

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

**ISO/IEC
15408-3**

Third edition
2008-08-15

Corrected version
2011-06-01

Information technology Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security —

Part 3: Security assurance components

iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW
*Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité — Critères
d'évaluation pour la sécurité TI —
Partie 3: Composants d'assurance de sécurité*

[ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008](#)
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Reference number
ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008(E)



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Published in Switzerland

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Foreword

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The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

ISO/IEC 15408-3 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *IT Security techniques*. The identical text of ISO/IEC 15408 is published by the Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations as Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. The common XML source for both publications can be found at <http://www.oc.ccn.cni.es/xml/standards.iteh.ai>

This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition (ISO/IEC 15408-3:2005), which has been technically revised.

[ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008](https://standards.iteh.ai/standards/iso-iec-15408-3:2008)

ISO/IEC 15408 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security*:

- *Part 1: Introduction and general model*
- *Part 2: Security functional components*
- *Part 3: Security assurance components*

This corrected version of ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008 incorporates miscellaneous editorial corrections mainly related to EAL4 and EAL6 assurance components, ADV_FSP, ADV_TDS, ATE_DPT.2, ATE_IND, and ALC.

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Introduction

Security assurance components, as defined in this part of ISO/IEC 15408, are the basis for the security assurance requirements expressed in a Protection Profile (PP) or a Security Target (ST).

These requirements establish a standard way of expressing the assurance requirements for TOEs. This part of ISO/IEC 15408 catalogues the set of assurance components, families and classes. This part of ISO/IEC 15408 also defines evaluation criteria for PPs and STs and presents evaluation assurance levels that define the predefined ISO/IEC 15408 scale for rating assurance for Targets of Evaluation (TOEs), which is called the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs).

The audience for this part of ISO/IEC 15408 includes consumers, developers, and evaluators of secure IT products. ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, Clause 5 provides additional information on the target audience of ISO/IEC 15408, and on the use of ISO/IEC 15408 by the groups that comprise the target audience. These groups may use this part of ISO/IEC 15408 as follows:

- a) Consumers, who use this part of ISO/IEC 15408 when selecting components to express assurance requirements to satisfy the security objectives expressed in a PP or ST, determining required levels of security assurance of the TOE.
- b) Developers, who respond to actual or perceived consumer security requirements in constructing a TOE, reference this part of ISO/IEC 15408 when interpreting statements of assurance requirements and determining assurance approaches of TOEs.
- c) Evaluators, who use the assurance requirements defined in this part of ISO/IEC 15408 as a mandatory statement of evaluation criteria when determining the assurance of TOEs and when evaluating PPs and STs.

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Information technology Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security —

Part 3: Security assurance components

1 Scope

This part of ISO/IEC 15408 defines the assurance requirements of ISO/IEC 15408. It includes the evaluation assurance levels (EALs) that define a scale for measuring assurance for component Targets of Evaluation (TOEs), the composed assurance packages (CAPs) that define a scale for measuring assurance for composed TOEs, the individual assurance components from which the assurance levels and packages are composed, and the criteria for evaluation of Protection Profiles (PPs) and Security Targets (STs).

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

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ISO/IEC 15408-1, *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 1: Introduction and general model* [ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008](#)

ISO/IEC 15408-2, *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 2: Security functional components* <https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/5edd8e75-9127-414f-9a90-bdadc139a9c5/iso-iec-15408-3-2008>

3 Terms and definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms

For the purposes of this document, the terms, definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms given in ISO/IEC 15408-1 apply.

4 Overview

4.1 Organisation of this part of ISO/IEC 15408

Clause 5 describes the paradigm used in the security assurance requirements of this part of ISO/IEC 15408.

Clause 6 describes the presentation structure of the assurance classes, families, components, evaluation assurance levels along with their relationships, and the structure of the composed assurance packages. It also characterises the assurance classes and families found in Clauses 9 through 16.

Clause 7 provides detailed definitions of the EALs.

Clause 8 provides detailed definitions of the CAPs.

Clauses 9 through 16 provide the detailed definitions of this part of ISO/IEC 15408 assurance classes.

Annex A provides further explanations and examples of the concepts behind the Development class.

Annex B provides an explanation of the concepts behind composed TOE evaluations and the Composition class.

Annex C provides a summary of the dependencies between the assurance components.

Annex D provides a cross reference between PPs and the families and components of the APE class.

Annex E provides a cross reference between the EALs and the assurance components.

Annex F provides a cross reference between the CAPs and the assurance components.

