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Foreword

This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Special Committee Emergency Communications (EMTEL).

Modal verbs terminology

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Executive summary

The Pan-European Mobile Emergency Application (PEMEA) architecture provides the requirements and architecture for a solution to provide emergency application interconnection. It specifies the protocols and procedures enabling interoperable implementations of the architecture and provides extension points to enable new communication mechanisms as they evolve.

Introduction

The rise of smart devices such as smart phones, tablets and laptops has led to an explosion in communications applications. Many of these applications aim to supplement existing communications services, such as providing caller and location information for emergency calls, while others seek to provide alternative communication mechanisms such as total conversation and instant messaging for example. Many of these applications already exist in limited local capacities but lack a common framework for easy interconnection. This limitation prohibits a user's application operating in a region other than the one it was developed in and having his/her information and accurate location information passed to the PSAP serving their location. The Pan-European Mobile Emergency Application (PEMEA) architecture provides a solution to interconnect these applications.

1 Scope

The present document is divided into two parts. The first part provides the requirements and functional architecture while the second part provides the protocol and procedures for implementing the Pan-European Mobile Emergency Application (PEMEA). The first part identifies the key functional entities involved in the emergency application architecture, the interfaces between each functional entity, and the requirements on each interface. The second part defines the data exchanges, message, protocols and procedures used across each of the identified PEMEA interfaces.

It is recognized that many existing application implementations combine the functional entities identified in the present document into a single entity. The most common example of combined functional entities is the combined Application Provider (AP) and PSAP Service Provider (PSP), these are common because it is often the PSAP that writes or engages a third-party to write a local emergency application that interfaces directly with the PSAP. The present document does not seek to disallow integrated node implementations, however, it does not define how additional applications or application providers using proprietary Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and protocols can provide PEMEA extended features, such solutions are left to the integrated node providers.

2 References

2.1 Normative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/.

NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.

[1] IETF RFC 2818: "HTTP Over TLS", May 2000.

[2] IETF RFC 2965: "HTTP State Management Mechanism", October 2000.

[3] IETF RFC 4119: "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object Format", December 2005.

[4] IETF RFC 5491: "GEOPRIV Presence Information Data Format Location Object (PIDF-LO) Usage Clarification, Considerations, and Recommendations", March 2009.

[5] IETF RFC 3966: "The tel URI for telephone Number", December 2004.

[6] IETF RFC 7459: "Representation of Uncertainty and Confidence in the Presence Information Data Format Location Object (PIDF-LO)", February 2015.

[7] IETF RFC 3863: "Presence Information Data Format (PIDF)", August 2004.

[8] IETF RFC 5139: "Revised Civic Location Format for Presence Information Data Format Location Object (PIDF-LO)", February 2008.

[9] IETF RFC 6848: "Specifying Civic Address Extensions in the Presence Information Data Format Location Object (PIDF-LO)", January 2013.

[10] IANA: "Method Token Registry of Values".

NOTE: Available at http://www.iana.org/assignments/method-tokens/method-tokens.xhtml#method-tokens-1.

[11] IETF RFC 7852: "Additional Data Related to an Emergency Call", July 2016.

[12] IETF RFC 7105: "Using Device-Provided Location-Related Measurements in Location Configuration Protocols", January 2014.

[13] IANA: "Language subtag registry".

NOTE: Available at http://www.iana.org/assignments/language-subtag-registry/language-subtag-registry.

[14] ISO 639-3 (2007): "Codes for the representation of names of languages -- Part 3: Alpha-3 code for comprehensive coverage of languages".

NOTE: Available at https://www.iso.org/standard/39534.html.

[15] IETF RFC 6753: "A Location Dereference Protocol Using HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD)", October 2012.

[16] IETF RFC 5808: "Requirements for a Location-by-Reference Mechanism", May 2010.

[17] Open Mobile Alliance OMA-TS-MLP-V3-2-20110719-A: "Mobile Location Protocol 3.2" July 2011.

[18] Open Mobile Alliance OMA-TS-MLP-V3-3-1-20111117-A: "Mobile Location Protocol 3.3.1", November 2011.

