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TECHNICAL REPORT

colour inside

Industrial-process measurement, control and automation – Framework for functional safety and security

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INDUSTRIAL-PROCESS MEASUREMENT, CONTROL AND AUTOMATION – FRAMEWORK FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY AND SECURITY

FOREWORD

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IEC TR 63069 has been prepared by IEC technical committee TC 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

The text of this Technical Report is based on the following documents:

Draft DTR	Report on voting
65/698/DTR	65/713A/RVDTR

Full information on the voting for the approval of this Technical Report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This document has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to the specific document. At this date, the document will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

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INTRODUCTION

0.1 Purpose of this document

Many sector specific guides, standards and technical specifications have been developed in the fields of safety and security. However, a generic document for framework for safety and security is largely expected by industry actors. Even the terms "safety" and "security" are sometimes used for different meanings in these documents. As a result, it can be difficult to apply them holistically at the same time to a manufacturing system.

0.2 Background

Security has become a new factor to be considered in system engineering. The parts of the IEC 61508 series published in 2010 took into account that security can impact functional safety.

In IEC TC 65 (Industrial-process measurement, control and automation), considerable concerns arose with respect to the impacts of security incidents to safety functions in IACS (industrial automation and control systems); many complex systems of that kind are becoming connected systems (particularly by interaction based on wireless connectivity from sensors/actuators to complete plants, grids, etc.) for maintenance and operations. The overall question was: "How to design and manage safety and security – in cooperation, integrated, or separate system?"

0.3 Issues on the terminology

Definitions of some terms, such as "safety", "security" and "risk", are sometimes different in different documents. Although they are consistent in a set of documents in each area of safety and security, they can be inconsistent when both standards are applied at the same time. From these reasons, the terminology is carefully used in this document.

0.4 Target audience

The target audience of this document includes, but is not limited to,

– asset owners (including those responsible for concept and governance),
– system integrators (including those responsible for design and realisation),
– product suppliers (including those responsible for design and realisation),
– service providers (including operators and maintainers), and
– authorities (including those responsible for assessment and audit).

INDUSTRIAL-PROCESS MEASUREMENT, CONTROL AND AUTOMATION – FRAMEWORK FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY AND SECURITY

1 Scope

This document explains and provides guidance on the common application of IEC 61508 (all parts) and IEC 62443 (all parts) in the area of industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

This document can apply to other industrial sectors where IEC 61508 (all parts) and IEC 62443 (all parts) are applied.

NOTE Usage or reference of this document for industry specific sector standards is encouraged.

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 61508 (all parts), *Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems*

IEC 62443 (all parts), *Security for industrial automation and control systems*

3 Terms, definitions, symbols, abbreviated terms and conventions

3.1 Terms and definitions defined for this document

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- IEC Electropedia: available at http://www.electropedia.org/
- ISO Online browsing platform: available at http://www.iso.org/obp

NOTE Within this document, new terms and definitions are created only if not provided by the IEC 61508 series or the IEC 62443 series.

3.1.1
incident handling
actions of detecting, reporting, assessing, responding to, dealing with, and learning from security incidents

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016, 3.6, modified – The words "information security incidents" has been replaced by "security incidents".]

3.1.2
incident response
actions taken to mitigate or resolve a security incident, including those taken to protect and restore the normal operational conditions of an IACS and the information stored in it

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016, 3.7, modified – The words "information security incident" were replaced by "security incident", and "information system" was replaced by "IACS".]

3.1.3
safety domain
safety activities carried out by assigned persons or organizations and their outcomes according to IEC 61508 (all parts)

3.1.4
security domain
security activities carried out by assigned persons or organizations and their outcomes according to IEC 62443 (all parts)

3.1.5
security environment
area of consideration where all relevant security countermeasures are in place and effective

3.1.6
access
ability and means to communicate with or otherwise interact with a system in order to use system resources

Note 1 to entry: Access may involve physical access (authorization to be allowed physically in an area, possession of a physical key lock, PIN code, or access card or biometric attributes that allow access) or logical access (authorization to log in to a system and application, through a combination of logical and physical means).