5 Assurance paradigm

The purpose of this clause is to document the philosophy that underpins ISO/IEC 15408 approach to assurance. An understanding of this clause will permit the reader to understand the rationale behind this part of ISO/IEC 15408 assurance requirements.

5.1 ISO/IEC 15408 philosophy

ISO/IEC 15408 philosophy is that the threats to security and organisational security policy commitments should be clearly articulated and the proposed security measures be demonstrably sufficient for their intended purpose.

Furthermore, measures should be adopted that reduce the likelihood of vulnerabilities, the ability to exercise (i.e. intentionally exploit or unintentionally trigger) a vulnerability, and the extent of the damage that could occur from a vulnerability being exercised. Additionally, measures should be adopted that facilitate the subsequent identification of vulnerabilities and the elimination, mitigation, and/or notification that a vulnerability has been exploited or triggered.

5.2 Assurance approach

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ISO/IEC 15408 philosophy is to provide assurance based upon an evaluation (active investigation) of the IT product that is to be trusted. Evaluation has been the traditional means of providing assurance and is the basis for prior evaluation criteria documents. In aligning the existing approaches, ISO/IEC 15408 adopts the same philosophy. ISO/IEC 15408 proposes measuring the validity of the documentation and of the resulting IT product by expert evaluators with increasing emphasis on scope, depth, and rigour.

ISO/IEC 15408 does not exclude, nor does it comment upon, the relative merits of other means of gaining assurance. Research continues with respect to alternative ways of gaining assurance. As mature alternative approaches emerge from these research activities, they will be considered for inclusion in ISO/IEC 15408, which is so structured as to allow their future introduction.

5.2.1 Significance of vulnerabilities

It is assumed that there are threat agents that will actively seek to exploit opportunities to violate security policies both for illicit gains and for well-intentioned, but nonetheless insecure actions. Threat agents may also accidentally trigger security vulnerabilities, causing harm to the organisation. Due to the need to process sensitive information and the lack of availability of sufficiently trusted products, there is significant risk due to failures of IT. It is, therefore, likely that IT security breaches could lead to significant loss.

IT security breaches arise through the intentional exploitation or the unintentional triggering of vulnerabilities in the application of IT within business concerns.

Steps should be taken to prevent vulnerabilities arising in IT products. To the extent feasible, vulnerabilities should be:

- a) eliminated -- that is, active steps should be taken to expose, and remove or neutralise, all exercisable vulnerabilities;

- b) minimised -- that is, active steps should be taken to reduce, to an acceptable residual level, the potential impact of any exercise of a vulnerability;
- c) monitored -- that is, active steps should be taken to ensure that any attempt to exercise a residual vulnerability will be detected so that steps can be taken to limit the damage.

5.2.2 Cause of vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities can arise through failures in:

- a) requirements -- that is, an IT product may possess all the functions and features required of it and still contain vulnerabilities that render it unsuitable or ineffective with respect to security;
- b) development -- that is, an IT product does not meet its specifications and/or vulnerabilities have been introduced as a result of poor development standards or incorrect design choices;
- c) operation -- that is, an IT product has been constructed correctly to a correct specification but vulnerabilities have been introduced as a result of inadequate controls upon the operation.

5.2.3 ISO/IEC 15408 assurance

Assurance is grounds for confidence that an IT product meets its security objectives. Assurance can be derived from reference to sources such as unsubstantiated assertions, prior relevant experience, or specific experience. However, ISO/IEC 15408 provides assurance through active investigation. Active investigation is an evaluation of the IT product in order to determine its security properties.

iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW

5.2.4 Assurance through evaluation

(standards.iteh.ai)

Evaluation has been the traditional means of gaining assurance, and is the basis of ISO/IEC 15408 approach. Evaluation techniques can include, but are not limited to:

<https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/5edd8e75-9127-414f-9a90-0dade159a9c5/iso-iec-15408-3-2008>

- a) analysis and checking of process(es) and procedure(s);
- b) checking that process(es) and procedure(s) are being applied;
- c) analysis of the correspondence between TOE design representations;
- d) analysis of the TOE design representation against the requirements;
- e) verification of proofs;
- f) analysis of guidance documents;
- g) analysis of functional tests developed and the results provided;
- h) independent functional testing;
- i) analysis for vulnerabilities (including flaw hypothesis);
- j) penetration testing.

5.3 ISO/IEC 15408 evaluation assurance scale

ISO/IEC 15408 philosophy asserts that greater assurance results from the application of greater evaluation effort, and that the goal is to apply the minimum effort required to provide the necessary level of assurance. The increasing level of effort is based upon:

- a) scope -- that is, the effort is greater because a larger portion of the IT product is included;