

# INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

## NORME INTERNATIONALE

**Nuclear power plants – Control rooms – Supplementary control points for reactor shutdown without access to the main control room**

**Centrales nucléaires de puissance – Salles de commande – Points de commande supplémentaires pour l'arrêt des réacteurs sans accès à la salle de commande principale (salle de commande de repli)**



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


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## INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS –  
CONTROL ROOMS –  
SUPPLEMENTARY CONTROL POINTS FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN  
WITHOUT ACCESS TO THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM**

## FOREWORD

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International Standard IEC 60965 has been prepared by subcommittee 45A: Instrumentation and control of nuclear facilities, of IEC technical committee 45: Nuclear instrumentation.

The text of this standard is based on the following documents:

FDIS	Report on voting
45A/749/FDIS	45A/769/RVD

Full information on the voting for the approval of this standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 1989. This edition constitutes a technical revision.

The main technical changes with regard to the previous edition are as follows:

- to clarify the definitions and review the requirements.
- to update the reference to new standards published since the first issue, including IEC 61227, IEC 61771, IEC 61772, IEC 61839, and IEC 62241.
- to align the Standard with the new revisions of IAEA documents NS-R-1 and NS-G-1.3.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the maintenance result date indicated on the IEC web site under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

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Withd~~rawn~~

## INTRODUCTION

### a) Technical background, main issues and organization of the standard

IEC 60965:1989 was developed to provide requirements relevant to the design of NPP supplementary control points for reactor shutdown without access to the main control room. The first edition of IEC 60965 has been used extensively within the nuclear industry. It was however recognized that recent technical developments especially those which are based on software technology should be incorporated. It was also recognized that the relationships with the standard for the main control room (i.e. IEC 60964) and the derivative standards to that standard (i.e. IEC 61227, IEC 61771, IEC 61772, IEC 61839, and IEC 62241) should be clarified and conditioned.

This IEC standard specifically focuses on the functional design process of the supplementary control points of an NPP. It is intended that the standard is used by NPP designers, design authorities, vendors, utilities, and by licensors.

At the end of the current revision, at the FDIS stage, two further points were identified. These are: (a) requirements should be included associated with regular testing of the SCP, and (b) a theoretical assessment is needed of the time available during which the reactor will be safe but unattended, in order to move from the MCR to the SCP and for the SCP to become operational. However, since these points were not raised formally by any National Committee, they are recorded in this introduction for development in the next revision.

### b) Situation of the current standard in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series

IEC 60965 is the third level IEC SC 45A document tackling the issue of the design of supplementary control points.

IEC 60965 is to be read in association with IEC 60964 for the design of the main control room (including the derivative standards mentioned above) which is the appropriate IEC SC 45A document providing guidance on operator controls, verification and validation of design, application of visual display units, functional analysis and assignment, and alarm functions and presentation.

For more details on the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series, see item d) of this introduction.

### c) Recommendations and limitations regarding the application of this Standard

The purpose of this standard is to provide functional design requirements to be used in the design of the supplementary control points of a nuclear power plant to meet safety requirements.

This standard is intended for application to supplementary control points whose conceptual design is initiated after the publication of this standard. The recommendations of the standard may be used for refits, upgrades and modifications.

Aspects for which special recommendations have been provided in this Standard, in accordance with Clauses 6.15 to 6.30 of IAEA NS-G-1.3, are:

- The definition of the MCR and plant design bases for which the supplementary control points are to be used.
- Access by station staff to the supplementary control points in such emergencies.
- Assurance for the station staff that the environment at the supplementary control points is safe when they are to be used.

- Provision of information at the supplementary control points on the state of the reactor critical functions.
- Transfer of control and indication functions from the main control room to the supplementary control points in emergencies.
- Independence and separation of the cabling used by the supplementary control points from that used by the main control room.
- Assurance that a safe shutdown state has been reached using the supplementary control points.
- Communication facilities between the supplementary control points and to the station management.

To ensure that the Standard will continue to be relevant in future years, the emphasis has been placed on issues of principle, rather than specific technologies.

**d) Description of the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series and relationships with other IEC documents and other bodies documents (IAEA, ISO)**

The top-level document of the IEC SC 45A standard series is IEC 61513. It provides general requirements for I&C systems and equipment that are used to perform functions important to safety in NPPs. IEC 61513 structures the IEC SC 45A standard series.

IEC 61513 refers directly to other IEC SC 45A standards for general topics related to categorization of functions and classification of systems, qualification, separation of systems, defence against common cause failure, software aspects of computer-based systems, hardware aspects of computer-based systems, and control room design. The standards referenced directly at this second level should be considered together with IEC 61513 as a consistent document set.

At a third level, IEC SC 45A standards not directly referenced by IEC 61513 are standards related to specific equipment, technical methods, or specific activities. Usually these documents, which make reference to second-level documents for general topics, can be used on their own.

