety that will encourage their use.

Buildings meant for residential purposes can be split into two categories:

- a) Individual dwellings, detached or in groups;
- b) Residential blocks with apartments.

In the area of crime prevention, three objective criteria have been taken into account:

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- a) Risk to body and life;
- b) The nature and value of the property to be protected;
- c) The degree of accessibility of this property.

The history of crime in Europe demonstrates that property theft is often linked with crimes against people (subjected to physical assault at home or close to their residence).

Technical protection measures will assist in preventing crime against persons and property and unauthorised access to buildings.

Recommendations are also given for the protection of vehicles and other property kept in common areas.

The methodology will consist of describing the behaviour patterns of potential offenders, providing a risk analysis tool for the site under consideration, whether individual dwellings or residential blocks, and proposing technical recommendations and solutions.

**4.2 Designing out crime in individual neighbourhoods**

Any crime prevention strategy is essentially one of risk management. Consequently, before an effective strategy can be developed, it is important to identify and understand the risk factors involved.

When assessing the level of risk it is essential to give high priority to local factors. A diagnostic survey of crime in the immediate neighbourhood should be carried out to identify the types of crime reported, where and when incidents occurred and who the groups of victims were.

NOTE This can be achieved by spatial mapping to identify crime clustering or hot spots.

It is also important to identify factors that may influence the opportunity for crime in a particular area but which may not necessarily be obvious. For example, a desire line that passes through a residential area may link two features also attractive to potential offenders. Although the features may be some distance away from the dwellings, they can influence the possibility of crime.

Where a new residential development is planned, it is important to consider the crime generating potential of the development and to take into consideration the findings of the diagnostic survey of crime in neighbouring areas (see Annex E).

**4.3 Image of the neighbourhood**

First impressions gained by potential offenders will have the greatest influence on their decision to offend or not. Although potential offenders may be attracted to a well-maintained residential area due to its obvious prosperity, it is similarly probable that the residents are proud of their property and therefore also more watchful and protective.

Households that take joint prevention measures and action to improve the environment are likely to experience less crime and an improvement in the quality of life. To facilitate this, the design of the development should have a clear identity and the layout should allow maximum permissible natural surveillance within the residential area.

Consideration should also be given to provision of a mix of dwelling types and occupancy.

NOTE Generally speaking burglars will prefer to avoid confrontation. An unoccupied building is more vulnerable than an occupied building. Even a lack of visibility from the street or other buildings increases the risk. A burglar's enemies are time, noise and a risk of human presence nearby (discovery by police or others).

Apart from burglary, other so-called “public space” delinquency acts can generate fear of crime, namely degradation of public and private property (vandalism, arson in refuse bins), vehicular crime (car theft, theft of bicycles, mopeds and motor bikes, trafficking in spare parts), and culminating in attacks on people.

These offences and other crimes can be perpetrated by either local residents or people from other areas, and different approaches to prevention are needed.

#### 4.4 Types of burglar

For the purpose of this Technical Specification, burglars are categorised as being either opportunist or experienced.

Opportunist burglars are those who will commit an offence if the opportunity presents itself. They are interested in buildings with easy access, a low level of surveillance and ready escape routes.

The potential offender will know that most dwellings have articles worth stealing and will feel confident that the reward will be worth the minimal risk involved. Other factors that may influence an opportunist burglar include the absence of vehicles from the hard standing in front of a dwelling, poor or no lighting, lack of an alarm system, or a general feeling that none of the residents in the neighbourhood are taking an interest in the area.

The opportunist burglar is likely to carry only lightweight hand tools, such as a crowbar or screwdriver, but may also make use of implements left within easy reach by the resident, such as a spade. Accessible windows and doors, which only have a short forced entry resistance time, offer the ease of access that this type of burglar is seeking (see Annex A).

