



**LTE;
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and
critical assets in 3GPP network product classes
(3GPP TR 33.926 version 15.2.0 Release 15)**

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1 Scope

The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class.

2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
- [2] 3GPP TR 33.916: "Security Assurance Methodology for 3GPP network products classes".
- [3] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access".
- [4] 3GPP TR 33.821: "Rationale and track of security decisions in Long Term Evolution (LTE) RAN/3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE)".
- [5] 3GPP TS 33.116: "Security Assurance Specification for MME network product class".
- [6] 3GPP TS 33.250: "Security assurance specification for the PGW network product class".

3 Definitions and abbreviations

3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

GNP Class (Generic Network Product Class): generic network product class is a class of network products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities for that particular network product

3.2 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

GNP	Generic Network Product
SCAS	Security Assurance Specification
SECAM	Security Assurance Methodology

4 Generic Network Product (GNP) class description

4.1 Overview

A 3GPP generic network product class defines a set of functions that are implemented on that product, which includes, but not limited to minimum set of common 3GPP functions for that product covered in 3GPP specifications, other functions not covered by 3GPP specifications, as well as interfaces to access that product. A generic network product also includes hardware, software, and OS components that the product is implemented on. The current document describes the threats and the critical assets in the course of developing 3GPP security assurance specifications for a particular network product class.

Applicability of the GNP security assurance specification to products: Assume a telecom equipment vendor wants to sell a product to an operator, and the latter is interested in following the Security Assurance Methodology as described in TR 33.916[2], then, before evaluation according to TR 33.916[2] in a testing laboratory can start, it first needs to be determined which security assurance specifications written by 3GPP apply to the given product.

Each 3GPP Network Product, is basically a device composed of hardware (e.g. chip, processors, RAM, network cards), software (e.g. operating system, drivers, applications, services, protocols), and interfaces (e.g. console interfaces and O&M interfaces) that allow the 3GPP network product to be managed and configured locally and/or remotely. A GNP is a 3GPP network product.

GNP Security Assurance Specification (GNP SCAS): The GNP SCAS provides a description of the security requirements (which are including test cases) pertaining to that generic network product class.

Need for a GNP network product model: This minimum set of functions listed in clause 4.2 is exclusively meant as a membership criterion for the GNP Class. It is not meant to restrict the functionality of a GNP, or the scope of the present document in any way. On the contrary, it is clear that GNPs will contain many more functions than those from the minimum set listed in clause 4.2, and the GNP will contain requirements relating to functions not contained in this minimum set. Some of these functions, beyond the minimum set, can be found from various 3GPP specifications, but by far not all these functions. This implies that there is a need to describe the functions that cannot be found from 3GPP specifications in some other way before the GNP can be written so that the GNP can make reference to this description. This description is the GNP model, cf. clause 4.3.

EXAMPLE 1: 3GPP specifications do not describe a local management interface, but the GNP will have to take it into account, so a local management interface needs to be part of an GNP model.

EXAMPLE 2: The GNP sometimes says e.g.: "Authentication events on the local management interface shall be logged." This implies the presence of a logging function. The logging function is not part of the defining minimum set of functions from clause 4.2. If a product implements this minimum set, but no logging function, then this just means that the product is a GNP, but will fail the evaluation against the GNP SCAS.

The GNP model is further used in clauses 5 and 6 in various ways, e.g. the critical assets can point to parts of the GNP model, threats and requirements can refer to interfaces shown in the GNP model, etc.

4.2 Minimum set of functions defining the GNP class

According to TR 33.916 [2], a network product class is a class of products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities. This common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in pertinent 3GPP specifications, such as clause 4.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [3], Release 8 [3].

NOTE: The reason why the definition of the common set of functions refers to a particular Release 8 version of TS 23.401 [3], contrary to what is customary in 3GPP when referencing other 3GPP specifications, is that a Security Assurance Specification is to avoid having a moving target when defining a network product class. Nevertheless, the set of functions in clause 4.3.1 of 3GPP TS 23.401, Release 8 [3] is expected to be stable, as only FASMO corrections are allowed to Release 8. Furthermore, this set is believed to be minimal, i.e. implemented by all network products, which may not be true for the corresponding set of functions from later releases of TS 23.401 [3]. For the description of these functions compliance with TS 23.401 Release 8 [3] later version is allowed as, obviously, a generic network product should still remain a member of the GNP class when it implements a FASMO correction to Release 8.

4.3 Generic network product model

4.3.1 Generic network product model overview

Figure 4.3-1 depicts the components of a generic network product model at a high level. These components are further described in the following subclauses.




Figure 4.3-1: GNP model

4.3.2 Functions defined by 3GPP

A GNP will, in many cases, implement 3GPP-defined functions from various releases of pertinent 3GPP specifications. Vendors are, to a large extent, free to select the features implemented in their GNPs. E.g. a GNP could lack support for relay nodes, as introduced in Release 10, but implement all other features defined up to and including Release 10.

4.3.3 Other functions

A GNP will also contain functionality not or not fully covered in 3GPP specifications.

Examples include, but are not limited to, local or remote management functions.

4.3.4 Operating System (OS)

The present document assumes that the GNP is implemented on dedicated hardware that requires an operating system to run.

4.3.5 Hardware

The present document assumes that the GNP is implemented on dedicated hardware. Aspects of virtualization and cloud are not taken into account in the present version.

NOTE: Aspects of virtualization and cloud are FFS in future releases of the GNP SCAS. They deserve separate study for finding out how to define the boundaries between the GNP class and the hosting environment (e.g. shared HW and Virtual Machine) and which security assumptions to make on this environment.

4.3.6 Interfaces

There are two types of logical interfaces defined for the GNP:

- remote logical interfaces; and
- local logical interfaces.

A **remote logical interface** is an interface which can be used to communicate with the GNP from another network node.

The entire protocol stack implementing the communication is considered to be part of the remote logical interface.

Remote Logical Interfaces also include the remote access interfaces to the GNP for its maintenance through e.g. an Element Management System (EMS).

A **local logical interface** is an interface that can be used only via physical connection to the GNP. That is, the connection requires physical access to the GNP.

The entire protocol stack is considered to be part of the local logical interface. The entire protocol stack and the physical parts of the interface can be used by local connections.

Local Logical Interfaces also include the local hardware interfaces and the Local Maintenance Terminal interface (LMT) of the GNP used for its maintenance through a console.

This means that for both, **local and remote logical interfaces**, the GNP model does not only cover the application layer protocol, for which a GNP function terminates the interface (e.g. S5), but also the protocols (e.g. SCTP, IP, Ethernet, USB) in the protocol stack below the application layer protocol.

There are some major differences between local and remote interfaces from security perspective. For example attaching to a local interface may cause execution of complex internal procedures in the GNP like loading USB device drivers, enumeration of attached devices, mounting file systems etc.

A GNP hosts the following interfaces:

Remote logical interfaces:

- Service interfaces that are defined in pertinent 3GPP specifications
- Service interfaces that are not defined by 3GPP
- Remote OAM interface
- EMS (Element Management System) interface

Local logical interfaces:

- OAM local console
- LMT (Local Maintenance Terminal) interface
- GNP local hardware interfaces

NOTE: There is some overlap between the present clause 4.3.6 and clauses 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 in as far as a GNP function (e.g. S5) is part of the termination point for a logical interface.

4.4 Scope of the present document

4.4.1 Introduction

The present subclause refers to the GNP model in clause 4.3.