



Reference

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Full standard:  
<https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/403ffc30-ceda-4afb-8446-694501b221d7/etsi-tr-118-512-v2.0.0-2016-09>

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## Foreword

This Technical Report (TR) has been produced by ETSI Partnership Project oneM2M (oneM2M).

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# 1 Scope

The present document provides options and analyses for the security features and mechanisms providing end-to-end security and group authentication for oneM2M.

The scope of this technical report includes use cases, threat analyses, high level architecture, generic requirements, available options, evaluation of options, and detailed procedures for executing end-to-end security and group authentication.

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# 2 References

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References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

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The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

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## 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations

### 3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ETSI TS 118 111 [i.1] and the following apply:

**authenticated encryption with associated data:** An algorithm providing confidentiality for the plaintext and a way to check its integrity and authenticity while providing the ability to check the integrity and authenticity of some associated data. In this context: plaintext refers to data that is authenticated and encrypted; and associated data refers to data that is authenticated, but not encrypted. See IETF RFC 5166 [i.4] for further details.

**canonical:** unique and unambiguous representation of data [i.2].

**canonicalization:** process of converting a legal representation of data into its canonical form

**End-to-End Authentication:** provides an entity with the ability to validate another entity's identity that was supplied as part of the message

NOTE: The communicating entities can be multiple hops away.

**End-to-End Data Confidentiality Protection:** provides the ability for an entity to provide for confidentiality protection of data

NOTE: The confidentiality protected data can be transported over multiple hops consisting of trusted or untrusted communication entities. Only authorized entities can decrypt the confidentiality protected data. Such a protection mechanism would ensure that the data is confidentiality protected "at-rest" and "in-transit" even when handled by intermediate nodes.

**End-to-End Data Integrity Protection:** provides the ability for an entity to integrity protect data

NOTE: The integrity protected data can be transported over multiple hops consisting of trusted or untrusted communication entities. An authorized consumer of the data is able to verify the integrity of data and is also able to verify the originator of the data. Such a protection mechanism would ensure that the data is integrity protected "at-rest" and "in-transit" even when handled by intermediate nodes.

**End-to-End Security:** provides for securing messages that can traverse multiple hops between communication entities

NOTE: Securing of messages involves mutually authenticating the end entities. Securing of messages also involves providing confidentiality and integrity protection of messages in order that end entities are assured that the messages have not been altered or eavesdropped by un-authorized entities (including intermediary nodes involved in the transmission)

**group authentication:** provides an entity (authenticator) with the ability to validate the identities of all entities which belong to a group [i.6]

NOTE 1: Confidentiality and integrity of communication between the authenticator and each individual entity in the group is protected from exploit by other entities in the group and any middle node.

NOTE 2: This may contain additional information.

**M2M Trust Enabler Function (TEF):** trusted third-party entity that can provide services such as credential generation, registration and provisioning in order to enable secure data protection and access

**object-based security:** technology that embeds application data within a secure object that can be safely handled by untrusted entities [i.3]

## 3.2 Symbols

For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:

|| Concatenation

## 3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| AMI    | Advanced Metering Infrastructure   |
| AEAD   | Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data                                |
| DAP    | Data Aggregation Point   |
| IdAx   | Identifier for entity Ax   |
| IdAy   | Identifier for entity Ay   |
| IdB    | Identifier for entity B  |
| IdC    | Identifier for entity C  |
| Kpsa   | Provisioned Credential for M2M Security Association Establishment            |
| KpsaId | Provisioned Credential for M2M Security Association Establishment Identifier |
| Ks     | M2M Group Secure Connection Key  |
| KsId   | M2M Group Secure Connection Key Identifier                                   |
| Rand   | Random Number Generated by the Infrastructure Node                           |
| MN     | Middle Node  |
| IN     | Infrastructure Node  |

---

## 4 Conventions

The key words "Shall", "Shall not", "May", "Need not", "Should", "Should not" in this document are to be interpreted as described in the oneM2M Drafting Rules [i.5].

---

## 5 Use Cases

### 5.1 Use Case of End-to-End Authentication in Key Distribution

#### 5.1.1 Description

An oneM2M system may need to transfer sensitive data that should not be exposed to any intermediate nodes or even the application programs in the end nodes, i.e. these data should only be handled, stored and used in secure environments. One example is to distribute secret keys to the members of a group so that the group members can communicate to each other confidentially. In this case the hop-by-hop security mechanisms cannot meet the required security level, and an end-to-end security mechanism should be adopted.

The use case in the following clauses shows how an end-to-end mechanism could be used to deploy group credentials. For more information about using group credentials seeing clause 5.4.

#### 5.1.2 Actors

The entities involved in this use case are shown in the Figure 5.1.2-1 and described as follows:

**M2M Server:** It represents an infrastructure equipment that is responsible for creating groups, generating group credentials and transferring group credentials to group members.

**M2M Gateway:** It represents a gateway that is responsible for forwarding the messages exchanging between M2M Server and target M2M Devices. It also acts as a group agent that is responsible for controlling the entities in the Group-1, Group-2 and Group-3, and broadcasting control commands to these entities.

**M2M Device:** It represents a device that is responsible for accumulating data from fire sensors, controlling fire doors or fire extinguishing equipments which are attached to this M2M Device.

**Group-1:** It contains a set of M2M Devices which are responsible for accumulating data from attached fire sensors.

**Group-2:** It contains a set of M2M Devices which are responsible for controlling attached fire doors.

**Group-3:** It contains a set of M2M Devices which are responsible for controlling attached fire extinguishing equipments.




Figure 5.1.2-1: Group credential distribution use case

### 5.1.3 Pre-conditions

M2M Server, M2M Gateway and M2M Devices are all pre-provisioned with credential(s) that can be used for authentication, data integrity protection and data confidentiality protection.

M2M Devices register to the M2M Gateway in order to communicate with the M2M Server.

### 5.1.4 Normal Flow

Group credentials distribution procedure:

- 1) M2M Server creates group resources for the M2M Devices according to their functionality. Group-1 is used for grouping all the M2M Devices that are responsible for accumulating the data from the fire sensors. Group-2 is used for grouping all the M2M Devices that are responsible for controlling the fire doors. Group-3 is used for grouping all the M2M Devices that are responsible for controlling the fire extinguishing equipments.
- 2) The M2M Server generates group credentials for each group separately.
- 3) The M2M Server performs an end-to-end authentication with both the M2M Gateway and a target M2M Device with their pre-provisioned credentials. After that a security mechanism used to transfer group credentials is negotiated.
- 4) The M2M Server encrypts the group credentials using the pre-provisioned credentials shared with the M2M Device and the security method selected in step 3, encapsulates it into a message, and then sends this message to the M2M Gateway.
- 5) The M2M Gateway forwards the message further to the target M2M Device.
- 6) The target M2M Device extracts the encrypted content from the message, and then decrypts the encrypted content to get the group credentials.

### 5.1.5 Potential requirements

- 1) M2M System should support end-to-end security providing mutual authentication, security association establishment and remote security provisioning.
- 2) M2M System should support establishment of end-to-end security using pre-provisioned credentials.
- 3) The information exchanged between end entities should not be exposed to the intermediate nodes.