
**Information technology — Open Systems
Interconnection — The Directory:
Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks**

*Technologies de l'information — Interconnexion de systèmes ouverts
(OSI) — L'annuaire: Cadres de clé publique et de certificat d'attribut*

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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Introduction.....	viii
SECTION 1 – GENERAL.....	1
1 Scope.....	1
2 Normative references.....	2
2.1 Identical Recommendations International Standards.....	2
2.2 Paired Recommendations International Standards equivalent in technical content.....	3
3 Definitions.....	3
3.1 OSI Reference Model security architecture definitions.....	3
3.2 Directory model definitions.....	3
3.3 Definitions.....	4
4 Abbreviations.....	6
5 Conventions.....	7
6 Frameworks overview.....	7
6.1 Digital signatures.....	8
SECTION 2 – PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATE FRAMEWORK.....	10
7 Public-keys and public-key certificates.....	11
7.1 Generation of key pairs.....	15
7.2 Public-key certificate creation.....	15
7.3 Certificate validity.....	15
8 Public-key certificate and CRL extensions.....	17
8.1 Policy handling.....	18
8.1.1 Certificate policy.....	18
8.1.2 Cross-certification.....	19
8.1.3 Policy mapping.....	20
8.1.4 Certification path processing.....	20
8.1.5 Self-issued certificates.....	20
8.2 Key and policy information extensions.....	21
8.2.1 Requirements.....	21
8.2.2 Public-key certificate and CRL extension fields.....	21
8.2.2.1 Authority key identifier extension.....	22
8.2.2.2 Subject key identifier extension.....	22
8.2.2.3 Key usage extension.....	22
8.2.2.4 Extended key usage extension.....	23
8.2.2.5 Private key usage period extension.....	24
8.2.2.6 Certificate policies extension.....	24
8.2.2.7 Policy mappings extension.....	25
8.3 Subject and issuer information extensions.....	26
8.3.1 Requirements.....	26
8.3.2 Certificate and CRL extension fields.....	26
8.3.2.1 Subject alternative name extension.....	26
8.3.2.2 Issuer alternative name extension.....	26
8.3.2.3 Subject directory attributes extension.....	27
8.4 Certification path constraint extensions.....	27
8.4.1 Requirements.....	27
8.4.2 Certificate extension fields.....	28
8.4.2.1 Basic constraints extension.....	28
8.4.2.2 Name constraints extension.....	29
8.4.2.3 Policy constraints extension.....	30
8.4.2.4 Inhibit any policy extension.....	30

8.5	Basic CRL extensions.....	30
8.5.1	Requirements.....	30
8.5.2	CRL and CRL entry extension fields.....	31
8.5.2.1	CRL number extension.....	31
8.5.2.2	Reason code extension.....	32
8.5.2.3	Hold instruction code extension.....	32
8.5.2.4	Invalidity date extension.....	33
8.5.2.5	CRL scope extension.....	33
8.5.2.6	Status referral extension.....	35
8.5.2.7	CRL stream identifier extension.....	36
8.5.2.8	Ordered list extension.....	36
8.5.2.9	Delta information extension.....	37
8.6	CRL distribution points and delta-CRL extensions.....	37
8.6.1	Requirements.....	37
8.6.2	CRL distribution point and delta-CRL extension fields.....	38
8.6.2.1	CRL distribution points extension.....	38
8.6.2.2	Issuing distribution point extension.....	39
8.6.2.3	Certificate issuer extension.....	40
8.6.2.4	Delta CRL indicator extension.....	40
8.6.2.5	Base update extension.....	41
8.6.2.6	Freshest CRL extension.....	41
9	Delta CRL relationship to base.....	41
10	Certification path processing procedure.....	42
10.1	Path processing inputs.....	42
10.2	Path processing outputs.....	43
10.3	Path processing variables.....	43
10.4	Initialization step.....	43
10.5	Certificate processing.....	44
10.5.1	Basic certificate checks.....	44
10.5.2	Processing intermediate certificates.....	44
10.5.3	Explicit policy indicator processing.....	45
10.5.4	Final processing.....	46
11	PKI directory schema.....	46
11.1	PKI directory object classes and name forms.....	46
11.1.1	PKI user object class.....	46
11.1.2	PKI CA object class.....	46
11.1.3	CRL distribution points object class and name form.....	46
11.1.4	Delta CRL object class.....	47
11.1.5	Certificate Policy & CPS object class.....	47
11.1.6	PKI certificate path object class.....	47
11.2	PKI directory attributes.....	47
11.2.1	User certificate attribute.....	47
11.2.2	CA certificate attribute.....	47
11.2.3	Cross certificate pair attribute.....	48
11.2.4	Certificate revocation list attribute.....	48
11.2.5	Authority revocation list attribute.....	48
11.2.6	Delta revocation list attribute.....	48
11.2.7	Supported algorithms attribute.....	48
11.2.8	Certification practice statement attribute.....	49
11.2.9	Certificate policy attribute.....	49
11.2.10	PKI path attribute.....	49
11.3	PKI directory matching rules.....	50
11.3.1	Certificate exact match.....	50
11.3.2	Certificate match.....	50
11.3.3	Certificate pair exact match.....	51
11.3.4	Certificate pair match.....	51
11.3.5	Certificate list exact match.....	52

