
**Certificate management for financial
services —**

**Part 1:
Public key certificates**

Gestion de certificats pour les services financiers —

Partie 1: Certificats de clé publique

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of technical committees is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the technical committees are circulated to the member bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the member bodies casting a vote.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

ISO 15782-1 was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 68, *Financial services*, Subcommittee SC 2, *Security management and general banking operations*.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO 15782-1:2003), which has been technically revised.

ISO 15782 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Certificate management for financial services*:

— *Part 1: Public key certificates*

— *Part 2: Certificate extensions*

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Introduction

This part of ISO 15782 adopts ISO/IEC 9594-8 for the financial services industry and defines certificate management procedures and data elements.

Detailed requirements for the financial industry for the individual extensions are given in ISO 15782-2.

While the techniques specified in this part of ISO 15782 are designed to maintain the integrity of financial messages and support the service of non-repudiation, this part of ISO 15782 does not guarantee that a particular implementation is secure. It is the responsibility of the financial institution to put an overall process in place with the necessary controls to ensure that the process is securely implemented, with these controls including the application of appropriate audit tests in order to validate compliance.

The binding association between the identity of the owner of a public key and that key is documented in order to prove the ownership of the corresponding private key. This binding is called a public key certificate. Public key certificates are generated by a trusted entity known as a Certification Authority (CA).

The proper implementation of this part of ISO 15782 is intended to provide assurances of the binding of the identity of an entity to the key used by that entity to sign documents, including wire transfers and contracts.

This part of ISO 15782 defines a certificate management framework for authentication, including the authentication of keys for encryption. The techniques specified by this part of ISO 15782 can be used when initiating a business relationship between legal entities (entities).

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Certificate management for financial services —

Part 1: Public key certificates

1 Scope

This part of ISO 15782 defines a certificate management system for financial industry use for legal and natural persons that includes

- credentials and certificate contents,
- Certification Authority systems, including certificates for digital signatures and for encryption key management,
- certificate generation, distribution, validation and renewal,
- authentication structure and certification paths, and
- revocation and recovery procedures.

This part of ISO 15782 also recommends some useful operational procedures (e.g. distribution mechanisms, acceptance criteria for submitted credentials).

Implementation of this part of ISO 15782 will also be based on business risks and legal requirements.

This part of ISO 15782 does not include

- the protocol messages used between the participants in the certificate management process,
- requirements for notary and time stamping,
- Certificate Policy and Certification Practices requirements, or
- Attribute Certificates.

While this part of ISO 15782 provides for the generation of certificates that could include a public key used for encryption key management, it does not address the generation or transport of keys used for encryption.

Implementers wishing to comply with ISO/IEC 9594-8 can utilize the certificate structures defined by that International Standard. Those wishing to implement compatible certificate and certificate revocation structures but without the overhead associated with the X.500 series can utilize the ASN.1 structures defined in ISO 15782-2. ISO 15782-2 can also be referred to for a financial services profile of certificate and CRL extensions.

ISO 21188 provides additional information for implementers on Certificate Policies, Certification Practice Statements, and PKI controls. ISO 21188 sets out a framework of requirements to manage a PKI through Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements and to enable the use of public key certificates in the financial services industry. It also defines control objectives and supporting procedures to manage risks.

NOTE The use of a bold sans serif font, such as **CertReqData** or **CRLEntry**, denotes the use of abstract syntax notation (ASN.1), as defined in ISO/IEC 8824-1 to ISO/IEC 8824-4 and ISO/IEC 8825-1 and ISO/IEC 8825-2. Where it makes sense to do so, the ASN.1 term is used in place of normal text. Refer to ISO 15782-2 for related ASN.1 modules.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 8824-1, *Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation — Part 1*

ISO/IEC 8824-2, *Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification — Part 2*

ISO/IEC 8824-3, *Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification — Part 3*

ISO/IEC 8824-4, *Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications — Part 4*

ISO/IEC 8825-1, *Information technology — ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) — Part 1*

ISO/IEC 8825-2, *Information technology — ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Packed Encoding Rules (PER) — Part 2*

ISO/IEC 9594-8, *Information Technology — Open Systems Interconnection — The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks — Part 8*

