
**Information technology — Security
techniques — Security requirements
for cryptographic modules**

*Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité — Exigences
de sécurité pour les modules cryptographiques*

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

ISO/IEC 19790 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *IT Security techniques*.

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Introduction

In Information Technology there is an ever-increasing need to use cryptographic mechanisms such as the protection of data against unauthorised disclosure or manipulation, for entity authentication and for non-repudiation. The security and reliability of such mechanisms are directly dependent on the cryptographic modules in which they are implemented.

This International Standard provides for four increasing, qualitative levels of security requirements intended to cover a wide range of potential applications and environments. The security requirements cover areas relative to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic module ports and interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; finite state model; physical security; operational environment; cryptographic key management; self-tests; design assurance; and mitigation of other attacks.

The overall security level of a cryptographic module must be chosen to provide a level of security appropriate for the security requirements of the application and environment in which the module is to be utilized and for the security services that the module is to provide. The responsible authority in each organization should ensure that their computer and telecommunication systems that utilize cryptographic modules provide an acceptable level of security for the given application and environment. Since each authority is responsible for selecting which approved security functions are appropriate for a given application, compliance with this International Standard does not imply either full interoperability or mutual acceptance of compliant products. The importance of security awareness and of making information security a management priority should be communicated to all concerned.

Information security requirements vary for different applications; organizations should identify their information resources and determine the sensitivity to and the potential impact of a loss by implementing appropriate controls. Controls include, but are not limited to

- physical and environmental controls;
- software development;
- backup and contingency plans; and
- information and data controls.

These controls are only as effective as the administration of appropriate security policies and procedures within the operational environment.

This International Standard will be revised later, if a new work item is approved, in order to improve the links with Common Criteria scheme (ISO/IEC 15408).

This International Standard is derived from NIST Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) PUB 140-2 (see Bibliography [1]).

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Information technology — Security techniques — Security requirements for cryptographic modules

1 Scope

This International Standard specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems. This International Standard defines four security levels for cryptographic modules to provide for a wide spectrum of data sensitivity (e.g., low value administrative data, million dollar funds transfers, and life protecting data) and a diversity of application environments (e.g., a guarded facility, an office, and a completely unprotected location). Four security levels are specified for each of 10 requirement areas. Each security level offers an increase in security over the preceding level.

While the security requirements specified in this International Standard are intended to maintain the security provided by a cryptographic module, compliance to this International Standard is not sufficient to ensure that a particular module is secure or that the security provided by the module is sufficient and acceptable to the owner of the information that is being protected.

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2 Normative references (standards.iteh.ai)

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 15408 (all parts), *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security*

ISO/IEC 18031, *Information technology — Security techniques — Random bit generation*

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

3.1

approval authority

any national or international organisation/authority mandated to approve and/or evaluate security functions

3.2

approved

ISO/IEC approved or approval authority approved

3.3

approved mode of operation

mode of the cryptographic module that employs only approved security functions

NOTE Not to be confused with a specific mode of an approved security function, e.g., Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode.

3.4 approved operating system

any operating system evaluated and approved by an approval authority

3.5 approved protection profile

any protection profile approved by an approval authority

3.6 ISO/IEC approved

security function that is either

- specified in an ISO/IEC standard or
- adopted/recommended in an ISO/IEC standard and specified either in an annex of the ISO/IEC standard or in a document referenced by the ISO/IEC standard

3.7 asymmetric cryptographic technique

cryptographic technique that uses two related transformations — a public transformation (defined by the public key) and a private transformation (defined by the private key) — which have the property that, given the public transformation, it is computationally infeasible to derive the private transformation in a given limited time and with a given limited computing power

3.8 authentication code

cryptographic checksum based on an approved security function

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NOTE Also known as a Message Authentication Code (MAC).

3.9 certificate

entity's data rendered unforgeable with the private or secret key of a certification authority

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3.10 compromise

unauthorised disclosure, modification, substitution, or use of CSPs or the unauthorised modification or substitution of PSPs

3.11 confidentiality

property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised entities

3.12 control information

information that is entered into a cryptographic module for the purposes of directing the operation of the module

**3.13 critical security parameter
CSP**

secret or private security related information whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module

EXAMPLE Secret and private cryptographic keys, authentication data such as passwords, PINs.

3.14**cryptographic boundary**

explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical and/or logical bounds of a cryptographic module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a cryptographic module

3.15**cryptographic key**

key

sequence of symbols that controls the operation of a cryptographic transformation

NOTE A cryptographic transformation may include but is not limited to encipherment, decipherment, cryptographic check function computation, signature generation, or signature verification.

3.16**cryptographic key component**

key component

parameter(s) used in a security function to perform a cryptographic function

3.17**cryptographic module**

module

set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements security functions and is contained within the cryptographic boundary

3.18**cryptographic module security policy
security policy**

precise specification of the security rules under which a cryptographic module shall operate, including the rules derived from the requirements of this International Standard and additional rules imposed by the module

NOTE See Annex B.

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3.19**crypto officer**

role taken by an individual or a process (i.e., subject) acting on behalf of an individual allowing cryptographic initialisation or management functions of a cryptographic module to be performed

3.20**data path**

physical or logical route over which data passes

NOTE A physical data path may be shared by multiple logical data paths.

3.21**differential power analysis**

DPA

analysis of the variations of the electrical power consumption of a cryptographic module, for the purpose of extracting information correlated to cryptographic operation

3.22**digital signature**

data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of a data unit that allows the recipient of the data unit to prove the origin and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery (e.g., by the recipient)

3.23**electronic key entry**

entry of cryptographic keys into a cryptographic module using electronic methods such key loader or on line means

NOTE The operator of the key may have no knowledge of the value of the key being entered.

