

SLOVENSKI STANDARD

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Uporabniški vmesnik za pametne kartice, ki se uporabljajo kot naprave za izdelovanje varnega podpisa - 1. del: Osnovne storitve

Application Interface for smart cards used as Secure Signature Creation Devices - Part 1: Basic services

Anwendungsschnittstelle für Chipkarten, die zur Erzeugung gesicherter Signaturen verwendet werden — Teil 1 Basis-Anforderungen

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Interfaces applicatives des cartes à puce utilisées pour le création de signatures électroniques sécurisées - Partie 1: Services de base

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Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: EN 14890-1:2008

ICS:

35.240.15	Identifikacijske kartice in sorodne naprave	Identification cards and related devices
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**Application Interface for smart cards used as Secure Signature
Creation Devices - Part 1: Basic services**

Interface applicative des cartes à puces utilisées comme dispositifs de création de signature numérique sécurisés -
Partie 1 : Services de bases

Anwendungsschnittstelle für Chipkarten, die zur Erzeugung qualifizierter elektronischer Signaturen verwendet werden -
Teil 1: Allgemeine Dienste

This European Standard was approved by CEN on 27 September 2008.

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Contents

Foreword.....	6
1 Scope	7
2 Normative references	8
3 Terms and definitions	8
4 Symbols and abbreviations	11
5 Signature application	13
5.1 Application Flow	13
5.2 Trusted environment versus untrusted environment.....	16
5.3 Selection of ESIGN application	16
5.3.1 General.....	16
5.3.2 Exceptions for Secure Messaging	17
5.4 Selection of cryptographic information application	17
5.5 Concurrent usage of signature applications	17
5.5.1 General.....	17
5.5.2 Methods of channel selection	17
5.5.3 Security issues on multiple channels.....	17
5.6 Security environment selection	18
5.7 Key selection.....	18
5.8 Basic Security Services	18
6 User verification.....	19
6.1 General.....	19
6.2 Knowledge based user verification	19
6.2.1 General.....	19
6.2.2 Explicit user verification	20
6.2.3 Password related mechanisms	20
6.2.4 Presentation formats	21
6.2.5 Retry counters.....	21
6.2.6 Password Change.....	21
6.2.7 Reset of RC and setting a new password	22
6.3 Biometric user verification	23
6.3.1 General.....	23
6.3.2 Retrieval of the Biometric Information Template	24
6.3.3 Performing the biometric user verification	25
6.3.4 Reset of RC.....	27
7 Digital Signature Service	28
7.1 Signature generation algorithms	28
7.2 Activation of digital signature service.....	28
7.3 General aspects	29
7.4 Signature Generation	30
7.4.1 No hashing in Card	30
7.4.2 Partial hashing	31
7.4.3 All hashing in Card	32
7.5 Selection of different keys, algorithms and input formats.....	33
7.5.1 Restore an existing SE	34
7.5.2 Modify the HT of a current SE	34
7.5.3 Modify the DST of a current SE	35
7.6 Read certificates and certificate related information.....	36
7.6.1 Read certificate related CIOs.....	36
7.6.2 Read signer's certificate from ICC	36
7.6.3 Retrieval of the signer's certificate from a directory service	37