ISO/IEC 15408 (all parts), *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security*

ISO 15782-2:2001, *Banking — Certificate Management — Part 2: Certificate extensions*

ISO 16609, *Banking — Requirements for message authentication using symmetric techniques*

ISO 21188:2006, *Public key infrastructure for financial services — Practices and policy framework*

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

- 3.1**
ASN.1 module
identifiable collection of ASN.1 types and values
- 3.2**
attribute
characteristic of an entity
- 3.3**
audit journal
chronological record of system activities which is sufficient to enable the reconstruction, review and examination of the sequence of environments and activities surrounding or leading to each event in the path of a transaction from its inception to the output of the final results
- 3.4**
authorization
granting of rights
- 3.5**
CA certificate
certificate whose subject is a CA, and whose associated private key is used to sign certificates

3.6**certificate hold
certificate suspension**

temporary interruption of the validity of a certificate by the CA

3.7**certificate information**

information in a certificate which is signed

3.8**certificate policy**

named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements

EXAMPLE A particular Certificate Policy might indicate the applicability of a type of certificate to the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the trading of goods within a given price range.

NOTE 1 The Certificate Policy should be used by the user of the certificate to decide whether or not to accept the binding between the subject (of the certificate) and the public key. Some of the components in the Certificate Policy framework are given concrete values and represented by a registered object identifier in the X.509, Version 3 certificate. The object owner also registers a textual description of the policy and makes it available to the Relying Parties.

NOTE 2 The Certificate Policy object identifier can be included in the following extensions in the X.509, Version 3 certificates: Certificate Policies, policy mappings, and policy constraints. The object identifier(s) may appear in none, some, or all of these fields. These object identifiers may be the same (referring to the same Certificate Policy) or may be different (referring to different Certificate Policies).

3.9**certificate policy framework**

comprehensive set of security- and liability-related components that can be used to define a Certificate Policy

NOTE A subset of the components in the Certificate Policy framework are given concrete values to define a Certificate Policy.

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3.10**certificate re-key**

process whereby an entity with an existing key pair and certificate receives a new certificate for a new public-key, following the generation of a new key pair

3.11**certificate renewal**

process whereby an entity is issued for a new instance of an existing certificate with a new validity period

3.12**certificate request data
credentials**

signed information in a certificate request, including the entity's public key, entity identity and other information included in the certificate

3.13**certificate revocation list****CRL**

list of revoked certificates

3.14**certification**

process of creating a public key certificate for an entity

3.15**certification authority****CA**

entity trusted by one or more entities to create, assign, and revoke or hold public key certificates

3.16

certification authority system

set of entities, including a CA, that manages certificates throughout the life of the certificate

NOTE The entities are responsible for

- generation,
- submission,
- registration,
- certification,
- distribution,
- use,
- renewal,
- re-key,
- revocation or hold, and
- expiry.

3.17

certification path

ordered sequence of certificates of entities which, together with the public key of the initial entity in the path, can be processed to obtain the public key of the final entity in the path

3.18

certification practice statement CPS

statement of the practices which a Certification Authority employs in issuing and managing certificates through their life cycle

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3.19

compromise

violation of the security of a system such that an unauthorized disclosure or modification of sensitive information may have occurred

3.20

confidentiality

property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes

3.21

CRL distribution point

directory entry or other distribution source for CRLs

NOTE A CRL distributed through a CRL distribution point may contain revocation entries for only a subset of the full set of certificates issued by one CA or may contain revocation entries for multiple CAs.

3.22

cross-certification

process by which two CAs mutually certify each other's public keys

cf. **policy mapping** (3.44)

3.23

(cryptographic) key

parameter that determines the operation of a cryptographic function

NOTE Cryptographic functions include the following:

- the transformation from plain text to cipher text and vice versa;
- synchronized generation of keying material;
- digital signature generation or validation.

3.24**cryptographical hash**

mathematical function which maps values from a large (possibly very large) domain into a smaller (fixed) range

NOTE It satisfies the following properties:

- it is computationally unfeasible to find any input which maps to a pre-specified output (i.e. pre-image resistant);
- it is computationally unfeasible to find any two distinct inputs which map to the same output (i.e. collision-resistant).

