# ETSI TS 101 331 V1.8.1 (2021-07)



# Lawful Interception (LI); Requirements of Law Enforcement Agencies (standards.iteh.ai)

ETSI TS 101 331 V1.8.1 (2021-07) https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/d65874d8-72f5-45a8-9efe-3402e9b8f13c/etsi-ts-101-331-v1-8-1-2021-07

# Reference RTS/LI-00206 Keywords lawful interception, security

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### **Foreword**

ETSI TS 101 331 V1.8.1 (2021-07)

This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Lawful Interception (LI).

The present document replaces ETSI ETR 331 (1996) [i.1] (and earlier versions of the present document).

# Modal verbs terminology

In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and "cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the <u>ETSI Drafting Rules</u> (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions).

"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.

### Introduction

Originally ETSI ETR 331 [i.1] was intended to incorporate into ETSI standards the EU Council Resolution of 1995 [1] on International User Requirements. In consequence, the original ETSI ETR 331 [i.1] concentrated on telephony networks such as PSTN, ISDN and GSM because these were the main communications networks. The introduction of TETRA, GPRS, UMTS and the increased usage of the Internet forced a change so that ETSI ETR 331 [i.1] has been replaced by the present document which focuses on the interpretation of ETSI ETR 331 [i.1] on specific technologies in the different annexes.

According to rules set by the laws of individual nations as well as decisions of the European Union, there is a need to lawfully intercept communications traffic and intercept related information in modern communications systems. With the aim of harmonising the interception policy in the member states, the Council of the European Union adopted a set of requirements in EU Council Resolution of 1995 [1], with the aim of feeding them into national legislation. The LEA requirements have to be taken into account in defining the abstract handover interface.

The definition of a handover interface for the delivery of the results of lawful interception should allow the technical facilities to be provided:

- with reliability;
- with accuracy;
- at low cost;
- with minimum disruption;
- most speedily;
- in a secure manner;
- using standard procedures.

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## 1 Scope

The present document gives guidance for lawful interception of communications in the area of co-operation by Communications Service Providers (CSPs). It provides a set of requirements relating to handover interfaces for the interception by law enforcement and state security agencies. Requirements with regard to communications services provided from areas outside national boundaries are not fully developed yet and therefore only some preliminary requirements have been annexed for information.

The present document describes the requirements from a Law Enforcement Agency's (LEA's) point of view.

Not all requirements necessarily apply in one individual nation.

These requirements need to be used to derive specific network requirements and furthermore to standardize handover interfaces.

### 2 References

### 2.1 Normative references

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NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

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The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.

[1] European Union Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications (96/C 329/01).

### 2.2 Informative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

- [i.1] ETSI ETR 331: "Security Techniques Advisory Group (STAG); Definition of user requirements for lawful interception of telecommunications; Requirements of the law enforcement agencies".
- [i.2] ETSI TS 103 307: "CYBER; Security Aspects for LI and RD Interfaces".

# 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations

### 3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply:

access provider: company that provides a user of some network with access from the user's terminal to that network

**buffer:** temporary storing of information in case the necessary communication connection to transport information to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) is temporarily unavailable

**call:** logical association between several users (this could be connection oriented or connection less) capable of transferring information between two or more users of a communications system

NOTE: In this context a user may be a person or a machine.

**communications:** any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photo optical system

**Communications Service Provider (CSP):** network operator, access provider or service provider who is obliged by law to perform a lawful action in response to a warrant (e.g. perform Lawful Interception)

**content of communication:** information exchanged between two or more users of a communications service, excluding intercept related information

NOTE: This includes information which may, as part of some communications service, be stored by one user for subsequent retrieval by another.

**Handover Interface (HI):** physical and logical interface across which the interception measures are requested from CSP, and the results of interception are delivered from a CSP to a law enforcement monitoring facility

identity: technical label which may represent the origin of destination of any communications traffic, as a rule clearly identified by a physical communications identity number (such as a delephone number) of the logical or virtual communications identity number (such as a personal number) which the subscriber can assign to a physical access on a case-by-case basis

**intercept related information:** collection of information or data associated with communication services involving the target identity, specifically communication associated information or data (e.g. unsuccessful communication attempts), service associated information or data (e.g. service profile management by subscriber) and location information

**interception** (**lawful interception**): action (based on the law), performed by a CSP, of making available certain information and providing that information to an LEMF

NOTE: In the present document the term interception is not used to describe the action of observing communications by an LEA (see below).

**interception interface:** physical and logical locations within the CSP's communications facilities where access to the content of communication and intercept related information is provided

NOTE: The interception interface is not necessarily a single, fixed point.

