

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION



**Telecontrol equipment and systems –
Part 5-7: Transmission protocols – Security extensions to IEC 60870-5-101 and
IEC 60870-5-104 protocols (applying IEC 62351)**

IEC TS 60870-5-7:2013

<https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/9223ba2a-6462-45f0-b285-39297a7e81e0/iec-ts-60870-5-7-2013>



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TELECONTROL EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS –

**Part 5-7: Transmission protocols – Security extensions to
IEC 60870-5-101 and IEC 60870-5-104 protocols
(applying IEC 62351)**

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Technical specifications are subject to review within three years of publication to decide whether they can be transformed into International Standards.

IEC 60870-5-7, which is a technical specification, has been prepared by IEC technical committee 57: Power systems management and associated information exchange.

The text of this technical specification is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
57/1308/DTS	57/1339/RVC

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical specification can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

In this publication the following print types are used:

Clause 10: Direct quotations from IEC/TS 62351-3:2007: in italic type.

A list of all the parts in the IEC 60870 series, published under the general title *Telecontrol equipment and systems*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

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TELECONTROL EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS –

Part 5-7: Transmission protocols – Security extensions to IEC 60870-5-101 and IEC 60870-5-104 protocols (applying IEC 62351)

1 Scope

This part of IEC 60870 describes messages and data formats for implementing IEC/TS 62351-5 for secure authentication as an extension to IEC 60870-5-101 and IEC 60870-5-104.

The purpose of this base standard is to permit the receiver of any IEC 60870-5-101/104 Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) to verify that the APDU was transmitted by an authorized user and that the APDU was not modified in transit. It provides methods to authenticate not only the device which originated the APDU but also the individual human user if that capability is supported by the rest of the telecontrol system.

This specification is also intended to be used, together with the definitions of IEC/TS 62351-3, in conjunction with the IEC 60870-5-104 companion standard.

The state machines, message sequences, and procedures for exchanging these messages are defined in the IEC/TS 62351-5 specification. This base standard describes only the message formats, selected options, critical operations, addressing considerations and other adaptations required to implement IEC/TS 62351 in the IEC 60870-5-101 and 104 protocols.

The scope of this specification does not include security for IEC 60870-5-102 or IEC 60870-5-103. IEC 60870-5-102 is in limited use only and will therefore not be addressed. Users of IEC 60870-5-103 desiring a secure solution should implement IEC 61850 using the security measures from in IEC/TS 62351 referenced in IEC 61850.

Management of keys, certificates or other cryptographic credentials within devices or on communication links other than IEC 60870-5-101/104 is out of the scope of this specification and may be addressed by other IEC/TS 62351 specifications in the future.

2 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 60870-5-101:2003, *Telecontrol equipment and systems – Part 5-101:Transmission protocols – Companion standard for basic telecontrol tasks*

IEC 60870-5-104:2006, *Telecontrol equipment and systems – Part 5-104:Transmission protocols – Network access for IEC 60870-5-101 – Using standard transport profiles*

IEC/TS 62351-3:2007, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 3: Communication network and system security – Profiles including TCP/IP*

IEC/TS 62351-5:2013, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives*

IEC/TS 62351-8, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 8: Role-based access control*

3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations

3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

NOTE Terms 3.1.1 to 3.1.7 are included here because they are specific to the IEC 60870-5 standards and may be useful for reading this specification as an independent document. Terms 3.1.8 to 3.1.9 are included here because they are specific to IEC/TS 62351-5.

3.1.1

Application Protocol Data Unit

complete application layer message transmitted by a station

3.1.2

Application Service Data Unit

application layer message submitted to lower layers for transmission

3.1.3

Controlling Station

device or application that initiates most of the communications and issues commands

Note 1 to entry: Commonly called a “master” in some protocol specifications.

3.1.4

Controlled Station

remote device that transmits data gathered in the field to the controlling station

Note 1 to entry: Commonly called the “outstation” or “slave” in some protocols.

3.1.5

Control Direction

data transmitted by the controlling station to the controlled station(s)

3.1.6

Message Authentication Code

calculated value used by a receiving station to authenticate and check the integrity of an Application Protocol Data Unit

3.1.7

Monitoring Direction

data transmitted by the controlled station to the controlling stations

3.1.8

Challenger

station that issues authentication challenges. May be either a controlled or controlling station.

3.1.9

Responder

station that responds or reacts to authentication challenges. May be either a controlled or controlling station.

3.2 Abbreviated terms

Refer to IEC/TS 62351-2 for a list of applicable abbreviated terms. Terms 3.2.1 to 3.2.3 are included here because they are specifically used in the affected protocols and used in the discussion of this authentication mechanism.

3.2.1

ASDU

Application Service Data Unit

3.2.2

APDU

Application Protocol Data Unit

3.2.3

MAC

Message Authentication Code

4 Selected options

4.1 Overview of clause

This clause describes which of the options specified in IEC/TS 62351-5 shall be implemented in IEC 60870-5-101 and IEC 60870-5-104.

4.2 MAC algorithms

IEC 60870-5 stations shall implement all the mandatory MAC algorithms listed in IEC/TS 62351-5, and may implement any of the optional MAC algorithms listed there.

4.3 Encryption algorithms

IEC 60870-5 stations shall implement all the mandatory encryption algorithms listed in IEC/TS 62351-5, and may implement any of the optional encryption algorithms listed there.

4.4 Maximum error count

IEC 60870-5 stations may implement a maximum error count in the range specified in IEC/TS 62351-5.

