Železniške naprave - Specifikacija in prikaz zanesljivosti, razpoložljivosti, vzdrževalnosti in varnosti (RAMS) - 2. del: Sistemska pristop k varnosti

Railway Applications - The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) - Part 2: Systems Approach to Safety

Bahnanwendungen - Spezifikation und Nachweis von Zuverlässigkeit, Verfügbarkeit, Instandhaltbarkeit und Sicherheit (RAMS) - Teil 2: Systembezogene Sicherheitsmethodik

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Railway Applications - The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) - Part 2: Systems Approach to Safety

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European foreword

This document (EN 50126-2:2017) has been prepared by CLC/TC 9X "Electrical and electronic applications for railways".

The following dates are fixed:

- latest date by which this document has to be implemented at national level by publication of an identical national standard or by endorsement (dop) 2018-07-03
- latest date by which the national standards conflicting with this document have to be withdrawn (dow) 2020-07-03


The former edition of CLC/TR 50126-2:2007 is made obsolete by the new editions EN 50126-1:2017 and EN 50126-2:2017; the reason is that the scope of the present part was modified compared to the superseded edition.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CENELEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

EN 50126 "Railway applications – The specification and demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS)" consists of the following parts:

- Part 1: Generic RAMS process;
- Part 2: System approach to safety.

This document has been prepared under a mandate given to CENELEC by the European Commission and the European Free Trade Association, and supports essential requirements of EU Directive(s).

For the relationship with EU Directive(s) see informative Annex ZZ, which is an integral part of this document.
Introduction

EN 50126-1:1999 was aiming at introducing the application of a systematic RAMS management process in the railway sector. Through the application of this standard and the experiences gained over the last years, the need for revision and restructuring became apparent with a need to deliver a systematic and coherent approach to RAMS applicable to all the railway application fields Command, Control and Signalling, Rolling Stock and Fixed Installations.

The revision work improved the coherency and consistency of the standards, the concept of safety management and the practical usage of EN 50126 and took into consideration the existing and related Technical Reports as well.

This European Standard provides railway duty holders and the railway suppliers, throughout the European Union, with a process which will enable the implementation of a consistent approach to the management of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety, denoted by the acronym RAMS.

Processes for the specification and demonstration of RAMS requirements are cornerstones of this standard. This European Standard promotes a common understanding and approach to the management of RAMS.

EN 50126 forms part of the railway sector specific application of IEC 61508. Meeting the requirements in this European Standard together with the requirements of other suitable standards is sufficient to ensure that additional compliance to IEC 61508 does not need to be demonstrated.

With regard to safety, EN 50126-1 provides a Safety Management Process which is supported by guidance and methods described in EN 50126-2.

EN 50126-1 and EN 50126-2 are independent from the technology used. As far as safety is concerned, EN 50126 takes the perspective of safety with a functional approach.

The application of this standard should be adapted to the specific requirements for the system under consideration.

This European Standard can be applied systematically by the railway duty holders and railway suppliers, throughout all phases of the life-cycle of a railway application, to develop railway specific RAMS requirements and to achieve compliance with these requirements. The systems-level approach developed by this European Standard facilitates assessment of the RAMS interactions between elements of railway applications even if they are of complex nature.

This European Standard promotes co-operation between the stakeholders of Railways in the achievement of an optimal combination of RAMS and cost for railway applications. Adoption of this European Standard will support the principles of the European Single Market and facilitate European railway inter-operability.

In accordance with CENELEC editing rules 1), mandatory requirements in this standard are indicated with the modal verb “shall”. Where justifiable, the standard permits process tailoring.

Specific guidance on the application of this standard for Safety aspects is provided in EN 50126-2. EN 50126-2 provides various methods for use in the safety management process. Where a particular method is selected for the system under consideration, the mandatory requirements of this method are by consequence mandatory for the safety management of the system under consideration.

This European Standard consists of the main part (Clause 1 to Clause 11) and Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G and ZZ. The requirements defined in the main part of the standard are normative, whilst Annexes are informative.

