



SLOVENSKI STANDARD
oSIST prEN IEC 62443-2-4:2022
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Zaščita industrijske avtomatizacije in nadzornih sistemov - 2-4. del: Zahteve za program varnosti zaščite za ponudnike storitev IACS

Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 2-4: Security program requirements for IACS service providers

IT-Sicherheit für industrielle Automatisierungssysteme - Teil 2-4: Anforderungen an das IT-Sicherheitsprogramm von Dienstleistern für industrielle Automatisierungssysteme

Sécurité des automatismes industriels et des systèmes de commande - Partie 2-4: Exigences de programme de sécurité pour les fournisseurs de service IACS

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TITLE:

Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 2-4: Security program requirements for IACS service providers

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NOTE FROM TC/SC OFFICERS:

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**SECURITY FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION
AND CONTROL SYSTEMS –****Part 2-4: Security program requirements
for IACS service providers****Ed.2**

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International Standard IEC 62443-2-4 Ed. 2 has been prepared by IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation in collaboration with the liaison International Instrumentation Users Association, referred to as the WIB from its original and now obsolete Dutch name.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts in the IEC 62443 series, published under the general title *Security for industrial automation and control systems*, can be found on the IEC website.

Edition 2 of IEC 62443-2-4 makes editorial corrections discovered since its release and provides clarifications that have been identified as necessary, primarily through the use of the document during conformity assessment and during the development of profiles. One area of clarification

102 is that some requirements were interpreted as technical requirements, when the intention was
103 for them to be the use/configuration of technical capabilities.

104 Future standards in this series will carry the new general title as cited above. Titles of existing
105 standards in this series will be updated at the time of the next edition.

106 The committee has decided that the contents of the base publication and its amendment will
107 remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under
108 "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the
109 publication will be

- 110 • reconfirmed,
- 111 • withdrawn,
- 112 • replaced by a revised edition, or
- 113 • amended.

114

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116

INTRODUCTION

117 This standard is the part of the IEC 62443 series that contains security requirements for
118 providers of integration and maintenance services for Industrial Automation and Control
119 Systems (IACS).

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SECURITY FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS –

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Part 2-4: Security program requirements for IACS service providers

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127

128

Ed.2

129

130 1 Scope

131 This part of IEC 62443 specifies a comprehensive set of requirements for security capabilities
132 for IACS service providers that they can offer to the asset owner during integration and
133 maintenance activities of an Automation Solution. Because not all requirements apply to all
134 industry groups and organizations, Subclause 4.1.4 provides for the development of Profiles
135 that allow for the subsetting of these requirements. Profiles are used to adapt this document
136 to specific environments, including environments not based on an IACS.

137 NOTE 1 The term “Automation Solution” is used as a proper noun (and therefore capitalized) in this part of
138 IEC 62443 to prevent confusion with other uses of this term.


139 Collectively, the security capabilities offered by an IACS service provider are referred to as its
140 Security Program for IACS Asset Owners. In a related specification, IEC 62443-2-1 describes
141 requirements for the Security Management System of the asset owner.

142 NOTE 2 In general, these security capabilities are policy, procedure, practice and personnel related.

143 Figure 1 illustrates the integration and maintenance security capabilities of the asset owner,
144 service provider(s) and product supplier(s) of an IACS and their relationships to each other and
145 to the Automation Solution. Some of the IEC 62443-2-4 security program requirements are
146 associated with security requirements described in IEC 62443-3-3 and IEC 62443-4-2.

147 NOTE 3 The IACS is a combination of the Automation Solution and the organizational measures necessary for its
148 design, deployment, operation, and maintenance.

149 NOTE 4 Maintenance of legacy system with insufficient security functional capabilities, implementation of policies,
150 processes and procedures are recommended as risk mitigations.



151

152

Figure 1 – Scope of service provider capabilities

153 In Figure 1, the Automation Solution is illustrated to contain the Essential Functions that include
 154 safety functions, commonly implemented by a Safety Instrumented System (SIS), and
 155 complementary and control functions, commonly implemented by supporting applications, such
 156 as batch management, advanced control, historian, and security related applications. The
 157 dashed boxes indicate that these components are “optional”.

