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## Modal verbs terminology

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# Contents

Intellectual Property Rights .....	2
Legal Notice .....	2
Modal verbs terminology.....	2
Foreword.....	5
1 Scope .....	7
2 References .....	7
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations .....	7
3.1 Terms.....	7
3.2 Symbols.....	7
3.3 Abbreviations .....	7
4 AMF-specific security requirements and related test cases.....	8
4.1 Introduction .....	8
4.2 AMF-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases. ....	8
4.2.1 Introduction.....	8
4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the AMF deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases.....	8
4.2.2.1 Authentication and key agreement procedure .....	8
4.2.2.1.1 Synchronization failure handling .....	8
4.2.2.1.2 RES* verification failure handling .....	9
4.2.2.2 Void.....	11
4.2.2.3 Security mode command procedure.....	11
4.2.2.3.1 Replay protection of NAS signalling messages.....	11
4.2.2.3.2 NAS NULL integrity protection.....	12
4.2.2.3.3 NAS integrity algorithm selection and use .....	13
4.2.2.4 Security in intra-RAT mobility .....	13
4.2.2.4.1 Bidding down prevention in Xn-handover .....	13
4.2.2.4.2 NAS protection algorithm selection in AMF change .....	14
4.2.2.5 5G-GUTI allocation .....	15
4.2.2.5.1 5G-GUTI allocation.....	15
4.2.2.6 Security in registration procedure .....	16
4.2.2.6.1 Invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handling .....	16
4.2.3 Technical Baseline .....	17
4.2.3.1 Introduction .....	17
4.2.3.2 Protecting data and information.....	17
4.2.3.2.1 Protecting data and information – general .....	17
4.2.3.2.2 Protecting data and information – unauthorized viewing .....	17
4.2.3.2.3 Protecting data and information in storage .....	17
4.2.3.2.4 Protecting data and information in transfer.....	17
4.2.3.2.5 Logging access to personal data .....	17
4.2.3.3 Protecting availability and integrity.....	17
4.2.3.4 Authentication and authorization.....	17
4.2.3.5 Protecting sessions .....	17
4.2.3.6 Logging .....	18
4.2.4 Operating Systems .....	18
4.2.5 Web Servers.....	18
4.2.6 Network Devices .....	18
4.3 AMF-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases .....	18
4.3.1 Introduction.....	18
4.3.2 Technical baseline.....	18
4.3.3 Operating systems.....	18
4.3.4 Web servers .....	18
4.3.5 Network devices .....	18
4.3.6 Network functions in service-based architecture .....	18
4.4 AMF-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases .....	18

**Annex A (informative):**    **Change history** .....19  
History .....20

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## Foreword

This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

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where:

- x the first digit:
  - 1 presented to TSG for information;
  - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
  - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.

In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings:

- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something
- shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something

The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports.

The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document.

- should** indicates a recommendation to do something
- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something
- may** indicates permission to do something
- need not** indicates permission not to do something

The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended.

- can** indicates that something is possible
- cannot** indicates that something is impossible

The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not".

- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

In addition:

**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements.

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# 1 Scope

The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the AMF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptations of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the AMF network product class.

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# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
- [2] 3GPP TS 33.501 (Release 15): "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
- [3] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".
- [4] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification".
- [5] 3GPP TS 24.501: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3".
- [6] 3GPP TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes".

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# 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations

## 3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

## 3.2 Symbols

Void.

## 3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].



## 4 AMF-specific security requirements and related test cases

### 4.1 Introduction

AMF specific security requirements include both requirements derived from AMF-specific security functional requirements in relevant specifications as well as security requirements introduced in the present document derived from the threats specific to AMF as described in TR 33.926 [6].

### 4.2 AMF-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases.

#### 4.2.1 Introduction

The present clause describes the security functional requirements and the corresponding test cases for AMF network product class. The proposed security requirements are classified in two groups:

- Security functional requirements derived from TS 33.501 [2] and detailed in clause 4.2.2.
- General security functional requirements which include requirements not already addressed in TS 33.501 [2] but whose support is also important to ensure that AMF conforms to a common security baseline detailed in clause 4.2.3.

#### 4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the AMF deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases

##### 4.2.2.1 Authentication and key agreement procedure

###### 4.2.2.1.1 Synchronization failure handling

*Requirement Name:* Synchronization failure handling

*Requirement Reference:* TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.1.3.3.2

*Requirement Description:* "Upon receiving an authentication failure message with synchronisation failure (AUTS) from the UE, the SEAF sends an Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" to the AUSF.

An SEAF will not react to unsolicited "synchronisation failure indication" messages from the UE.

The SEAF does not send new authentication requests to the UE before having received the response to its Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" from the AUSF (or before it is timed out)."

as specified in TS 33.501[2], clause 6.1.3.3.2.

*Threat References:* TR 33.926 [6], clause K.2.2.1, Resynchronization

*Test Case:*

**Test Name:** TC\_SYNC\_FAIL\_SEAF\_AMF

**Purpose:**

Verify that synchronization failure is correctly handled by the SEAF/AMF.

**Pre-Conditions:**

- Test environment with UE and AUSF. The UE and the AUSF may be simulated.
- AMF network product is connected in emulated/real network environment.

### Execution Steps

Test A:

- 1) The UE sends an authentication failure message to the SEAF/AMF with *synchronisation failure* (AUTS).
- 2) The SEAF/AMF sends a Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Request message with a "*synchronisation failure indication*" to the AUSF.
- 3) The AUSF sends a Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF/AMF immediately after receiving the request from the SEAF/AMF, to make sure the SEAF/AMF will receive the response before timeout.

Test B:

- 1) The UE sends an authentication failure message to the SEAF/AMF with *synchronisation failure* (AUTS).
- 2) The SEAF/AMF sends a Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Request message with a "*synchronisation failure indication*" to the AUSF.
- 3) The AUSF does not send a Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF/AMF before timeout.

### Expected Results:

Before receiving Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Response message from the AUSF and before the timer for receiving Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Response message runs out,

For Test B, the SEAF/AMF does not send any new authentication request to the UE.

For Test A, the SEAF/AMF may initiate new authentication towards the UE.

#### 4.2.2.1.2 RES\* verification failure handling

*Requirement Name:* RES\* verification failure handling

*Requirement Reference:* TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.1.3.2.2

*Requirement Description:*

"The SEAF shall proceed with step 10 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1 and after receiving the Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Request message from the AUSF in step 12 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1, proceed as described below:

- if the AUSF has indicated in the Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF that the verification of the RES\* was not successful in the AUSF, or
- if the verification of the RES\* was not successful in the SEAF,

then the SEAF shall either reject the authentication by sending an Authentication Reject to the UE if the SUCI was used by the UE in the initial NAS message or the SEAF/AMF shall initiate an Identification procedure with the UE if the 5G-GUTI was used by the UE in the initial NAS message to retrieve the SUCI and an additional authentication attempt may be initiated.

Also, if the SEAF does not receive any Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Request message from the AUSF as expected, then the SEAF shall either reject the authentication to the UE or initiate an Identification procedure with the UE."

As specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.1.3.2.2.