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11.3.6	Certificate list match.....	52
11.3.7	Algorithm identifier match.....	53
11.3.8	Policy match.....	53
11.3.9	PKI path match.....	53
SECTION 3 – ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE FRAMEWORK		53
12	Attribute certificates	54
12.1	Attribute certificate structure.....	54
12.2	Attribute certificate paths	56
13	Attribute Authority, SOA and Certification Authority relationship	56
13.1	Privilege in attribute certificates.....	57
13.2	Privilege in public-key certificates.....	57
14	PMI models.....	58
14.1	General model	58
14.1.1	PMI in access control context.....	59
14.1.2	PMI in a non-repudiation context.....	59
14.2	Control model.....	59
14.3	Delegation model	60
14.4	Roles model.....	61
14.4.1	Role attribute	61
15	Privilege management certificate extensions.....	62
15.1	Basic privilege management extensions.....	62
15.1.1	Requirements.....	62
15.1.2	Basic privilege management extension fields.....	63
15.1.2.1	Time specification extension.....	63
15.1.2.2	Targeting information extension.....	63
15.1.2.3	User notice extension.....	64
15.1.2.4	Acceptable privilege policies extension	64
15.2	Privilege revocation extensions.....	65
15.2.1	Requirements.....	65
15.2.2	Privilege revocation extension fields.....	65
15.2.2.1	CRL distribution points extension.....	65
15.2.2.2	No revocation information extension	66
15.3	Source of Authority extensions	65
15.3.1	Requirements.....	65
15.3.2	SOA extension fields.....	65
15.3.2.1	SOA identifier extension	65
15.3.2.2	Attribute descriptor extension	66
15.4	Role extensions.....	67
15.4.1	Requirements.....	67
15.4.2	Role extension fields	67
15.4.2.1	Role specification certificate identifier extension	67
15.5	Delegation extensions.....	68
15.5.1	Requirements.....	68
15.5.2	Delegation extension fields	68
15.5.2.1	Basic attribute constraints extension	68
15.5.2.2	Delegated name constraints extension.....	70
15.5.2.3	Acceptable certificate policies extension.....	70
15.5.2.4	Authority attribute identifier extension	71
16	Privilege path processing procedure	71
16.1	Basic processing procedure	72
16.2	Role processing procedure	72
16.3	Delegation processing procedure.....	72
16.3.1	Verify integrity of domination rule.....	73
16.3.2	Establish valid delegation path.....	73
16.3.3	Verify privilege delegation.....	73
16.3.4	Pass/fail determination	74