158 NOTE 5 The term “process” in BPCS may apply to a variety of industrial processes, including continuous processes
 159 and manufacturing processes.

160 NOTE 6 Automation Solutions typically have a single control system (product), but they are not restricted to do so.
 161 In general, the Automation Solution is the set of hardware and software, independent of product packaging, that is
 162 used to control a physical process (e.g. continuous or manufacturing) as defined by the asset owner.

163 NOTE 7 Service providers often provide reference architectures.

164 **2 Normative references**

165 The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For
 166 dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of
 167 the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

168 “None”

169 **3 Terms, definitions, abbreviated terms and acronyms**

170 **3.1 Terms and definitions**

171 For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

172 ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following
173 addresses:

- 174 • IEC Electropedia: available at <http://www.electropedia.org/>
- 175 • ISO Online browsing platform: available at <http://www.iso.org/obp>

176 3.1.1

177 **asset owner**

178 role of an organization responsible for one or more IACSs

179 Note 1 to entry: Used in place of the generic word end user to provide differentiation.

180 Note 2 to entry: This definition includes the components that are part of the IACS.

181 Note 3 to entry: In the context of this standard, asset owner also includes the operator of the IACS.

182 3.1.2

183 **attack surface**

184 physical and functional interfaces of a system that can be accessed and through which the
185 system can be potentially exploited

186 Note 1 to entry: The size of the attack surface for a software interface is proportional to the number of methods and
187 parameters defined for the interface. Simple interfaces, therefore, have smaller attack surfaces than complex
188 interfaces.

189 Note 2 to entry: The size of the attack surface and the number of vulnerabilities are not necessarily related to each
190 other.

191 3.1.3

192 **Automation Solution**

193 collection of control system and any complementary components that have been installed and
194 configured to operate in an IACS

195 Note 1 to entry: Automation Solution is used as a proper noun in this part of IEC 62443.

196 Note 2 to entry: The difference between the control system and the Automation Solution is that the control system
197 is incorporated into the Automation Solution design (e.g. a specific number of workstations, controllers, and devices
198 in a specific configuration), which is then implemented. The resulting configuration is referred to as the
199 Automation Solution.

200 Note 3 to entry: The Automation Solution may be provided by multiple suppliers, including the product supplier of
201 the control system and the product suppliers of complementary components.

202 Note 4 to entry: The Automation Solution does not include the processes and procedures used during integration,
203 maintenance, and operation of the IACS.

204 Note 5 to entry: An Automation Solution, once integration into a given environment is complete, is ready for
205 operation

206 3.1.4

207 **basic process control system**

208 system that responds to input signals from the process, its associated equipment, other
209 programmable systems and/or an operator and generates output signals causing the process
210 and its associated equipment to operate in the desired manner but does not perform any safety
211 integrated functions (SIF)

212 Note 1 to entry: Safety instrumented functions are specified in the IEC 61508 series.

213 Note 2 to entry: The term “process” in this definition may apply to a variety of industrial processes, including
214 continuous processes and manufacturing processes.

215 3.1.5

216 **component**

217 entity belonging to an IACS that exhibits the characteristics of one or more of a host device,
218 network device, software application, or embedded device

219 **3.1.6**
 220 **consultant**
 221 subcontractor that provides guidance, including expert advice, to the asset owner, integration
 222 or maintenance service provider, or product supplier

223 Note1 to entry: a consultant can provide assistance for component or system countermeasures

224 **3.1.7**
 225 **control system**
 226 hardware and software components used in the design and implementation of an IACS

227 Note 1 to entry: As shown in Figure 1, control systems are composed of field devices, embedded control devices,
 228 network devices, and host devices (including workstations and servers).

229 Note 2 to entry: As shown in Figure 1, control systems are represented in the Automation Solution by a BPCS and
 230 an optional SIS.

