



SLOVENSKI STANDARD
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Splošne varnostne zahteve za radijsko opremo - 1. del: Radijska oprema, povezana z internetom

Common security requirements for radio equipment - Part 1: Internet connected radio equipment

Gemeinsame Sicherheitsanforderungen für mit dem Internet verbundene Funkanlagen

Exigences de sécurité communes applicables aux équipements radioélectriques connectés à l'internet

Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: prEN 18031-1

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ICS:

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Common security requirements for radio equipment - Part 1: Internet connected radio equipment

Exigences de sécurité communes applicables aux
équipements radioélectriques connectés à l'internet

Gemeinsame Sicherheitsanforderungen für mit dem
Internet verbundene Funkanlagen

This draft European Standard is submitted to CEN members for enquiry. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/CLC/JTC 13.

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prEN 18031-1:2023 (E)91 **European foreword**

92 This document (prEN 18031-1:2023) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/CENELEC JTC
93 13/WG 8 “Special Working Group RED Standardization Request”, the secretariat of which is held by NEN.

94 This document is currently submitted to the CEN Enquiry.

95 This document has been prepared under a mandate given to CEN/CENELEC by the European Commission
96 and the European Free Trade Association and supports essential requirements of EU Directive(s) /
97 Regulation(s).

98 For relationship with EU Directive(s) / Regulation(s), see informative Annex ZA, which is an integral part
99 of this document.

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100 **Introduction**

101 It is important to note that in order to achieve the overall cybersecurity of radio equipment, defence in
102 depth best practices will be needed. In particular, no one single measure will suffice to achieve the given
103 objectives, indeed achieving even a single security objective will usually require a suite of mechanisms
104 and measures. Throughout this document, the guidance material includes lists of examples. These lists
105 must be read only as indicative possibilities: there are other possibilities that are not listed, and even
106 using the examples given will not be sufficient unless the mechanisms and measures chosen are
107 implemented in a coordinated fashion.

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prEN 18031-1:2023 (E)**1 Scope**

This document specifies common security requirements for internet-connected radio equipment. This document provides technical specifications for radio equipment, which concerns electrical or electronic products that are capable to communicate over the internet, regardless of whether these products communicate directly or via any other equipment.

2 Normative references

There are no normative references in this document.

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- IEC Electropedia: available at <https://www.electropedia.org/>
- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <https://www.iso.org/obp/>

3.1 access control mechanism

equipment functionality to grant, restrict or deny access to specific *equipment's* resources

Note 1 to entry: Access to specific equipment's resources can amongst others be:

- reading specific data; or
- writing specific data to equipment's persistent storage; or
- performing a specific equipment functionality such as recording audio.

3.2 authentication

provision of assurance that an *entity* is who or what it claims to be

3.3 authentication mechanism

equipment functionality to verify that an *entity* is who or what it claims to be

Note 1 to entry: An entity can amongst others claim to be:

- a specific human, owner of a user account, device, or service; or
- a member of specific groups such as an authorized group to access a specific equipment's resource; or
- authorized by another entity to access a specific equipment's resource.

Note 2 to entry: Typically, the verification is based on examining evidence from one or more elements of the categories:

- knowledge; and
- possession; and
- inherence.

- 142 **3.4**
143 **authenticator**
144 means used to validate the claim of an *entity*
- 145 EXAMPLE: A password or token may be used as an authenticator.
- 146 **3.5**
147 **best practice**
148 measures that have been shown to provide appropriate security for the corresponding use case
- 149 **3.6**
150 **brute force attack**
151 method based on trial-and-error to guess the right *authenticator*
- 152 **3.7**
153 **communication mechanism**
154 *equipment* functionality that allows communication via a device *interface*
- 155 **3.8**
156 **confidential security parameters**
157 secret security related information whose modification or disclosure can compromise the security of an
158 asset
- 159 **3.9**
160 **denial of service (DoS)**
161 prevention or interruption of authorized access to an equipment resource or the delaying of equipment
162 operations and functions
- 163 [SOURCE : IEC 62443-1-1 :2019, 3.2.42] modified
- 164 **3.10**
165 **entity**
166 user, device or service
- 167 **3.11**
168 **equipment**
169 **radio equipment**
170 electrical or electronic product, which intentionally emits and/or receives radio waves for the purpose
171 of radio communication and/or radio determination, or an electrical or electronic product which must be
172 completed with an accessory, such as an antenna, to intentionally emit and/or receive radio waves for
173 the purpose of radio communication and/or radio determination
- 174 [SOURCE: Directive 2014/53/EU, article 2.1(1)]
- 175 **3.12**
176 **external interface**
177 *interface* on the *equipment* that is accessible from outside the *equipment*

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178 **3.13**
 179 **factory default state**
 180 defined state where the configuration settings and configuration of the equipment is set to initial values
 181 typically set when it leaves the manufacturing factory

182 Note 1 to entry: a factory default state may include security updates, installed after the equipment being placed on
 183 the market.

