

SLOVENSKI STANDARD SIST-TS CEN/TS 15130:2020

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Poštne storitve - Infrastruktura za elektrotehnične zaznamke pri frankiranju (DPM) - Informacije v podporo uporabi DPM

Postal services - DPM infrastructure - Messages supporting DPM applications

Postalische Dienstleistungen - Infrastruktur für Elektronische Freimachungsvermerke (DPM) - Nachrichten zur Unterstützung von Anwendungen der DPM

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Services Postaux - Affranchissement électronique, Infrastructure du système - Messages pris en charge par les applications <u>SIST-TS CEN/TS 15130:2020</u>

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English Version

Postal services - DPM infrastructure - Messages supporting DPM applications

Services Postaux - Affranchissement électronique, Infrastructure du système - Messages pris en charge par les applications Postalische Dienstleistungen - Infrastruktur für Elektronische Freimachungsvermerke (DPM) -Nachrichten zur Unterstützung von Anwendungen der DPM

This Technical Specification (CEN/TS) was approved by CEN on 21 October 2019 for provisional application.

The period of validity of this CEN/TS is limited initially to three years. After two years the members of CEN will be requested to submit their comments, particularly on the question whether the CEN/TS can be converted into a European Standard.

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European foreword

This document (CEN/TS 15130:2020) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 331 "Postal Services", the secretariat of which is held by NEN.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

This document will supersede CEN/TS 15130:2006.

In comparison with the previous edition, the following technical modifications have been made:

- a) Normative Annex A Implicit certification process, has been updated with reference to a state-of-theart algorithm for new applications of digital signature generation and verification.
- b) The Bibliography has been updated accordingly.

According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organisations of the following countries are bound to announce this Technical Specification: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

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Introduction

The purpose of this document is to define a consistent and complete set of messages between vendors and posts infrastructures in support of DPM applications.

It is assumed that the reader of this document is familiar with computer-related technologies normally used to design and implement applications requiring an interaction between computer systems. This document makes use of industry-accepted technical standards and concepts like public key cryptography and communication protocols.

This document defines the significant content and the format for data exchanges and messages, consistent with current industry practices. Also, consistent with the concepts of extensibility and flexibility, this document allows for extensions supporting specific (local) implementations using additional data elements.

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1 Scope

This document specifies the information exchanges between various parties' infrastructures that take place in support of DPM applications. It complements standards that address the design, security, applications and readability of Digital Postage Marks.

The following items will be addressed by this document:

- identification of parties participating in exchanges of information described by this document;
- identification of functions (interactions, use cases);
- definition of parties' responsibilities in the context of above functions;
- definition of messages between parties: message meaning and definition of communication protocols to support each function;
- definition of significant content (payload) for each message;
- security mechanisms providing required security services, such as authentication, privacy, integrity and non-repudiation.

This document does not address:

- design of DPM supporting infrastructure for applications internal to providers and carriers;
- design of DPM devices and applications for applications internal to end-users.

NOTE Although there are other communications between various parties involved in postal communications, this document covers only DPM-related aspects of such communications.

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2 Normative references^{167c2b70ee77/sist-ts-cen-ts-15130-2020}

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 9798-3, IT Security techniques — Entity authentication — Part 3: Mechanisms using digital signature techniques

ISO 10126-2, Banking — Procedures for message encipherment (wholesale) — Part 2: DEA algorithm

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- IEC Electropedia: available at <u>http://www.electropedia.org/</u>
- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <u>https://www.iso.org/obp</u>

3.1

ascending register value

numerical value that is equal to the total accumulated value of postage that has been accounted for and printed by the mailing system (usually used in the context of a postage meter or a franking machine)

3.2

authentication

verification of the identity of a person, process or the origin of the data being exchanged

3.3

control sum

sum of the descending register value and ascending register value in a mailing system

3.4

cryptographic material

information used in conjunction with cryptographic methods of protecting information

3.5

cryptographic key

information that uniquely determines a bijection (one-to-one transformation) from the space of messages to the space of ciphertexts

3.6

Cryptographic Validation Codes

CVC

value, cryptographically derived from selected postal data, which may be used in verifying the integrity of such data and authenticating its origin

3.7

3.8

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data integrity

property of a communication channel whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since the time it was created, transmitted, or stored by an authorized source

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descending register value

numerical value equal to the total value of unused postage remaining in the mailing system (usually used in the context of a postage meter or a franking machine)

3.9

Digital Postage Mark

DPM

postmark printed or otherwise attached to a mail item and containing information that may be captured and used by mail handling organizations and the recipient