231 **3.1.8**
 232 **handover**
 233 act of turning an Automation Solution over to the asset owner

234 Note 1 to entry: Handover effectively transfers responsibility for operations and maintenance of an
 235 Automation Solution from the integration service provider to the asset owner and generally occurs after successful
 236 completion of system test, often referred to as Site Acceptance Test (SAT)

237 **3.1.9**
 238 **harden**
 239 process of improving the security of a system or component through a reduction of risk factors

240 Note 1 to entry: Hardening generally involves adapting and configuring the Automation Solution / components and
 241 related policies and procedures to meet the security needs of the asset owner's site

242 **3.1.10**
 243 **industrial automation and control system**
 244 collection of personnel, hardware, software, procedures and policies involved in the operation
 245 of the industrial process and that can affect or influence its safe, secure and reliable operation

246 Note 1 to entry: The IACS may include components that are not installed at the asset owner's site.

247 Note 2 to entry: The definition of IACS was taken from IEC-62443-3-3 and is illustrated in Figure 1. Examples of
 248 IACSS include Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
 249 IEC 62443-2-4 also defines the proper noun "Automation Solution" to mean the specific instance of the control system
 250 product and possibly additional components that are designed into the IACS. The Automation Solution, therefore,
 251 differs from the control system since it represents a specific implementation (design and configuration) of the control
 252 system hardware and software components for a specific asset owner.

253 **3.1.11**
 254 **integration service provider**
 255 service provider that provides integration activities for an Automation Solution including design,
 256 installation, configuration, testing, commissioning, and handover

257 Note 1 to entry: Integration service providers are often referred to as integrators or Main Automation Contractors
 258 (MAC).

259 **3.1.12**
 260 **maintenance service provider**
 261 service provider that provides support activities for an Automation Solution after handover

262 Note 1 to entry: Maintenance is often considered to be distinguished from operation (e.g. in common colloquial
 263 language it is often assumed that an Automation Solution is either in operation or under maintenance). Maintenance
 264 service providers can perform support activities during operations, e.g. managing user accounts, security monitoring,
 265 and security assessments.

266 **3.1.13**
267 **portable media**
268 portable devices that contain data storage capabilities that can be used to physically copy data
269 from one piece of equipment and transfer it to another

270 Note 1 to entry: Types of portable media include but are not limited to: CD / DVD / Blu-ray Media, USB memory
271 devices, smart phones, flash memory, solid state disks, hard drives, handhelds, and portable computers.

272 **3.1.14**
273 **product**
274 system, subsystem or component that is manufactured, developed or refined for use by other
275 products

276 Note 1 to entry: The processes required by the practices defined in this document apply iteratively to all levels of
277 product design (for example, from the system level to the component level).

278 **3.1.15**
279 **product supplier**
280 manufacturer of hardware and/or software product

281 Note 1 to entry: Used in place of the generic word vendor to provide differentiation.

282 **3.1.16**
283 **profile**
284 named combination of options, chosen according to a specified framework, that are necessary
285 to accomplish a particular function

286 Note 1 to entry: The options can be chosen from one or several documents or subdivisions of documents.

287 **3.1.17**
288 **remote access**
289 access to a control system through an external interface of the control system

290 Note 1 to entry: Examples of applications that support remote access include RDP, OPC, and Syslog.
<https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/1524a74e-ff93-4209-a09a->

291 Note 2 to entry: In general, remote access applications and the Automation Solution will reside in different security
292 zones as determined by the asset owner. See IEC 62443-3-2 for the application of zones and conduits to the
293 Automation Solution by the asset owner.

294 **3.1.18**
295 **safety instrumented system**
296 system used to implement functional safety

297 Note 1 to entry: See IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 for more information on functional safety.

298 Note 2 to entry: Not all industry sectors use this term. This term is not restricted to any specific industry sector, and
299 it is used generically to refer to systems that enforce functional safety. Other equivalent terms include safety systems
300 and safety related systems.

301 **3.1.19**
302 **security compromise**
303 violation of the security of a system such that an unauthorized (1) disclosure or modification of
304 information or (2) denial of service may have occurred

305 Note 1 to entry: A security compromise represents a breach of the security of a system or an infraction of its security
306 policies. It is independent of impact or potential impact to the system.

