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Prizemni snopovni radio (TETRA) - Govor in podatki (V+D) - 7. del: Varnost

Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 7: Security

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

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ETSI

European Telecommunications Standards Institute

ETSI Secretariat

Postal address: F-06921 Sophia Antipolis CEDEX - FRANCE
Office address: 650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis - Valbonne - FRANCE
X.400: c=fr, a=atlas, p=etsi, s=secretariat - **Internet:** secretariat@etsi.fr

Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 - Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16

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