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.1]

3.1.7
architecture
specific configuration of hardware and software elements in a system

[SOURCE: IEC 61508-4:2010, 3.3.4]

3.1.8
asset
physical or logical object owned by or under the custodial duties of an organization, having either a perceived or actual value to the organization

Note 1 to entry: In the case of industrial automation and control systems the physical assets that have the largest directly measurable value may be the equipment under control.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.6]

3.1.9
attack
assault on a system that derives from an intelligent threat – i.e., an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security services and violate the security policy of a system

Note 1 to entry: There are different commonly recognized classes of attack:

- An "active attack" attempts to alter system resources or affect their operation.
- A "passive attack" attempts to learn or make use of information from the system but does not affect system resources.
- An "inside attack" is an attack initiated by an entity inside the security perimeter (an "insider") – i.e., an entity that is authorized to access system resources but uses them in a way not approved by those who granted the authorization.
- An "outside attack" is initiated from outside the perimeter, by an unauthorized or illegitimate user of the system (including an insider attacking from outside the security perimeter). Potential outside attackers range from amateur pranksters to organized criminals, international terrorists, and hostile governments.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.9]

3.1.10
availability
ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under given conditions at a given instant or over a given time interval, assuming that the required external resources are provided

Note 1 to entry: This ability depends on the combined aspects of the reliability performance, the maintainability performance and the maintenance support performance.

Note 2 to entry: Required external resources, other than maintenance resources do not affect the availability performance of the item.

Note 3 to entry: In French the term "disponibilité" is also used in the sense of "instantaneous availability"."

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.16]

3.1.11
confidentiality
assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, processes, or devices

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.28]

3.1.12
countermeasure
action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can be taken

Note 1 to entry: The term "control" is also used to describe this concept in some contexts. The term countermeasure has been chosen for IEC TS 62443-1-1 to avoid confusion with the term "control" in the context of process control.

Note 2 to entry: The words "minimizing the harm" in this definition do not relate to functional safety.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.33, modified – Addition of Note 2 to entry.]

3.1.13
dangerous failure
failure of an element and/or subsystem and/or system that plays a part in implementing the safety function that:

a) prevents a safety function from operating when required (demand mode) or causes a safety function to fail (continuous mode) such that the EUC is put into a hazardous or potentially hazardous state; or

b) decreases the probability that the safety function operates correctly when required

[SOURCE: IEC 61508-4:2010, 3.6.7]

3.1.14
defence in depth
provision of multiple security protections, especially in layers, with the intent to delay if not prevent an attack

Note 1 to entry: Defence in depth implies layers of security and detection, even on single systems, and provides the following features:

- attackers are faced with breaking through or bypassing each layer without being detected;
- a flaw in one layer can be mitigated by capabilities in other layers;
- a system security becomes a set of layers within the overall network security.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.40]

3.1.15
essential function
function or capability that is required to maintain health, safety, the environment and availability for the equipment under control

Note 1 to entry: Essential functions include, but are not limited to, the safety instrumented function (SIF), the control function and the ability of the operator to view and manipulate the equipment under control. The loss of essential functions is commonly termed loss of protection, loss of control and loss of view respectively. In some industries additional functions such as history may be considered essential.

[SOURCE: IEC 62443-3-3:2013, 3.1.22]

3.1.16
functional safety
part of the overall safety relating to the EUC and the EUC control system that depends on the correct functioning of the E/E/PE safety-related systems and other risk reduction measures

[SOURCE: IEC 61508-4:2010, 3.1.12]

3.1.17
harm
physical injury or damage to the health of people or damage to property or the environment

[SOURCE: IEC 61508-4:2010, 3.1.1]

3.1.18
hazard
potential source of harm

Note 1 to entry: The term includes danger to persons arising within a short time scale (for example, fire and explosion) and also those that have a long-term effect on a person's health (for example, release of a toxic substance).

[SOURCE: IEC 61508-4:2010, 3.1.2]

3.1.19
incident
event that is not part of the expected operation of a system or service that causes or may cause, an interruption to, or a reduction in, the quality of the service provided by the system

[SOURCE: IEC 62443-2-1:2010, 3.1.18]

3.1.20
industrial automation and control systems
IACS
collection of personnel, hardware, and software that can affect or influence the safe, secure, and reliable operation of an industrial process

Note 1 to entry: These systems include, but are not limited to:

- industrial control systems, including distributed control systems (DCSs), programmable logic controllers (PLCs), remote terminal units (RTUs), intelligent electronic devices, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), networked electronic sensing and control, and monitoring and diagnostic systems. (In this context, process control systems include basic process control system and safety instrumented system (SIS) functions, whether they are physically separate or integrated.)
- associated information systems such as advanced or multivariable control, online optimizers, dedicated equipment monitors, graphical interfaces, process historians, manufacturing execution systems, and plant information management systems.
- associated internal, human, network, or machine interfaces used to provide control, safety, and manufacturing operations functionality to continuous, batch, discrete, and other processes.

[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.57]