184 **3.14**
 185 **initialization**
 186 process that configures the network connectivity of the *equipment* for operation

187 Note 1 to entry: Initialization may provide the possibility to configure authentication features for a user or for
 188 network access

189 **3.15**
 190 **interface**
 191 shared boundary across which *entities* exchange information

192 **3.16**
 193 **legacy**
 194 *equipment*, software/hardware component, cryptography or communication protocol that cannot be
 195 protected against current cybersecurity threats without mitigating measures

196 **3.17**
 197 **machine interface**
 198 *external interface* between the *equipment* and a service or device

199 **3.18**
 200 **network equipment**
 201 *equipment* that exchanges data between different networks

202 **3.19**
 203 **network asset**
 204 *network functions*, or *network functions configuration* stored at the *equipment*, or *sensitive security*
 205 *parameter* stored at the *equipment* for access to network resources

206 **3.20**
 207 **network function**
 208 *equipment's* functionality to access network resources

209 **3.21**
 210 **network functions configuration**
 211 data that defines the behaviour of the *equipment's network functions*

212 **3.22**
 213 **network interface**
 214 *external interface* enabling the *equipment* to have or provide access to a network

215 Note 1 to entry: Examples for network interfaces are a LAN port (wired) or a wireless network interface enabling
 216 WLAN or Bluetooth communication, e.g., using a 2.4 GHz antenna.

- 217 **3.23**
 218 **operational state**
 219 state in which the *equipment* is functioning normally providing its intended use and within its intended
 220 operational environment of use
- 221 **3.24**
 222 **optional services**
 223 services which are not necessary to setup the *equipment*, and which are not part of the basic functionality
 224 but are still relevant for the intended use of the *equipment* and are delivered as part of the factory default.
 225 Example: an SSH service on the equipment is not required for basic functionality of the equipment, but it may be
 226 used to allow a remote access to the equipment
- 227 **3.25**
 228 **password**
 229 sequence of characters (letters, numbers, or other symbols) used to authenticate an *entity*
 230 Note: personal identification numbers (PINs) are also considered a form of password
- 231 **3.26**
 232 **public security parameters**
 233 security related public information whose modification can compromise the security of an asset
- 234 **3.27**
 235 **resilient**
 236 able to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or
 237 compromises on systems that use or are enabled by cyber resources.
- 238 [SOURCE: NIST Glossary: https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/cyber_resiliency]
 (https://standards.iteh.ai)
- 239 **3.28**
 240 **risk**
 241 combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm
- 242 [SOURCE: ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014] [oSIST prEN 18031-1:2023](https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/01422ad1-c951-4969-9d8c-22970a29b7e8/osist-pren-18031-1-2023)
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- 243 **3.29**
 244 **security asset**
 245 *equipment's* security functionality that can directly affect the *equipment's* integrity, or *security relevant*
 246 *configuration* used by the *equipment* or, *sensitive security parameter* for *equipment's* integrity used by the
 247 *equipment*
- 248 **3.30**
 249 **security relevant configuration**
 250 data that affects the behaviour of the *equipment's* security functionality
- 251 **3.31**
 252 **sensitive security parameters**
 253 *confidential security parameter* for an asset or *public security parameter* for an asset
- 254 **3.32**
 255 **security update**
 256 software update that addresses security vulnerabilities through code patches or other mitigations

prEN 18031-1:2023 (E)**3.33****storage mechanism**

equipment functionality that allows to store information

3.34**update mechanism**

equipment functionality that allows to change *equipment's* software

3.35**user interface**

external interface between the *equipment* and a user

3.36**vulnerability**

weakness, design, or implementation error that can lead to an unexpected, undesirable event compromising the security of the *equipment*, network, application, or protocol involved.

[SOURCE: (ITSEC) (definition given by ENISA, "computer system" has been replaced by "equipment")]

4 Application of this standard

This standard uses the concept of mechanism to instruct the user of this standard when to apply certain security measures. Mechanisms address the applicability and appropriateness through a set of requirements including assessment criteria. The pass/fail decision is made for each of the items specified, for example when checking the applicability of a requirement on external interfaces, then the decision whether the requirement and all further requirements need to be fulfilled is determined for each external interface independently.

