



**Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS);
LTE;**

3G Security;

**Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example
algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation
functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*;**

**Document 3: Implementors' test data
(3GPP TS 35.207 version 18.0.0 Release 18)**



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Foreword

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Introduction

This document has been prepared by the 3GPP Task Force, and contains an example set of algorithms which may be used as the authentication and key generation functions **f1**, **f1***, **f2**, **f3**, **f4**, **f5** and **f5***. (It is not mandatory that the particular algorithms specified in this document are used — all seven functions are operator-specifiable rather than being fully standardised). This document is one five, which between them form the entire specification of the example algorithms, entitled:

- 3GPP TS 35.205: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*;
Document 1: General".
- 3GPP TS 35.206: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*;
Document 2: Algorithm Specification".
- 3GPP TS 35.207: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*;
Document 3: Implementors' Test Data".
- 3GPP TS 35.208: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*;
Document 4: Design Conformance Test Data".
- 3GPP TR 35.909: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*;
Document 5: Summary and results of design and evaluation".

1 Outline of the implementors' test data

Section 2 introduces the algorithms and describes the notation used in the subsequent sections.

Section 3 provides test data for the Rijndael kernel function.

Section 4 provides test data for the authentication algorithms $f1$ and $f1^*$.

Section 5 provides test data for the algorithms $f2$, $f5$ and $f3$.

Section 6 provides test data for the algorithms $f4$ and $f5^*$.

1.1 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TS 33.102 v3.5.0: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture".
- [2] 3GPP TS 33.105 v3.4.0: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements".
- [3] 3GPP TS 35.206: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions $f1$, $f1^*$, $f2$, $f3$, $f4$, $f5$ and $f5^*$; Document 2: Algorithm Specification".
- [4] 3GPP TS 35.207: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions $f1$, $f1^*$, $f2$, $f3$, $f4$, $f5$ and $f5^*$; Document 3: Implementors' Test Data" (this document).
- [5] 3GPP TS 35.208: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions $f1$, $f1^*$, $f2$, $f3$, $f4$, $f5$ and $f5^*$; Document 4: Design Conformance Test Data".
- [6] Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen: "AES Proposal: Rijndael", available at <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/round2/AESAlgs/Rijndael/Rijndael.pdf> or <http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/rijndaeldocV2.zip>
- [7] <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/>

2 Introductory information

2.1 Introduction

Within the security architecture of the 3GPP system there are seven security functions $f1$, $f1^*$, $f2$, $f3$, $f4$, $f5$ and $f5^*$. The operation of these functions falls within the domain of one operator, and the functions are therefore to be specified by each operator rather than being fully standardized. The algorithms specified in this document are examples that may be used by an operator who does not wish to design his own.

The inputs and outputs of all seven algorithms are defined in section 2.5.

2.2 Radix

Unless stated otherwise, all test data values presented in this document are in hexadecimal.

2.3 Bit/Byte ordering

All data variables in this specification are presented with the most significant bit (or byte) on the left hand side and the least significant bit (or byte) on the right hand side. Where a variable is broken down into a number of substrings, the leftmost (most significant) substring is numbered 0, the next most significant is numbered 1, and so on through to the least significant.

2.4 List of Variables

AK	a 48-bit anonymity key that is the output of either of the functions $f5$ and $f5^*$.
AMF	a 16-bit authentication management field that is an input to the functions $f1$ and $f1^*$.
c1,c2,c3,c4,c5	128-bit constants, which are XORed onto intermediate variables.
CK	a 128-bit confidentiality key that is the output of the function $f3$.
IK	a 128-bit integrity key that is the output of the function $f4$.
K	a 128-bit subscriber key that is an input to the functions $f1$, $f1^*$, $f2$, $f3$, $f4$, $f5$ and $f5^*$.
MAC-A	a 64-bit network authentication code that is the output of the function $f1$.
MAC-S	a 64-bit resynchronisation authentication code that is the output of the function $f1^*$.
OP	a 128-bit Operator Variant Algorithm Configuration Field that is a component of the functions $f1$, $f1^*$, $f2$, $f3$, $f4$, $f5$ and $f5^*$.
OP _C	a 128-bit value derived from OP and K and used within the computation of the functions.
r1,r2,r3,r4,r5	integers in the range 0–127 inclusive, which define amounts by which intermediate variables are cyclically rotated.
RAND	a 128-bit random challenge that is an input to the functions $f1$, $f1^*$, $f2$, $f3$, $f4$, $f5$ and $f5^*$.
RES	a 64-bit signed response that is the output of the function $f2$.
SQN	a 48-bit sequence number that is an input to either of the functions $f1$ and $f1^*$. (For $f1^*$ this input is more precisely called SQN _{MS} .)

2.5 Algorithm Inputs and Outputs

The inputs to the algorithms are given in tables 1 and 2, the outputs in tables 3–9 below.

Table 1. inputs to f_1 and f_1^*

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
K	128	Subscriber key K[0]...K[127]
RAND	128	Random challenge RAND[0]...RAND[127]
SQN	48	Sequence number SQN[0]...SQN[47]. (For f_1^* this input is more precisely called SQN _{MS} .)
AMF	16	Authentication management field AMF[0]...AMF[15]

Table 2. inputs to f_2 , f_3 , f_4 , f_5 and f_5^*

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
K	128	Subscriber key K[0]...K[127]
RAND	128	Random challenge RAND[0]...RAND[127]

Table 3. f_1 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
MAC-A	64	Network authentication code MAC-A[0]...MAC-A[63]

Table 4. f_1^* output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
MAC-S	64	Resynch authentication code MAC-S[0]...MAC-S[63]

Table 5. f_2 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
RES	64	Response RES[0]...RES[63]

Table 6. f_3 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
CK	128	Confidentiality key CK[0]...CK[127]

Table 7. f_4 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
IK	128	Integrity key IK[0]...IK[127]

Table 8. f_5 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
AK	48	Anonymity key AK[0]...AK[47]

Table 9. f_5^* output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
AK	48	Resynch anonymity key AK[0]...AK[47]

NOTE: Both f_5 and f_5^* outputs are called AK according to reference [2]. In practice only one of them will be calculated in each instance of the authentication and key agreement procedure.

2.6 Coverage

The test data sets for the kernel function Rijndael have been chosen in a way that, provided all data sets are tested:

- Every S-Box entry is being used.
- Each input bit has been in both the '0' and '1' state.

The test data sets for all seven functions are based on the test data sets above. The values for OP, K and RAND have been chosen such that the input values of the first encryption are the test data sets of Rijndael. This way, the following coverage is being reached, provided all test data sets are tested:

- The conditions for Rijndael seen above.
- Each input bit for the functions has been in both the '0' and '1' state.

3 Rijndael test data

3.1 Overview

The test data sets presented here are for the cryptographic kernel function Rijndael with 128-bit key and data as it is specified in [3].

3.2 Format

Rijndael is composed of 10 rounds that transform the input into the output. An intermediate result is called the State. The State can be pictured as a 4x4 rectangular array of bytes (128 bits in total). The cipher key is similarly pictured as a 4x4 rectangular array. In each of the data intermediate values of the round key array and of the State are given. For the first set the value of the State after each step of the algorithm is given. In the remaining data sets only the value of the State as it is at the end of each round is given.

The internal states will be written as hexadecimal strings, column by column and from top to bottom within each column (the same way as plaintext bytes are fed into the matrix).

Example: The State

C2	37	2E	21
3C	69	51	9E
62	EC	9D	23
CC	29	D8	F7

is represented by the string `c23c62cc 3769ec29 2e519dd8 219e23f7`.