**interception measure:** technical measure which facilitates the interception of communications traffic pursuant to the relevant national laws and regulations

Law Enforcement Agency (LEA): organization authorized by a warrant based on a national law to receive the results of communications interceptions

**Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF):** law enforcement facility designated as the transmission destination for the results of interception relating to a particular target

**lawful authorization:** permission granted to an LEA under certain conditions to intercept specified communications and requiring co-operation from a CSP

NOTE: Typically, this refers to a warrant or order issued by a lawfully authorized body.

**location information:** information relating to the geographic, physical or logical location of an identity relating to a target

**network operator:** operator of a public communications infrastructure which permits the conveyance of signals between defined network termination points by wire, by microwave, by optical means or by other electromagnetic means

**quality of service:** quality specification of a communications channel, system, virtual channel, computer-communications session, etc.

NOTE: Quality of service may be measured, for example, in terms of signal-to-noise ratio, bit error rate, message throughput rate or call blocking probability.

**reliability:** probability that a system or service will perform in a satisfactory manner for a given period of time when used under specific operating conditions

**result of interception:** information relating to a target service, including the content of communication and intercept related information, which is passed by a CSP to an LEA

NOTE: Intercept related information has to be provided whether or not communication activity is taking place.

**service provider:** natural or legal person providing one or more public communications services whose provision consists wholly or partly in the transmission and routeing of signals on a communications network

NOTE: A service provider need not necessarily run his own network.

target: entity or entities, specified in a warrant, the lawful action applies to (e.g. whose communications are to be intercepted)

target identity: identity associated with a target service (see below) used by the target

target service: communications service associated with a target and usually specified in a warrant for interception

NOTE: There may be more than one target service associated with a single target.

warrant: formal mechanism to require lawful action from a LEA served to the CSP on given target identifier(s) 3402e9b8f13c/etsi-ts-101-331-v1-8-1-2021-07

NOTE: Depending on jurisdiction a warrant is also known as: intercept request, intercept order, lawful order, court order, lawful order or judicial order (in association with supporting legislation).

### 3.2 Symbols

Void.

### 3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

ADSL Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line
CC Content of Communications
CSP Communication Service Provider
GPRS General Packet Radio Service

GSM Global System for Mobile communications

HI Handover Interface

IMEI International Mobile station Equipment Identity
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity

IP Internet Protocol

IRI Intercept Related Information
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
LEA Law Enforcement Agency

LEMF Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility

LI Lawful Interception

MSISDN Mobile Station International ISDN number

PDP Packet Data Protocol

PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network

TETRA TErrestrial Trunked RAdio

TISPAN Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking

UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System UPT Universal Personal Telecommunications

VoIP Voice over IP

## 4 User (LEA) requirements

### 4.1 Overview

This clause presents the user requirements related to the lawful interception of communications with the LEA being the user. The relevant terms are defined in clause 3.1. These user requirements are subject to national law and international treaties and should be interpreted in accordance with applicable national policies.

The following list of requirements is a collection of items, where several requirements might not correspond to national laws and regulations of the individual countries. Implementation takes place if required by national law. The Handover Interface(s) (HIs) should be configured in such a way that it (they) will comply with the appropriate national requirements. A warrant will specify a subset of requirements to be delivered on a case-by-case basis.

The consequences and implications of these requirements contain clarifications for new developments (e.g. virtualized networks or 5G communications).

# 4.2 General requirements (standards.iteh.ai)

- a) The obligation of the CSP as to which communications traffic shall be intercepted is subject to national laws.
- b) In accordance with the relevant warrant a CSP shall ensure that:
  - 1) the entire content of communication/associated with a target identity being intercepted can be intercepted during the entire period of the warrant;
  - 2) any content of communication associated with a target identity being intercepted which is routed to technical storage facilities or is retrieved from such storage facilities can be intercepted during the entire period of the warrant;
- NOTE 1: Interception at retrieval from storage is assumed to be performed by the provider of such services, if covered by the warrant for interception. This may not be always be possible, e.g. if a mailbox storage facility is located in another country. Access to the stored information by the LEA might be by a search warrant and not by interception as such.
  - 3) the delivery of the intercept related information is reliable. If the intercept related information cannot be delivered immediately to the relevant LEMF, then the intercept related information shall be buffered until they can be delivered;
  - 4) the delivery of the content of communication is reliable. If the content of communication cannot be delivered immediately to the relevant LEMF, then the content of communication shall be buffered if this is required by national laws;
- NOTE 2: Buffering is assumed to take place according to normal routines and regularly installed facilities in the network for the type of communication being intercepted. If special measures for buffering are requested by the authorities, these would normally be provided external to the regular communication system, e.g. in mediation devices.
- NOTE 3: Buffering is applied to prevent information loss due to disturbances or delays in the network or delivery mechanism. Buffering is not intended to overcome the exceptional case the LEMF is not available.