17	PMI directory schema.....	74
17.1	PMI directory object classes.....	74
17.1.1	PMI user object class.....	74
17.1.2	PMI AA object class.....	74
17.1.3	PMI SOA object class.....	74
17.1.4	Attribute certificate CRL distribution point object class.....	74
17.1.5	PMI delegation path object class.....	75
17.1.6	Privilege policy object class.....	75
17.2	PMI Directory attributes.....	75
17.2.1	Attribute certificate attribute.....	75
17.2.2	AA certificate attribute.....	75
17.2.3	Attribute descriptor certificate attribute.....	75
17.2.4	Attribute certificate revocation list attribute.....	75
17.2.5	AA certificate revocation list attribute.....	76
17.2.6	Delegation path attribute.....	76
17.2.7	Privilege policy attribute.....	76
17.3	PMI general directory matching rules.....	76
17.3.1	Attribute certificate exact match.....	76
17.3.2	Attribute certificate match.....	76
17.3.3	Holder issuer match.....	77
17.3.4	Delegation path match.....	77
SECTION 4 – DIRECTORY USE OF PUBLIC-KEY & ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE FRAMEWORKS.....		77
18	Directory authentication.....	78
18.1	Simple authentication procedure.....	78
18.1.1	Generation of protected identifying information.....	79
18.1.2	Procedure for protected simple authentication.....	79
18.1.3	User password attribute type.....	80
18.2	Strong Authentication.....	80
18.2.1	Obtaining public-key certificates from the directory.....	81
18.2.1.1	Example.....	81
18.2.2	Strong authentication procedures.....	83
18.2.2.1	One-way authentication.....	84
18.2.2.2	Two-way authentication.....	84
18.2.2.3	Three-way authentication.....	85
19	Access control.....	86
20	Protection of Directory operations.....	86
Annex A – Public-Key and Attribute Certificate Frameworks.....		87
Annex B – CRL Generation and Processing Rules.....		107
B.1	Introduction.....	107
B.1.1	CRL types.....	107
B.1.2	CRL processing.....	108
B.2	Determine parameters for CRLs.....	108
B.3	Determine CRLs required.....	109
B.3.1	End-entity with critical CRL DP.....	109
B.3.2	End-entity with no critical CRL DP.....	109
B.3.3	CA with critical CRL DP.....	110
B.3.4	CA with no critical CRL DP.....	110
B.4	Obtain CRLs.....	110
B.5	Process CRLs.....	110
B.5.1	Validate base CRL scope.....	110
B.5.1.1	Complete CRL.....	111
B.5.1.2	Complete EPRL.....	111
B.5.1.3	Complete CARL.....	111
B.5.1.4	Distribution point based CRL/EPRL/CARL.....	112
B.5.2	Validate delta CRL scope.....	112
B.5.3	Validity and currency checks on the base CRL.....	113
B.5.4	Validity and checks on the delta CRL.....	113

Annex C – Examples of Delta CRL Issuance	114
C.1 Introduction	114
Annex D – Privilege Policy and Privilege Attribute Definition Examples	116
D.1 Introduction	116
D.2 Sample syntaxes	116
D.2.1 First example	116
D.2.2 Second example	118
D.3 Privilege attribute example	120
Annex E – An introduction to public key cryptography	121
Annex F – Reference definition of algorithm object identifiers	123
Annex G – Examples of use of certification path constraints	124
G.1 Example 1: Use of basic constraints	124
G.2 Example 2: Use of name constraints	124
G.3 Example 3: Use of policy mapping and policy constraints	124
Annex H – Alphabetical list of information item definitions	126
Annex I – Amendments and corrigenda	129

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 3.

In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

Users and implementors should note the existence of a "defect resolution" procedure in ISO/IEC JTC 1 to identify and correct errors in International Standards through the publication of Technical Corrigenda. Identical corrections are made to the corresponding ITU-T Recommendations through Corrigenda and may also be made in the form of Implementors' Guides. Details of Technical Corrigenda to International Standards are available on the ISO website; published Technical Corrigenda can be obtained via the ISO webstore or from the ISO and IEC national bodies. Corrigenda and Implementors' Guides to ITU-T Recommendations can be obtained from the ITU-T website.

International Standard ISO/IEC 9594-8 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 6, *Telecommunications and information exchange between systems*, in collaboration with ITU-T. The identical text is published as ITU-T Recommendation X.509.

This fourth edition of ISO/IEC 9594-8 constitutes a technical revision of the third edition (ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998), which is provisionally retained in order to support implementations based on the third edition. This edition also incorporates Corrigendum 1:2000.

ISO/IEC 9594 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — The Directory*:

- *Part 1: Overview of concepts, models and services*
- *Part 2: Models*
- *Part 3: Abstract service definition*
- *Part 4: Procedures for distributed operation*
- *Part 5: Protocol specifications*
- *Part 6: Selected attribute types*
- *Part 7: Selected object classes*
- *Part 8: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks*
- *Part 9: Replication*
- *Part 10: Use of systems management for administration of the Directory*

Annexes A, B and F form a normative part of this part of ISO/IEC 9594. Annexes C, D, E, G, H and I are for information only.

