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Navodila za uporabo ISO 13849-1 in IEC 62061 pri načrtovanju z varnostjo povezanih krmilnih sistemov za stroje

Guidance on the application of ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery

Lignes directrices relatives à l'application de l'ISO 13849-1 et de la CEI 62061 dans la conception des systèmes de commande des machines relatifs à la sécurité

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Guidance on the application of ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of technical committees is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the technical committees are circulated to the member bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the member bodies casting a vote.

In exceptional circumstances, when a technical committee has collected data of a different kind from that which is normally published as an International Standard ("state of the art", for example), it may decide by a simple majority vote of its participating members to publish a Technical Report. A Technical Report is entirely informative in nature and does not have to be reviewed until the data it provides are considered to be no longer valid or useful.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

ISO/TR 23849 was prepared jointly by Technical Committee ISO/TC 199, *Safety of machinery*, and Technical Committee IEC/TC 44, *Safety of machinery — Electrotechnical aspects*. The draft was circulated for voting to the national bodies of both ISO and IEC. These technical committees have agreed that no modification will be made to this Technical Report except by mutual agreement.

Introduction

This Technical Report has been prepared by experts from both IEC/TC 44/WG 7 and ISO/TC 199/WG 8 in response to requests from their Technical Committees to explain the relationship between IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1. In particular, it is intended to assist users of these International Standards in terms of the interaction(s) that can exist between the standards to ensure that confidence can be given to the design of safety-related systems made in accordance with either standard.

It is intended that this Technical Report be incorporated into both IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1 by means of corrigenda that reference the published version of this document. These corrigenda will also remove the information given in Table 1, *Recommended application of IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1*, provided in the common introduction to both standards, which is now recognized as being out of date. Subsequently, it is intended to merge ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 by means of a JWG of ISO/TC 199 and IEC/TC 44.

Guidance on the application of ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery

1 Scope

This Technical Report is intended to explain the application of IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1[1)] in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery.

2 General

2.1 Both IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1 specify requirements for the design and implementation of safety-related control systems of machinery[2)]. The methods developed in both of these standards are different but, when correctly applied, can achieve a comparable level of risk reduction.

2.2 These standards classify safety-related control systems that implement safety functions into levels that are defined in terms of their probability of dangerous failure per hour. ISO 13849-1 has five Performance Levels (PLs), a, b, c, d and e, while IEC 62061 has three safety integrity levels (SILs), 1, 2 and 3.

2.3 Product standards (type-C) committees specify the safety requirements for safety-related control systems and it is recommended that these committees classify the levels of confidence required for them in terms of PLs and SILs.

2.4 Machinery designers may choose to use either IEC 62061 or ISO 13849-1 depending on the specific features of the application.

2.5 The selection and use of either standard is likely to be determined by, for example:

— previous knowledge and experience in the design of machinery safety-related control systems based upon the concept of categories described in ISO 13849-1:1999 can mean that the use of ISO 13849-1:2006 is more appropriate;

— safety-related control systems based upon media other than electrical can mean that the use of ISO 13849-1 is more appropriate;

— customer requirements to demonstrate the safety integrity of a machine safety-related control system in terms of a SIL can mean that the use of IEC 62061 is more appropriate;

— safety-related control systems of machinery used in, for example, the process industries, where other safety-related systems (such as safety instrumented systems in accordance with IEC 61511) are characterized in terms of SILs, can mean that the use of IEC 62061 is more appropriate.

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1) This Technical Report considers ISO 13849-1:2006 rather than ISO 13849-1:1999, which has been withdrawn.

2) These standards have been adopted by the European standardization bodies CEN and CENELEC as ISO 13849-1 and EN 62061, respectively, where they are published with the status of transposed harmonized standards under the Machinery Directive (98/37/EC and 2006/42/EC). Under the conditions of their publication, the correct use of either of these standards is presumed to conform to the relevant essential safety requirements of the Machinery Directive (98/37/EC and 2006/42/EC).