4.5 Use of aggressive mode

IEC 60870-5 stations shall implement IEC/TS 62351-5 aggressive mode. Aggressive mode shall be the normal method of authentication for stations implementing this specification. However, IEC 60870-5 stations shall also permit it to be configured as disabled. A station with aggressive mode disabled shall not transmit any S_AR_NA_1 Aggressive Mode Request ASDUs and shall reply to any such ASDUs with S_ER_NA_1 Authentication Error ASDUs, subject to the limitations on Error messages described in IEC/TS 62351-5.

Regardless of whether aggressive mode is disabled, IEC 60870-5 stations shall initialize the challenge data in both directions when establishing communications, as described in 8.2.

5 Operations considered critical

IEC 60870-5-101 and IEC 60870-5-104 ASDUs identified as “M” (for “Mandatory”) in the “M/O” (“Mandatory or Optional”) column in 10.10 shall be considered critical operations. Stations complying with this standard shall require the sender to authenticate those ASDUs. Any station may optionally require authentication of any other ASDUs.

Devices complying with this standard shall provide information along with the Interoperability Tables identifying which ASDUs the device/station considers critical, requiring authentication. Refer to 10.10. If an ASDU is identified as critical, the ACT or DEACT cause of transmission is shall be considered mandatory critical, but not ACTCON or ACT_TERM.

IEC/TS 62351-5 states that any device may arbitrarily decide that an ASDU is critical and can therefore initiate a challenge for any reason. However, IEC 60870-5 shall not enforce this rule. ASDUs that are considered critical at any time by an IEC 60870-5 station shall always be considered critical by that station unless the station is reconfigured.

Any ASDUs capable of changing security configuration parameters, now or in the future, shall be considered critical.

6 Addressing information

Each IEC 60870-5-101 station shall include in its MAC calculations the destination station address from the IEC 60870-5 data link layer in the "Addressing Information" portion of the calculation. The octets of the address when included in the calculation shall be as transmitted.

7 Implementation of messages

7.1 Overview of clause

This clause describes how the secure authentication messages described in IEC/TS 62351-5 are implemented in IEC 60870-5-101 and IEC 60870-5-104.

7.2 Data definitions

7.2.1 Causes of transmission

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Stations implementing secure authentication shall use the causes of transmission listed in Table 1 in addition to those described in 7.2.3 of IEC 60870-5-101:2003.

Table 1 – Additional cause of transmission

- Cause := UI6[1..6]<14..16>
- <14> := authentication
- <15> := maintenance of authentication session key
- <16> := maintenance of user role and update key

7.2.2 Type identifiers

Stations implementing secure authentication shall use the Type Identifications listed in Table 2 in addition to those described in 7.2.1 of IEC 60870-5-101:2003 and Clause 6 of IEC 60870-5-104:2006. This range of Type Identifications was previously allocated for system information in the monitor direction. The ASDUs identified by these types may be transmitted in either the control or monitor direction.

Table 2 – Additional type identifiers

- | | | | |
|---------------------|----|--|-----------|
| TYPE IDENTIFICATION | := | UI8[1..8]<81..87> | |
| <41> | := | integrated totals containing time tagged security statistics | S_IT_TC_1 |
| <81> | := | authentication challenge | S_CH_NA_1 |
| <82> | := | authentication reply | S_RP_NA_1 |
| <83> | := | aggressive mode authentication request | S_AR_NA_1 |
| <84> | := | session key status request | S_KR_NA_1 |

<85>	:=	session key status	S_KS_NA_1
<86>	:=	session key change	S_KC_NA_1
<87>	:=	authentication error	S_ER_NA_1
<90>	:=	user status change	S_US_NA_1
<91>	:=	update key change request	S_UQ_NA_1
<92>	:=	update key change reply	S_UR_NA_1
<93>	:=	update key change symmetric	S_UK_NA_1
<94>	:=	update key change asymmetric	S_UA_NA_1
<95>	:=	update key change confirmation	S_UC_NA_1

7.2.3 Security statistics

Stations implementing secure authentication shall use the ASDU Type 41: *Integrated totals containing time-tagged security statistics* to report the values of the security statistics described in 7.3.2 of IEC/TS 62351-5:2013. This ASDU type is defined in 7.3.15. The Information Object Address of each security statistic shall be recorded in the Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement for each station as described in 10.9.

The procedures used by the outstation to report the security statistics shall be the same as for the existing integrated totals, as described in 7.4.8 of IEC 60870-5-101:2003, particularly including the ability for these totals to be reported using spontaneous transmission.

All security statistics shall be placed reported in a single integrated totals group.

7.2.4 Variable length data

IEC/TS 62351-5 allocates two octets in each message for the length field of variable length data, permitting the variable length data to be up to 62 335 octets long. In all cases, this is much larger than necessary. To conserve buffer space and reduce the probability of buffer overflow attacks, the maximum value of these length fields shall be limited as defined in Table 3.

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Table 3 – Maximum lengths of variable length data

Abbrev.	Name	Subclause in IEC 60870-5-7:2013	Message name	Maximum length for IEC/TS 60870-5-7 (octets)
CLN	Challenge data length	7.3.1	Challenge	64
		7.3.4	Key Status	
		7.3.11	Update Key Change Reply	
HLN	MAC length	7.3.2	Reply	64
WKL	Wrapped key data length	7.3.6	Session Key Change	1 024
ELN	Error length	7.3.7	Error	128
UNL	User name length	7.3.9	User Status Change	256
		7.3.10	Update Key Change Request	
UKL	User public key length	7.3.9	User Status Change	6 144
CDL	Certification Data Length	7.3.8	User Certificate	8 192
		7.3.9	User Status Change	1 024
CCL	Controlling station challenge data length	7.3.10	Update Key Change Request	64
EUL	Encrypted update key length	7.3.12	Update Key Change – sym	8 192
		7.3.13	Update Key Change – asym	