

# TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security –  
Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives

[IEC TS 62351-5:2013](https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/757aeff6-56e3-402a-910f-4236d72f099d/iec-ts-62351-5-2013)

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INTERNATIONAL  
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## INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT  
AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE –  
DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –**

**Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives**

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Technical specifications are subject to review within three years of publication to decide whether they can be transformed into International Standards.

IEC/TS 62351-5, which is a technical specification, has been prepared by IEC technical committee 57: Power systems management and associated information exchange.



This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2009. It constitutes a technical revision. The primary changes in the second edition are:

- adds the capability to change Update Keys remotely;
- adds security statistics to aid in detecting attacks;
- adds measures to avoid being forced to change session keys too often;
- discards unexpected messages more often as possible attacks;
- adds to the list of permitted security algorithms;
- adds new rules for calculating challenge sequence numbers.

The text of this technical specification is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
57/1204/DTS	57/1282/RVC

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical specification can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

Capitalization has been used in the text of this specification to formally identify the most important components of the described security mechanism. These components include: 1) data items e.g. Update Keys, Session Keys; 2) message names, e.g. Challenge, Reply, Aggressive Mode Request; 3) event names e.g. Reply Timeout, Rx Invalid Reply; 4) state names, e.g. Security Idle, Wait for Reply; and 5) statistics e.g. Authentication Failures, Unexpected Messages.

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A list of all the parts in the IEC 62351 series, published under the general title *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- transformed into an International standard,
- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

# POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE – DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –

## Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives

### 1 Scope and object

This part of IEC 62351 specifies messages, procedures and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from IEC 60870-5: Telecontrol equipment and systems – Transmission protocols. This Technical Specification applies to at least those protocols listed in Table 1.

**Table 1 – Scope of application to standards**

Number	Name
IEC 60870-5-101	Companion standard for basic telecontrol tasks
IEC 60870-5-102	Companion standard for the transmission of integrated totals in electric power systems
IEC 60870-5-103	Companion standard for the informative interface of protection equipment
IEC 60870-5-104	Network access for IEC 60870-5-101 using standard transport profiles
DNP3	Distributed Network Protocol (based on IEC 60870-1 through IEC 60870-5 and controlled by the DNP Users Group)

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The initial audience for this Technical Specification is intended to be the members of the working groups developing the protocols listed in Table 1. For the measures described in this specification to take effect, they must be accepted and referenced by the specifications for the protocols themselves. This document is written to enable that process.

The subsequent audience for this specification is intended to be the developers of products that implement these protocols.

Portions of this specification may also be of use to managers and executives in order to understand the purpose and requirements of the work.

This part of IEC/TS 62351 focuses only on application layer authentication and security issues arising from such authentication. Other security concerns – in particular, protection from eavesdropping or man-in-the-middle attacks through the use of encryption – are considered to be outside the scope. Encryption may be added through the use of this specification with other specifications.

This document is organized working from the general to the specific, as follows:

- Clauses 2 through 4 provide background terms, definitions, and references.
- Clause 5 describes the problems this specification is intended to address.
- Clause 6 describes the mechanism generically without reference to a specific protocol.
- Clauses 7 and 8 describe the mechanism more precisely and are the primary normative part of this specification.
- Clause 9 describes a few particular implementation issues that are special cases.
- Clause 10 describes the requirements for other standards referencing this specification.

- Clause 11 describes the Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) for this mechanism.

Unless specifically labelled as informative or optional, all clauses of this specification are normative.