307 **3.1.20**
308 **security incident**
309 security compromise that is of some significance to the asset owner or failed attempt to
310 compromise the system whose result could have been of some significance to the asset owner

311 Note 1 to entry: The term “of some significance” is relative to the environment in which the security compromise is
 312 detected. For example, the same compromise may be declared as a security incident in one environment and not in
 313 another. Triage activities are often used by asset owners to evaluate security compromises and identify those that
 314 are significant enough to be considered incidents.

315 Note 2 to entry: In some environments, failed attempts to compromise the system, such as failed login attempts,
 316 are considered significant enough to be classified as security incidents.

317 3.1.21

318 **security patch**

319 software patch that is relevant to the security of a software component

320 Note 1 to entry: For the purpose of this definition, firmware is considered software.

321 Note 2 to entry: Software patches may address known or potential vulnerabilities, or simply improve the security of
 322 the software component, including its reliable operation.

323 3.1.22

324 **security program**

325 portfolio of security services, including integration services and maintenance services, and their
 326 associated policies, procedures, and products that are applicable to the IACS

327 Note 1 to entry: The security program for IACS service providers refers to the policies and procedures defined by
 328 them to address security concerns of the IACS.

329 3.1.23

330 **service provider**

331 role of an organization (internal or external organization, manufacturer, etc.) that provides a
 332 specific support service and associated supplies in accordance with an agreement with the
 333 asset owner

334 Note 1 to entry: This term is used in place of the generic word “vendor” to provide differentiation.

335 3.1.24

336 **subcontractor**

337 service provider under contract to the integration or maintenance service provider or to another
 338 subcontractor that is directly or indirectly under contract to the integration or maintenance
 339 service provider

340 3.1.25

341 **system**

342 interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a complex whole

343 Note 1 to entry: A system may be packaged as a product.

344 Note 2 to entry: In practice, the interpretation of its meaning is frequently clarified by the use of an adjective, such
 345 as control system. In the context of a control system, the elements are largely hardware and software elements.

346 3.1.26

347 **verify**

348 check that the specified requirement was met

349 3.1.27

350 **vulnerability**

351 flaw or weakness in the design, implementation, or operation and management of a component
 352 that can be exploited to cause a security compromise

353 Note 1 to entry: Security policies typically include policies to protect confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
 354 system assets.

355 3.2 Abbreviations

356 AES_GCM Advanced Encryption Standard Galois/Counter Mode

357 BPCS Basic Process Control System

358	BR	Base Requirement
359	CEF	Common Event Format
360	DCS	Distributed Control System
361	EWS	Engineering Workstation
362	IACS	Industrial Automation and Control System
363	RE	Requirement Enhancement
364	RDP	Remote Desktop Protocol
365	RFC	Request For Comment
366	RFQ	Request For Quote
367	SCADA	Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
368	SIEM	Security Information and Event Management
369	SIF	Safety Instrumented Function
370	SIL	Safety Integrity Level
371	SIS	Safety Instrumented System
372	SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
373	SOW	Statement Of Work
374	SSID	Service Set Identifier
375	SP	Security Program
376	TR	Technical Report
377	VPN	Virtual Private Network

378 **4 Concepts**

379 **4.1 Use of IEC 62443-2-4**

380 **4.1.1 Use of IEC 62443-2-4 by service providers**

381 “Service provider” and “asset owner” are terms that represent roles of an organization. While
382 they can be in the same organization, they are typically in separate organizations, with the
383 service provider under contract to the asset owner’s organization.

384 This part of the IEC 62443 series defines a single set of requirements for security-related
385 processes to be supported by security programs of both integration and maintenance service
386 providers (see 4.1.5 and 4.1.6). Although implementation of these requirements by integration
387 and maintenance service providers can be different, the requirements apply equally to both.
388 Support for these requirements means that the service provider can provide them to the asset
389 owner upon request.

390 The terms and conditions for providing these capabilities are beyond the scope of this standard.
391 In addition, IEC 62443-2-4 can be used by these service providers to structure and improve
392 their security programs.