The mechanisms are documented using the following structure and how to apply them:

Table 1

Clause #	Title	Description on how to apply the standard
5.x	XXX Mechanism	Mechanism for each specific item (e.g., external interface or security asset)
5.x.1	XXX-1 Applicability of mechanisms	Applicability of the mechanism
5.x.1.1	Requirement	For each specific item determine and assess if the mechanism is required. Note: A mechanism might combine applicability and appropriateness in a single requirement.
5.x.1.2	Rationale	
5.x.1.3	Guidance	
5.x.1.4	Assessment criteria	
5.x.1.4.1	Assessment objective	
5.x.1.4.2	Required information	
5.x.1.4.3	Conceptual assessment	
5.x.1.4.4	Functional completeness assessment	
5.x.1.4.5	Functional sufficiency assessment	
5.x.2	XXX-2 Appropriate mechanisms	Appropriateness of the mechanism
5.x.2.1	Requirement	

Clause #	Title	Description on how to apply the standard
5.x.2.2	Rationale	For each specific item for which the mechanism is required as determined by XXX-1, determine and assess if the mechanism is implemented sufficiently. Note: A mechanism might have multiple appropriateness sub-clauses to focus on specific properties.
5.x.2.3	Guidance	
5.x.2.4	Assessment criteria	
5.x.2.4.1	Assessment objective	
5.x.2.4.2	Required information	
5.x.2.4.3	Conceptual assessment	
5.x.2.4.4	Functional completeness assessment	
5.x.2.4.5	Functional sufficiency assessment	
5.x.y	XXX-# Supporting Requirements	Applicability and appropriateness of supporting requirements for the mechanism
5.x.y.1	Requirement	For each specific item for which the mechanism is required as determined by XXX-1, determine and assess if the supporting requirement needs to be implemented (there might be specific conditions, for instance if the equipment is a toy) and if it needs to be implemented, whether it is implemented sufficiently.
5.x.y.2	Rationale	
5.x.y.3	Guidance	
5.x.y.4	Assessment criteria	
5.x.y.4.1	Assessment objective	
5.x.y.4.2	Required information	
5.x.y.4.3	Conceptual assessment	
5.x.y.4.4	Functional completeness assessment	
5.x.y.4.5	Functional sufficiency assessment	

280 The assessments are conducted by examining the documented assessment cases, not all assessment cases
281 might be provided for every mechanism:

282 — Conceptual assessment

283 Examine if the provided documentation and rationale adequately provides the required evidence
284 (for example the rationale why a mechanism is not applicable for a specific network interface).

285 — Functional completeness assessment

286 Examine and test if the provided documentation is complete (for example use network scanners
287 to verify that all external interfaces are properly identified, documented and assessed)

288 — Functional sufficiency assessment

289 Examine and test if the implementation is adequate (for example run fuzzing tools on a network
290 interface to check if it is resilient to attacks with malformed data)

291 Each of the assessments is further divided into the following sub-clauses which might use a decision tree
292 to guide the assessment:

293 — Assessment purpose

294 — Preconditions

295 — Assessment units

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296 — Assignment of verdict

297 Required information lists the information that is to be provided through technical documentation. The
298 standard does not require each required information element to be provided as a separate document.

299 5 Requirements**300 5.1 [ACM] Access control mechanism****301 5.1.1 [ACM-1] Applicability of access control mechanisms****302 5.1.1.1 Requirement**

303 The equipment shall use access control mechanisms to manage entities access to security assets and
304 network assets, unless for security or network assets where:

- 305 — Its full public accessibility is the “equipment’s reasonably foreseeable and intended use”; or
- 306 — the “foreseeable and intended operational environment of use” ensures that its accessibility is
307 limited to authorized entities.

308 5.1.1.2 Rationale

309 Security and network assets are exposed to unauthorized access attempts. Access control mechanisms
310 limit the ability of any unauthorized entity to access these assets.

311 5.1.1.3 Guidance

312 The requirement does not demand access control mechanisms on assets that it does not cover (for
313 example, the dispense button on a coffee machine). Further it does not demand access control
314 mechanisms for assets that are in principle covered, but where the reasonably foreseeable and intended
315 use is to be generally accessible by the public or where the foreseeable and intended operational
316 environment of use ensures that only authorized access is possible.

317 Note that radio interfaces might be accessible even if the equipment is in a trusted environment, for
318 instance a wireless network is often accessible from outside a user’s home.

319 For example, depending on the equipment’s technical properties, foreseeable and intended use and
320 foreseeable and intended operational environment of use access control mechanisms might not be
321 necessary for relevant assets where:

- 322 — all entities with access to the equipment (the equipment is intended to be operated in an area
323 which has physical access control) are authorized to access these assets (for example, the WPS
324 button on a home router);
- 325 — the equipment’s functionality only provides information (on assets) that is intended to be publicly
326 accessible (for instance broadcasting Bluetooth advertising beacons).

327 Access control mechanisms need properties to tie access rights to. Such properties can amongst others
328 be:

- 329 — verified claims of entities (for instance being owner of a user account, member of specific group,
330 authorized by another entity);
- 331 — certain states of the equipment or the equipment’s environment (for instance an electronic flight
332 bag might have different access rights for a local user when it is operated in the air, then when it
333 is stored at the ground);