[19] Open Mobile Alliance OMA-TS-MLP-V3-4-20150512-A: "Mobile Location Protocol 3.4", May 2015.

2.2 Informative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

[i.1] ETSI TS 103 479: "Emergency Communications (EMTEL); Core elements for network independent access to emergency services".

[i.2] EENA: "Pan-European Mobile Emergency Application (PEMEA) Requirements and Functional Architecture", Version 7, February 2015.

NOTE: Available at https://eena.org/wp-content/uploads/2015_12_02_PEMEA-Final.pdf.

[i.3] Void.

3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations

3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply:

security: techniques and methods used to ensure:

- ***authentication*** of entities accessing resources or data
- ***authorization*** of authenticated entities prior to accessing or obtaining resources and/or data
- ***privacy*** of user data ensuring access only to authenticated and authorized entities

- ***secrecy*** of information transferred between two authenticated and authorized entities

trusted: identity of entity assured through an approved authentication mechanism and the entity authorized to perform the action

3.2 Symbols

Void.

3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

AP	Application Provider
API	Application Programming Interface
App	Application
ASP	Aggregating Service Provider
BCF	Border Control Function
BSSID	Basic Service Set Identifier
CID	Cell Identifier
ECRF	Emergency Call Routing Function
EDR	Emergency Data Received (message)
EDS	Emergency Data Send (message)
EENA	European Emergency Number Association
ESInet	Emergency Services IP Network
ESRP	Emergency Services Routing Proxy
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Institute
GML	Geography Markup Language
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
HELD	HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery
HTTP	Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IMEI	International Mobile Equipment Identifier
IMSI	International Mobile Subscriber Identifier
LIF	Location Interworking Function
LIS	Location Information Server
LNG	Legacy Network Gateway
MAC	Media Access Control
MCC	Mobile Country Code
MLP	Mobile Location Protocol
MNC	Mobile Network Code
MSISDN	Mobile Service International Subscriber Dial Number
OMA	Open Mobile Alliance
oPSP	Originating PSP
OTT	Over The Top
Pa	PEMEA Application to AP interface
PEMEA	Pan-European Mobile Emergency Application
PIDF-LO	Presence Information Data Format Location Object
Pp	PEMEA PSP to PSAP interface
Pr	PEMEA PSP to ASP or ASP to PS interface
PRA	PEMEA Registration Authority
Ps	PEMEA AP to PSP interface
PSAP	Public Safety Answering Point
PSP	PSAP Service Provider
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network
RTT	Real-Time Text
SIP	Session Initiation Protocol
SIPS	SIP Secure
TLS	Transport Layer Security
tPSP	terminating PSP

ttl	time to live
UCF	Universal Character Set
UMTS	Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (cellular 3G)
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
URN	Universal Resource Name
UTC	Coordinated Universal Time
UTF	UCF Transformation Format
VSP	Voice Service Provider
XML	eXtensible Markup Language
XSD	XML Schema Definition

4 PEMEA architecture and functional entities

4.1 Introduction

The extensive deployment of existing mobile emergency applications and their interconnection into a Pan-European Emergency Application ecosystem has prompted the definition of entities identified in Figure 1.



Figure 1: PEMEA Reference Architecture

In some implementations functional entities may be owned and operated by the same commercial entity, for example the Application Provider (AP) and the PSAP Service Provider (PSP) may be the same. In these cases, the external interfaces shown in the reference architecture need only apply when communicating with external entities.

4.2 Functional entities overview

4.2.0 PEMEA Registration Authority

The PEMEA Registration Authority (PRA) is the entity that contains registrations for all currently valid PEMEA entities. The PRA accepts registrations from entities that conform to the PEMEA protocol and procedures and only registered entities may send or receive messages in the PEMEA network. The PRA provides a list of these entities to all valid entities when requested to do so.