An experienced burglar will, prior to carrying out an offence, conduct an important phase of gathering information. It is also probable that they will have a specific target in mind and may be prepared to use more effective tools to gain entry to the premises (see Annex A). They very often have expertise in bypassing or sabotaging mechanical, electronic or CCTV detection security devices.

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## 5 Risk analysis and assessment of related protection levels

The following assessment of the level of risk makes it possible to define the most appropriate protection levels over five classes, in ascending order from 1 to 5 (see Table 1).

**Table 1 — Level of risk and crime prevention measures**

Level of protection	Level of risk	Action to be taken
1	Very low	Simple physical protective measures
2	Low	Additional physical protective measures required
3	Medium	Additional physical + limited electronic protection measures required
4	High	Extensive physical + medium electronic protection measures required
5	Very high	Extensive physical + extensive electronic protection measures required

The risk analysis in Annex B is based on a two-step procedure. The method used is based on questionnaires, which consider potential significance and potential risk. The result matches increasing risk with appropriate measures of protection.

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A second and simpler analysis in Annex C is based on the evaluation of increasing risk factors, which are quantified on a scale from 0 to 5. By adding these factors in the same way as a potential offender would, an evaluation of vulnerability is obtained. The higher the figure, the higher the risk factor and the greater the preventive measures that are needed.

Risk factors may require regular checking and up dating.

## 6 Level of protection

### 6.1 Recommended resistance class of products

Table 2 shows the recommended resistance class of products in ascending order from 1 to 5 to achieve the levels of protection established in Table 1.

**Table 2 — Recommended resistance class of products to achieve specified levels of protection**

Product	European Standard	Level of protection				
		1	2	3	4	5
Entrance doors <sup>a</sup>	ENV 1627	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3-4	Class 4-5	Class 5-6 <sup>b</sup>
Security lock	EN 12209	Grade 2	Grade3	Grade 3	Grade4	Grade 5
Cylinder for lock <sup>b</sup>	EN 1303	Class 4	Class 4	Class 4	Class 5	Class 5
Security lock furniture <sup>c</sup>	EN 1906	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Class 4
Accessible window	ENV 1627	Class 1	Class 2	Class3	Class 4	Class 4
Accessible glazing <sup>d</sup>	EN 356	Class P4A	Class P5A	Class P6B	Class P7B	Class P8B
Shutter used to protect accessible window or door <sup>e</sup>	ENV 1627	Class 1	Class 2	Class2	Class 3	Class 4
	If the shutter is used together with a burglar resistant window or a door, the resistance class can be reduced.					
Window or door which only can be reached with a climbing device <sup>f</sup>	ENV 1627	-	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4
Glazing which only can be reached with a climbing device	EN 356	Double glazing	Double glazing	Class P4A	Class P5A	Class P6B
Alarm or intrusion system	EN 50130, EN 50131-1	-	Grade 1 (Optional)	Grade 1 (Optional)	Grade 2	Grade 3
Safe	EN 1143-1	Required when the valuables exceed a specific amount				

<sup>a</sup> If door leaf and frame are strongly constructed, a single point locking system should suffice up to resistance class 3. If door and frame are weaker, a multipoint locking system should be used on doors of resistance class 3 and higher.

<sup>b</sup> Doors in resistance classes 5 and 6 should be tested with the security lock and lock cylinder fitted, in accordance with the requirements of ENV 1627.

<sup>c</sup> The components are always examined fitted e.g. a door with the frame, hinges and the lock. Doors in the resistance classes 1 to 4 the user can select the lock cylinder and the security lock fitting, for these classes, components are also tested separately (see EN 1303 and EN 1906:2002, Annex A). Doors in the resistance classes 5 and 6 lock cylinder and security lock fitting are a part of the tests in accordance with ENV 1630.