393 In addition, service providers can use IEC 62443-3-3 and IEC 62443-4-2 in conjunction with
394 IEC 62443-2-4 to work with suppliers of underlying control systems/components. This
395 collaboration can assist the service provider in developing policies and procedures around a
396 capability of a system/component, e.g. backup and restore based on the recommendations from
397 the suppliers of the systems/components used.

398 NOTE IACS is a generic expression used to describe an industrial automation and control systems (based on the
399 definition taken from IEC 62443-1-1), that can be extended to other automation vertical industries. For example:
400 Substation Automation Solutions, smart grid, distributed grid, medical device manufacturing, building automation
401 systems, elevators, and escalators.

402 The security programs implementing these requirements are expected to be independent of
 403 different releases of the control system that is embedded in the Automation Solution. That is a
 404 new release of the control system product does not necessarily require a change to the service
 405 provider's security program. However, changes to the security program will be required when
 406 changes to the underlying control system make the existing security program deficient with
 407 respect to these IEC 62443-2-4 requirements.

408 EXAMPLE 1 A service provider may have experience with a specific control system line of products. Developing
 409 policies and procedures for that line of products will be based on the recommendations of the product supplier and
 410 the capabilities of the product line. Therefore, when the product capabilities for backup and restore are changed, the
 411 corresponding capabilities of the service provider's security program (corresponding to SP.12.XX) may have to be
 412 changed to remain consistent with the updated product capabilities. On the other hand, the service provider's policies
 413 and procedures around non-disclosure agreements or personnel background checks (corresponding to SP.01.03 and
 414 SP.01.04) and are very likely independent of the control system product used in the Automation Solution.

415 This collaboration can also be used to improve security in these systems/components. First,
 416 the service provider can recommend new or updated security features to the system/component
 417 supplier. Second, the service provider can gain knowledge about the system/component that
 418 allows it to add its own compensating security measures to the Automation Solution during
 419 deployment or maintenance.

420 The requirements are specified in Annex A, and are defined in terms of the capabilities that
 421 these security programs are required to provide. Clause 4.1.4 discusses the ability of industry
 422 groups to subset these capabilities into profiles to address risk reduction. See IEC 62443-3-2
 423 for more detail on security risks.

424 IEC 62443-2-4 also recognizes that security programs evolve and that capabilities go through
 425 a lifecycle of their own, often starting as completely manual and evolving over time to become
 426 more formal, more consistent, and more effective. Clause 4.2 addresses this issue of evolving
 427 capabilities by defining a maturity model to be used with the application of this standard.

428 EXAMPLE 2 A specific capability might be introduced as a set of manual procedures and then later supplemented
 429 with automated tools.

430 As a result, the requirements in Annex A are stated abstractly, allowing for a wide range of
 431 implementations. Integration service provider security program processes that meet these
 432 requirements are used during the deployment, configuration, handover, and commissioning of
 433 the Automation Solution, while maintenance service providers security program processes are
 434 used to update and maintain the security of the Automation Solution once it becomes
 435 operational.

436 It is expected that service providers and asset owners will negotiate and agree on which of
 437 these required processes are to be provided and how they are to be provided. These aspects
 438 of fulfilling the requirements are beyond the scope of IEC 62443-2-4, although the use of
 439 profiles that are accepted by the asset owner and the service provider could make this easier.

440 EXAMPLE 3 A service provider capable of supporting complex passwords has to be capable of supporting specific
 441 variations of complex passwords as defined by the password policies of asset owners.

442 EXAMPLE 4 Many capabilities have a timeliness aspect related to their performance. What is considered timely
 443 should be agreed to by both the asset owner and the service provider.

444 4.1.2 Use of IEC 62443-2-4 by asset owners

445 IEC 62443-2-4 can be used by asset owners to request specific security capabilities from the
 446 service provider. More specifically, prior to such a request, IEC 62443-2-4 can be used by asset
 447 owners to determine whether or not a specific service provider's security program includes the
 448 capabilities that the asset owner needs.

449 In general, IEC 62443-2-4 recognizes that asset owner requirements vary, so it has been written
 450 to encourage service providers to implement the required capabilities so that they can be
 451 adaptable to a wide variety of asset owners. For example, the asset owner can evaluate whether