1 Scope

This part 2 of EN 50126

• considers the safety-related generic aspects of the RAMS life-cycle;

• defines methods and tools which are independent of the actual technology of the systems and subsystems;

• provides:
  – the user of the standard with the understanding of the system approach to safety which is a key concept of EN 50126;
  – methods to derive the safety requirements and their safety integrity requirements for the system and to apportion them to the subsystems;
  – methods to derive the safety integrity levels (SIL) for the safety-related electronic functions.

NOTE This standard does not allow the allocation of safety integrity levels to non-electronic functions.

• provides guidance and methods for the following areas:
  – safety process;
  – safety demonstration and acceptance;
  – organisation and independence of roles;
  – risk assessment;
  – specification of safety requirements;
  – apportionment of functional safety requirements;
  – design and implementation.

• provides the user of this standard with the methods to assure safety with respect to the system under consideration and its interactions;

• provides guidance about the definition of the system under consideration, including identification of the interfaces and the interactions of this system with its subsystems or other systems, in order to conduct the risk analysis;

• does not define:
  – RAMS targets, quantities, requirements or solutions for specific railway applications;
  – rules or processes pertaining to the certification of railway products against the requirements of this standard;
  – an approval process by the safety authority.

This part 2 of EN 50126 is applicable to railway applications fields, namely Command, Control and Signalling, Rolling Stock and Fixed Installations, and specifically:

• to the specification and demonstration of safety for all railway applications and at all levels of such an application, as appropriate, from complete railway systems to major systems and to individual and
combined sub-systems and components within these major systems, including those containing software, in particular:

– to new systems;

– to new systems integrated into existing systems already accepted, but only to the extent and insofar as the new system with the new functionality is being integrated. It is otherwise not applicable to any unmodified aspects of the existing system;

– as far as reasonably practicable, to modifications and extensions of existing systems accepted prior to the creation of this standard, but only to the extent and insofar as existing systems are being modified. It is otherwise not applicable to any unmodified aspect of the existing system;

• at all relevant phases of the life-cycle of an application;

• for use by railway duty holders and the railway suppliers.

It is not required to apply this standard to existing systems which remain unmodified, including those systems already compliant with any former version of EN 50126.

The process defined by this European Standard assumes that railway duty holders and railway suppliers have business-level policies addressing Quality, Performance and Safety. The approach defined in this standard is consistent with the application of quality management requirements contained within EN ISO 9001.

2 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

EN 50126-1:2017, Railway Applications — The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) — Part 1: Generic RAMS Process

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in EN 50126-1 apply.

4 Abbreviations

ALARP  As Low As Reasonable Practicable
CBA   Cost Benefit Analysis
CCF   Common Cause Failure (Analysis)
CoP   Code of Practice
COTS  Commercial Off-The-Shelf
DRA   Differential Risk Aversion
ERE   Explicit Risk Estimation
EMC   Electromagnetic compatibility
ETA   Event Tree Analysis
FMECA Failure Mode Effect & Criticality Analysis
FTA   Fault Tree Analysis
GA    Generic Application
GASC  Generic Application Safety Case
5 Safety process

5.1 Risk assessment and hazard control

In this sub-clause, the Hourglass Model is introduced: it offers a simplified approach that, although not containing all aspects implied in the life-cycle model, helps to clarify some issues.

The Hourglass Model provides an overview of the major safety-related activities that are needed to ensure an acceptable safety level for a technical system, including the corresponding responsibility areas.

Technical system means a product or an assembly of products including the design, implementation and support documentation. The development of a technical system starts with its requirements specification and ends with its acceptance. The design of relevant interfaces considering interactions with human operators and their behaviour is considered, while human operators themselves and their actions are not included in a technical system. Both the maintenance process (described in the maintenance manuals) and the operation are specified but are not considered parts of the technical system itself. They can be restricted by “application conditions”.

The purpose of this model is to highlight the separation between risk analysis as part of risk assessment (at the railway system level) from hazard analysis as part of hazard control (at the level of the system under consideration).

This enhances co-operation between the relevant stakeholders, clarifying responsibilities and interfaces and has the advantages of reducing complexity and facilitating modularization.