A fourth level extending the IEC SC 45A standard series, corresponds to the Technical Reports which are not normative.

IEC 61513 has adopted a presentation format similar to the basic safety publication IEC 61508 with an overall safety life-cycle framework and a system life-cycle framework and provides an interpretation of the general requirements of IEC 61508-1, IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-4, for the nuclear application sector. Compliance with IEC 61513 will facilitate consistency with the requirements of IEC 61508 as they have been interpreted for the nuclear industry. In this framework IEC 60880 and IEC 62138 correspond to IEC 61508-3 for the nuclear application sector.

IEC 61513 refers to ISO as well as to IAEA 50-C-QA (now replaced by IAEA GS-R-3) for topics related to quality assurance (QA).

The IEC SC 45A standards series consistently implements and details the principles and basic safety aspects provided in the IAEA code on the safety of NPPs and in the IAEA safety series, in particular the Requirements NS-R-1, establishing safety requirements related to the design of Nuclear Power Plants, and the Safety Guide NS-G-1.3 dealing with instrumentation and control systems important to safety in Nuclear Power Plants. The terminology and definitions used by SC 45A standards are consistent with those used by the IAEA.



# NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS – CONTROL ROOMS – SUPPLEMENTARY CONTROL POINTS FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN WITHOUT ACCESS TO THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM

## 1 Scope

This International Standard establishes requirements for the supplementary control points provided to enable the operating staff of nuclear power plants to shut down the reactor and maintain the plant in a safe shut-down state in the event that control of the safety functions can no longer be exercised from the main control room, due to unavailability of the main control room or its facilities.

The standard also establishes requirements for the selection of functions, the design and organisation of the human-machine interface, and the procedures which shall be used systematically to verify and validate the functional design of the supplementary control points.

It is assumed that supplementary control points provided for shutdown operations from outside the main control room would be unattended during normal plant conditions other than for periodic testing. The requirements reflect the application of human engineering principles as they apply to the human-machine interface during such periodic testing and during abnormal plant conditions.

This standard does not cover special emergency response facilities (e.g. a technical support centre) or facilities provided for radioactive waste handling. Detailed equipment design is also outside the scope of the standard.

This standard follows the principles of IAEA Requirements NS-R-1 “Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design” and IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-1.3 “Instrumentation and Control Systems Important to Safety in Nuclear Power Plants”.

The purpose of this standard is to provide functional design requirements to be used in the design of the supplementary control points of a nuclear power plant to meet safety requirements.

This standard is intended for application to supplementary control points whose conceptual design is initiated after the publication of this standard. If it is desired to apply it to existing plants or designs, special care must be taken to ensure a consistent design basis. This relates, for example, to factors such as the consistency between the supplementary control points and the main control room, the ergonomic approach, the automation level and the information technology.

## 2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 60709, *Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to safety – Separation*

IEC 60964, *Nuclear power plants – Control rooms – Design*

IEC 61226, *Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important for safety – Classification of instrumentation and control functions*

IEC 61513, *Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control for systems important to safety – General requirements for systems*

IEC 61771, *Nuclear power plants – Main control room – Verification and validation of design*

IAEA NS-R-1:2000, *Safety of nuclear power plants: Design*

IAEA NS-G-1.3:2002, *Instrumentation and Control Systems Important to Safety in Nuclear Power Plants*

### 3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. For other terms, refer to the general terminology defined in IEC 60964, IEC 61513 and in the IAEA NUSS programme, such as Safety Guide NS-G-1.3 or the safety glossary.

#### 3.1 control room staff

a group of plant personnel stationed in the control room, which is responsible for achieving the plant operational goals by controlling plant through the human-machine interface. Typically, the control room staff consists of supervisory operators, and operators who actually monitor plant and plant conditions and manipulate controls, but may also include those staff members and experts who are authorised to be present in the control room, e.g. during long lasting event sequences.

[IEC 60964, 3.4]

#### 3.2 local control points (or facilities)

points (or facilities) located outside the control room where local operators perform control activities

[IEC 60964, 3.17]

#### 3.3 local operators

the operating staff that perform tasks outside the control room

[IEC 60964, 3.18]

#### 3.4 operating staff

plant personnel working on shift to operate the plant. The operating staff includes the control room staff, maintenance engineers, etc.

[IEC 60964, 3.20]

#### 3.5 supplementary control point

a location from which limited plant control and/or monitoring can be carried out to accomplish the safety functions identified by the safety analysis as required in the event of a loss of ability to perform those functions from the main control room. The supplementary control point may be a special control room, but in many cases comprises a set of control panels and displays in switchgear rooms or similar areas.