4.2.1 Application (App)

Software that runs on a smartphone or mobile computing platform that is capable of making an emergency call using mobile network operator call control machinery (3G/4G/WiFi). Simultaneous to call establishment the App sends user authentication information to an Application Provider and subsequently sends location, connectivity and other information about the caller to the Application Provider for subsequent conveyance to a PSAP.

4.2.2 Application Provider (AP)

The Application Provider (AP) is the entity that provides a mobile emergency application. It is responsible for authenticating the Application prior to accepting caller information from the App. The AP needs to format the data received from the App, possibly combining it with caller information stored in AP server, and conveying it to a PSAP Service Provider (PSP). There needs to be a trust relationship between the AP and PSP. Where the AP and PSP are not the same entity then data formats defined in the present document shall be used to convey caller information from the AP to the PSP.

In the general case, an AP has a relationship with a single PSP. However, an AP may have a relationship with more than one PSP. When this is the case it is up to the AP to determine which PSP to send the information to. How the AP makes this determination is out of scope of the present document, but the AP shall only send the information to one PSP to avoid multiple routing of the same messages through the network.

4.2.3 PSAP Service Provider (PSP)

The role of the PSAP Service Provider (PSP) is to take caller information from trusted sources and ensure that it is provided to the correct PSAP. Where the PSP directly serves the PSAP for which the information is destined, then it is referred to as the terminating-PSP (tPSP). If a PSP receives information that it knows is not for a PSAP that it directly services then it should use its knowledge of other PSPs to attempt to deliver the information to the PSP serving the correct PSAP. When this occurs it is referred to as an originating-PSP (oPSP). This situation occurs when the caller makes the call outside the area that is serviced by the AP that provided the application.

Information coming from trusted sources shall comply with the data formats and communication mechanisms defined in the present document.

Trusted information may come from one of two sources. It may come directly from an AP with which the PSP has a direct trust relationship (***Ps***). Alternatively, the information may come from an AP with which the terminating-PSP has no direct trust relationship (***Pr***). In this latter case, the trust relationship is brokered by another PSP or chain of PSPs to the terminating-PSP.

How the PSP provides or renders information to a PSAP that it directly services is out of scope of the present document.

4.2.4 Aggregating Service Provider (ASP)

The primary role of the PSP is to ensure that accurate and trusted caller information is provided to the PSAP that is terminating an emergency call. A PSP may have knowledge of immediately adjacent terminating-PSPs but requiring a PSP to have a relationship with all other PSPs so that it can direct caller information to the correct terminating-PSP is a daunting and unnecessary task. The role of the Aggregating Service Provider (ASP) is to provide this routing capability and some high-level ideas are described in Annex A.

The ASP operates as a centralized or regional entity and can determine, based on information included in the PEMEA data object, the best terminating-PSP to direct the information to. There may be more than one ASP across Europe and where this occurs meshing is expected to occur. How the meshing occurs is an operational consideration outside the scope of the present document but may be addressed by subsequent operational considerations.

4.3 Interface definitions

4.3.1 Application Interface (Pa)

This is the interface used for communication between the Application and the Application Provider. The exact nature and communication on this interface is out of scope of the present document as this is the interface that allows Application Providers to implement and support service differentiation features in their products. Whilst the implementation of this interface is not in scope of PEMEA, there are specific functions of this interface that a PEMEA-complying implementation shall provide. How these requirements are implemented is out of scope.

4.3.2 Application Provider to PSAP Service Provider Interface (Ps)

This is the interface used by the Application Provider to push caller information to the PSAP Service Provider (PSP). This is a secure interface that requires mutual authentication between the AP and the PSP and a complying AP and PSP shall implement this interface in accordance with the details in the present document when they are not the same entity.

4.3.3 PSAP Service Provider Interface to Aggregating Service Provider Interface (Pr)

This is the interface used by the PSP to route caller information to a different PSP, in which case the sending PSP becomes the origination-PSP (oPSP). The ***Pr*** interface may also be used by the PSP to receive caller information from a different PSP; in this case the receiving PSP becomes the terminating-PSP (tPSP).