8	Device authentication	38
8.1	Certification authorities and certificates.....	38
8.1.1	Certificate chains.....	38
8.1.2	Usage of cross certificates.....	39
8.2	Authentication environments.....	40
8.2.1	SCA in trusted environment.....	40
8.2.2	SCA in untrusted environment	41
8.2.3	Specification of the environment.....	41
8.2.4	Display message mechanism	41
8.2.5	Additional authentication environments.....	41
8.3	Key transport and key agreement mechanisms	41
8.4	Key transport protocol based on RSA	42
8.4.1	Authentication Steps.....	43
8.4.2	Session Key creation	52
8.5	Device authentication with privacy protection.....	52
8.5.1	Authentication steps	53
8.6	Privacy constrained Modular EAC (mEAC) protocol with non-traceability feature (based on elliptic curves)	70
8.6.1	Example for traceability case.....	70
8.6.2	Notation	70
8.6.3	Authentication steps	71
8.7	Asymmetric Authentication summary.....	82
8.8	Symmetric authentication scheme	83
8.8.1	Authentication steps	83
8.8.2	Session Key creation	86
8.9	Compute Session keys from key seed K _{IFDICC}	87
8.9.1	Compute TDES session keys	87
8.9.2	Compute AES-128 session keys for CBC mode and EMAC	88
8.9.3	Compute AES-128 session keys for CBC mode and CMAC	88
8.10	Compute send sequence counter SSC	89
8.11	Post-authentication phase.....	89
8.12	Ending the secure session.....	89
8.12.1	Example for ending a secure session.....	89
8.12.2	Rules for ending a secure session	89
8.13	Reading the Display Message	90
8.14	Updating the Display Message	92
9	Secure messaging	93
9.1	CLA byte	93
9.2	TLV coding of command and response message	93
9.3	Treatment of SM-Errors	94
9.4	Padding for checksum calculation	94
9.5	Send sequence counter (SSC)	94
9.6	Message structure of Secure Messaging APDUs	95
9.6.1	Cryptograms	95
9.6.2	Cryptographic Checksums	97
9.6.3	Final command APDU construction	100
9.7	Response APDU protection.....	101
9.8	Use of TDES and AES	107
9.8.1	TDES/AES encryption/decryption.....	107
9.8.2	CBC mode	108
9.8.3	Retail MAC with TDES	108
9.8.4	EMAC with AES	109
9.8.5	CMAC with AES	110
10	Key Generation	111
10.1	Key generation and export using PrK.ICC.AUT	111
10.2	Key generation and export with dynamic or static SM.....	111
10.3	Write certificates.....	112
10.4	Setting keys in static secure messaging	112
11	Key identifiers and parameters	112

11.1	Key identifiers (KID).....	112
11.2	Public Key parameters	112
11.3	DSA with ELC public key parameters.....	113
11.4	RSA Diffie-Hellman key exchange parameters.....	114
11.5	ELC key exchange parameters.....	114
12	Data structures.....	115
12.1	CRTs.....	115
12.1.1	CRT AT for selection of internal authentication keys	115
12.1.2	CRT for selection of IFD's PuK.CA _{IFD} .CS_AUT	115
12.1.3	CRT for selection of IFD's PuK.IFD.AUT	116
12.1.4	CRT AT for selection of the public DH key parameters	116
12.1.5	GENERAL AUTHENTICATE DH key parameters	116
12.1.6	CRT AT for selection of ICC's private authentication key	116
12.1.7	CRT for selection of IFD's PuK.IFD.AUT	117
12.1.8	CRT for selection of PrK.ICC.KA.....	117
12.2	Key transport device authentication protocol	117
12.2.1	EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	117
12.2.2	INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE.....	118
12.3	Privacy device authentication protocol.....	119
12.3.1	EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	119
12.3.2	INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE.....	120
13	AlgIDs, Hash- and DSI Formats	121
13.1	Algorithm Identifiers and OIDs.....	121
13.2	Hash Input-Formats	122
13.2.1	PSO:HASH without command chaining	123
13.2.2	PSO:HASH with command Chaining	124
13.3	Formats of the Digital Signature Input (DSI).....	124
13.3.1	DSI according to ISO/IEC 14888-2 (scheme 2).....	124
13.3.2	DSI according to PKCS #1 V 1.5.....	125
13.3.3	Digest Info for SHA-X	127
13.3.4	DSI according to PKCS #1 V 2.1	128
13.3.5	DSA with DH key parameters	130
13.3.6	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm - ECDSA	130
14	CV_Certificates and Key Management	130
14.1	Level of trust in a certificate	130
14.2	Key Management	130
14.3	Card Verifiable Certificates	131
14.3.1	Signature-Certificates	132
14.3.2	Authentication Certificates	132
14.4	Use of the public key extracted from the certificate	132
14.5	Validity of the key extracted from a certificate	132
14.6	Structure of CVC	133
14.6.1	Non-self-descriptive certificates	133
14.6.2	Self-descriptive certificates	134
14.7	Certificate Content.....	134
14.7.1	CPI-Certificate Profile Identifier.....	135
14.7.2	CAR-Certification Authority Reference	136
14.7.3	CHR-Certificate Holder Reference	137
14.7.4	CHA-Certificate Holder Authorization (CHA)	138
14.7.5	Role identifier specifications	139
14.7.6	CHAT-Certificate Holder Authorization Template (CHAT).....	142
14.7.7	OID — Object identifier	142
14.7.8	CED — Certificate Effective Date	144
14.7.9	CXD — Certificate Expiration date	144
14.8	Certificate signature	144
14.8.1	Non self-descriptive certificates	144
14.8.2	Self descriptive certificates	146
14.9	Coding of the certificate content.....	146
14.9.1	Non self-descriptive certificates	146

