ETSI GR SAI 005 V1.1.1 (2021-03)



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Foreword

This Group Report (GR) has been produced by ETSI Industry Specification Group (ISG) Secure AI (SAI).

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1 Scope

The present document summarizes and analyses existing and potential mitigation against threats for AI-based systems as discussed in ETSI GR SAI 004 [i.1]. The goal is to have a technical survey for mitigating against threats introduced by adopting AI into systems. The technical survey shed light on available methods of securing AI-based systems by mitigating against known or potential security threats. It also addresses security capabilities, challenges, and limitations when adopting mitigation for AI-based systems in certain potential use cases.

2 References

2.1 Normative references

Normative references are not applicable in the present document.

2.2 Informative references

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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations (standards.iteh.ai)

3.1 Terms

ETSI GR SAI 005 V1.1.1 (2021-03)

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: 35a21b959449/etsi-gr-sai-005-v1-1-2021-03

adversarial examples: carefully crafted samples which mislead a model to give an incorrect prediction

conferrable adversarial examples: subclass of transferable adversarial examples that exclusively transfer with a target label from a source model to its surrogates

distributional shift: distribution of input data changes over time

inference attack: attacks launched from deployment stage

model-agnostic mitigation: mitigations which do not modify the addressed machine learning model

model enhancement mitigation: mitigations which modify the addressed machine learning model

training attack: attacks launched from development stage

transferable adversarial examples: adversarial examples which are crafted for one model but also fool a different model with a high probability

3.2 Symbols

Void.

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

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AE	Adversarial Example
AI	Artificial Intelligence
API	Application Interface
BDP	Boundary Differential Privacy
BIM	Basic Iterative Method
CNN	Convolutional Neural Network
CW	Carlini & Wagner (attacks)
DNN	Deep Neural Network
DP-SGD	Differential-Privacy Stochastic Gradient Descent
FGSM	Fast Gradient Sign Method
GNN	Graph Neural Network
ILSVRC	ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge
IP	Intellectual Property
JPEG	Joint Photographic Experts Group
JSMA	Jacobian-based Saliency Map
KNHT	Keyed Non-parametric Hypothesis Tests
L-BFGS	Limited-Memory Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (algorithm)
ML	Machine Learning
MNIST	Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology
MNTD	Meta Neural Trojan Detection
PATE	Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensemble
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
PGD	Project Gradient-Descent ANDARD PREVIEW
PRADA	Protecting Against DNN Model Stealing Attacks
ReLU	Rectified Linear Unit standards.iteh.ai)
RNN	Recurrent Neural Network
RONI	Reject On Negative Impact
SAI	Securing Artificial Intelligence SAI 005 V1.1.1 (2021-03)
SAT	Satisfippiifstandards.tteh.al/catalog/standards/sist/b68ecdtb-bbec-48c0-a490-
SGD	Stochastic Gradient Descent ^{49/etsi-} gr-sai-005-v1-1-1-2021-03
SMT	Satisfiability Modulo Theories
STRIP	STRong Intentional Perturbation
TRIM	Trimmed-based algorithm
ULP	Universal Litmus Pattern

4 Overview

4.1 Machine learning models workflow

Artificial intelligence has been driven by the rapid progress in deep learning and the wide applications of deep learning, such as image classification, object detection, speech recognition and language translation. Therefore, the present document focuses on deep learning and explores existing mitigations countermeasuring attacks on deep learning.

A machine learning model workflow is represented in Figure 1. The model life-cycle includes both development and deployment stages. The *training dataset* is the subset of domain data samples used to train the model, and it can be obtained from one or multiple data sources, represented in Figure 1 as *data supply chain*. A pretrained model can be used as input to create the target model. At development stage, via the training dataset, the model is trained. The trained model is then tested. Pursuant to ETSI GR SAI 004 [i.1], the testing step will include functional test and adversarial test. At deployment stage, the trained and tested model is deployed, i.e. becomes the *model in operation*. Given *inference input*, the *model in operation* delivers an *output*. In Figure 1, the dotted lines from the *model in operation* back to the *model under development* capture the model *updates* in online learning scenarios [i.2]. *Updates* can be pairs of inference input and user feedback, served as new training data to refine the model. *Updates* can also be locally-computed model parameter refinements. These multiple dotted lines between the *model under development* and the *model in operation* capture the federated learning scenarios, where a global model is distributed among several entities and entities provide model updates to refine the global model.