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Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV);
NFV Security;
Report on use cases and technical approaches for multi-layer host administration

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Foreword

This Group Specification (GS) has been produced by ETSI Industry Specification Group (ISG) Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV).

Modal verbs terminology

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Introduction

The Security Problem Statement, ETSI GS NFV-SEC 001 [i.1] identifies an issue with multi-layer administration for NFV. Multi-layer administration seeks to provide methods, capabilities, procedures and assurances that safeguard Virtual Machines or Containers running on a virtualisation host from interference. The specific problem is that any user or process with root access to the hosting service can normally view and change the memory and processes of any hosted application. This is due to the fact that in the default administrative configuration for the majority of host-based virtualisation systems - whether using hypervisors or Containers - any process or administrator operating at the "base" level has access to the memory of all applications - including VMs and Containers - running on that host. The term *inspection* is often used to refer to the ability for processes to directly interact with system memory. Further detail is provided in clause 6.1.1.

Although this configuration is generally acceptable when the hosted applications and the hosting service operate in the same trust domain, or when the hosted applications are in the same trust context and a subordinate trust domain to the hosting service, there are a number of use cases where the trust relationship from the hosted application to the hosting service does not conform to this model. In these cases, the hosted application may wish to protect a set of its resources from the hosting service.

Note that there are also attacks in the opposite direction: from the hosted application against the hosting service. While serious, these are well understood issues and most hosting services already track vulnerabilities in this context and provide defensive measures against these types of attacks. Another type of attack is from one hosted application against another hosted application on the same hosting service. Neither of these "top-down" attacks are considered explicitly in the present document, however, some of the methods and techniques presented here will reduce the incidence of such attacks (e.g. hardware mediated secure enclaves). The focus of the present document, then, is on securing hosted applications against attacks by the hosting service, as well as limiting undesired visibility.

Note that multi-layer administration in the context of NFV should not be confused with the similar term "Multi-Layer Security" (MLS), though certain concepts relevant to MLS may be relevant or referenced in the present document.

1 Scope

The present document addresses multi-layer administration use cases and technical approaches, an issue identified in the Security Problem Statement, ETSI GS NFV-SEC 001 [i.1]. Multi-layer administration seeks to provide methods, capabilities, procedures and assurances - of various strengths based on requirements and available technologies and techniques - that safeguard Virtual Machines or Containers running on a virtualisation host ("hosted applications") - from interference (of various types) by the host system or platform ("hosting service").

The scope of the present document is generally the system comprising the hosting service, associated hardware (including TPM, GPU, etc.), software and configuration, and the hosted application. Some requirements and measures outside this context are also considered, but not necessarily in equal depth.

2 References

2.1 Normative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies.

Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference.

NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.

[1] ETSI GS NFV 001: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Use Cases".

2.2 Informative references

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The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

[i.1] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 001: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Problem Statement".

[i.2] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Security and Trust Guidance".

[i.3] ETSI TR 103 331: "CYBER; Structured threat information sharing".

[i.4] ETSI TS 102 232: "Lawful Interception (LI); Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery".

[i.5] ETSI TS 101 331: "Lawful Interception (LI); Requirements of Law Enforcement Agencies".

[i.6] ETSI TS 102 656: "Lawful Interception (LI); Retained Data; Requirements of Law Enforcement Agencies for handling Retained Data".

[i.7] ETSI TS 102 657: "Lawful Interception (LI); Retained data handling; Handover interface for the request and delivery of retained data".

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[i.8] ETSI DGS/NFV-SEC007: "Network Function Virtualisation (NFV); Trust; Report on Attestation Technologies and Practices for Secure Deployments".

[i.9] NIST Special Publication 800-122: "Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII)".

NOTE: Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-122/sp800-122.pdf

[i.10] Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. .

NOTE: Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML

[i.11] TCG PC: "Client Specific Implementation Specification for Conventional BIOS - Specification Version 1.21 Errata".

[i.12] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 004: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Privacy and Regulation; Report on Lawful Interception Implications".

[i.13] Forensics Whitepapers.

NOTE: https://digital-forensics.sans.org/community/whitepapers.

[i.14] TCG: "Trusted Platform Module Library Specification, Family 2.0".

NOTE: http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tpm_library_specification.

[i.15] TCG: "TSS TAB and Resource Manager Specification".

NOTE: http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tss_tab_and_resource_manager

[i.16] NIST FIPS 140-2: "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules".