14.9.2	Self-descriptive certificates.....	147
14.9.3	Self-descriptive certificates for elliptic curve cryptography.....	147
14.10	Steps of CVC verification.....	150
14.10.1	First round: CVC verification from a Root PuK.....	151
14.10.2	Subsequent round(s)	152
14.11	Commands to handle the CVC.....	152
14.12	C_CV.IFD.AUT (non self-descriptive)	152
14.13	C_CV.CA.CS-AUT (non self-descriptive).....	154
14.14	C.ICC.AUT.....	155
14.15	Self-descriptive CV Certificate (Example).....	155
14.15.1	Public Key	156
15	Files.....	157
15.1	File structure.....	157
15.2	File IDs	158
15.3	EF.DIR	158
15.4	EF.SN.ICC	158
15.5	EF.DH	159
15.6	EF.ELC	159
15.7	EF.C.ICC.AUT	160
15.8	EF.C.CA _{ICC} .CS-AUT.....	160
15.9	EF.C_X509.CH.DS.....	161
15.10	EF.C_X509.CA.CS (DF.ESIGN)	161
15.11	EF.DM.....	161
16	Cryptographic Information Application	162
16.1	ESIGN cryptographic information layout example	163
16.1.1	EF.CIAInfo	164
16.1.2	EF.AOD	165
16.1.3	EF.PrKD	168
16.1.4	EF.PuKD	170
16.1.5	EF.CD	171
16.1.6	EF.DCOD... https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/67862784-9b17-41c3-a187-7ce6a337b157/sist-en-14890-1-2009	172
Annex A	(informative) Device authentication — Cryptographic view	175
A.1	Algorithms for authentication with key exchange or key negotiation	175
A.2	Device authentication with key transport	175
A.2.1	Conformance to ISO/IEC 11770-3	175
A.2.2	Using min(SIG, N-SIG) for the signature token	177
A.3	Device authentication with key negotiation.....	178
A.3.1	Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange.....	179
A.4	Device authentication with privacy protection.....	181
A.4.1	The authenticity of the public DH parameters.....	183
A.5	Device authentication with non traceability	185
A.5.1	Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange.....	185
A.6	The “Grandmaster Chess Attack”	187
Annex B	(informative) Personalization scenarios	189
Annex C	(informative) Build scheme for mEAC Object Identifiers	191
Bibliography	193

Foreword

This document (EN 14890-1:2008) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 224 "xxx", the secretariat of which is held by AFNOR.

This European Standard shall be given the status of a national standard, either by publication of an identical text or by endorsement, at the latest by June 2009, and conflicting national standards shall be withdrawn at the latest by June 2009.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

This document supersedes CWA 14890-1:2004.

This standard additionally provides generic Identification, Authentication and Digital Signature (IAS) services and thereby contains all additional cryptographic services specified in CWA 14890-2.

The standard will enable the development of interoperable cards issued by any card industry sector. The standard will describe an application interface and behavior of the SSCD i.e. it should be possible to implement on e.g. native and interpreter based cards.

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This standard *Application Interface for smart cards used as Secure Signature Creation Devices* consists of two parts:

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- Part 1: "Basic Services" describes the mandatory specifications for an SSCD as part of generic IAS Services to be used in compliance to requirements of Article 5.1 of the Electronic Signature Directive,
- Part 2: "Additional Services" describes remaining services for IAS.