Introduction

This Recommendation | International Standard, together with other Recommendations | International Standards, has been produced to facilitate the interconnection of information processing systems to provide directory services. A set of such systems, together with the directory information which they hold, can be viewed as an integrated whole, called the *Directory*. The information held by the Directory, collectively known as the Directory Information Base (DIB), is typically used to facilitate communication between, with or about objects such as application-entities, people, terminals and distribution lists.

The Directory plays a significant role in Open Systems Interconnection, whose aim is to allow, with a minimum of technical agreement outside of the interconnection standards themselves, the interconnection of information processing systems:

- from different manufacturers;
- under different managements;
- of different levels of complexity; and
- of different ages.

Many applications have requirements for security to protect against threats to the communication of information. Virtually all security services are dependent upon the identities of the communicating parties being reliably known, i.e. authentication.

This Recommendation | International Standard defines a framework for public-key certificates. That framework includes specification of data objects used to represent the certificates themselves as well as revocation notices for issued certificates that should no longer be trusted. The public-key certificate framework defined in this Specification, while it defines some critical components of a Public-key Infrastructure (PKI), it does not define a PKI in its entirety. However, this Specification provides the foundation upon which full PKIs and their specifications would be built.

Similarly, this Recommendation | International Standard defines a framework for attribute certificates. That framework includes specification of data objects used to represent the certificates themselves as well as revocation notices for issued certificates that should no longer be trusted. The attribute certificate framework defined in this Specification, while it defines some critical components of a Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI), it does not define a PMI in its entirety. However, this Specification provides the foundation upon which full PMIs and their specifications would be built.

Information objects for holding PKI and PMI objects in the Directory and for comparing presented values with stored values are also defined.

This Recommendation | International Standard also defines a framework for the provision of authentication services by the Directory to its users.

This Recommendation | International Standard provides the foundation frameworks upon which industry profiles can be defined by other standards groups and industry forums. Many of the features defined as optional in these frameworks, may be mandated for use in certain environments through profiles. This fourth edition technically revises and enhances, but does not replace, the third edition of this Recommendation | International Standard. Implementations may still claim conformance to the third edition. However, at some point, the third edition will not be supported (i.e. reported defects will no longer be resolved). It is recommended that implementations conform to this fourth edition as soon as possible.

This fourth edition specifies version 1 and 2 of the Directory protocols.

The first and second editions specified only version 1. Most of the services and protocols specified in this edition are designed to function under version 1. However some enhanced services and protocols, e.g. signed errors, will not function unless all Directory entities involved in the operation have negotiated version 2. Whichever version has been negotiated, differences between the services and between the protocols defined in the four editions, except for those specifically assigned to version 2, are accommodated using the rules of extensibility defined in this edition of ITU-T Rec. X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-5.

Annex A, which is an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, provides the ASN.1 module which contains all of the definitions associated with the frameworks.

Annex B, which is an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, provides rules for generating and processing Certificate Revocation Lists.

Annex C, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, provides examples of delta-CRL issuance.

ISO/IEC 9594-8:2001(E)

Annex D, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, provides examples of privilege policy syntaxes and privilege attributes.

Annex E, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, is an introduction to public-key cryptography.

Annex F, which is an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, defines object identifiers assigned to authentication and encryption algorithms, in the absence of a formal register.

Annex G, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, contains examples of the use of certification path constraints.

Annex H, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, contains an alphabetical list of information item definitions in this Specification.

Annex I, which is not an integral part of this Recommendation | International Standard, lists the amendments and defect reports that have been incorporated to form this edition of this Recommendation | International Standard.

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) draw attention to the fact that it is claimed that compliance with this part of ISO/IEC 9594 may involve the use of a patent concerning the CRL distribution point facility.

ISO and IEC take no position concerning the evidence, validity and scope of this patent right.

