

ETSI TS 133 180 V15.4.0 (2019-05)



LTE;
Security of the mission critical service
(3GPP TS 33.180 version 15.4.0 Release 15)

Standard Preview
(standards.it-ebooks.info)
Full standard: https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/1797185-013c-4da2-96ab-8d2c60aa245b/etsi-ts-133-180-v15-4-0-2019-05



Reference

RTS/TSGS-0333180vf40

Keywords

LTE, SECURITY

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Foreword

This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

Version x.y.z

where:

- x the first digit:
 - 1 presented to TSG for information;
 - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
 - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
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