

# PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SPECIFICATION

## PRE-STANDARD



**Industrial communication networks – Profiles –  
Part 3-18: Functional safety fieldbuses – Additional specifications for CPF  
SNpFAMILY**

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**INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS –  
PROFILES –****Part 3-18: Functional safety fieldbuses –  
Additional specifications for CPF SNpFAMILY**

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65C/530/PAS	65C/534/RVD

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The list of all the parts of the IEC 61784 series, under the general title *Industrial communication networks – Profiles*, can be found on the IEC web site.

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## INTRODUCTION

This PAS contains an additional profile – SNpTYPE – which may be integrated into a future new edition of IEC 61784-3.

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## INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS – PROFILES –

### Part 3-18: Functional safety fieldbuses – Additional specifications for CPF SNpFAMILY

#### 1 Scope

This part of the IEC 61784-3 series specifies a safety communication layer (services and protocol) based on CPF SNpFAMILY of IEC/PAS 62633 and IEC/PAS 61158 Type SNpTYPE. It identifies the principles for functional safety communications defined in IEC 61784-3 that are relevant for this safety communication layer.

NOTE 1 It does not cover electrical safety and intrinsic safety aspects. Electrical safety relates to hazards such as electrical shock. Intrinsic safety relates to hazards associated with potentially explosive atmospheres.

This part of the IEC 61784-3 series defines mechanisms for the transmission of safety-relevant messages among participants within a distributed network using fieldbus technology in accordance with the requirements of IEC 61508 series for functional safety. These mechanisms may be used in various industrial applications such as process control, manufacturing automation and machinery.

This part of the IEC 61784-3 series provides guidelines for both developers and assessors of compliant devices and systems.

NOTE 2 The resulting SIL claim of a system depends on the implementation of the selected functional safety communication profile within this system – implementation of a functional safety communication profile according to this part of the IEC 61784-3 series in a standard device is not sufficient to qualify it as a safety device.

#### 2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 61158 (all parts), *Industrial communication networks – Fieldbus specifications*

IEC/PAS 61158-3-22, *Industrial communication networks – Fieldbus specifications – Part 3-22: Data-link layer service definition – Type SNpType elements*

IEC/PAS 61158-4-22, *Industrial communication networks – Fieldbus specifications – Part 4-22: Data-link layer protocol specification – Type SNpType elements*

IEC/PAS 61158-5-22, *Industrial communication networks – Fieldbus specifications – Part 5-22: Application layer service definition – Type SNpType elements*

IEC/PAS 61158-6-22, *Industrial communication networks – Fieldbus specifications – Part 6-22: Application layer protocol specification – Type SNpType elements*

IEC 61508 (all parts), *Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems*

IEC 61784-2, *Industrial communication networks – Profiles – Part 2: Additional fieldbus profiles for real-time networks based on ISO/IEC 8802-3*

IEC 61784-3, *Industrial communication networks – Profiles – Part 3: Functional safety fieldbuses – General rules and profile definitions*

IEC/PAS 62633, *Industrial communication networks – Profiles – Additional fieldbus profiles for real-time networks based on ISO/IEC 8802-3 - SNpTYPE*

### 3 Terms, definitions, symbols, abbreviated terms and conventions

#### 3.1 Terms and definitions

##### 3.1.1 Common terms and definitions

###### 3.1.1.1

###### **availability**

probability for an automated system that for a given period of time there are no unsatisfactory system conditions such as loss of production

NOTE Availability depends on MTBF (mean time between failure) and MDT (mean down time):  
Availability =  $MTBF / (MTBF + MDT)$ .

###### 3.1.1.2

###### **black channel**

communication channel without available evidence of design or validation according to IEC 61508 series

###### 3.1.1.3

###### **communication channel**

logical connection between two end-points within a communication system

###### 3.1.1.4

###### **communication system**

arrangement of hardware, software and propagation media to allow the transfer of messages (ISO/IEC 7498 application layer) from one application to another

###### 3.1.1.5

###### **connection**

logical binding between two application objects within the same or different devices

###### 3.1.1.6

###### **Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)**

<value> redundant data derived from, and stored or transmitted together with, a block of data in order to detect data corruption <method> procedure used to calculate the redundant data

NOTE See also [2], [3]<sup>1</sup>.

###### 3.1.1.7

###### **error**

discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition

NOTE 1 An error can be caused by a faulty item, for example a computing error made by faulty computer equipment.

[IEV 191-05-24], [IEC 61508-4:1998], [IEC 61158]

<sup>1</sup> Figures in square brackets refer to the bibliography.

NOTE 2 Errors may be due to design mistakes within hardware/software and/or corrupted information due to electromagnetic interference and/or other effects.

NOTE 3 Errors do not necessarily result in a failure or a fault.

### 3.1.1.8

#### **failure**

termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function

NOTE 1 The definition in IECV 191-04-01 is the same, with additional notes.