The holder of this patent right has assured ISO and IEC that he is willing to negotiate licences under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions with applicants throughout the world. In this respect, the statement of the holder of this patent right is registered with ISO and IEC. Information may be obtained from:

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Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this part of ISO/IEC 9594 may be the subject of patent rights other than those identified above. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

ITU-T RECOMMENDATION

**INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY – OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECTION –
THE DIRECTORY: PUBLIC-KEY AND ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE FRAMEWORKS**

SECTION 1 – GENERAL

1 Scope

This Recommendation | International Standard addresses some of the security requirements in the areas of authentication and other security services through the provision of a set of frameworks upon which full services can be based. Specifically, this Recommendation | International Standard defines frameworks for:

- Public-key certificates;
- Attribute certificates;
- Authentication services.

The public-key certificate framework defined in this Recommendation | International Standard includes definition of the information objects for Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), including public-key certificates, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL). The attribute certificate framework includes definition of the information objects for Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI), including attribute certificates, and Attribute Certificate Revocation List (ACRL). This Specification also provides the framework for issuing, managing, using and revoking certificates. An extensibility mechanism is included in the defined formats for both certificate types and for all revocation list schemes. This Recommendation | International Standard also includes a set of standard extensions for each, which is expected to be generally useful across a number of applications of PKI and PMI. The schema components, including object classes, attribute types and matching rules for storing PKI and PMI objects in the Directory, are included in this Recommendation | International Standard. Other elements of PKI and PMI, beyond these frameworks, such as key and certificate management protocols, operational protocols, additional certificate and CRL extensions are expected to be defined by other standards bodies (e.g. ISO TC 68, IETF, etc.).

The authentication scheme defined in this Recommendation | International Standard is generic and may be applied to a variety of applications and environments.

The Directory makes use of public-key certificates and attribute certificates, and the framework for the Directory's use of these facilities is also defined in this Recommendation | International Standard. Public-key technology, including certificates, is used by the Directory to enable strong authentication, signed and/or encrypted operations, and for storage of signed and/or encrypted data in the Directory. Attribute certificates can be used by the Directory to enable rule-based access control. Although the framework for these is provided in this Specification, the full definition of the Directory's use of these frameworks, and the associated services provided by the Directory and its components is supplied in the complete set of Directory Specifications.

This Recommendation | International Standard, in the Authentication services framework, also:

- specifies the form of authentication information held by the Directory;
- describes how authentication information may be obtained from the Directory;
- states the assumptions made about how authentication information is formed and placed in the Directory;
- defines three ways in which applications may use this authentication information to perform authentication and describes how other security services may be supported by authentication.

This Recommendation | International Standard describes two levels of authentication: simple authentication, using a password as a verification of claimed identity; and strong authentication, involving credentials formed using cryptographic techniques. While simple authentication offers some limited protection against unauthorized access, only strong authentication should be used as the basis for providing secure services. It is not intended to establish this as a general framework for authentication, but it can be of general use for applications which consider these techniques adequate.

Authentication (and other security services) can only be provided within the context of a defined security policy. It is a matter for users of an application to define their own security policy which may be constrained by the services provided by a standard.

It is a matter for standards-defining applications which use the authentication framework to specify the protocol exchanges which need to be performed in order to achieve authentication based upon the authentication information obtained from the Directory. The protocol used by applications to obtain credentials from the Directory is the Directory Access Protocol (DAP), specified in ITU-T Rec. X.519 | ISO/IEC 9594-5.

2 Normative references

The following Recommendations and International Standards contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation | International Standard. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and Standards are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this Recommendation | International Standard are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and Standards listed below. Members of IEC and ISO maintain registers of currently valid International Standards. The Telecommunication Standardization Bureau of ITU maintains a list of currently valid ITU-T Recommendations.

2.1 Identical Recommendations | International Standards

- ITU-T Recommendation X.411 (1999) | ISO/IEC 10021-4:1999, *Information technology – Message Handling Systems (MHS) – Message transfer system: Abstract service definition and procedures.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.500 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-1:2001, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Overview of concepts, models and services.*¹⁾
- ITU-T Recommendation X.501 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:2001, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Models.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.511 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-3:2001, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Abstract service definition.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.518 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-4:2001, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Procedures for distributed operation.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.519 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-5:2001, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Protocol specifications.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-6:2001, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Selected attribute types.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.521 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-7:2001, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Selected object classes.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.525 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-9:2001, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Replication.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.530 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-10:2001, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Use of systems management for administration of the Directory.*
- CCITT Recommendation X.660 (1992) | ISO/IEC 9834-1:1993, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Procedures for the operation of OSI Registration Authorities: General procedures.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:1998, *Information technology – Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8824-2:1998, *Information technology – Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8824-3:1998, *Information technology – Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification.*

¹⁾ For each of the X.500 series of Recommendations | 9594 parts referenced in this clause, the 4th edition of those Specifications should be used when they become available.

- ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8824-4:1998, *Information technology – Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:1998, *Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER).*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.691 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8825-2:1998, *Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Packed Encoding Rules (PER).*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.812 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-3:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Access control framework.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.813 (1996) | ISO/IEC 10181-4:1997, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Non-repudiation framework.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.880 (1994) | ISO/IEC 13712-1:1995, *Information technology – Remote Operations: Concepts, model and notation.*
- ITU-T Recommendation X.881 (1994) | ISO/IEC 13712-2:1995, *Information technology – Remote Operations: OSI realizations – Remote Operations Service Element (ROSE) service definition.*

2.2 Paired Recommendations | International Standards equivalent in technical content

- CCITT Recommendation X.800 (1991), *Security Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications.*
ISO 7498-2:1989, *Information processing systems – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model – Part 2: Security Architecture.*

3 Definitions

iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW

For the purposes of this ITU-T Recommendation International Standard, the following definitions apply.

3.1 OSI Reference Model security architecture definitions

The following terms are defined in CCITT Rec. X.800 | ISO 7498-2:

- a) asymmetric (encipherment);
- b) authentication exchange;
- c) authentication information;
- d) confidentiality;
- e) credentials;
- f) cryptography;
- g) data origin authentication;
- h) decipherment;
- i) encipherment;
- j) key;
- k) password;
- l) peer-entity authentication;
- m) symmetric (encipherment).

3.2 Directory model definitions

The following terms are defined in ITU-T Rec. X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2:

- a) attribute;
- b) Directory Information Base;
- c) Directory Information Tree;

- d) Directory System Agent;
- e) Directory User Agent;
- f) distinguished name;
- g) entry;
- h) object;
- i) root.

3.3 Definitions

The following terms are defined in this Recommendation | International Standard:

- 3.3.1 attribute certificate:** A data structure, digitally signed by an Attribute Authority, that binds some attribute values with identification information about its holder.
- 3.3.2 Attribute Authority (AA):** An authority which assigns privileges by issuing attribute certificates.
- 3.3.3 Attribute Authority Revocation List (AARL):** A revocation list containing a list of references to attribute certificates issued to AAs that are no longer considered valid by the issuing authority.
- 3.3.4 Attribute Certificate Revocation List (ACRL):** A revocation list containing a list of references to attribute certificates that are no longer considered valid by the issuing authority.
- 3.3.5 authentication token; (token):** Information conveyed during a strong authentication exchange, which can be used to authenticate its sender.
- 3.3.6 authority:** An entity, responsible for the issuance of certificates. Two types are defined in this Specification; certification authority which issues public-key certificates and attribute authority which issues attribute certificates.
- 3.3.7 authority certificate:** A certificate issued to an authority (e.g. either to a certification authority or to an attribute authority).
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[ISO/IEC 9594-8:2001](https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/3a20f798-ce69-437d-9e6c-)
- 3.3.8 base CRL:** A CRL that is used as the foundation in the generation of a dCRL.
- 3.3.9 CA-certificate:** A certificate for one CA issued by another CA.
- 3.3.10 certificate policy:** A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements. For example, a particular certificate policy might indicate applicability of a type of certificate to the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the trading of goods within a given price range.
- 3.3.11 Certificate Revocation List (CRL):** A signed list indicating a set of certificates that are no longer considered valid by the certificate issuer. In addition to the generic term CRL, some specific CRL types are defined for CRLs that cover particular scopes.
- 3.3.12 certificate user:** An entity that needs to know, with certainty, the public key of another entity.
- 3.3.13 certificate serial number:** An integer value, unique within the issuing authority, which is unambiguously associated with a certificate issued by that CA.
- 3.3.14 certificate-using system:** An implementation of those functions defined in this Directory Specification that are used by a certificate-user.
- 3.3.15 certificate validation:** The process of ensuring that a certificate was valid at a given time, including possibly the construction and processing of a certification path, and ensuring that all certificates in that path were valid (i.e. were not expired or revoked) at that given time.
- 3.3.16 Certification Authority (CA):** An authority trusted by one or more users to create and assign public-key certificates. Optionally the certification authority may create the users' keys.
- 3.3.17 Certification Authority Revocation List (CARL):** A revocation list containing a list of public-key certificates issued to certification authorities, that are no longer considered valid by the certificate issuer.

