IEC 62443-3-2

Edition 1.0 2020-06

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

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Security for industrial automation and control systems – Part 3-2: Security risk assessment for system design

IEC 62443-3-2:2020-06(en)

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

ICS 25.040.40; 35.030

ISBN 978-2-8322-8501-5

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

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SECURITY FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS –

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FOREWORD

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International Standard IEC 62443-3-2 has been prepared by IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

The text of this standard is based on the following documents:

FDIS	Report on voting
65/799/FDIS	65/804/RVD

Full information on the voting for the approval of this International Standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This document has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts in the IEC 62443 series, published under the general title *Security for industrial automation and control systems*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to the specific document. At this date, the document will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

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INTRODUCTION

There is no simple recipe for how to secure an industrial automation and control system (IACS) and there is good reason for this. It is because security is a matter of risk management. Every IACS presents a different risk to the organization depending upon the threats it is exposed to, the likelihood of those threats arising, the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and the consequences if the system were to be compromised. Furthermore, every organization that owns and operates an IACS has a different tolerance for risk.

This document strives to define a set of engineering measures that will guide an organization through the process of assessing the risk of a particular IACS and identifying and applying security countermeasures to reduce that risk to tolerable levels.

A key concept in this document is the application of IACS security zones and conduits. Zones and conduits are introduced in IEC TS 62443-1-1.

This document has been developed in cooperation with the ISA99 liaison. ISA99 is the committee on Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security of the International Society of Automation (ISA).

The audience for this document is intended to include the asset owner, system integrator, product supplier, service provider, and compliance authority.

This document provides a basis for specifying security countermeasures by aligning the target security levels (SL-Ts) identified in this document with the required capability security levels (SL-Cs) specified in IEC 62443-3-3.

SECURITY FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS –

Part 3-2: Security risk assessment for system design

1 Scope

This part of IEC 62443 establishes requirements for:

- defining a system under consideration (SUC) for an industrial automation and control system (IACS);
- partitioning the SUC into zones and conduits;
- assessing risk for each zone and conduit;
- establishing the target security level (SL-T) for each zone and conduit; and
- documenting the security requirements.

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 62443-3-3:2013, *Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-3: System security requirements and security levels*

3 Terms, definitions, abbreviated terms, acronyms and conventions

3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://www.iso.org/obp
- IEC Electropedia: available at http://www.electropedia.org/

3.1.1
channel
specific logical or physical communication link between assets

Note 1 to entry: A channel facilitates the establishment of a connection.

3.1.2
compliance authority
entity with jurisdiction to determine the adequacy of a security assessment or the effectiveness of implementation as specified in a governing document

Note 1 to entry: Examples of compliance authorities include government agencies, regulators, external and internal auditors.

3.1.3
conduit
logical grouping of communication channels that share common security requirements connecting two or more zones

3.1.4
confidentiality
preservation of authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information

3.1.5
consequence
result of an incident, usually described in terms of health and safety effects, environmental impacts, loss of property, loss of information (for example, intellectual property), and/or business interruption costs, that occurs from a particular incident

3.1.6
countermeasure
action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces a threat, a vulnerability, or the consequences of an attack by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can be taken

Note 1 to entry: The term “control” is also used to describe this concept in some contexts. The term countermeasure has been chosen for this document to avoid confusion with the word control in the context of “process control.”

3.1.7
cyber security
measures taken to protect a computer or computer system against unauthorized access or attack

Note 1 to entry: IACS are computer systems.

3.1.8
dataflow
movement of data through a system comprised of software, hardware, or a combination of both

3.1.9
external network
network that is connected to the SUC that is not part of the SUC

3.1.10
impact
measure of the ultimate loss or harm associated with a consequence

EXAMPLE: The consequence of the incident was a spill. The impact of the spill was a $100 000 fine and $25 000 in clean-up expenses.

Note 1 to entry: Impact may be expressed in terms of numbers of injuries and/or fatalities, extent of environmental damage and/or magnitude of losses such as property damage, material loss, loss of intellectual property, lost production, market share loss, and recovery costs.

3.1.11
likelihood
chance of something happening

Note 1 to entry: In risk management terminology, the word “likelihood” is used to refer to the chance of something happening, whether defined, measured or determined objectively or subjectively, qualitatively or quantitatively, and described using general terms or mathematically (such as a probability or a frequency over a given time period).

Note 2 to entry: A number of factors are considered when estimating likelihood in information system risk management such as the motivation and capability of the threat source, the history of similar threats, known vulnerabilities, the attractiveness of the target, etc.

[SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009 [13][1], 3.6.1.1 and ISO/IEC 27005:2018 [12], 3.7]

3.1.12
process hazard analysis
set of organized and systematic assessments of the potential hazards associated with an industrial process

3.1.13
residual risk
risk that remains after existing countermeasures are implemented (such as, the net risk or risk after countermeasures are applied)

3.1.14
risk
expectation of loss expressed as the likelihood that a particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability with a particular consequence

3.1.15
security level
SL
measure of confidence that the SUC, security zone or conduit is free from vulnerabilities and functions in the intended manner

3.1.16
security perimeter
logical or physical boundary surrounding all the assets that are controlled and protected by the security zone

3.1.17
system under consideration
SUC
defined collection of IACS assets that are needed to provide a complete automation solution, including any relevant network infrastructure assets

Note 1 to entry: An SUC consists of one or more zones and related conduits. All assets within a SUC belong to either a zone or conduit.

3.1.18
threat
circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image or reputation) and/or organizational assets including IACS

Note 1 to entry: Circumstances include individuals who, contrary to security policy, intentionally or unintentionally prevent access to data or cause the destruction, disclosure, or modification of data such as control logic/parameters, protection logic/parameters or diagnostics.

3.1.19
threat environment
summary of information about threats, such as threat sources, threat vectors and trends, that have the potential to adversely impact a defined target (for example, company, facility or SUC)

[1] Numbers in square brackets refer to the bibliography.

3.1.20
threat source
intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability or a situation and method that can accidentally exploit a vulnerability

3.1.21
threat vector
path or means by which a threat source can gain access to an asset

3.1.22
tolerable risk
level of risk deemed acceptable to an organization

Note 1 to entry: Organizations should include consideration of legal requirements when establishing tolerable risk. Additional guidance on establishing tolerable risk can be found in ISO 31000 [14] and NIST 800-39 [16].

3.1.23
unmitigated cyber security risk
level of cyber security risk that is present in a system before any cyber security countermeasures are considered

Note 1 to entry: This level helps identify how much cyber security risk reduction is required to be provided by any countermeasure.

3.1.24
vulnerability

flaw or weakness in a system's design, implementation or operation and management that could be exploited to violate the system's integrity or security policy

3.1.25
zone

grouping of logical or physical assets based upon risk or other criteria, such as criticality of assets, operational function, physical or logical location, required access (for example, least privilege principles) or responsible organization

Note 1 to entry: Collection of logical or physical assets that represents partitioning of a system under consideration on the basis of their common security requirements, criticality (for example, high financial, health, safety, or environmental impact), functionality, logical and physical (including location) relationship.

3.2 Abbreviated terms and acronyms

The list below defines the abbreviated terms and acronyms used in this document.

ANSI	American National Standards Institute
BPCS	Basic process control system
CERT	Computer emergency response team
CRS	Cyber security requirements specification
DCS	Distributed control system
HMI	Human machine interface
HSE	Health, safety and environment
HVAC	Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning
IACS	Industrial automation and control system(s)
ICS-CERT	Industrial control system CERT
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IIoT	Industrial Internet of Things
IPL	Independent protection layer