

INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD

ISO/IEC
15408-3

Third edition
2008-08-15

**Information technology — Security
techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT
security —**

**Part 3:
Security assurance components**

*Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité — Critères
d'évaluation pour la sécurité TI —*

Partie 3: Composants d'assurance de sécurité

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<https://standards.iteh.ai/sist/5eduge75-9127-414f-9a90-6adc139a9e5/15408-3-2008>

Reference number
ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008(E)



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Published in Switzerland

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Foreword

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The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

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ISO/IEC 15408-3 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *IT Security techniques*. The identical text of ISO/IEC 15408 is published by the Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations as Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. The common XML source for both publications can be found at <http://www.oc.ccn.cni.es/xml>

This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition (ISO/IEC 15408-3:2005), which has been technically revised.

ISO/IEC 15408 consists of the following parts under the general title *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security*:

- *Part 1: Introduction and general model*
- *Part 2: Security functional components*
- *Part 3: Security assurance components*

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Introduction

Security assurance components, as defined in this part of ISO/IEC 15408, are the basis for the security assurance requirements expressed in a Protection Profile (PP) or a Security Target (ST).

These requirements establish a standard way of expressing the assurance requirements for TOEs. This part of ISO/IEC 15408 catalogues the set of assurance components, families and classes. This part of ISO/IEC 15408 also defines evaluation criteria for PPs and STs and presents evaluation assurance levels that define the predefined ISO/IEC 15408 scale for rating assurance for TOEs, which is called the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs).

The audience for this part of ISO/IEC 15408 includes consumers, developers, and evaluators of secure IT products. ISO/IEC 15408-1 provides additional information on the target audience of ISO/IEC 15408, and on the use of IEC 15408 by the groups that comprise the target audience. These groups may use this part of ISO/IEC 15408 as follows:

- a) Consumers, who use this part of ISO/IEC 15408 when selecting components to express assurance requirements to satisfy the security objectives expressed in a PP or ST, determining required levels of security assurance of the TOE.
- b) Developers, who respond to actual or perceived consumer security requirements in constructing a TOE, reference this part of ISO/IEC 15408 when interpreting statements of assurance requirements and determining assurance approaches of TOEs.
- c) Evaluators, who use the assurance requirements defined in this part of ISO/IEC 15408 as a mandatory statement of evaluation criteria when determining the assurance of TOEs and when evaluating PPs and STs.

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Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security —

Part 3: Security assurance components

1 Scope

This part of ISO/IEC 15408 defines the assurance requirements of ISO/IEC 15408. It includes the evaluation assurance levels (EALs) that define a scale for measuring assurance for component TOEs, the composed assurance packages (CAPs) that define a scale for measuring assurance for composed TOEs, the individual assurance components from which the assurance levels and packages are composed, and the criteria for evaluation of PPs and STs.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 15408-1, *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 1: Introduction and general model*

ISO/IEC 15408-2, *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 2: Security functional components*

3 Terms and definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms

For the purposes of this document, the terms, definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms given in ISO/IEC 15408-1 apply.

4 Overview

4.1 Organisation of this part of ISO/IEC 15408

Clause 5 describes the paradigm used in the security assurance requirements of this part of ISO/IEC 15408.

Clause 6 describes the presentation structure of the assurance classes, families, components, evaluation assurance levels along with their relationships, and the structure of the composed assurance packages. It also characterises the assurance classes and families found in Clauses 9 through 16.

Clause 7 provides detailed definitions of the EALs.

Clause 8 provides detailed definitions of the CAPs.

Clauses 9 through 16 provide the detailed definitions of this part of ISO/IEC 15408 assurance classes.

Annex A provides further explanations and examples of the concepts behind the Development class.

Annex B provides an explanation of the concepts behind composed TOE evaluations and the Composition class.

Annex C provides a summary of the dependencies between the assurance components.