<sup>d</sup> Glazing of building parts in accordance with ENV 1627, resistance class 5 and 6 should be protected against attack with angle grinders. For protection against attack by firearms or explosion glazing should comply with:  
EN 1063: Resistance against bullet attack  
EN 13541: Resistance against explosion pressure  
The documents mentioned above describe only the qualities of the glass themselves. The requirements for complex components are described in the following documents:  
EN 1522: Bullet Resistance, EN 13123-1: Explosion resistance, Shock tube or EN 13123-2, Range test.  
EN 356, EN 1063 and EN 13541 cover security levels of glazing but not fixing, which should comply with relevant manufacturers' recommendations.

<sup>e</sup> Shutters can be used together with a tested burglar resistant door or window. The two components can in this case have lower resistance classes. Note, only shutters in the closed position have burglar resistance characteristics.

<sup>f</sup> Balconies on higher floors can often be reached by experienced burglars.

## 6.2 Additional recommendations for specific risks

### 6.2.1 Semi-private areas and spaces in common use

To further enhance security, consideration should be given to the installation of a CCTV surveillance system and/or an access control system. CCTV surveillance systems should comply with the requirements of EN 50132-7. Access control systems should comply with EN 50133-1.

### 6.2.2 Additional requirements for personal security

The protection of persons against firearms (see EN 1063, EN 1522) or the effects of explosives (see EN 13541, EN 13123-1, EN 13123-2) should be individually specified in accordance with these standards.

## 7 Individual dwellings

### 7.1 Risk analysis

For the creation of a risk analysis for individual dwellings see forms B.1 to B.3.

Annex C shows a simplified risk analysis for the evaluation of existing risk and the recommended protective measures.

### 7.2 Enhancing the security of individual dwelling areas

The various elements that can influence the protection of dwellings against theft, burglary or aggression occur in three concentric zones:

- a) the peripheral environment;
- b) the immediate surroundings of the dwelling, or perimeter;
- c) the building itself and internal areas.

### 7.3 Peripheral environment

This includes:

- a) access routes,
- b) control of pedestrian or vehicle access,
- c) lighting

#### 7.3.1 Access routes:

Whenever possible, the access routes (vehicular, pedestrian, etc.) should be open and visible from the entrance of an area in order to deter location searches by potential burglars. For example, this can be obtained by grouping dwellings in such a way that an important number will face a relatively limited length of street.

Road surfacing will also contribute to this threshold feeling (e.g. by forming symbolic / psychological barriers such as traffic calming humps). The risk of crime may also be reduced by minimising access points.

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As far as possible, and as a deliberate measure to prevent crime, the areas around dwellings in a neighbourhood should maximise territoriality.

The sense of territoriality should be tangible enough to discourage potential offenders who would feel more at risk of being challenged, or observed committing a crime. One commonly accepted method of achieving this is by the application of 'defensible space' concepts, i.e. the classification of space into four different kinds of area: public space, semi-public space, semi-private space and private space. To maximise security of dwellings and their surroundings the layout of spaces and their management should avoid giving the impression of abandoned territory.

Offenders are likely to become astute at judging the territorial quality of an area and the risks associated with its invasion. These risks are higher the more private the space and are emphasised by barriers between private and public space. These may be physical, such as hedges, walls etc, or more symbolic, such as signboards, vegetation or a change in surface material.

**7.3.3 Design and layout of public space**

The design and layout of public space should meet the recommendations given in ENV 14383-2.

Public spaces are open areas with uncontrolled access, such as roads and car parking areas. Where possible public areas should be designed to make the legitimate user feel safe and the potential offender feel vulnerable. By using clear sight lines and good lighting, offenders can be denied places of concealment.

Care should be taken when locating pedestrian footpaths as they can increase permeability within a development and supply unnecessary access points to dwellings.

Approach roads to residential areas should be kept to a minimum and should be well planned, well lit and visible from the windows of nearby dwellings.

Measures aimed at deterring search behaviour in neighbourhoods include surface-texturing the threshold of the access road and providing entrance markers to create the impression of crossing from a public to a semi-public area. A well-populated cul-de-sac can create an area where intruders are likely to feel at risk of being observed, and residents and visitors may feel more secure. Dwellings should be grouped so that maximum mutual surveillance of approaches and vulnerable entry points is possible, in which anyone coming from or going to a dwelling can be seen by neighbours.

