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Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) - Common Interface (CI) - Part 7: Security features

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Foreword

This European Standard (EN) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT).

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The present document is part 7 of a multi-part deliverable ([1] to [8]). Full details of the entire series can be found in part 1 [1].

The following cryptographic algorithms are subject to controlled distribution:

a) DECT Standard Authentication Algorithm (DSAA);

b) DECT Standard Cipher (DSC).

These algorithms are distributed on an individual basis. Further information and details of the current distribution procedures can be obtained from the ETSI Secretariat at the address on the first page of the present document.

Further details of the DECT system may be found in ETSI TR 101 178 [i.1] and ETSI ETR 043 [i.2].

National transposition dates	
Date of adoption of this EN:	23 March 2022
Date of latest announcement of this EN (doa):	30 June 2022
Date of latest publication of new National Standard or endorsement of this EN (dop/e):	31 December 2022
Date of withdrawal of any conflicting National Standard (dow):	31 December 2023

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Modal verbs terminology

In the present document "**shall**", "**shall not**", "**should**", "**should not**", "**may**", "**need not**", "**will**", "**will not**", "**can**" and "**cannot**" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions).

"**must**" and "**must not**" are **NOT** allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.

Introduction

The present document contains a detailed specification of the security features which may be provided by DECT systems. An overview of the processes required to provide all the features detailed in the present document is presented in figures 0.1 and 0.2.



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Figure 0.1: Overview of DECT historic security processes (until revision V2.3.1 of the present document)

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

Figure 0.2: Overview of DECT current security processes (from revisions V2.4.1 and V2.5.1 of the present document)

The present document consists of four main clauses (clauses 4 to 7), together with a number of informative/normative and important annexes (A to O). The purpose of this introduction is to briefly preview the contents of each of the main clauses and the supporting annexes.

Each of the main clauses starts with a description of its objectives and a summary of its contents. Clause 4 is concerned with defining a security architecture for DECT. This architecture is defined in terms of the security services which may be offered (see clause 4.2), the mechanisms which are used to provide these services (see clause 4.3), the security parameters and keys required by the mechanisms (challenges, keys, etc.), and which are passed across the air interface or held within DECT Portable Parts (PPs), Fixed Parts (FPs) or other network entities (for example management centres) (see clause 4.4), the processes which are required to provide the security mechanisms (see clause 4.5) and the recommended combinations of services (see clause 4.6).

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Clause 5 is concerned with specifying how certain cryptographic algorithms are to be used for the security processes. Three algorithms are required:

- an authentication algorithm;
- a key stream generator for MAC layer encryption; and
- a key stream generator plus a Message Authentication Code generator for CCM authenticated encryption.

The key stream generator is only used for the MAC encryption process, and this process is specified in clause 4.5.4.

The key stream generator plus a Message Authentication Code generator for CCM encryption are used for the CCM authenticated encryption and this process is described in clauses 4.5.5 and 6.6.

For both encryption processes, the authentication algorithm may be used to derive authentication session keys and cipher keys, and is the basis of the authentication process itself. The way in which the authentication algorithm is to be used to derive authentication session keys is specified in clause 5.2. The way in which the algorithm is to be used to provide the authentication process and derive cipher keys is specified in clause 5.3.

Neither the key stream generator nor the authentication algorithm are specified in the clause 5 of the present document. Only their input and output parameters are defined. In principle, the security features may be provided by using appropriate proprietary algorithms. The use of proprietary algorithms may, however, limit roaming in the public access service environment, as well as the use of PPs in different environments.

For example, for performance reasons, the key stream generator for MAC layer encryption will need to be implemented in hardware in PPs and FPs. The use of proprietary generators will then limit the interoperability of systems provided by different manufacturers.

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Five standard algorithms have been specified. These are the DECT Standard Authentication Algorithm (DSAA, see annex H), the DECT Standard Authentication Algorithm #2 (DSAA2, see annex L), the DECT Standard Cipher (DSC, see annex J), the DECT Standard Cipher #2 (DSC2, see annex M) and the CCM Authenticated Encryption Algorithm (see annex N).

The DECT Standard Authentication Algorithm #2 (DSAA2, see annex L) and the DECT Standard Cipher #2 (DSC2, see annex M) are based on AES [10] and were introduced with the revision V2.4.1 of the present document.

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The CCM Authenticated Encryption Algorithm (CCM, see annex N) is also based on AES [10] and was introduced with the revision V2.5.1 of the present document.

The DECT Standard Authentication Algorithm (DSAA) and the DECT Standard Cipher (DSC) are confidential. Because of their confidential nature, these algorithms are not included in the present document. However, the algorithms will be made available to DECT equipment manufacturers. The DSAA may also need to be made available to public access service operators who, in turn, may need to make it available to manufacturers of authentication modules.

The DECT Standard Authentication Algorithm #2 (DSAA2), the DECT Standard Cipher #2 (DSC2) and the CCM Algorithm (CCM) are publicly available and they are defined in annex L (DSAA2), annex M (DSC2) and annex N (CCM) of the present document.

Clause 6 is concerned with integrating the security features into the DECT system. Four aspects of integration are considered. The first aspect is the association of user security parameters (in particular, authentication keys) with DECT identities. This is the subject of clause 6.2. The second aspect of integration is the definition of the NWK layer protocol elements and message types needed for the exchange of authentication parameters across the air interface. This is dealt with in clause 6.3. The MAC layer procedures for the encryption of data passed over the air interface are the subject of clause 6.4. Finally, clause 6.5 is concerned with security attributes which DECT systems may support, and the NWK layer messages needed to enable PPs and FPs to identify which security algorithms and keys will be used to provide the various security services.

Clause 7 is concerned with key management issues. Careful management of keys is fundamental to the effective operation of a security system, and clause 7.2 is intended to provide guidance on this subject. The clause includes an explanation of how the DECT security features may be supported by different key management options.