[IEC 61508-4:1998], [ISO/IEC 2382-14.01.11]

NOTE 2 Failure may be due to an error (for example, problem with hardware/software design or message disruption)

### 3.1.1.9

#### **fault**

abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of a functional unit to perform a required function

NOTE IECV 191-05-01 defines "fault" as a state characterized by the inability to perform a required function, excluding the inability during preventative maintenance or other planned actions, or due to lack of external resources.

[IEC 61508-4:1998], [ISO/IEC 2382-14.01.10]

### 3.1.1.10

#### **fieldbus**

communication system based on serial data transfer and used in industrial automation or process control applications

### 3.1.1.11

#### **frame**

denigrated synonym for DLPDU

### 3.1.1.12

#### **Frame Check Sequence (FCS)**

redundant data derived from a block of data within a DLPDU (frame), using a hash function, and stored or transmitted together with the block of data, in order to detect data corruption

NOTE 1 An FCS can be derived using for example a CRC or other hash function.

NOTE 2 See also [2], [3].

### 3.1.1.13

#### **hash function**

(mathematical) function that maps values from a (possibly very) large set of values into a (usually) smaller range of values

NOTE 1 Hash functions can be used to detect data corruption.

NOTE 2 Common hash functions include parity, checksum or CRC.

[IEC 62210, modified]

### 3.1.1.14

#### **hazard**

state or set of conditions of a system that, together with other related conditions will inevitably lead to harm to persons, property or environment

### 3.1.1.15

#### **message**

ordered series of octets intended to convey information

[ISO/IEC 2382-16.02.01, modified]

**3.1.1.16**  
**message sink**

part of a communication system in which messages are considered to be received

[ISO/IEC 2382-16.02.03]

**3.1.1.17**  
**message source**

part of a communication system from which messages are considered to originate

[ISO/IEC 2382-16.02.02]

**3.1.1.18**  
**nuisance trip**

spurious trip with no harmful effect

NOTE Internal abnormal errors can be caused in communication systems such as wireless transmission, for example by too many retries in the presence of interferences.

**3.1.1.19**  
**proof test**

periodic test performed to detect failures in a safety-related system so that, if necessary, the system can be restored to an "as new" condition or as close as practical to this condition

NOTE A proof test is intended to confirm that the safety-related system is in a condition that assures the specified safety integrity.

[IEC 61508-4 and IEC 62061, modified]

**3.1.1.20**  
**redundancy**

existence of means, in addition to the means which would be sufficient for a functional unit to perform a required function or for data to represent information

EXAMPLE Duplicated functional components and the addition of parity bits are both instances of redundancy.

NOTE 1 Redundancy is used primarily to improve reliability or availability.

NOTE 2 The definition in IECV 191-15-01 is less complete.

[IEC 61508-4:1998], [ISO/IEC 2382-14.01.12]

**3.1.1.21**  
**reliability**

probability that an automated system can perform a required function under given conditions for a given time interval ( $t_1, t_2$ )

NOTE 1 It is generally assumed that the automated system is in a state to perform this required function at the beginning of the time interval.

NOTE 2 The term "reliability" is also used to denote the reliability performance quantified by this probability.

NOTE 3 Within the MTBF or MTTF period of time, the probability that an automated system will perform a required function under given conditions is decreasing.

NOTE 4 Reliability differs from availability.

[IEC 62059-11, modified]

**3.1.1.22**  
**risk**

combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm

[IEC 61508-4:1998]

**3.1.1.23  
safety communication layer (SCL)**

communication layer that includes all the necessary measures to ensure safe transmission of data in accordance with the requirements of IEC 61508

**3.1.1.24  
safety data**

data transmitted across a safety network using a safety protocol

NOTE The Safety Communication Layer does not ensure safety of the data itself, only that the data is transmitted safely.

**3.1.1.25  
safety device**

device designed in accordance with IEC 61508 and which implements the functional safety communication profile

**3.1.1.26  
safety function**

function to be implemented by an E/E/PE safety-related system, other technology safety-related system or external risk reduction facilities, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the EUC, in respect of a specific hazardous event

[IEC 61508-4:1998]

**3.1.1.27  
safety function response time**

worst case elapsed time following an actuation of a safety sensor connected to a fieldbus, before the corresponding safe state of its safety actuator(s) is achieved in the presence of errors or failures in the safety function channel

NOTE This concept is introduced in IEC 61784-3, 5.2.4 and addressed by the functional safety communication profiles defined in this part of the IEC 61784-3 series.

**3.1.1.28  
safety integrity level (SIL)**

discrete level (one out of a possible four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the E/E/PE safety-related systems, where safety integrity level four has the highest level of safety integrity and safety integrity level one has the lowest

NOTE The target failure measures for the four safety integrity levels are specified in Tables 2 and 3 of IEC 61508-1.

[IEC 61508-4:1998]

**3.1.1.29  
safety measure**

<this standard> measure to control possible communication errors that is designed and implemented in compliance with the requirements of IEC 61508

NOTE 1 In practice, several safety measures are combined to achieve the required safety integrity level.

NOTE 2 Communication errors and related safety measures are detailed in IEC 61784-3, 5.3 and 5.4.

**3.1.1.30  
safety-related application**

programs designed in accordance with IEC 61508 to meet the SIL requirements of the application