
**Information technology — Security
techniques — Methodology for IT security
evaluation**

*Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité —
Méthodologie pour l'évaluation de sécurité TI*

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

ISO/IEC 18045 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology, Subcommittee SC 27, IT Security techniques*. The identical text of ISO/IEC 18045 is published by the Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations as *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation*. The common XML source for both publications can be found at <http://www.oc.ccn.cni.es/xml>.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO/IEC 18045:2005), which has been technically revised.

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Introduction

The target audience for this International Standard is primarily evaluators applying ISO/IEC 15408 and certifiers confirming evaluator actions; evaluation sponsors, developers, PP/ST authors and other parties interested in IT security are a secondary audience.

This International Standard recognises that not all questions concerning IT security evaluation will be answered herein and that further interpretations will be needed. Individual schemes will determine how to handle such interpretations, although these can be subject to mutual recognition agreements. A list of methodology-related activities that can be handled by individual schemes can be found in Annex A.

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Information technology — Security techniques — Methodology for IT security evaluation

1 Scope

This International Standard is a companion document to the evaluation criteria for IT security defined in ISO/IEC 15408. It defines the minimum actions to be performed by an evaluator in order to conduct an ISO/IEC 15408 evaluation, using the criteria and evaluation evidence defined in ISO/IEC 15408.

This International Standard does not define evaluator actions for certain high assurance ISO/IEC 15408 components, where there is as yet no generally agreed guidance.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 15408 (all parts), *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security*

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

NOTE Terms which are presented in bold-faced type are themselves defined in this clause.

3.1

action

evaluator action element of ISO/IEC 15408-3

NOTE These actions are either explicitly stated as evaluator actions or implicitly derived from developer actions (implied evaluator actions) within ISO/IEC 15408-3 assurance components.

3.2

activity

application of an assurance class of ISO/IEC 15408-3

3.3

check

generate a **verdict** by a simple comparison

NOTE Evaluator expertise is not required. The statement that uses this verb describes what is mapped.

3.4

evaluation deliverable

any resource required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator or evaluation authority to perform one or more evaluation or evaluation oversight activities

3.5

evaluation evidence

tangible **evaluation deliverable**

3.6
evaluation technical report
report that documents the **overall verdict** and its justification, produced by the evaluator and submitted to an evaluation authority

3.7
examine
generate a **verdict** by analysis using evaluator expertise

NOTE The statement that uses this verb identifies what is analysed and the properties for which it is analysed.

3.8
interpretation
clarification or amplification of an ISO/IEC 15408, ISO/IEC 18045 or **scheme** requirement

3.9
methodology
system of principles, procedures and processes applied to IT security evaluations

3.10
observation report
report written by the evaluator requesting a clarification or identifying a problem during the evaluation

3.11
overall verdict
pass or fail statement issued by an evaluator with respect to the result of an evaluation

3.12
oversight verdict
statement issued by an evaluation authority confirming or rejecting an *overall verdict* based on the results of evaluation oversight activities

3.13
record
retain a written description of procedures, events, observations, insights and results in sufficient detail to enable the work performed during the evaluation to be reconstructed at a later time

3.14
report
include evaluation results and supporting material in the **evaluation technical report** or an **observation report**

3.15
scheme
set of rules, established by an evaluation authority, defining the evaluation environment, including criteria and **methodology** required to conduct IT security evaluations

3.16
sub-activity
application of an assurance component of ISO/IEC 15408-3

NOTE Assurance families are not explicitly addressed in this International Standard because evaluations are conducted on a single assurance component from an assurance family.

3.17
tracing
simple directional relation between two sets of entities, which shows which entities in the first set correspond to which entities in the second

3.18**verdict**

pass, fail or inconclusive statement issued by an evaluator with respect to an ISO/IEC 15408 evaluator action element, assurance component, or class

NOTE Also see **overall verdict**.

3.19**work unit**

most granular level of evaluation work

NOTE Each evaluation methodology action comprises one or more work units, which are grouped within the evaluation methodology action by ISO/IEC 15408 content and presentation of evidence or developer action element. The work units are presented in this International Standard in the same order as ISO/IEC 15408 elements from which they are derived. Work units are identified in the left margin by a symbol such as ALC_TAT.1-2. In this symbol, the string *ALC_TAT.1* indicates ISO/IEC 15408 component (i.e. this International Standard sub-activity), and the final digit (2) indicates that this is the second work unit in the ALC_TAT.1 sub-activity.

4 Symbols and abbreviated terms

ETR Evaluation Technical Report

OR Observation Report

5 Overview**5.1 Organisation of this International Standard**

Clause 6 defines the conventions used in this International Standard.

Clause 7 describes general evaluation tasks with no verdicts associated with them as they do not map to ISO/IEC 15408 evaluator action elements.

Clause 8 addresses the work necessary for reaching an evaluation result on a PP.

Clauses 9 to 15 define the evaluation activities, organised by Assurance Classes.

Annex A covers the basic evaluation techniques used to provide technical evidence of evaluation results.