The Hourglass Model describes two main aspects:

- risk assessment, deriving safety requirements for operational and technical issues (including maintenance), and
hazard control, satisfying given functional safety requirements coming from upper levels by determining and analysing causes and designing and implementing control measures.

### Risk Assessment

- **System Definition**
- **Risk Analysis**, including:
  - Hazard Identification
  - Consequence Analysis
  - Selection of RAP
- **Risk Evaluation**

### System Requirements Specification

- List of identified hazards with associated safety measures
- **Safety Requirements**:
  - Selected Codes of Practice
  - Objectives from ERE
  - Reference systems specifications

### Hazard Control

### Figure 1 — The Hourglass Model

**NOTE** Part A (Risk Assessment) is associated with phases 1 to 3 in the life-cycle as depicted in Figure 4 in EN 50126-1:2017. Part B corresponds to phase 4 and part C to phases 5 to 9. Part D shows the "feedback of subsequent hazard identification into risk analysis" (see Figure 4 in EN 50126-1:2017).

### 5.2 A. Risk assessment

#### 5.2.1 General

Risk assessment is performed at the railway system level.

It relies on a System Definition and includes Risk analysis and Risk evaluation.

It defines the high level system safety requirements, in particular safety requirements for the system under consideration from the perspective of the railway duty holder and the operator. It takes into account safety-related operational aspects, previous experience and the regulatory requirements for the railway application.

The main task for this activity is the risk analysis, which is derived from the system definition. The risk analysis includes hazard identification, consequence analysis, and selection of Risk Acceptance Principle (RAP).
The specification of safety requirements is the final result of risk assessment; in Figure 1 it is allocated to box B, because it constitutes an interface (together with system requirement specifications and the list of identified hazards) between different responsibilities.

5.2.2 Conducting risk assessment

The level of detail in a risk assessment should be adequate to enable the risk to be properly considered. The purpose is not to catalogue every trivial hazard, nor is it expected that hazards beyond the limits of current knowledge will always be identified. A risk assessment should reflect a reasonable analysis of hazards and their associated risks within the railway operation and within the applied technology itself. Where considered to be worthwhile, risk assessments should be correlated with historical records of accidents and the records of causes.

When possible, consideration of technical implementation/architecture should be avoided in this first stage, i.e. the system to be developed should be considered as a black box, of which functions and hazards are evaluated only at the boundaries. These boundaries are well defined interfaces between the operational environment and the system under consideration.

As an example, an “unintentional train motion” is a hazard for a train. It can be observed as an abstraction at the boundary of the “system train” and it could lead to different accidents depending on the operational context (e.g. collision in context with over-speeding while running or fall of persons in connection with a train moving in a station while expected to stand still, etc.).

Assumptions defined during the risk assessment shall be checked and updated throughout the life-cycle phases.

5.3 B. Outcome of the risk assessment

The results of the risk assessment are a set of safety requirements associated to clearly-identified functions, systems or operating rules. They are part of the System Requirement Specification which establishes the technical interface between the stakeholders.

NOTE The project organisational structure and responsibilities are other factors to consider in understanding and controlling risk. For organisational aspects and requirements it is advised to refer to Clause 7.

On the basis of the selected risk acceptance principles, safety requirements can refer to Codes of Practice, to Reference Systems, or give explicit targets derived from an Explicit Risk Estimation (ERE).

Safety requirements include required safety functions, which could be assessed quantitatively (e.g. maximum rates of hazards), semi-quantitatively or qualitatively (e.g. use of trained drivers for controlling human errors).

Safety requirements should be assessed with an holistic approach to the system under consideration, i.e. the residual risk of the whole system after introducing safety requirements should be assessed taking into consideration all identified hazards.

5.4 C. Hazard control

The hazard control stage in the hourglass model ensures that the system under consideration is compliant with the safety requirements. Hazard control is performed for a specific system architecture.

The major impacts of human factors, operational and general maintenance rules as well as procedures are part of the preceding risk analysis and should have already been taken into account in the safety requirements. Therefore, during hazard control, the designer of the system under consideration can focus on the internal causes of the identified hazards.