NOTE: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html.

[i.17] TCG: "Virtualized Trusted Platform Architecture Specification".

NOTE: http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/virtualized_trusted_platform_architecture_specification.

[i.18] ETSI DGS/NFV-SEC010: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Report on Retained Data problem statement and requirements".

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3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

AAA	Authentication, Authorisation & Auditing
ADMF	Administrative Function (for Lawful Interception)
API	Application Programming Interface
AUC	AUthentication Centre
BIOS	Basic Input/Output System
BMSC	Broadcast-Multicast Service Centre
BRAS	Broadband Remote Access Server
CSCF	Call Session Control Function
CIA	Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CRTM	Core Root of Trust for Measurement
CS	Circuit Switched
CSCF	Call Session Control Function
CSP	Cloud Service Provider
DMA	Direct Memory Access
DSLAM	Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer
EMS	Element Management System
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards

GGSN	Gateway GPRS support node
GMSC	Gateway Mobile Switching Centre
GPRS	General Packet Radio Service
GPU	Graphics Processing Unit
GPU	Graphics Processing Unit
GW	Gateway
HLR	Home Location Register
HSM	Hardware Security Module
HSS	Home Subscriber Server
HW	Hardware
I/O	Input/Output
IaaS	Infrastructure as a Service
KVM	KVM hypervisor software
LBA	Logical Block Array(s)
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
LI	Lawful Interception
LTE	Long Term Evolution
MAC	Modify, Access, Create
MFRP	Multimedia Resource Function Processor
MLS	Multi-Layer Security
MME	Mobility Management Entity
MRFC	Media Resource Function Controller
MSC	Mobile Switching Centre
NFV	Network Function Virtualisation
NFVI	Network Function Virtualisation Infrastructure
NIC	Network Interface Card
OS	Operating System
OSS	Operations Support Systems
PC	Personal Computer
PCI	Payment Card Industry
PCR	Platform Configuration Register
PII	Personal Identifiable Information
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
pTPM	physical Trusted Platform Module
RAID	Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks OR Redundant Array of Independent Disks
RAM	Random Access Memory
RD	Retained Data
RSA	RSA encryption algorithm
RTM	Root-of Trust for Measurement
SBC	Session Border Controller
SDN	Software-Defined Networking
SED	Self-Encrypting Drive
SGSN	Serving GPRS support node
SLA	Service Level Agreement
SMSC	Short Message Service Centre
SW	Software
TBB	Trusted Building Block
TCG	Trusted Computing Group

NOTE: www.trustedcomputinggroup.org

ToR	Top of Rack
TPM	Trusted Platform Module
UICC	Universal Integrated Circuit Card
VIM	Virtual Infrastructure Manage
VLR	Visitor Location Register
VM	Virtual Machine
VMM	Virtual Machine Manager
VNF	Virtual Network Function
VNFC	Virtual Network Function Component
VNFCI	Virtual Network Function Component Instance
VNFI	Virtual Network Function Instance

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VNFM	Virtual Network Function Manager
VoLTE	Voice over LTE
vTPM	virtual TPM

4 Use cases for multi-layer administration

4.0 Use cases - introduction

These use case descriptions provide various levels of detail, some referencing items in in clause 5.1 to note which specific requirements are relevant to the use case. This is particularly the case where regulatory requirements allow for detailed definition of requirements (in the case, for instance, of Lawful Interception clause 4.5 and Retained Data clause 4.6. In other cases, the specific requirements will depend more on the business requirements of the operator, the current business environment and local norms: here, a general description of the use case is provided, and some suggestions made.

4.1 Multi-tenant hosting

This is the case where one operator hosts VNFs (or VNFCIs) from one or more operators on NFVI owned and/or operated by the first operator. This is identified in ETSI GS NFV 001 [1] as Use Case #1 "Infrastructure as a Service", but is differentiated in the present document from the use case in clause 4.2.

