INTERNATIONAL STANDARD



First edition

Information technology — Biometric presentation attack detection —





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ISO/IEC 30107-1:2015(E)

Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see <u>www.iso.org/directives</u>).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see <u>www.iso.org/patents</u>).

Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not 160e0 constitute an endorsement.

For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information

ISO/IEC 30107-1 was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC JTC1, Information technology, star Subcommittee SC 37, *Biometrics*.

unde unde https://standards.iteof.se ISO/IEC 30107 consists of the following parts, under the general title Information technology -*Biometric presentation attack detection:*

- Part 1: Framework
- Part 2: Data formats
- Part 3: Testing and reporting

Introduction

Biometric technologies are used to recognize individuals based on biological and behavioural characteristics and, consequently, are often used as a component in security systems. A biometric technology assisted security system may attempt to recognize persons who are known as either friends or foes, or may attempt to recognize persons who are unknown to the system as either.

Since the beginnings of these technologies, the possibility of subversion of recognition by determined adversaries has been widely acknowledged, as has the need for countermeasures to detect and defeat subversive recognition attempts, or presentation attacks. Subversion of the intended function of a biometric technology can take place at any point within a security system and by any actor, whether a system insider or an external adversary. This International Standard (ISO/IEC 30107) will be limited in scope, however, focusing on techniques for the automated detection of presentation attacks undertaken by biometric capture subjects at the point of presentation and collection of the relevant biometric characteristics. We will call these automated techniques "Presentation Attack Detection" (PAD) methods.

The potential for subversion of biometric systems at the point of data collection by determined individuals acting as biometric capture subjects has limited the use of biometrics in applications which are unsupervised by an agent of the system owner, such as remote collections over untrusted networks. Guidelines on e-authentication, for example, do not recommend the use of biometrics as an authentication factor for this reason. In unattended applications, such as remote authentication over open networks, automated presentation attack detection methods could be applied to mitigate the risks of attack. Standards, best practices and independently evaluated techniques could improve the security of all systems employing biometrics, whether using supervised or unsupervised data capture, including those using biometric recognition to secure online transactions.

As is the case for biometric recognition, PAD techniques are subject to errors, both false positive and false negative: false positive indications wrongly categorize routine presentations as attacks, thus impairing the efficiency of the system, and false negative indications wrongly categorize presentation attacks as routine, not preventing a security breach. Therefore, the decision to use a specific implementation of PAD will depend upon the requirements of the application and consideration of the trade-offs with respect to security and efficiency.

The purpose of this part of ISO/IEC 30107 is to provide a foundation for PAD through defining terms and establishing a framework through which presentation attack events can be specified and detected so that they can be categorized, detailed and communicated for subsequent biometric system decision making and performance assessment activities. This foundation will also benefit other standards projects in ISO/IEC committees and sub-committees. This International Standard does not advocate a specific technique as a standard PAD tool.

There are two other parts of ISO/IEC 30107. Part 2 defines data formats for conveying the type of approach used in biometric presentation attack detection and for conveying the results of presentation attack detection methods. Part 3 establishes principles and methods for performance assessment of presentation attack detection algorithms or mechanisms.

Information technology — Biometric presentation attack detection —

Part 1: **Framework**

1 Scope

This part of ISO/IEC 30107 establishes terms and definitions that are useful in the specification, characterization and evaluation of presentation attack detection methods.

Outside the scope are

- standardization of specific PAD detection methods;
- detailed information about countermeasures (i.e. anti-spoofing techniques), algorithms, or sensors; and
- overall system-level security or vulnerability assessment.

The attacks to be considered in ISO/IEC 30107 are those that take place at the sensor during the presentation and collection of the biometric characteristics.

Any other attacks are considered outside the scope of ISO/IEC 30107.

2 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012, Information technology — Vocabulary — Part 37: Biometrics

NOTE The electronic version of ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012 can be downloaded for free from the ISO/IEC Information Technology Task Force (ITTF) web site: <u>http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/index.html</u>.