Annex B provides an explanation of the Vulnerability Analysis criteria and examples of their application

6 Document Conventions**6.1 Terminology**

Unlike ISO/IEC 15408, where each element maintains the last digit of its identifying symbol for all components within the family, this International Standard may introduce new work units when an ISO/IEC 15408 evaluator action element changes from sub-activity to sub-activity; as a result, the last digit of the work unit's identifying symbol may change although the work unit remains unchanged.

Any methodology-specific evaluation work required that is not derived directly from ISO/IEC 15408 requirements is termed *task* or *sub-task*.

6.2 Verb usage

The auxiliary verb *shall* is used only when the provided text is mandatory and therefore only within the work units and sub-tasks. The work units and sub-tasks contain mandatory activities that the evaluator must perform in order to assign verdicts.

Guidance text accompanying work units and sub-tasks gives further explanation on how to apply ISO/IEC 15408 words in an evaluation. The verb usage is in accordance with ISO definitions for these verbs. The auxiliary verb *should* is used when the described method is strongly preferred. All other auxiliary verbs, including *may*, are used where the described method(s) is allowed but is neither recommended nor strongly preferred; it is merely explanation.

The verbs *check*, *examine*, *report* and *record* are used with a precise meaning within this part of this International Standard and the Clause 3 should be referenced for their definitions.

6.3 General evaluation guidance

Material that has applicability to more than one sub-activity is collected in one place. Guidance whose applicability is widespread (across activities and EALs) has been collected into Annex A. Guidance that pertains to multiple sub-activities within a single activity has been provided in the introduction to that activity. If guidance pertains to only a single sub-activity, it is presented within that sub-activity.

6.4 Relationship between ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045 structures

There are direct relationships between ISO/IEC 15408 structure (i.e. class, family, component and element) and the structure of this International Standard. Figure 1 illustrates the correspondence between ISO/IEC 15408 constructs of class, family and evaluator action elements and evaluation methodology activities, sub-activities and actions. However, several evaluation methodology work units may result from the requirements noted in ISO/IEC 15408 developer action and content and presentation elements.




Figure 1 - Mapping of ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045 structures

7 Evaluation process and related tasks

7.1 Introduction

This clause provides an overview of the evaluation process and defines the tasks an evaluator is intended to perform when conducting an evaluation.

Each evaluation, whether of a PP or TOE (including ST), follows the same process, and has four evaluator tasks in common: the input task, the output task, the evaluation sub-activities, and the demonstration of the technical competence to the evaluation authority task.

The input task and the output tasks, which are related to management of evaluation evidence and to report generation, are entirely described in this clause. Each task has associated sub-tasks that apply to, and are normative for all ISO/IEC 15408 evaluations (evaluation of a PP or a TOE).

The evaluation sub-activities are only introduced in this clause, and fully described in the following clauses.

In contrast to the evaluation sub-activities, input and output tasks have no verdicts associated with them as they do not map to ISO/IEC 15408 evaluator action elements; they are performed in order to ensure conformance with the universal principles and to comply with this International Standard.

The demonstration of the technical competence to the evaluation authority task may be fulfilled by the evaluation authority analysis of the output tasks results, or may include the demonstration by the evaluators of their understanding of the inputs for the evaluation sub-activities. This task has no associated evaluator verdict, but has an evaluator authority verdict. The detailed criteria to pass this task are left to the discretion of the evaluation authority, as noted in Annex A.5.

7.2 Evaluation process overview

7.2.1 Objectives

This subclause presents the general model of the methodology and identifies:

- a) roles and responsibilities of the parties involved in the evaluation process;
- b) the general evaluation model.

7.2.2 Responsibilities of the roles

The general model defines the following roles: sponsor, developer, evaluator and evaluation authority.

The sponsor is responsible for requesting and supporting an evaluation. This means that the sponsor establishes the different agreements for the evaluation (e.g. commissioning the evaluation). Moreover, the sponsor is responsible for ensuring that the evaluator is provided with the evaluation evidence.

The developer produces the TOE and is responsible for providing the evidence required for the evaluation (e.g. training, design information), on behalf of the sponsor.

The evaluator performs the evaluation tasks required in the context of an evaluation: the evaluator receives the evaluation evidence from the developer on behalf of the sponsor or directly from the sponsor, performs the evaluation sub-activities and provides the results of the evaluation assessment to the evaluation authority.

The evaluation authority establishes and maintains the scheme, monitors the evaluation conducted by the evaluator, and issues certification/validation reports as well as certificates based on the evaluation results provided by the evaluator.

7.2.3 Relationship of roles

To prevent undue influence from improperly affecting an evaluation, some separation of roles is required. This implies that the roles described above are fulfilled by different entities, except that the roles of developer and sponsor may be satisfied by a single entity.

Moreover, some evaluations (e.g. EAL1 evaluation) may not require the developer to be involved in the project. In this case, it is the sponsor who provides the TOE to the evaluator and who generates the evaluation evidence.