Walls in public / semi-public areas are likely to be the most attractive to graffiti artists and provision of anti-graffiti surface protection should be considered at the design stage.

**7.3.4 Design and layout of semi-public space**

Semi-public spaces are areas that are more public than private. Footpath systems, resident parking, garage courts, enclosed play areas and accesses to multiple dwelling complexes fall into this category.

Criminal activities in visitor car parks may be minimised by using either of two approaches:

- a) visitor parking is located as near as possible to the dwellings so that the occupants can have sight and supervision over them.
- b) visitor parking is located further away with access controls for residents; access for emergency or assistance vehicles should be ensured.

The footpath system should be planned according to the same principles as the approach roads and be well lit and well defined. Unsupervised, completely separate footpaths running through residential areas are seen as public space and should be avoided because they give more opportunities for assault and access or they provide escape routes for offenders, and may contribute to an increased fear of crime.

### 7.3.5 Design and layout of semi-private space

Semi-private space includes areas such as front gardens, paths or steps to main entrance doors, and hard-standing for vehicles.

For residents it is important that the route from their front door to a busy public road is safe and secure. As far as possible, pedestrian routes should be clearly visible from the windows of nearby dwellings so that residents may be less afraid to walk around by day or night.

### 7.3.6 Defensible private space

Private space includes areas under the direct control of a person or persons, which are not directly accessible by others, for example a rear garden.

## 7.4 Immediate surroundings of the dwelling

### 7.4.1 Boundary fence or wall

Fences are physical obstacles, which mark the border between public and semi-private or private space. They can be constructed of simple parts: e.g. wood or metal elements, grids (see EN 10223-6 and EN 12839), masonry walls, vegetation such as hedges, or a combination of such elements. Physical barrier fences may be supplemented by electro technical parts; e.g. anti-intrusion sensors, CCTV with or without sensors<sup>1</sup>, or security lighting, connected with an intrusion alarm system.

Where the occupier wishes to prevent access to the area inside the fence it will be necessary for the main gate to be controlled by a double access lock or an electronic locking system with or without remote control device.

It is advisable that remote access control from public areas is by intercom or videophone.

Additional access gates should be permanently locked and not be opened unless requested by authorized persons.

Equal protection should be afforded to the boundary fence and all passageways.

There should be good visibility over all accesses from the inside of the dwelling.

### 7.4.2 Layout and location of garages

Apart from their function as shelter for vehicles, garages are also used as a storage place for bicycles, motorcycles and gardening tools, including lawn mowers; thus a secured garage can reduce the risk of theft. Garages should be located close to dwellings, preferably with their access door facing the street and at least at a car length from the pavement or public passageway. If the garage has a connecting door with the dwelling, the latter should be treated as if it were an external door (see Table 2).

### 7.4.3 Security measures to prevent the theft of motor vehicles

As a general rule, the parking of a car or motorcycle inside a closed and locked garage should be sufficient protection against theft or damage. It is advisable to avoid parking on the street or in a public parking area away from dwellings where there is little or no surveillance or lighting. When parked on the street, vehicles should be equipped with mechanical or electronic anti-theft devices.

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<sup>1</sup> Reacting to a movement within the detection area.

All of this should be incremented according to the security level and value of the property to be protected in compliance with relevant privacy legislation.

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Tools, ladders and any other implements that can be used to assist in criminal activity should be locked inside a shed or garage, or be secured to a wall with an appropriate locking device.

**7.4.5 Telephone connection**

Where telephone lines are used for the transmission of alarm calls and/or for automatic alarm transfers, they should be inaccessible to unauthorized manipulation. In some circumstances vital telephone lines should be equipped with electronic line control system.