3 Comparison of standards

3.1 A comparison of the technical requirements in ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 has been carried out in respect of the following aspects:

— terminology;

— risk estimation and performance allocation;

— safety requirements specification;

— systematic integrity requirements;

— diagnostic functions;

— software safety requirements.

3.2 Additionally, an evaluation of the use of the simplified mathematical formulae to determine the probability of dangerous failures (PFH_D) and $MTTF_d$ according to both standards has been carried out.

3.3 The conclusions from this work are the following.

— Safety-related control systems can be designed to achieve acceptable levels of functional safety using either of the two standards by integrating non-complex[3)] SRECS (safety-related electrical control system) subsystems or SRP/CS (safety-related parts of a control system) designed in accordance with IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1, respectively.

— Both standards can also be used to provide design solutions for complex SRECS and SRP/CS by integrating electrical/electronic/programmable electronic subsystems designed in accordance with IEC 61508.

— Both standards currently have value to users in the machinery sector and benefits will be gained from experience in their use. Feedback over a reasonable period on their practical application is essential to support any future initiatives to move towards a standard that merges the contents of both IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1.

— Differences exist in detail and it is recognized that some concepts (e.g. functional safety management) will need further work to establish equivalence between respective design methodologies and some technical requirements.

4 Risk estimation and assignment of required performance

4.1 A comparison has been carried out on the use of the methods to assign a SIL and/or PL_r to a specific safety function. This has established that there is a good level of correspondence between the respective methods provided in Annex A of each standard.

4.2 It is important, regardless of which method is used, that attention be given to ensure that appropriate judgements are made on the risk parameters to determine the SIL and/or PL_r that is likely to apply to a specific safety function. These judgements can often best be made by bringing together a range of personnel (e.g. design, maintenance, operators) to ensure that the hazards that may be present at machinery are properly understood.

4.3 Further information on the process of risk estimation and the assignment of performance targets can be found in ISO 14121-1 and IEC 61508-5.

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3) Although there is no definition for the term “non-complex” SRECS or SRP/CS this should be considered equivalent to low complexity in the context of IEC 62061:2005, 3.2.7.

5 Safety requirements specification

5.1 A first stage in the respective methodologies of both ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 requires that the safety function(s) to be implemented by the safety-related control system are specified.

5.2 An assessment should have been performed relevant to each safety function that is to be implemented by a control circuit by, for example, using ISO 13849-1, Annex A, or IEC 62061, Annex A. This should have determined what risk reduction needs to be provided by each particular safety function at a machine and, in turn, what level of confidence is required for the control circuit that performs this safety function.

5.3 The level of confidence specified as a PL and/or a SIL is relevant to a specific safety function.

5.4 The following shows the information that should be provided in relation to safety functions by a product (type-C) standard.

Safety function(s) to be implemented by a control circuit:

Name of safety function

Description of the function

Required level of performance according to ISO 13849-1: PL_r a to e

and/or

Required safety integrity according to IEC 62061: SIL 1 to 3

6 Assignment of performance targets: PL versus SIL

Table 1 gives the relationship between PL and SIL based on the average probability of a dangerous failure per hour. However, both standards have requirements (e.g. systematic safety integrity) additional to these probabilistic targets that are also to be applied to a safety-related control system. The rigour of these requirements is related to the respective PL and SIL.

Table 1 — Relationship between PLs and SILs based on the average probability of dangerous failure per hour

Performance level (PL)	Average probability of a dangerous failure per hour (1/h)	Safety integrity level (SIL)
a	$\geqslant 10^{-5}$ to $< 10^{-4}$	No special safety requirements
b	$\geqslant 3 \times 10^{-6}$ to $< 10^{-5}$	1
c	$\geqslant 10^{-6}$ to $< 3 \times 10^{-6}$	1
d	$\geqslant 10^{-7}$ to $< 10^{-6}$	2
e	$\geqslant 10^{-8}$ to $< 10^{-7}$	3