



**Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA);
Voice plus Data (V+D);
Part 7: Security**

iTeh STANDARDS REVIEW
(Standard Draft Review)
Full standard
<https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/etsi/en-300-392-7-v3.4.0-2016-04/part-7-security>
4685-a9bc-3bb5c4641eb8/etsi-en-300-392-7-v3.4.0-2016-04/part-7-security

Reference
REN/TETRA-06184

Keywords
security, TETRA, V+D

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Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C
Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la
Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° 7803/88.

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Foreword

This draft European Standard (EN) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee TETRA and Critical Communications Evolution (TCCE), and is now submitted for the combined Public Enquiry and Vote phase of the ETSI standards EN Approval Procedure.

The present document is part 7 of a multi-part deliverable covering the Voice plus Data (V+D), as identified below:

- ETSI EN 300 392-1: "General network design";
ETSI EN 300 392-2: "Air Interface (AI)";
ETSI EN 300 392-3: "Interworking at the Inter-System Interface (ISI)";
ETSI ETS 300 392-4: "Gateways basic operation";
ETSI EN 300 392-5: "Peripheral Equipment Interface (PEI)";
ETSI EN 300 392-7: "Security";
ETSI EN 300 392-9: "General requirements for supplementary services";
ETSI EN 300 392-10: "Supplementary services stage 1";
ETSI EN 300 392-11: "Supplementary services stage 2";
ETSI EN 300 392-12: "Supplementary services stage 3";
ETSI ETS 300 392-13: "SDL model of the Air Interface (AI)";
ETSI ETS 300 392-14: "Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) proforma specification";
ETSI TS 100 392-15: "TETRA frequency bands, duplex spacings and channel numbering";
ETSI TS 100 392-16: "Network Performance Metrics";
ETSI TR 100 392-17: "TETRA V+D and DMO specifications";
ETSI TS 100 392-18: "Air interface optimized applications".

NOTE 1: Part 3, sub-parts 6 and 7 (Speech format implementation), part 4, sub-part 3 (Data networks gateway), part 10, sub-part 15 (Transfer of control), part 13 (SDL) and part 14 (PICTS) of this multi-part deliverable are in status "historical" and are not maintained.

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Modal verbs terminology

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1 Scope

The present document defines the Terrestrial Trunked Radio system (TETRA) supporting Voice plus Data (V+D). It specifies the air interface, the inter-working between TETRA systems and to other systems via gateways, the terminal equipment interface on the mobile station, the connection of line stations to the infrastructure, the security aspects in TETRA networks, the management services offered to the operator, the performance objectives, and the supplementary services that come in addition to the basic and teleservices.

The present part describes the security mechanisms in TETRA V+D. It provides mechanisms for confidentiality of control signalling and user speech and data at the air interface, authentication and key management mechanisms for the air interface and for the Inter-System Interface (ISI).

Clause 4 describes the authentication and key management mechanisms for the TETRA air interface. The following two authentication services have been specified for the air-interface in ETSI ETR 086-3 [i.3], based on a threat analysis:

- authentication of an MS by the TETRA infrastructure;
- authentication of the TETRA infrastructure by an MS.

Clause 5 describes the mechanisms and protocol for enable and disable of both the mobile station equipment and the mobile station user's subscription.

Air interface encryption may be provided as an option in TETRA. Where employed, clause 6 describes the confidentiality mechanisms using encryption on the air interface, for circuit mode speech, circuit mode data, packet data and control information. Clause 6 describes both encryption mechanisms and mobility procedures. It also details the protocol concerning control of encryption at the air interface.

The present document does not address the detail handling of protocol errors or any protocol mechanisms when TETRA is operating in a degraded mode. These issues are implementation specific and therefore fall outside the scope of the TETRA standardization effort.

The detail description of the Authentication Centre is outside the scope of the present document.

2 References

2.1 Normative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at <https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/>.

NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.

- [1] ETSI EN 300 392-1: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 1: General network design".
- [2] ETSI EN 300 392-2: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 2: Air Interface (AI)".
- [3] ISO 7498-2: "Information processing systems - Open Systems Interconnection - Basic Reference Model - Part 2: Security Architecture".
- [4] ETSI EN 300 812-3: "Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Subscriber Identity Module to Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface; Part 3: Integrated Circuit (IC); Physical, logical and TSIM application characteristics".