The main task is the “hazard analysis” comprising:

- a dedicated hazard identification focusing on the system under consideration (refinement);
- causal analysis;
- a Common Cause Analysis (see 11.4 for details).
Hazard identification is a recurring task, iterating on several levels during development of the system under consideration. In order to distinguish between different tasks (and related documents) the hazard identification has been quoted twice in Figure 1:

1. during risk assessment, hazard identification focuses on high level hazards derived from the system functions (black box) and related operation of the system as well as its environment;

2. within the hazard control, a refined/iterated hazard identification focuses on hazards and their causes derived from the technical solutions, i.e. from defined architecture and internal interfaces of the system under consideration, and potential new hazards introduced by the system itself.

Both kinds of identified hazards shall be addressed during hazard control. Figure 2 shows the general case where the cause of a hazard at the railway system level consists of a hazard on the level of the system under consideration, with respect to its boundary. The boundary for a hazard identification is always given in the system definition that limits the scope of the task. This implies that the hazards are structured hierarchically. Hence a hierarchical approach to hazard analysis and hazard logging should be used.

The picture is hazard-oriented and shows a “bow-tie” shape, suggesting that several causes could lead to the same hazard and one hazard could lead to several different accidents.

Example The hazard at railway system level is a train passing a signal at danger and entering another train’s route, potentially leading to a collision (the accident). The cause at railway system level (the hazard at the level of system under consideration) is a too long braking distance. The cause at sub-system level is that the brakes were not applied by the Driver (or applied too late). The external occurrence barrier is provided by safety equipment ordering an emergency brake.

The demonstration of compliance with the safety requirements for the system under consideration can be performed in various forms of verification. These forms depend on the nature of the underlying requirements set at the beginning of the hazard control.

5.5 D. Revision of risk assessment

During the hazard control stage, fulfilment of safety requirements might not be reached in the first iteration. Three potential causes are:

- additional hazards are identified at the level of the system under consideration;
- a need for new operational rules arises;
- additional external safety measures are required to fulfil the safety targets.

In all these cases, a revision of the risk assessment is necessary.
This revision should also take into account the application conditions that could arise at the level of the system under consideration.

5.6 Responsibilities

Risk assessment is mainly within the responsibility of the railway duty holders and operators. If no risk assessment is provided by the railway duty holder or operator, the roles and responsibilities may be contracted to other parties (manufacturers and suppliers), provided that they have a documented and suitable range of competencies to consider the whole operational context in detail. They shall assess the risk resulting from introducing changes to the operational context, taking into account safety-related operational aspects, previous experience and regulatory requirements. In any case the railway duty holders should accept the results of the risk assessment.

The supplier of the technical system is responsible for the hazard control. In the case that several suppliers are in charge for different systems under consideration, the railway duty holder shall be responsible for organising an overall hazard control.

Railway duty holder and supplier shall conform to the prevailing legal requirements.

6 Safety demonstration and acceptance

6.1 Introduction

This clause provides additional details on safety demonstration and safety acceptance processes for the system under consideration. Except where considered appropriate, it does not specify who should carry out the work at each stage, since this may vary in different circumstances.

Safety demonstration evidence is based on the safety case. The purpose and content of the safety case are defined in EN 50126-1:2017, Clause 8.

In terms of safety processes, the development of a system can be categorised in three types:

- Generic Product: The system is considered from a generic point of view, applicable to different classes of applications; Analyses are carried out within an operational context which is application-independent.

- Generic Application: The system is considered suitable for multiple applications of the same class; Analyses are carried out within an operational context which is application-dependent. The safety process includes the definition of the application design process.

- Specific application: The system is considered for a specific application (including its physical implementation).

6.2 Safety demonstration and safety acceptance process

Three different categories of safety case can be defined according to the involved type of development as previously defined:

- Generic Product;

- Generic Application;

- Specific Application.

In all three categories the structure of the safety case is basically the same.

The Specific Application Safety Case shall address the following two aspects:

- the Application Design;