3.25**cryptographic module**

device wherein cryptographic functions (e.g. encryption, authentication, key generation) are performed

3.26**cryptography**

discipline which embodies principles, means and methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its information content, prevent its undetected modification, prevent its unauthorized use or a combination thereof

3.27**cryptoperiod**

time span during which a specific key is authorized for use or in which the keys for a given system may remain in effect

3.28**data integrity**

property whereby data has not been altered or destroyed

3.29**delta-CRL**

subset of a CRL indicating changes since the prior CRL update

3.30**(digital) signature**

cryptographic transformation of data which, when associated with a data unit, provides the services of origin authentication and data integrity, and may support signer non-repudiation

3.31**directory repository**

method for distributing or making available certificates or CRLs

EXAMPLE A database or an X.500 Directory.

3.32**distinguished name**

globally unique name for an entity

NOTE 1 Methods for determining global uniqueness are outside the scope of this part of ISO 15782.

NOTE 2 An entity may be issued for more than one certificate with the same distinguished name.

3.33**dual control**

process of utilizing two or more separate entities (usually persons), who are operating in concert, to protect sensitive functions or information

NOTE 1 Both entities are equally responsible for the physical protection of materials involved in vulnerable transactions. No single person is able to access or to utilize the materials (e.g. cryptographic key).

NOTE 2 For manual key and certificate generation, conveyance, loading, storage, and retrieval, dual control requires split knowledge of key among the entities. Also see **split knowledge** (3.52).

3.34
end entity

certificate subject, other than a CA, which uses its private key for purposes other than signing certificates

3.35
entity

legal (e.g. a corporation, labour union, state or nation) or natural person

EXAMPLE CA, RA or end entity.

3.36
financial message

communication containing information which has financial implications

3.37
key agreement

method for negotiating a key value without transferring the key, even in an encrypted form

EXAMPLE The Diffie-Hellman technique.

3.38
key fragment

part of a private key which has been divided into pieces (also called shares) that are distributed amongst entities such that the pooled fragments of specific subsets of entities can reconstitute the key

3.39
key management

handling of keying material throughout its life cycle in accordance with a security policy

3.40
key pair

(public key cryptography) public key and its corresponding private key

3.41
keying material

data, such as keys, certificates and initialization vectors, necessary to perform cryptographic operations

3.42
non-repudiation

service which provides proof of the integrity and origin of data which can be verified by a third party

NOTE The non-repudiation service protects against the signing entity falsely denying the action and can provide rebuttable presumption. It requires that appropriate processes and procedures (registration, audit journals, contractual arrangements, personnel, etc.) be in place.

3.43
out-of-band notification

notification using a communication means independent of the primary communications means

3.44
policy mapping

recognition that, when a CA in one domain certifies a CA in another domain, a particular Certificate Policy in the second domain may be considered by the authority of the first domain to be equivalent (but not necessarily identical in all respects) to a particular Certificate Policy in the first domain

cf. **cross-certification** (3.22)

3.45
policy qualifier

policy-dependent information that accompanies a Certificate Policy identifier in an X.509 certificate

3.46
private key

(asymmetric (public) key cryptosystem) key of an entity's key pair which is known only by that entity

3.47**public key**

(asymmetric (public) key cryptosystem) key of an entity's key pair which is publicly known

3.48**public key certificate**

public key and identity of an entity together with some other information, rendered unforgeable by signing the certificate information with the private key of the certifying authority that issued that public key certificate

3.49**public key validation****PKV**

process that does arithmetic tests on a candidate public key to provide assurance that it conforms to the specifications of the standard

NOTE 1 Attacks may be possible on the owner and/or user if a non-conforming public key is used.

NOTE 2 Public key validation can include arithmetic property tests (range, order, primality, etc.), canonical generation tests and consistency tests between components of a public key. Methods for public key validation are typically found in financial industry signature standards.

3.50**registration authority****RA**

entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of subjects of certificates, but is not a CA and hence does not sign or issue certificates

NOTE An RA may assist in the certificate application process, revocation process or both.