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012 and the following apply.

3.1

artefact

artificial object or representation presenting a copy of biometric characteristics or synthetic biometric patterns

3.2

liveness

quality or state of being alive, made evident by anatomical characteristics, involuntary reactions or physiological functions, or voluntary reactions or subject behaviours

EXAMPLE 1 Absorption of illumination by the skin and blood are anatomical characteristics.

EXAMPLE 2 The reaction of the iris to light and heart activity (pulse) are involuntary reactions (also called physiological functions).

EXAMPLE 3 Squeezing together one's fingers in hand geometry and a biometric presentation in response to a directive cue are both voluntary reactions (also called subject behaviours).

3.3

liveness detection

measurement and analysis of anatomical characteristics or involuntary or voluntary reactions, in order to determine if a biometric sample is being captured from a living subject present at the point of capture

Note 1 to entry: Liveness detection methods are a subset of presentation attack detection methods.

3.4

normal presentation

interaction of the biometric capture subject and the biometric data capture subsystem in the fashion intended by the policy of the biometric system

Note 1 to entry: The term "normal" is analogous to "routine" when referring to a "normal presentation." Any type of presentation that is not an attack is considered a "normal presentation."

3.5

presentation attack

presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the operation of the biometric system

Note 1 to entry: Presentation attack can be implemented through a number of methods, e.g. artefact, mutilations, replay, etc.

Note 2 to entry: Presentation attacks may have a number of goals, e.g. impersonation or not being recognized.

Note 3 to entry: Biometric systems may not be able to differentiate between biometric presentation attacks with the goal of interfering with the systems operation and non-conformant presentations.

Acco

3.6

presentation attack detection

PAD

automated determination of a presentation attack

Note 1 to entry: PAD cannot infer the subject's intent. In fact it may be impossible to derive that difference from the data capture process or acquired sample.

3.7

presentation attack instrument

PAI

biometric characteristic or object used in a presentation attack

Note 1 to entry: The set of PAI includes artefacts but would also include lifeless biometric characteristics (i.e. stemming from dead bodies) or altered biometric characteristics (e.g. altered fingerprints) that are used in an attack.

Note 2 to entry:

4 Symbols and abbreviated terms

- PAD Presentation Attack Detection
- PAI Presentation Attack Instrument

5 Characterisation of presentation attacks

5.1 General

Although attacks on a biometric system can occur anywhere and be instantiated by any actor, ISO/IEC 30107 focuses on biometric-based attacks on the data capture subsystem by biometric capture subjects attempting to subvert the intended operation of the system. Attacks by other actors and at other points of the system have previously been considered in documents such as [2]. ISO/IEC 30107 does not address protecting the data capture subsystem, including the sensor itself, from modification, replacement, or removal or protecting the communication between the data capture subsystem and other subsystems.

<u>Figure 1</u> illustrates several generic attacks against a biometric system. ISO/IEC 30107 only focuses on attacks pointed out by arrow "1," in which a biometric characteristic or PAI is presented to a sensor which is operating properly within a biometric system.




Figure 1 — Examples of points of attack in a biometric system (inspired by [1])

Presentation attacks can be carried out by two types of subversive biometric capture subjects: a biometric imposter, where the subversive biometric capture subject intends to be recognized as an individual other than him/herself, or a biometric concealer, where the subversive biometric capture subject intends to evade being recognized as any individual known to the system.

Biometric imposters may perform attacks in two different ways. In the first sub-type, the subversive data subject intends to be recognized as a specific individual known to the system. In the second sub-type, the subversive data subject intends to be recognized as any individual known to the system, without specification as to which one.

In contrast, biometric concealers will be seeking to conceal his/her own biometric characteristics, as opposed to modelling the characteristics of known individuals, e.g., using an artefact or through disguise or alteration of natural biometric characteristics.