## 2 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 60870-5 (all parts), *Telecontrol equipment and systems – Transmission protocols*

IEC/TS 62351-1, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 1: Communication network and system security – Introduction to security issues*

IEC/TS 62351-2, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 2: Glossary of terms*

IEC/TS 62351-3, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 3: Communication network and system security – Profiles including TCP/IP*

IEC/TS 62351-8, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 8: Role-based access control*

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ISO/IEC 9798-4, *Information technology – Security techniques – Entity authentication – Part 4: Mechanisms using a cryptographic check function*

ISO/IEC 11770-2:2008, *Information technology – Security techniques – Key management – Part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques*

ISO/IEC 11770-3:2008, *Information technology – Security techniques – Key management – Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques*

FIPS 180-2, *Secure Hash Standard* (includes SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512). USA NIST

FIPS 186-2, *Digital Signature Standard (DSS)*, USA NIST, February 2000 including Change Notice #1, October 2001. Used for the random number generation algorithms in the Appendix

FIPS 186-3, *Digital Signature Standard (DSS)*, USA NIST, June 2009. Used for digital signature algorithms when asymmetric Update Key change is implemented

RFC 2104, *HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication*

RFC 3394, *Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm*

RFC 3447, *Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1*

RFC 3629, *UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646*

RFC 5280, *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile*

NIST SP 800-38D, *Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC*

### 3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in IEC/TS 62351-2 and the following apply.

#### 3.1 challenger

station that issues authentication challenges

Note 1 to entry: It may be either a controlled or controlling station.

#### 3.2 control direction

direction of transmission from the controlling station to a controlled station

[SOURCE: IEC 60870-5-101:2003, 3.3]

#### 3.3 controlled station

station which is monitored, or commanded and monitored by a master (controlling) station

Note 1 to entry: It is commonly called an "outstation" or "slave" in some specifications.

[SOURCE: IEC 60870-1-3:1997] <https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/757aeff6-56e3-402a-910f-4236d72f099d/iec-ts-62351-5-2013>

#### 3.4 controlling station

station which performs the telecontrol of outstations

Note 1 to entry: It is commonly called a "master" or "master station" in some specifications.

[SOURCE: IEC 60870-1-3:1997]

#### 3.5 monitor direction

direction of transmission from a controlled station to a controlling station

[SOURCE: IEC 60870-5-101:2003, 3.4]

#### 3.6 responder

station that responds or reacts to authentication challenges

Note 1 to entry: It may be either a controlled or controlling station.

#### 3.7 telecontrol

control of operational equipment at a distance using the transmission of information by telecommunication techniques

Note 1 to entry: Telecontrol may comprise any combination of command, alarm, indication, metering, protection and tripping facilities, without any use of speech messages.

[SOURCE: IEC 60870-1-3:1997]

### 3.8

#### **application service data unit ASDU**

application layer message submitted to lower layers for transmission

## 4 Abbreviated terms

Refer to IEC/TS 62351-2 for a list of applicable abbreviated terms. The following term is included here because it is specifically used in the affected protocols and used in the discussion of this authentication mechanism.

**ASDU** application service data unit. The application layer message submitted to lower layers for transmission.

## 5 Problem description (informative)

### 5.1 Overview of clause

Clause 5 describes:

- the security threats that this specification is intended to address;
- the unique design problems in implementing authentication for IEC 60870-5 and derived protocols;
- the resulting design principles behind the mechanism.

### 5.2 Specific threats addressed

This specification shall address only the following security threats, as defined in IEC/TS 62351-2:

- spoofing;
- modification;
- replay;
- eavesdropping – on exchanges of cryptographic keys only, not on other data.

### 5.3 Design issues

#### 5.3.1 Overview of subclause

Subclause 5.3 describes the challenges faced in developing an authentication proposal that can be applied to all the IEC 60870-5 and derivative protocols. Subclause 5.3 is supplied for the benefit of security experts reviewing this document who may not be familiar with the electrical utility protocol environment.

#### 5.3.2 Asymmetric communications

All the protocols affected by this specification share the concept of inequality between the communication stations. In each of these protocols there is a designated controlling station and a designated controlled station, each having different roles, responsibilities, procedures and message formats. In particular, the controlling station is in many cases responsible for flow control and media access control.

The existence of a definite controlled/controlling station designation has two impacts on the design of this authentication mechanism:

- the format of messages in each direction will differ, even if the functions are the same;
- key distribution is simplified because they will always be issued by the controlling station.

### 5.3.3 Message-oriented

All of the affected protocols are message-oriented. This means that authentication must be performed on a message-by-message basis, rather than authenticating only at the beginning of a data stream and occasionally thereafter, as some connection-oriented protocols do.