The relevance to the present document is that the first operator (the hosting operator) may need to be able to provide assurances that sensitive processes, algorithms and data (e.g. subscriber details) owned by the other operators cannot be viewed or changed by the NFVI operator, whether intentionally or unintentionally. The exact requirements for such an agreement will be subject to contractual arrangements between different operators, and are not therefore considered in detail in the present document. They may include, however, the requirements described in the following clauses of the present document:

- 5.1.1 Capability assertion and attestation at boot-time
- 5.1.3 Assert secure provision of hosted application
- 5.1.6 Location assertion
- 5.2.1 Confidentiality of data
- 5.2.3 Confidentiality of processes
- 5.2.6 Secure communications
- 5.2.7 Secure storage
- 5.2.8 Secure clean-up
- 5.2.10 Assurance of compliance by hosting service
- 5.2.11 Availability of entropy source
- 5.3.2 Workload placement policy and operation security
- 5.3.3 Availability of an attestation authority

Another requirement that may arise is that of resource allocation: particularly the availability of sufficient CPU cycles and network bandwidth for hosted VNFs/VNFCIs. This is outside the scope of the present document, and it is expected that guarantees would be made by contractual agreements such as Service Level Agreements (SLAs). Monitoring for such SLAs is also considered outside the scope of the present document.

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4.2 Infrastructure as a service (IaaS)

Infrastructure as a service ("IaaS") is the case where a service provider may wish to provide infrastructure services to third party with the extra guarantee that the service provider cannot view or change data or algorithms in the hosted applications. This is not considered a "pure" NFV use case, as it is more akin to data centre hosting than service provision, but is briefly considered here as it shares similar requirements with multi-tenant and the measures available are also applicable. Infrastructure as a service is also a service offered by other business units of operators, and it is expected that best practice should be shared in both directions. A key point here is that customers may have requirements to keep encryption keys safe (see, for example, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/BYOE-bring-your-own-encryption and http://www.informationweek.com/interop/the-rise-of-bring-your-own-encryption-/a/d-id/1320796), and it will therefore fall to the hosting service provider to ensure that measures are in place to service this requirement.

The exact requirements for such a service will depend on the services offered by the hosting service provider, and are not therefore considered in detail in the present document. They may include, however, the requirements described in the following clauses of the present document:

- 5.1.1 Capability assertion and attestation at boot-time
- 5.1.3 Assert secure provision of hosted application
- 5.1.6 Location assertion
- 5.2.1 Confidentiality of data
- 5.2.3 Confidentiality of processes
- 5.2.6 Secure communications
- 5.2.7 Secure storage
- 5.2.8 Secure clean-up
- 5.2.10 Assurance of compliance by hosting service
- 5.2.11 Availability of entropy source
- 5.3.2 Workload placement policy and operation security
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As with Multi-tenant hosting clause 4.1, another requirement that may arise is that of fair resource allocation: particularly the availability of sufficient CPU cycles and network bandwidth for hosted VNFs/VNFCIs. This is outside the scope of the present document, and it is expected that guarantees would be made by contractual agreements such as Service Level Agreements (SLAs). Monitoring for such SLAs is also considered outside the scope of the present document.

4.3 Security Sensitive Application Functions

4.3.1 Introduction

This use case concerns the segregation of sensitive application functions from other network functions, where restricted access and additional security domain separation requirements may be applied by operators.

Examples of such functions are the 3GPP AUC (master cryptographic key database responsible for holding UICC keys and generating authentication vectors) and the HSS which contains the 3GPP user subscription information. Typically operators allow a very restricted set of administrators access to such sensitive functions compared with other network elements.

These functions are considered to be largely standalone islands within an operator's network although they will interconnect with other VNFs in other administrative domains via specific restricted interfaces at the virtualised application layer.

4.3.2 Applicability of security requirements in the context of Sensitive Application Functions

This clause gives specific interpretation of clause 5 in the context of Sensitive Application Functions.