## 4 Abbreviations

I&C	Instrumentation and Control
LCP	Local Control Point
MCR	Main Control Room
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
PIE	Postulated Initiating Event
SCP	Supplementary Control Points, Supplementary Control Point
V&V	Verification and Validation

## 5 Design principles

### 5.1 General

Clause 6.75 of IAEA NS-R-1 states “Sufficient instrumentation and control equipment shall be available, preferably at a single location (supplementary control room) that is physically and electrically separate from the control room, so that the reactor can be placed and maintained in a shut down state, residual heat can be removed, and the essential plant variables can be monitored should there be a loss of ability to perform these essential safety functions in the control room”.

Clauses 6.15 to 6.30 of IAEA NS-G-1.3 provide guidance on the requirements for supplementary control rooms (‘SCP’ in this standard), including requirements associated with the following:

- definition of the plant design bases that require use of the SCP (Clauses 6.17, 6.19, 6.20);
- location and configuration of the SCP to promote prompt mobilisation (Clause 6.29);
- qualified access path to the SCP, with hazard indication and suitable countermeasures along this path (Clauses 6.27, 6.28);
- prevention of unauthorised access to or use of the SCP (Clause 6.21);
- safety functions of the MCR and SCP not affected by the same PIE, and independence of the circuits associated with the SCP from those of the MCR (Clauses 6.20, 6.23);
- priority of control between the MCR and SCP, and transfer of control from the MCR to the SCP (Clauses 6.18, 6.20, 6.24);
- manual control in the SCP accomplished by simple actions (Clause 6.22);
- displays and controls in the SCP similar to those in the MCR, to the extent possible (Clause 6.22);
- consideration of the difference of purpose between the MCR and the SCP (Clause 6.25);
- if long-term use is envisaged, suitable facilities for habitability and workspace for tasks (Clause 6.30).

### 5.2 Main objectives

The SCP shall be provided with the means to trip the reactor and bring the plant to a safe shutdown state and maintain it in that state without access to the MCR. However, the SCP are not required to perform all the other plant control and monitoring functions which are typically performed in the MCR. According to the type of NPP and the detailed safety arguments, provisions to cope with a predefined set of PIE could be integrated in the SCP.

The SCP are required if the conditions within the MCR are no longer within its operational design bases, and in consequence are such that the MCR is no longer available. Possible causes include a control room fire, the entry of excess smoke or a dangerous atmosphere to the MCR, severe damage to the MCR or its cables such that safety functions cannot be performed, major damage to the control room area, or major failure of control room facilities.

The design basis PIE and sequences of events for which the SCP are necessary and intended to be used shall be identified. This shall include identification and justification of the assumed duration for which the SCP may be required.

Since events leading to unavailability of the MCR are very infrequent, it is anticipated that the plant safety analysis will demonstrate that such events can only coincide with another independent event in the plant at an acceptably low frequency; in particular, it is anticipated that the primary coolant circuit will be intact. However, due account shall be taken of any plant fault that may occur as a consequence of reactor trip and of any plant faults at shutdown that are of sufficient frequency to coincide with use of the SCP. In particular, the design of the SCP shall take account of the possible long-term unavailability of the MCR due to fire or other reasons.

The criteria for use of the SCP shall be clearly stated in the plant operating procedures.

It shall be possible to determine the complete safety state of the plant from outside the MCR. This should preferably be from the SCP.

From an operational viewpoint (e.g. to simplify operation and avoid misunderstanding), it is preferable to have only one SCP. Care shall be taken, however, to meet safety requirements, particularly requirements for redundancy and independence.

There should be full presentation ability at all SCP of any computer-based information display and alarm system.

There shall be adequate time to reach the SCP before necessary actions are required as well as sufficient equipment to provide necessary communication between all operating staff involved in these actions and with on-site and off-site locations. Requirements are given in 7.7.

The layout of the instrumentation and the mode of presentation at the SCP shall provide the operating staff with adequate information to assess the plant state and to supervise the shutdown (and subsequent hold down) of the reactor, the long term cooling of the reactor core and confinement of all radioactive substances.

The plant systems controlled from the SCP may be limited to those providing the safety functions.

The SCP shall provide sufficient control over the safety functions to reach and maintain a safe shutdown state, for the defined set of PIEs and conditions for which the MCR cannot be used. The supervision and control provided at the SCP shall include the state of the safety functions concerned and control of their initiation and termination, and the state of the related fundamental safety functions (see IAEA NS-R-1, Clause 4.6).

Facilities for site security monitoring, plant access control and fire alarms which are normally provided in the MCR shall also be provided in an independent location. This independent location may be the SCP or may be a location that would not be affected by the same event that causes the SCP to be used.

The design of SCP shall be consistent with the MCR design. The identification and design process for the relevant controls and indications needed for the SCP shall follow the requirements of IEC 60964, as summarised in Clause 6 of this standard.

### **5.3 Safety principles**

The design basis of an NPP normally specifies the internal and external hazards to be taken into account. The design shall ensure that such events are not able to make those functions of the MCR and SCP (and local control points) required for safe shutdown, monitoring to