According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organizations of the following countries are bound to implement this European Standard: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

1 Scope

Part 1 of this series specifies the application interface to Smart Cards during the usage phase, used as Secure Signature Creation Devices (SSCD) according to the Terms of the European Directive on Electronic Signature 1999/93 to enable interoperability and usage as SSCD on a national or European level.

This document describes the mandatory services for the usage of Smart Cards as SSCDs based on CEN CWA 14890 (all parts). This covers the signing function, storage of certificates, the related user verification, establishment and use of trusted path and channel, requirements for key generation and the allocation and format of resources required for the execution of those functions and related cryptographic token information.

Thereby the functionality of CWA 14890-1 is enhanced in the following areas:

- Device authentication with Elliptic Curves (ELC) for existing asymmetric authentication protocols (RSA Transport, Privacy Protocol),
- Enhancement of existing asymmetric authentication protocols due to privacy and non-traceability constraints,
- Card Verifiable (CV) Certificate Formats (self descriptive) with ELC for all types of authentication and authorization protocols,
- Secure Messaging Tags and use of commands with Odd-INS Code in compliance to the actual ISO/IEC 7816-4, **iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW
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- Further hash algorithms (SHA2-family) with corresponding Object identifier and Algorithm references,
- Use of AES in authentication protocols, [SIST EN 14890-1:2009](#)
- Use of AES for secure messaging. <https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/67862784-9b17-41c3-a187-7ce6a337b157/sist-en-14890-1-2009>

The following items are out of scope:

- 1) The physical, electrical and transport protocol characteristics of the card,
- 2) The external signature creation process and signature environment,
- 3) The elements required to verify an electronic signature produced by a card used as a SSCD,
- 4) The error handling process.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

NOTE For future implementations refer to the latest versions of the referenced documents; the following list refers to documents relevant at publication of this standard EN 14890.

EN ISO 3166-1, *Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions – Part 1: Country codes* (ISO 3166-1:2006)

ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005, *Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards – Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange*

ISO/IEC 7816-6, *Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards – Part 6: Interindustry data elements for interchange*

ISO/IEC 7816-8:2004, *Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards – Part 8: Commands for security operations*

ISO/IEC 7816-11:2004, *Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards – Part 11: Personal verification through biometric methods*

ISO/IEC 7816-15:2004, *Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards with contacts – Part 15: Cryptographic information application*

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ISO/IEC 9796-2:2008, *Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signature schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms*

ISO 11568-2:2005, *Banking – Key management (retail) – Part 2: Symmetric ciphers, their key management and life cycle*

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ISO/IEC 14888-2:2008, *Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signatures with appendix – Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms*

ISO/IEC 15946-1, *Information Technology – Security techniques — Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General*

ISO/IEC 18033-3, *Information technology – Security techniques – Encryption algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers*

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 and the following apply.

3.1

Answer-to-Reset file

elementary file which indicates operating characteristics of the card

3.2

command-response pair

set of two messages: a command followed by a response

3.3

data element

item of information seen at the interface for which are defined a name, a description of logical content, a format and a coding

3.4**data object**

information seen at the interface which consists of a tag, a length and a value (i.e., a data element)

NOTE In this specification, data objects are referred to as BER-TLV data objects.

3.5**data unit**

smallest set of bits which can be unambiguously referenced

3.6**dedicated file**

file containing file control information and, optionally, memory available for allocation

NOTE It may be the parent of EFs and/or DFs.

3.7**DF name**

string of bytes which uniquely identifies a dedicated file in the card

3.8**elementary file**

set of data units or records which share the same file identifier

NOTE It cannot be the parent of another file.

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3.10**file identifier**

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2-bytes binary value used to address a file

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3.11**master file**

mandatory unique dedicated file representing the root of the file structure

3.12**message**

string of bytes transmitted by the interface device to the card or vice-versa, excluding transmission-oriented characters as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-3

3.13**parent file**

dedicated file immediately preceding a given file within the hierarchy

3.14**password**

data which may be required by the application to be presented to the card by its user

NOTE A password in the context of this specification is a string of numbers and/or ASCII characters.

3.15**path**

concatenation of file identifiers without delimitation

NOTE If the path starts with the identifier of the master file, it is an absolute path.