Table 1

Clause of the present document	Notes for Security Sensitive Application Functions
5.0.1 Overview	Depending on the Sensitive Function availability is likely to be important (e.g. HSS & AUC), as network and/or user services will not be available without these functions.
5.0.2 Prevention versus remediation	Prevention is likely more important than remediation as the network may not function without these functions. However if a negative security event cannot be prevented, remediation is very important.
5.1.1 Capability assertion and attestation at boot-time	Important for Sensitive Application Functions but no specific provisions are noted.
5.1.2 Capability assertion and attestation at run-time	Important for Sensitive Application Functions but no specific provisions are noted.
5.1.3 Assert secure provision of hosted application	Important for Sensitive Application Functions but no specific provisions are noted.
5.1.4 Assert own system integrity at boot	Important for Sensitive Application Functions. VNFI may be to verify integrity of databases, static configuration data and application root key chain (e.g. AUC)
5.1.5 Assert continued integrity of own system at run-time	Important for Sensitive Application Functions. Loss of integrity of Sensitive Functions may lead to loss of integrity of whole virtualised network and services.
5.1.6 Location assertion	Depends on specific Sensitive Function.
5.2.1 Confidentiality of data	Depends on specific Sensitive Function. Would be critical for functions containing application cryptographic functions (e.g. AUC) but may not be critical in all functions.
5.2.2 Confidentiality of data-related metadata	Depends on specific Sensitive Function. Would be critical for functions containing application cryptographic functions (e.g. AUC) or subscriber databases (e.g. HSS) but may not be critical in all functions.
5.2.3 Confidentiality of processes	Important for Sensitive Application Functions but no specific provisions are noted.
5.2.4 Confidentiality of process-related metadata	Important for Sensitive Application Functions but no specific provisions are noted.
5.2.5 Concealment of resource usage	May be desirable for some functions to prevent attacks on cryptographic functions but absolute concealment unlikely to be required.
5.2.6 Secure communications	Important for Sensitive Application Functions but no specific provisions are noted.
5.2.7 Secure storage	Important for Sensitive Application Functions. Storage of cryptographic keys, algorithms and other sensitive information will require secure storage.
5.2.8 Secure clean-up	Important for Sensitive Application Functions. Cryptographic keys, algorithms and customer data subject to Data Protection requirements will require secure clean-up.
5.2.9 Secure routing/switching	Important for Sensitive Application Functions but no specific provisions are noted.
5.2.10 Assurance of compliance by hosting service	Important for Sensitive Application Functions but no specific provisions are noted.
5.2.11 Availability of entropy source	May be important for some functions (e.g. AUC) but not for other.
5.3.1 Secure routing/switching	Important for Sensitive Application Functions but no specific provisions are noted.
5.3.2 Workload placement policy and operation security	Important for Sensitive Application Functions but no specific provisions are noted.
5.3.3 Availability of an attestation authority	May be important for some functions.

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4.3.3 Notes on the technologies and measures in the context of Sensitive Application Functions

The following notes give specific interpretation of clause 6 in the context of Sensitive Application Functions.

Table 2

Clause of the present document	Notes for Sensitive Application Functions
6.1 Memory inspection	Memory inspection by a hosting service would cause issues for some Sensitive Functions (e.g. AUC). In general hosting services may not be trusted to introspect Sensitive Function details on hosted services.
6.2 Secure logging	There is a requirement for capability of logging for Sensitive Application Functions. However depending on the function, these logs may be need to be treat separately from other functions.
6.3 OS-level access control and 6.4 Post-incident analysis	This is important, but no specific provisions are noted.
6.5 Physical controls and alarms and 6.6 Personnel controls and checks	This is important and will depend on the specific function (e.g. AUC), but no specific provisions are noted.
6.8 Read-only partitions and 6.9 Write-only partitions	Read or write-only partitions will be required by some Sensitive Application Functions.
6.11 Communications Security	Confidentiality and integrity of network traffic are critical for most Sensitive Functions.
6.12 Measured boot, 6.13 Secured boot	This is important, but no specific provisions are noted.
6.14 Constant resource usage	Unlikely to be necessary in most sensitive functions. However may be required for specific components of cryptographic and similar functions (e.g. AUC).
6.15 Attestation, 6.16 Hardware-mediated execution enclaves, 6.17 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)	TPMs may be mandated to be hardware TPMs. Virtual TPMs may not be sufficiently robust.
6.18 Self-encrypting drives/storage	Confidentiality and integrity of data at rest is critical for most Sensitive Functions.
6.19 Direct Memory Access to hardware resources	Unlikely to be necessary in most sensitive functions but some VNFs are likely to require access to hardware accelerator functional (e.g. specialist cryptographic functions - see, for example, clause 6.20).
6.20 Hardware Security Modules	Some VNFs may require access to the security capabilities offered by HSMs.
6.21 Software integrity protection and verification	Software integrity protection and verification is expected to be required for almost all use cases.

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4.4 Security Network Monitoring & Control Functions

4.4.1 Introduction

This use case concerns the segregation of monitoring functions from other network functions, where restricted access and additional security domain separation requirements may be applied by operators.

Examples of such functions are the routers, firewalls, packet monitoring filters or other network defensive functions (e.g. proxy servers). These functions are used logically to protect virtualised functions running in other VMs.

These functions may be grouped in a single administrative domain or multiple parallel domains each containing one or more functions (e.g. one or more firewalls).