- 3.3.18 certification path:** An ordered sequence of certificates of objects in the DIT which, together with the public key of the initial object in the path, can be processed to obtain that of the final object in the path.
- 3.3.19 CRL distribution point:** A directory entry or other distribution source for CRLs; a CRL distributed through a CRL distribution point may contain revocation entries for only a subset of the full set of certificates issued by one CA or may contain revocation entries for multiple CAs.
- 3.3.20 cryptographic system, cryptosystem:** A collection of transformations from plain text into ciphertext and vice versa, the particular transformation(s) to be used being selected by keys. The transformations are normally defined by a mathematical algorithm.
- 3.3.21 data confidentiality:** This service can be used to provide for protection of data from unauthorized disclosure. The data confidentiality service is supported by the authentication framework. It can be used to protect against data interception.
- 3.3.22 delegation:** Conveyance of privilege from one entity that holds such privilege, to another entity.
- 3.3.23 delegation path:** An ordered sequence of certificates which, together with authentication of a privilege asserter's identity can be processed to verify the authenticity of a privilege asserter's privilege.
- 3.3.24 delta-CRL (dCRL):** A partial revocation list that only contains entries for certificates that have had their revocation status changed since the issuance of the referenced base CRL.
- 3.3.25 end entity:** A certificate subject that uses its private key for purposes other than signing certificates or an entity that is a relying party.
- 3.3.26 End-entity Attribute Certificate Revocation List (EARL):** A revocation list containing a list of attribute certificates issued to holders, that are not also AAs, that are no longer considered valid by the certificate issuer.
- 3.3.27 End-entity Public-key Certificate Revocation List (EPRL):** A revocation list containing a list of public-key certificates issued to subjects, that are not also CAs, that are no longer considered valid by the certificate issuer.
- 3.3.28 environmental variables:** Those aspects of policy required for an authorization decision, that are not contained within static structures, but are available through some local means to a privilege verifier (e.g. time of day or current account balance).
<https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/3a20f798-ce69-437d-9e6c-0734f177ce5f/iso-9594-8-2001>
- 3.3.29 full CRL:** A complete revocation list that contains entries for all certificates that have been revoked for the given scope.
- 3.3.30 hash function:** A (mathematical) function which maps values from a large (possibly very large) domain into a smaller range. A "good" hash function is such that the results of applying the function to a (large) set of values in the domain will be evenly distributed (and apparently at random) over the range.
- 3.3.31 holder:** An entity to whom some privilege has been delegated either directly from the Source of Authority or indirectly through another Attribute Authority.
- 3.3.32 indirect CRL (iCRL):** A revocation list that at least contains revocation information about certificates issued by authorities other than that which issued this CRL.
- 3.3.33 key agreement:** A method for negotiating a key value on-line without transferring the key, even in an encrypted form, e.g. the Diffie-Hellman technique (see ISO/IEC 11770-1 for more information on key agreement mechanisms).
- 3.3.34 object method:** An action that can be invoked on a resource (e.g. a file system may have read, write and execute object methods).
- 3.3.35 one-way function:** A (mathematical) function f which is easy to compute, but which for a general value y in the range, it is computationally difficult to find a value x in the domain such that $f(x) = y$. There may be a few values y for which finding x is not computationally difficult.
- 3.3.36 policy mapping:** Recognizing that, when a CA in one domain certifies a CA in another domain, a particular certificate policy in the second domain may be considered by the authority of the first domain to be equivalent (but not necessarily identical in all respects) to a particular certificate policy in the first domain.
- 3.3.37 private key; secret key (deprecated):** (In a public key cryptosystem) that key of a user's key pair which is known only by that user.