3.51**relying party****user**

recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance on that certificate

3.52**split knowledge**

condition under which two or more entities separately have key fragments which, individually, convey no knowledge of the resultant cryptographic key

3.53**subject**

entity whose public key is certified in a public key certificate

3.54**subject CA**

CA that is certified by the issuing CA

3.55**subscriber**

entity subscribing with a Certification Authority on behalf of one or more subjects

3.56**trusted CA public key**

public key used to validate the first certificate in a chain of certificates as a part of certification path processing

EXAMPLE The root key in a centralized trust model or a local CA key in a decentralized trust model (see Annex B).

NOTE If an end entity validates a chain of certificates from a trusted CA public key to the end certificate, then the end certificate is considered valid.

3.57**zeroize**

active destruction of electronically stored data, such as by degaussing, erasing or overwriting

4 Symbols and abbreviations

Symbols	Meaning
$X\{\text{information}\}$	Signing of "information" by X
X_p	X's public key. (e.g. X_{1p} is X_1 's public key)
X_s	X's private key
$X_1\langle X_2 \rangle$	X_2 's certificate issued by the CA, X_1
$X_1\langle X_2 \rangle X_2\langle X_3 \rangle \dots X_{n-1}\langle X_n \rangle$	Certificate path. Each item $X_i\langle X_{i+1} \rangle$ in the path is the certificate for the CA which produced the next item. This path is of arbitrary length and is functionally equivalent to $X_1\langle X_n \rangle$. Possession of X_{1p} allows a user to extract the authenticated public key of X_n .
$X_{1p} \cdot X_1\langle X_2 \rangle$	Unwrapping of a certificate or path. The public key of the leftmost CA (X_1) is used to extract the authenticated public key of the rightmost certificate ($X_1\langle X_2 \rangle$) by working through the path of intervening certificates. This example extracts X_{2p} .

NOTE The notation used in this part of ISO 15782 is a variant of the X.509 notation for certificates, certification paths and related information.

Abbreviations	Meaning
ASN.1	Abstract syntax notation
BER	Basic encoding rules
CA	Certification Authority
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
DER	Distinguished encoding rules
DSA	Digital signature algorithm
ECDSA	Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
PKI	Public key infrastructure
RA	Registration Authority
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman algorithm
SHA-1	Secure hash algorithm-1
URI	Uniform resource identifier

5 Public key infrastructure

5.1 Overview

Public key infrastructure (PKI) is a term used to describe the technical, legal and commercial infrastructure that enables the wide deployment of public key technology.

Public key technology is used for creating digital signatures and for managing symmetric keys. With public key cryptography, two keys are used: one is kept private with the user, the other is made publicly available. That which is signed or processed with one key (public or private) may be validated with its complement (public or private). Revealing the public key does not in any way compromise the private key.

The authentication of public keys is an essential requirement and, for this reason, public keys are housed in public key certificates. A certificate contains the public key and its identifying data and is digitally signed by a

Certification Authority (CA). This part of ISO 15782 is based on the ISO/IEC 9594-8 format for public key certificates.

As described in ISO 21188, the term “Certification Authority” reflects the aggregate of the following PKI roles including

- Certificate Issuer,
- Certificate Manufacturer,
- Registration Authority,
- Repository,
- Certificate Validation Service Provider, and
- Subject Cryptographic Mechanism Provider.

In this part of ISO 15782, we focus on the CA as a whole and on the RA function.

5.2 Public key management infrastructure process flow

The responsibilities, services and procedures required by a public key management infrastructure are as follows:

- key generation;
- registration;
- certification;
- distribution;
- usage;
- revocation hold;
- expiry;
- renewal;
- re-key.

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The main steps involved in certification are shown in Figure 1.

5.3 Certification Authority (CA)

A CA has a public/private key pair and uses a digital signature algorithm to produce certificates.

The binding of the entity's public key to its identity is accomplished by having the CA generate the certificate, thereby attesting to the relationship of the information therein and providing assurances of its integrity.

The binding of an entity's public key and identity is validated by using the public key of one or more CAs as described in 6.3.1. The certificate(s) and proof of validation shall be maintained by the validator in an audit journal. A CA may issue certificates to any entities, including CAs.

Entities (including CAs) can use these certificates to authenticate themselves to Relying Parties. Hence, authentication may involve a chain of certificates. The verification of a chain of certificates begins with the