- NOTE 4: Requirements for buffering to secure delivery of interception products should be based on analysis of total system reliability, including delivery nodes, delivery channels, the LEMF and any buffering devices that are used.
  - 5) the CSP shall not monitor or permanently record the results of interception.
  - 6) the CSP shall be able to deliver location information, as a choice, only at the beginning and end of a target's communications, during all phases of a target's communications, or independent of a target's communications. The exact method shall be able to be set on a per-intercept basis to satisfy a specific warrant.
- c) The ability to intercept communications shall be provided relating to the targets operating permanently within a communications system (e.g. a subscriber or account).
- d) The ability to intercept communications shall be provided relating to the targets operating temporarily within a communications system (e.g. a visiting mobile subscriber or a visiting subscriber using an access network to a home service). A visited network shall be able to process the interception of all services without home network assistance or visibility, using the identifiers provided by an LEA.
- e) The results of interception relating to a target service shall be provided by the CSP in such a way that any communications that do not fall within the scope of the warrant shall be excluded by the CSP.
- NOTE 5: It is assumed that the intercepting system exercises best effort to exclude non-authorized interception patterns (e.g. transferred communication).
- f) All results of interception provided at the handover interface shall be given a unique identification relating to warrant.
- g) The LI requirements are not limited to communication of individuals. The LI requirement also applies to devices in IoT including CIoT.
- h) The results of interception relating to a target service shall be provided by the CSP in such a way that only information that falls within the scope of the warrant shall be delivered, while information that falls outside the scope of the warrant shall be excluded by the CSP. The following are some examples:

  https://standards.itch.ai/catalog/standards/sist/d65874d8-72f5-45a8-9efe-
  - 1) Target location information: 9b8f13c/etsi-ts-101-331-v1-8-1-2021-07
    - i) all location information is delivered or is excluded;
    - ii) location information only at the beginning and end of a communication is delivered while location information at other phases of communication is excluded;
    - iii) location information at all phases of a communication is delivered while location information outside communications phases is excluded; or
    - iv) location information independent of any communications is delivered.

The location information identified for exclusion shall be omitted from the results of interception delivered to the LEMF.

- 2) Content of communication:
  - For IRI-only intercepts, the content of communication of the target shall be omitted from the results of interception delivered to the LEMF.
- 3) Post dialled digits:
  - Depending on the requirements for IRI-only intercepts, post dialled digits from the target, associated with voice/VoIP communications (see Annex D.2.1) shall be excluded from the results of interception delivered to the LEMF.
- NOTE 6: Information used for the IRI is expected to be part of standard network signalling procedures. No additional signalling is expected for the IRI.

### 4.3 Result of interception

The CSP shall, in relation to each target service:

- a) provide the content of communication (see also clause 4.2, bullet h));
- b) remove any service coding or encryption which has been applied to the content of communication (i.e. en clair) and the intercept related information at the instigation of the CSP;
- NOTE 1: If coding/encryption cannot be removed through means, which are available in the network or service for the given communication, the receiving agencies should be provided with keys, etc. to access the information en clair, see clause 4.3, item c).
- provide the LEA with any other decryption keys whose uses include encryption of the content of communication, where such keys are available for NWO/SvP/AP;
- d) provide intercept related information when the following events occur:
  - 1) when communication is attempted;
  - 2) when communication is established;
  - 3) when no successful communication is established;
  - 4) on change of status (e.g. in the access network);
  - 5) on change of service or service parameter;
  - 6) on change of location (this can be related or unrelated to the communication (e.g. at the beginning and end of a target's communications) or at all times when the apparatus is switched on);
  - 7) when a successful communication is terminated; iteh.ai)
  - 8) on change of access network or access provider (e.g., when roaming).

NOTE 2: In the present document, service should be taken to include so-called supplementary services.

- e) provide intercept related information that shall contain:
  - 1) the identities that have attempted communications with the target identity, successful or not;
  - 2) identities used by or associated with the target identity;
  - 3) details of services used and their associated parameters;
  - 4) information relating to status;
  - 5) time stamps;
  - 6) location information (see also clause 4.2, bullet b, item 6));
  - 7) post dialled digits (see also clause 4.2, bullet h)), for voice/VoIP based communication.
- f) apply the conditions mentioned above also to multi-party or multi-way communication if and as long as the target identity participates, or depending on national laws, even if the target identity is not participating but the multi-party/multi-way communication is associated with the target identity.

### 4.4 Location information

An LEA may request location information relating to locations (see also clause 4.2, item b), bullet 6)), in a number of forms:

a) the current geographic, physical or logical location of the target identity (either at the beginning and end of a target's communications, or during all phases of a target's communications, or independent of a target's communications), when communications activity (involving communication or a service) is taking place;