3.24

electronic key transport

transfer of cryptographic keys, usually in encrypted form, using electronic means such as a computer network

3.25

encrypted key

cryptographic key that has been encrypted using an approved security function with a key encryption key

3.26

entity

person, a group, a device or a process

3.27

environmental failure protection

EFP

use of features to protect against a compromise of the security of a cryptographic module due to environmental conditions or fluctuations outside of the module's normal operating range

3.28

environmental failure testing

EFT

use of specific methods to provide reasonable assurance that the security of a cryptographic module will not be compromised by environmental conditions or fluctuations outside of the module's normal operating range

3.29

error detection code

EDC

value computed from data and comprised of redundant bits of information designed to detect, but not correct, unintentional changes in the data

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3.30

finite state model

FSM

mathematical model of a sequential machine that is comprised of a finite set of input events, a finite set of output events, a finite set of states, a function that maps states and input to output, a function that maps states and inputs to states (a state transition function), and a specification that describes the initial state

3.31

firmware

programs and data components of a cryptographic module that are stored in hardware within the cryptographic boundary and cannot be dynamically written or modified during execution

EXAMPLE Storage hardware may include but is not limited to ROM, PROM, EEPROM, or FLASH.

3.32

hardware

physical equipment/components within the cryptographic boundary used to process programs and data

3.33

input data

information that is entered into a cryptographic module and may be used for the purposes of transformation or computation using an approved security function

3.34

integrity

property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorised and undetected manner

3.35**interface**

logical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the module for logical information flows

3.36**key encryption key****KEK**

cryptographic key that is used for the encryption or decryption of other keys

3.37**key establishment**

process of making available a shared secret key to one or more entities

NOTE Key establishment includes key agreement and key transport.

3.38**key loader**

self-contained device that is capable of storing at least one plaintext or encrypted cryptographic key or key component that can be transferred, upon request, into a cryptographic module

3.39**key management**

administration and use of the generation, registration, certification, deregistration, distribution, installation, storage, archiving, revocation, derivation and destruction of keying material in accordance with a security policy

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3.40**key transport**

process of transferring a key from one entity to another entity

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3.41**maintenance role**

role assumed to perform physical maintenance and/or logical maintenance services

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EXAMPLE Maintenance services may include but are not limited to hardware and/or software diagnostics.

3.42**manual key entry**

entry of a cryptographic key into a cryptographic module, using a device such as a keyboard

3.43**manual key transport**

out of band means of transporting cryptographic keys, such as a key loader

3.44**microcode**

processor instructions that correspond to an executable program instruction

EXAMPLE Assembler code.

3.45**operator**

individual or a process (subject) operating on behalf of the individual, authorised to assume one or more roles

3.46**output data**

information produced by a cryptographic module

3.47

passivation

process in the construction of semiconductor devices in which junctions, surfaces of components and integrated circuits are afforded a means of protection, which may modify circuit behaviour

NOTE 1 Silicon dioxide or phosphorus glass can be used for this purpose.

NOTE 2 Passivation material is technology dependent.

3.48

password

string of characters used to authenticate an identity or to verify access authorisation

EXAMPLE Letters, numbers, and other symbols.

3.49

personal identification number

PIN

numeric code used to authenticate an identity

3.50

physical protection

safeguarding of a cryptographic module, CSPs and PSPs using physical means

3.51

plaintext key

unencrypted cryptographic key

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3.52

port

physical/logical input or output point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the module

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3.53

private key

that key of an entity's asymmetric key pair which should only be used by that entity

NOTE In the case of an asymmetric signature system the private key defines the signature transformation. In the case of an asymmetric encipherment system the private key defines the decipherment transformation.

3.54

production-grade

product, component or software that has been tested to meet operational specifications

3.55

protection profile

implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOE that meet specific consumer needs

3.56

public key

that key of an entity's asymmetric key pair which can be made public

NOTE In the case of an asymmetric signature system the public key defines the verification transformation. In the case of an asymmetric encipherment system the public key defines the encipherment transformation. A key that is 'publicly known' is not necessarily globally available. The key may only be available to all members of a pre-specified group.

3.57

public key certificate

public key information of an entity signed by an appropriate certification authority and thereby rendered unforgeable

3.67

split knowledge

process by which a cryptographic key is split into multiple key components, individually sharing no knowledge of the original key, that can be subsequently input into, or output from, a cryptographic module by separate entities and combined to recreate the original cryptographic key

3.68

status information

information that is output from a cryptographic module for the purposes of indicating certain operational characteristics or states of the module

3.69

symmetric cryptographic technique

cryptographic technique that uses the same secret key for both the encryption and the decryption transformations

3.70

system software

general purpose software within the cryptographic boundary designed to facilitate the operation of the cryptographic module

EXAMPLES Operating system, compilers and utility programs.

3.71

tamper detection

automatic determination by a cryptographic module that an attempt has been made to compromise the security of the module

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3.72

tamper evidence

external indication that an attempt has been made to compromise the security of a cryptographic module

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NOTE The evidence of the tamper attempt should be observable.

3.73

tamper response

automatic action taken by a cryptographic module when tamper detection has occurred

3.74

target of evaluation

TOE

information technology product or system and associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of a CC evaluation

3.75

TOE security functions

TSF

subset of the TOE consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TOE security policy

3.76

TOE security policy

TSP

set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected, and distributed within a TOE

