

# TECHNICAL REPORT



**OPC unified architecture –  
Part 2: Security Model**

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Part 2: Security Model**

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IEC TR 62541-2:2016

INTERNATIONAL  
ELECTROTECHNICAL  
COMMISSION

ICS 25.040.40; 35.100.01

ISBN 978-2-8322-3641-3

**Warning! Make sure that you obtained this publication from an authorized distributor.**

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**OPC UNIFIED ARCHITECTURE –**

**Part 2: Security Model**

**FOREWORD**

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IEC TR 62541-2, which is a technical report, has been prepared by subcommittee 65E: Devices and integration in enterprise systems, of IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
65E/413/DTR	65E/464/RVC

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition of IEC TR 62541-2, published in 2010.

This second edition includes no technical changes with respect to the first edition but a number of clarifications and additional text for completeness.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

Throughout this document and the referenced other parts of the series, certain document conventions are used:

- Italics are used to denote a defined term or definition that appears in the “Terms and definition” clause in one of the parts of the series.
- Italics are also used to denote the name of a service input or output parameter or the name of a structure or element of a structure that are usually defined in tables.
- The italicized terms and names are also often written in camel-case (the practice of writing compound words or phrases in which the elements are joined without spaces, with each element's initial letter capitalized within the compound). For example the defined term is *AddressSpace* instead of *Address Space*. This makes it easier to understand that there is a single definition for *AddressSpace*, not separate definitions for *Address* and *Space*.

A list of all parts of the IEC 62541 series, published under the general title *OPC unified architecture*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

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# OPC UNIFIED ARCHITECTURE –

## Part 2: Security Model

### 1 Scope

This part of IEC 62541, which is a Technical Report, describes the OPC unified architecture (OPC UA) security model. It describes the security threats of the physical, hardware, and software environments in which OPC UA is expected to run. It describes how OPC UA relies upon other standards for security. It provides definition of common security terms that are used in this and other parts of the OPC UA specification. It gives an overview of the security features that are specified in other parts of the OPC UA specification. It references services, mappings, and *Profiles* that are specified normatively in other parts of this multi-part specification. It provides suggestions or best practice guidelines on implementing security. Any seeming ambiguity between this part of IEC 62541 and one of the normative parts of IEC 62541 does not remove or reduce the requirement specified in the normative part.

Note that there are many different aspects of security that have to be addressed when developing applications. However since OPC UA specifies a communication protocol, the focus is on securing the data exchanged between applications. This does not mean that an application developer can ignore the other aspects of security like protecting persistent data against tampering. It is important that the developers look into all aspects of security and decide how they can be addressed in the application.

This part of IEC 62541 is directed to readers who will develop OPC UA *Client* or *Server* applications or implement the OPC UA services layer. It is also for end users that wish to understand the various security features and functionality provided by OPC UA. It also offers some suggestions that can be applied when deploying systems. These suggestions are generic in nature since the details would depend on the actual implementation of the *OPC UA Applications* and the choices made for the site security.

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with Web Services and XML/SOAP. Information on these technologies can be found in SOAP Part 1: and SOAP Part 2.

### 2 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 62351 (all parts), *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security*

IEC TR 62541-1, *OPC unified architecture – Part 1: Overview and concepts*

IEC 62541-4, *OPC unified architecture – Part 4: Services*

IEC 62541-5, *OPC unified architecture – Part 5: Information Model*

IEC 62541-6, *OPC unified architecture – Part 6: Mappings*

IEC 62541-7, *OPC unified architecture – Part 7: Profiles*



SOAP Part 1: SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1: Messaging Framework

Available from Internet: <http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-part1/> (website checked 2016-04-05)

SOAP Part 2: SOAP Version 1.2 Part 2: Adjuncts

Available from Internet: <http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-part2/> (website checked 2016-04-05)

XML Encryption: XML Encryption Syntax and Processing

Available from Internet: <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/> (website checked 2016-04-05)

XML Signature: XML-Signature Syntax and Processing

Available from Internet: <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlsig-core/> (website checked 2016-04-05)