**7.5 External lighting****7.5.1 General**

Security lighting should be designed in such a way as to avoid shadow areas that favour offenders by enabling them to operate without being seen.

Security lighting may be either:

- a) automatically triggered by a presence;
- b) kept constantly on during hours of darkness.

**7.5.2 Lighting systems triggered by sensors**

Lighting systems triggered by sensors can help in preventing crime, depending on the situation. For example a lighting system triggered by motion or presence detectors is effective in urban areas or dwellings, whereas in isolated locations it might aid crime by providing light. In those situations strobe lighting would be more effective.

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**7.5.3 Location of luminaires and sensors**

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The space from the gate to the main access door should be well lit in order to enable proper identification of persons during darkness. Luminaires should not be positioned directly above a visitor's head, as it does not assist in identification, and should be located to the side to ensure that light is focused on the face.

Luminaires should be sited so that they do not cause inconvenience or danger to neighbours or road users. Luminaires, sensors and their power sources should be protected against manipulation by potential offenders.

The number or name of the dwelling, the name of the street or other information signs should be well lit so that visitors and emergency services can identify them immediately.

Guidance on the requirements for luminaires for road and street lighting is given in EN 60598-2-3.

**8 The building envelope****8.1 General**

The means employed to commit burglaries will depend upon several factors associated with the materials of the building fabric.

The most common points of forced entry in dwellings are doors and windows. Place and method of burglaries will be influenced by the following significant factors: environmental design, the visibility of the location, the burglar resistant characteristics of the doors, windows and their accessible fittings, as well as the fixings of these elements.

It is unusual for potential offenders to break a sheet of glass in a window and enter through the broken glass<sup>2</sup>. It is commonplace for glazing to be broken to gain access to unprotected fittings of a door or window. Doors and windows can be broken open in many ways:

- a) By physical force e.g. foot kick, shoulder blow
- b) By use of mechanical and/or electrical tools
- c) By manipulation of locks

## 8.2 Security of doors, windows and shutters

Doors, windows and shutters should conform to the requirements of ENV 1627 to achieve the required level of protection shown in Table 2.

In order to prevent theft by persons using false identities, it is also advisable to fit a wide-angle peephole in the main door in order to identify visitors while keeping the door locked. A robust safety door chain will make inspection of visitors (and of their documents) possible while preventing them from forcing the door open.

The glazing of burglar resistant building elements conforming to ENV 1627 must fulfil the requirements of EN 356. Requirements for glazing are described in ENV 1627 and in Table 2.

## 8.3 Accessibility of windows

Accessible windows are defined as windows to which a burglar can gain access to facilitate an attack. These include windows on the ground floor, at balconies and basement windows. Non-easily accessible windows are those, which a burglar can only attack from a ladder or another climbing device. In this position attack is more difficult, therefore windows with a lower resistance class can be used (see Table 2).

## 8.4 Security of emergency exits

Some countries of the European Union recommend that emergency exits are openable from the inside without the use of a key.

The purpose of emergency fire exits is to allow people in buildings to escape. Despite this design requirement, emergency exits can still fulfil the same burglar resistance requirements as conventional doors from the attack side of the door.

For glazed doors and any adjacent glazed panels glass in accordance with EN 356 should be provided. Requirements for glazing are described in ENV 1627 and in Table 2.

## 8.5 Letterboxes and letter plates

Where doors and windows are not locked with a key from the inside, the openings of letterboxes and letter plates should not be located less than 400 mm from the lock, unless a second locking device is installed more than 400 mm from the opening. If a box has been installed behind the opening, the aperture requirements of EN 13724 types 1, 2 or 3 should apply.

**NOTE** It should not be possible to use the letter plate opening to insert either an arm or tools that can manipulate the locks on the door and effect entry. Also provision of a box or cage behind the opening can prevent access to keys etc left nearby.

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<sup>2</sup> Where elements such as doors, windows or parts of facades have glazing down to the floor, there may be increased risk of break-in.