3.10

DPM signature verification key

public key that is used for the DPM signature verification

3.11

DPM signing Key

DPM signature generation key

private key that is used for digital signing of DPM information

3.12

DPM verifier

verifier

postal equipment that is used for DPM verification

3.13 **Exchange Validation Codes** EVC

code, known to or agreed between a mailer and a licensing post, which when applied to a postal item by the mailer may be used by the licensing post to authenticate the origin of the item and, under appropriate circumstances, to verify the integrity of agreed upon DPM data

3.14

implicit certificate

informational element that binds an entity's identity with its public cryptographic key allowing the verification of the digital signature by another entity using only information contained within the certificate itself

Note 1 to entry: In Digital Postage Mark verification systems based on public key cryptographic schemes, the verification key is public and can either be retrieved from a database (explicit certificate) or it can be computed from the information contained in the Digital Postage Mark (implicit certificate).

3.15

key management infrastructure

systems, policies and procedures used to create, store, distribute and update cryptographic keys

3.16

license

formal permission to account for postal charges and create an agreed upon evidence of payment for such charges given to qualified mailers by posts, carriers or their authorised agents (standards.iteh.ai)

3.17

license number

SIST-TS CEN/TS 15130:2020 informational element (typically numeric or alphanumeric code) that represents the fact that a mailer has obtained license from the post on a carrier-authorising the mailer to account for postal charges and to print evidence of a paid postage

3.18

licensing post

postal organisation responsible for issuing licenses to qualified mailers

3.19

MAC kev

DPM MAC key

Message Authentication Code (MAC) key used for the protection of the Digital Postal Mark (DPM) in DPM systems based on symmetric key cryptographic schemes

3.20

mailer

person or organization using the services of a post

3.21

mailing system

system which is used to account and evidence charges for postal services

Note 1 to entry: Variations of a mailing system include:

- franking machine or postage meter;
- personal computer with specialized software;

— online software service.

3.22

Message Authentication Code

MAC

value, cryptographically derived from selected data, which allows data integrity and implicit data origin to be verified

Note 1 to entry: Since MACs are based on shared secret schemes they allow for weaker (implicit) data origin verification than digital signatures that are based on public key cryptographic schemes.

3.23

non-repudiation

parametrisation

security service which prevents an entity from denying previous commitments or actions

3.24

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process of supplying a system or a device with all input information required for proper operation, involving assignment of specific numerical values to named variables used in computation of output values such as data elements of DPM ds.teh.al/catalog/standards/sist/58/53d33-2e0f-4bea-bad2-167c2b70ee77/sist-ts-cen-ts-15130-2020

3.25

post

postal administration postal authority

3.26

post

organization which has been designated by the UPU member country or territory as an operator responsible for fulfilling part or all of the member's obligations arising from adherence to the UPU convention and agreements

3.27

postal code

numeric or alphanumeric value that is uniquely indicative of a geographic location of an element of postal processing and delivery network, including postal processing facilities, retail offices, delivery units and individual recipient's mailboxes

3.28

privacy

confidentiality

security service used to keep the (meaningful) content of the information from all but those authorised to have it

3.29

public key cryptography

cryptographic system that uses two keys: a public key accessible to all parties and a private or secret key known only to one party (either the sender or the recipient of the message depending on the use of the system)

Note 1 to entry: An important element of the public key system is that the public and private keys are uniquely related to each other and it is computationally infeasible to compute private key from the knowledge of public key.

3.30

Public Key Infrastructure

PKI

system of digital certificates, certificate authorities, and registration authorities or agents that allows for authentication of all parties involved in communication and data exchange processes

3.31

symmetric key cryptography

encryption system in which the sender and receiver of a message share a single, common secret information (key) that is used both to encrypt and decrypt messages that are being exchanged

3.32

time stamp

value of the current time stored by a system to indicate when a certain transaction took place iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW

3.33

Universal Coordinated Time (standards.iteh.ai)

UCT

universal time, taking into account the addition or omission of leap seconds by atomic clocks each year to compensate for changes in the rotation of the earth (Greenwich Mean Time updated with leap seconds) 167c2b70ee77/sist-ts-cen-ts-15130-2020

3.34

vendor

provider and/or operator of mailing systems

3.35

World Wide Web Consortium

W3C

international consortium of companies involved with the development of open standards for internet and the web

3.36

XML

Extensible Mark-up Language

subset of SGML constituting a particular text mark-up language for interchange of structured data

3.37

XML schema

XML schema is an XML language for describing and constraining the content of XML documents

4 Requirements

4.1 Functional structure

This clause covers the organization of the logical layer of communication between post and vendor.

In the context of this document, a typical postal operator or a carrier of physical mail items is organized along well-defined functional elements. Specifically, typical functional elements are postal operations (including: mail collection, processing, sorting, transportation and delivery) and system administration and management control (including finance and marketing).