WS Security: SOAP Message Security 1.1

Available from Internet: <http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/16790/wss-v1.1-spec-os-SOAPMessageSecurity.pdf> (website checked 2016-04-05)

WS Secure Conversation: Web Services Secure Conversation Language (WS-SecureConversation)

Available from Internet: <http://specs.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/sc/WS-SecureConversation.pdf> (website checked 2016-04-05)

SSL/TLS: RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0

Available from Internet: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt> (website checked 2016-04-05)

X.509: X.509 Public Key Certificate Infrastructure

Available from Internet: <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459> (website checked 2016-04-05)

HTTP: RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol - HTTP/1.1

Available from Internet: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt> (website checked 2016-04-05)

HTTPS: RFC 2818: HTTP Over TLS

Available from Internet: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2818.txt> (website checked 2016-04-05)

IS Glossary: Internet Security Glossary

Available from Internet: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2828.txt> (website checked 2016-04-05)

NIST 800-57: Part 3: Application-Specific Key Management Guidance

Available from Internet: [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57\\_PART3\\_key-management\\_Dec2009.pdf](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_PART3_key-management_Dec2009.pdf) (website checked 2016-04-05)

NERC CIP: CIP 002-1 through CIP 009-1, by North-American Electric Reliability Council

Available from Internet: <http://www.nerc.com/files/cip-002-1.pdf> (website checked 2016-04-05)

SHA-1: Secure Hash Algorithm RFC

Available from Internet: <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3174> (website checked 2016-04-05)

PKI: Public Key Infrastructure article in Wikipedia

Available from Internet: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public\\_key\\_infrastructure](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_infrastructure) (website checked 2016-04-05)

X509 PKI: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure

Available from Internet: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280.txt> (website checked 2016-04-05)

### 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations

#### 3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in IEC TR 62541-1 as well as the following apply.

##### 3.1.1

#### **Application Instance**

individual installation of a program running on one computer

Note 1 to entry: There can be several Application Instances of the same application running at the same time on several computers or possibly the same computer.

##### 3.1.2

#### **Application Instance Certificate**

*Digital Certificate* of an individual *Application Instance* that has been installed in an individual host

Note 1 to entry: Different installations of one software product would have different Application Instance Certificates.

##### 3.1.3

#### **Asymmetric Cryptography**

*Cryptography* method that uses a pair of keys, one that is designated the *Private Key* and kept secret, the other called the *Public Key* that is generally made available

Note 1 to entry: Asymmetric Cryptography is also known as "public-key cryptography". In an Asymmetric Encryption algorithm when an entity A wants to ensure *Confidentiality* for data it sends to another entity B, entity A encrypts the data with a *Public Key* provided by entity B. Only entity B has the matching *Private Key* that is needed to decrypt the data. In an asymmetric Digital Signature algorithm when an entity A wants to ensure Integrity or provide Authentication for data it sends to an entity B, entity A uses its *Private Key* to sign the data. To verify the signature, entity B uses the matching *Public Key* that entity A has provided. In an asymmetric key agreement algorithm, entity A and entity B send their own *Public Key* to the other entity. Then each uses their own *Private Key* and the other's *Public Key* to compute the new key value according to IS Glossary.

##### 3.1.4

#### **Asymmetric Encryption**

the mechanism used by *Asymmetric Cryptography* for encrypting data with the *Public Key* of an entity and for decrypting data with the associated *Private Key*

##### 3.1.5

#### **Asymmetric Signature**

the mechanism used by *Asymmetric Cryptography* for signing data with the *Private Key* of an entity and for verifying the data's signature with the associated *Public Key*

##### 3.1.6

#### **Auditability**

security objective that assures that any actions or activities in a system can be recorded

##### 3.1.7

#### **Auditing**

the tracking of actions and activities in the system, including security related activities where the *Audit* records can be used to review and verify system operations

##### 3.1.8

#### **Authentication**

security objective that assures that the identity of an entity such as a *Client*, *Server*, or user can be verified