EN 14890-1:2008 (E)**3.16****private key**

secret part of an asymmetric key pair e.g. signature creation data as specified in the EU directive for electronic signatures

3.17**public key**

public part of an asymmetric key pair

3.18**record**

string of bytes which can be handled as a whole by the card and referenced by a record number

3.19**record number**

sequential number assigned to each record which uniquely identifies the record within its elementary file

3.20**retry counter**

counter being used to count the number of erroneous usages of a related (security) object

NOTE If the object (e.g. password entry) was used correctly (correct password entered) then the retry counter is reset to its initial value. A typical value of a retry counter is 3.

3.21**secret key**

either a symmetrical key or private part of a public key pair

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3.22**trusted channel**

means by which a TSF and a remote trusted SIST EN 14890-1:2009 product can communicate with necessary confidence to support the TSP

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3.23**trusted environment**

operating environment that avoids the fraud with data that is seen at the communication interface by the definition of its physical location, physical security protection or physical access conditions or other measures to protect from tampering or intrusion of data

NOTE See 8.2.3.

3.24**trusted path**

means by which a user and a TSF can communicate with necessary confidence to support the TSP

3.25**untrusted environment**

operating environment that allows tampering and intrusion of data available at the communication interface

NOTE The decision whether an environment is trusted cannot always be made at the system level and therefore might have to be taken by the card holder.

3.26**usage counter**

counter updated each time a related object is used

NOTE Opposite to retry counters, usage counters are not reset to their initial value after the object was successfully used.

4 Symbols and abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AID	Application Identifier
AKI	Authority Key Identifier
AKP	Asymmetric key pair
APDU	Application protocol data unit
AT	Authentication Template, CRT for Authentication
AUT	Authentication
BCD	Binary Coded Decimal
BER	Basic Encoding Rules
C	Certificate
CA	Certification Authority
CAR	CA Reference
CC	Cryptographic Checksum
CG	Cryptogram
CH	Cardholder
CHA	Certificate Holder Authorization
CHR	Certificate Holder Reference
CIA	Cryptographic Information Application
CIO	Cryptographic Information Object
CLA	Class byte
CPI	Certificate Profile Identifier
CRT	Control Reference Template
CS	CertSign, certificate containing the public part of a signature key pair
CV	Card Verifiable
CWA	CEN Workshop Agreement
C/S	Client/Server
D[key](msg)	Decipherment of <msg> with <key>
DE	Data Element
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DF	Dedicated File
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DIR	Directory
DO	Data Object
DS	Digital Signature
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
DSI	Digital Signature Input
DST	Digital Signature Template, CRT for DS
E[key](msg)	Encipherment of <msg> with <key>
ECC	European Citizen Card

EN 14890-1:2008 (E)

EDFB	Encrypted Data Formatted Block
EF	Elementary File
ELC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FCI	File Control Information
FID	File Identifier
h(msg)	hash-code of <msg>
HT	CRT for hash code
ICC	Integrated Circuit(s) Card
ID	Identifier
IFD	Interface Device
INS	Instruction byte
KE	Key Encipherment
KID	Key Identifier
MAC[key](msg)	Message Authentication Code of <msg> built with <key>
MF	Master File
MSE	MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
OID	Object Identifier
PI	Padding Indicator
PIN	Personal Identification Number (standards.iteh.ai)
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standards
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/67862784-9b17-41c3-a187-7ce6a337b157/sist-en-14890-1-2009
PrK	Private Key
PRND	Padding Random Number
PSO	PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme
PuK	Public Key
P1-P2	Parameter bytes
RC	Retry Counter
RCA	RootCA
RD	Reference Data
RFU	Reserved for Future Use
RID	Registered application provider identifier
RND	Random number
RSA	Sig-Alg. of Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SCA	Signature-Creation Application
SE	Security Environment
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SIG()	Signature of
SK	Secret Key
SM	Secure Messaging

SN	Serial Number
SSC	Send Sequence Counter
SSCD	Secure Signature Creation Device
SW1-SW2	Status bytes
TDES	Triple-DES
TOE	Target of evaluation
TLV	Tag, Length, Value
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSP	TOE Security Policy

5 Signature application

5.1 Application Flow

The following diagrams demonstrate a typical application flow as described in CWA 14170 [3].

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