This is a secure interface that requires mutual authentication between the oPSP and the tPSP or between the oPSP and the ASP and the tPSP and the ASP. A PSP that wishes to support Application roaming shall implement this interface in accordance with the details in the present document to be PEMEA compliant.

4.3.4 PSAP Service Provider to PSAP Interface (Pp)

This interface is shown for completeness but is outside the scope of the present document. The PSP may provide a simple web interface to the PSAPs it serves or it may integrate the data flows into existing PSAP systems. How this is performed will vary from PSAP to PSAP and from PSP to PSP.



Figure 2: Basic PEMEA PSAP Integration

5 PEMEA functional entity requirements

5.1 Introduction

PEMEA needs to be a secure network and it relies heavily on trust relationships between PSAPs and the entities that they allow to provide information to them. The architecture shown in Figure 1, shows applications connect to application providers (APs) that have trust relationships with PSAP service providers (PSP) that have very strong trust relationships with PSAP. That is, PSAPs trust the PSPs to provide accurate and trustworthy information.

5.2 Application requirements

Even though the Application itself is out-of-scope of the present document, the Application has to fulfil the following requirements to be compliant with PEMEA.

AA-1: The Application shall detect when the Application is being used and initiate an emergency call.

AA-2: The Application shall authenticate itself to the AP when it sends caller information.

AA-3: At emergency call time the Application shall send the most accurate location of the device as obtained from the device's location APIs and a device timestamp.

AA-4: At emergency call time the Application shall send, if it is able to obtain it, the identity of the current point of attachment to the cellular network. At the time of writing this is the full cell-id (MCC-MNC-Cell). However as WiFi becomes more supported as an access technology for cellular operators then the BSSID of the serving WiFi entity may be used instead.

NOTE 1: It is understood that increasingly mobile operating systems are not providing applications access to this information, nevertheless the application should try to acquire it where possible as it may allow for faster routing in some circumstances.

AA-5: The Application shall, if it is able to obtain it, provide the MSISDN of the device to the AP when data is conveyed at call time.

NOTE 2: It is understood that increasingly mobile operating systems are not providing applications access to the MSISDN or IMSI of the device, nevertheless the application should try to acquire this information where possible.

5.3 Application provider requirements

AP-1: The AP shall authenticate the application prior to accepting or processing caller information.

AP-2: The AP shall procure a registered domain name and a domain certificate from a trusted certificate authority asserting ownership of the registered domain name to the AP.

AP-3: The AP shall have a trust relationship with a PSP.

AP-4: The AP shall register with the PEMEA registration authority.

AP-5: The AP shall authenticate and check the authorization of the PSP before sending any data.

AP-6: The AP shall not send any information to a PSAP that fails authentication or authorization.

AP-7: The AP shall authenticate itself to the PSP based on its domain certificate.

AP-8: The AP shall comply with the ***Ps*** interface specification to convey information to a PSP.

AP-9: The AP may provide a means for the destination PSAP to obtain application specific information from the AP.

5.4 PSAP service provider requirements

PSP-1: A PSP shall procure a registered domain name and a domain certificate from a trusted certificate authority asserting ownership of the registered domain name to the PSP.

PSP-2: The PSAP shall register the domain name with the PEMEA registration authority.

PSP-3: A PSP shall identify itself to connecting entities using its domain certificate.

PSP-4: A PSP shall authenticate and check authorization of the AP each time a connection is made.

PSP-5: A PSP shall never accept connections from an AP that fails authentication or authorization.

PSP-6: An oPSP shall not cache caller information if the information is pushed to a tPSP or to an ASP over the ***Pr*** interface.

PSP-7: A tPSP shall not cache or log caller information for longer than terminating PSAP statutes allow, and should adhere to advertised caching periods provided in any messages or data structures.

PSP-8: If a PSP is unable to determine where the caller information should be delivered then it shall return an error to the node providing it with the information.

PSP-9: An oPSP shall authenticate and authorize any ASP or tPSP before sending any information over the ***Pr*** interface.

PSP-10: A tPSP shall authenticate and authorize an oPSP or ASP each time is connects.