### 3.1.9

#### **Authorization**

the ability to grant access to a system resource

### 3.1.10

#### **Availability**

security objective that assures that the system is running normally; that is, no services have been compromised in such a way to become unavailable or severely degraded

### 3.1.11

#### **Certificate Authority**

entity that can issue *Digital Certificates*, also known as a CA

Note 1 to entry: The *Digital Certificate* certifies the ownership of a Public Key by the named subject of the *Certificate*. This allows others (relying parties) to rely upon signatures or assertions made by the Private Key that corresponds to the *Public Key* that is certified. In this model of trust relationships, a CA is a trusted third party that is trusted by both the subject (owner) of the *Certificate* and the party relying upon the *Certificate*. CAs are characteristic of many Public Key infrastructure (PKI) schemes.

### 3.1.12

#### **Certificate Store**

persistent location where *Certificates* and *Certificate* revocation lists (CRLs) are stored

Note 1 to entry: It may be a disk resident file structure or on Windows platforms, it may be a Windows registry location.

### 3.1.13

#### **Confidentiality**

security objective that assures the protection of data from being read by unintended parties

### 3.1.14

#### **Cryptography**

transforming clear, meaningful information into an enciphered, unintelligible form using an algorithm and a key

### 3.1.15

#### **Cyber Security Management System**

#### **CSMS**

program designed by an organization to maintain the security of the entire organization's assets to an established level of *Confidentiality*, *Integrity*, and *Availability*, whether they are on the business side or the industrial automation and control systems side of the organization

### 3.1.16

#### **Digital Certificate**

structure that associates an identity with an entity such as a user, a product or an *Application Instance* where the *Certificate* has an associated asymmetric key pair which can be used to authenticate that the entity does, indeed, possess the *Private Key*

### 3.1.17

#### **Digital Signature**

value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and appended to data in such a way that any recipient of the data can use the signature to verify the data's origin and *Integrity*

### 3.1.18

#### **Hash Function**

algorithm such as SHA-1 for which it is computationally infeasible to find either a data object that maps to a given hash result (the "one-way" property) or two data objects that map to the same hash result (the "collision-free" property), see IS Glossary

**3.1.19**  
**Hashed Message Authentication Code**  
**HMAC**

MAC that has been generated using an iterative *Hash Function*

**3.1.20**  
**Integrity**

security objective that assures that information has not been modified or destroyed in an unauthorized manner, see IS Glossary

**3.1.21**  
**Key Exchange Algorithm**

protocol used for establishing a secure communication path between two entities in an unsecured environment whereby both entities apply a specific algorithm to securely exchange secret keys that are used for securing the communication between them

Note 1 to entry: A typical example of a Key Exchange Algorithm is the SSL Handshake Protocol specified in SSL/TLS.

**3.1.22**  
**Message Authentication Code**  
**MAC**

short piece of data that results from an algorithm that uses a secret key (see *Symmetric Cryptography*) to hash a *Message* whereby the receiver of the *Message* can check against alteration of the *Message* by computing a *MAC* that should be identical using the same *Message* and secret key

**3.1.23**  
**Message Signature**

*Digital Signature* used to ensure the *Integrity* of *Messages* that are sent between two entities

Note 1 to entry: There are several ways to generate and verify Message Signatures however they can be categorized as symmetric (See 3.1.34) and asymmetric (See 3.1.5) approaches.

**3.1.24**  
**Non-Repudiation**

strong and substantial evidence of the identity of the signer of a *Message* and of *Message Integrity*, sufficient to prevent a party from successfully denying the original submission or delivery of the *Message* and the *Integrity* of its contents

**3.1.25**  
**Nonce**

random number that is used once, typically by algorithms that generate security keys

**3.1.26**  
**OPC UA Application**

OPC UA *Client*, which calls OPC UA services, or an OPC UA *Server*, which performs those services

**3.1.27**  
**Private Key**

the secret component of a pair of cryptographic keys used for *Asymmetric Cryptography*

**3.1.28**  
**Public Key**

the publicly-disclosed component of a pair of cryptographic keys used for *Asymmetric Cryptography*, see IS Glossary