Since this document defines (for the major part) communications between vendor and post aimed at supporting postal revenue collection based on DPM, the postal operator is the main recipient and beneficiary of the information collected and communicated within the DPM supporting infrastructure.

Therefore, the functional requirements are organized to match the functional elements of the postal organization namely: postal operations and system administration and management control. Accordingly, Clause 5 of the present document is organized into the following major subclauses:

- key management processes;
- licensing and parameterization of mailing systems;
- data collection and reporting processes;

audit-related process. iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW

In this organization, key management processes Support postal operations while licensing and parameterization, data collection and audit-related clauses support system administration and management control. <u>SIST-TS CEN/TS 15130:2020</u>

Postal revenue collection systems that are based on DPM require postal verification of accounting processes performed by mailers. In practice, this amounts to DPM verification that is performed on individual mail items and, as such, becomes a part of postal operations.

DPM verification requires that all verification equipment (verifiers) have access to DPM verification keys or key materials (symmetric or public).

For the purpose of this document these verification keys are supplied to verifiers from postal key management infrastructure. The postal key management infrastructure in its relation to vendor key management infrastructure is covered in subsequent clauses of this document.

4.2 Technical requirements

Technical requirements for this document are driven by the needs of posts and vendors to create and operate a cost-effective, functional and efficient infrastructure which allows them to exchange information as described in Clause 5.

This infrastructure will allow interoperability between systems owned and operated by vendors and posts eliminating the need for custom interfaces between specific parties. The use of established technologies and industry-standard solutions will minimize the cost of such infrastructure. The optimum set of solutions is highly dependent on specific conditions and the state of the technology at any given time.

Specific performance levels (like scalability, speed, reliability, availability) are outside the scope of this document, as they evolve quickly and they vary greatly between organizations.

Annex B includes as an example a specific implementation of the transport layer using XML schema standard for data representation.

4.3 Security requirements

4.3.1 General

This subclause is a review of security requirements which are of specific interest to posts and vendors, in the context of DPM infrastructure. It includes a discussion of threats, vulnerabilities and approaches to reduce risks.

4.3.2 Introduction

This clause defines security requirements for the DPM supporting infrastructure and in its general approach follows Annex C "Security analysis considerations" of EN 14615. 4.3.4 defines threats and countermeasures that are specific to DPM supporting infrastructure.

Security of the Digital Postage Marks (DPM) rests on the information present in the DPM, and on security of DPM supporting infrastructure. The DPM information is designed to convince a verifier after it captures and interprets it that the postal charge accounting for the mail piece has occurred and that the payment has been made or will be made (depending on the payment arrangement). The basic principle at work here is the notion that certain information can be known to a mailer's postage evidencing device only if it has access to a protected (secret or private) piece of information known as a key. Access to such key shall always trigger an accounting action that results in a secure accounting for the postal charge (amount) required to be paid for the service of postal delivery. This secure accounting is performed either by deduction of the computed postage amount from an accounting register (descending register) responsible for storage of pre-paid funds or simply by updating a secure non-volatile register (ascending register) by the computed amount or both. Thus the DPM security and its linkage to a payment mechanism are delivered through secure cryptographic information processing using a private (secret) key. It is of paramount importance that such keys be securely managed throughout their use within the system. This document deals with DPM key management system and its specific arrangements concerning vendor-post interface. <u>SIST-TS CEN/TS 151302020</u>

A cryptographic system normally requires a clear definition of the message sender, message communication channel, message recipient and the message itself. For the purpose of this document both vendor and post play roles of sender and recipient since they engage in exchange of vital information required for the proper functioning of a DPM-based payment system. Such exchange is organized by using a public or private communication network that is referred to as a communication channel. In the process of exchanging required information vendor and post execute an agreed upon communication protocol normally consisting of a several rounds of sending and receiving information.

The usual services of information security are entity or message data origin authentication, message data integrity, message data confidentiality (privacy) and sender non-repudiation (see Bibliography [2] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14])

4.3.3 Security business objectives, policy and economics

This subclause defines most important security business objectives, policy and economics. Other more detailed security objectives, policy and economics are application and environment dependent and typically can be derived from the objectives listed below:

- a) postal business objective is to create and maintain cost effective access to postal services for mailers without negative impact on the quality of service and its ease of use. Specifically, postal revenue collection including DPM infrastructure security measures shall be balanced against the cost of implementation and maintenance of secure DPM supporting Infrastructure. This shall be done in such a way that the overall combined cost of revenue collection including the cost that shall be incurred by post, vendor and their joint customers is minimal;
- b) fundamental security policy and economics requirement is that a postal revenue collection system does not allow for attacks (resulting in significant revenue losses) that are easy to mount for