### 5.3.4 Poor sequence numbers or no sequence numbers

A common security technique to address the threat of replay is to include in the message a sequence number. Combined with tests for message integrity, the sequence number makes it harder for an attacker to simulate a legitimate user by just copying an existing message, because the messages must be transmitted in a particular order.

Unfortunately, none of the affected protocols includes a sequence number that would provide adequate protection. Those sequence numbers that do exist have very low maximum values, permitting an attacker to attempt a replay after gathering only a small number of messages.

Therefore, the design of this specification must include its own sequence numbers and other time-varying data to protect against replay.

### 5.3.5 Limited processing power

The lack of processing power available on many power utility devices has been a major design concern for the affected protocols since their creation. This design requirement necessarily affects the authentication mechanism also. The concern is heightened by the fact that many of these devices are single-processor machines; a denial-of-service attack would affect not only the communications capability of such devices but their function as an electrical control, protection, or monitoring device also.

Therefore, the use of security measures requiring extremely high processing power, such as public-key encryption and very large key sizes, has been avoided as much as possible.

### 5.3.6 Limited bandwidth

The limited amount of bandwidth available in utility networks has been the prime design concern (after message integrity) of the affected protocols. Links of 1 200 bits per second and lower are still a reality for many applications of these protocols. Some communications links also charge costs per octet transmitted.

Therefore the authentication mechanism must not add very much overhead (i.e. few octets) to the affected protocols. The size of the challenge and authentication data has therefore been limited and truncated as much as possible while retaining an adequate level of security. Other measures may be taken in the implementations in each protocol.

### 5.3.7 No access to authentication server

The nature of the utility networks in which the affected protocols are deployed is that the controlling station is often the only device with which the controlled station can communicate. If there is any access to other networks, it is often achieved through the device implementing the controlling station.

The impact of this fact on the authentication mechanism is that any system requiring on-line verification of the controlling station's security credentials by a third party is not practical.

### 5.3.8 Limited frame length

Because of the restrictions on bandwidth and message integrity, the affected protocols are designed to send data in small frames of 255 octets or less. Some derivative protocols permit “chaining” frames together to create larger application layer messages.

However, in general, the authentication mechanism cannot assume the transmission of large data units between the stations.

### 5.3.9 Limited checksum

Message integrity was a high priority in the design of the affected protocols. However, the integrity measures chosen for these protocols were designed to protect against random noise, and not a concerted attack, as discussed below.

- The serial IEC 60870-5 protocols use Frame Type FT1.2, which uses parity bits and a single-octet checksum to protect against bit errors. A single octet is not large enough to provide a secure message authentication code (MAC).
- The IEC 60870-5-104 protocol depends on the integrity measures of lower layers. Because this specification discusses an application layer mechanism only, it cannot depend on such measures. In any case, doing so would provide a solution for only one of the affected protocols.
- The DNP3 protocol uses the IEC 60870-5 FT3 frame, with a two-octet cyclic redundancy check every 16 octets or fewer. This provides considerable integrity for security purposes, except that there is no check for the entire frame.

Therefore, the authentication mechanism described in this specification cannot make use of the existing protocol integrity mechanisms to provide message integrity for security purposes.

### 5.3.10 Radio systems

The affected protocols are often used over radio systems which may or may not provide security measures of their own. Many existing utility radio networks provide no security at all.

Therefore, the mechanism described in this specification must assume a hostile and physically insecure transmission environment.

### 5.3.11 Dial-up systems

The affected protocols are often used over dial-up telephone networks which require several seconds to re-establish communications before each frame transmitted. Similarly, many radio systems require long “keying” times before each frame.

Therefore, the authentication mechanism provides an option, known as “aggressive mode” that reduces the number of extra frames of data to be transmitted.

### 5.3.12 Variety of protocols affected

The IEC 60870-5 family of protocols share many common functions and an underlying design philosophy. However, the various companion standards and derivative protocols have been implemented using a variety of message formats and procedures.

Therefore, this specification describes a generic authentication mechanism that must be mapped to each specific affected protocol within specifications that are specific to that protocol.