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Ships and marine technology — Assessment of onboard cyber safety

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Style Definition: Quote: Font color: Text 1

Style Definition: Smart Hyperlink1

Style Definition: Subtle Emphasis1: Font color: Text 1

Style Definition: Subtle Reference1: Font color: Text 1

Style Definition: Unresolved Mention1

Style Definition

Style Definition

Style Definition: ISO_Secret_Observations

Contents   Page

ISO/DIS 23799:2023(E)

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This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 8, *Ships and marine technology*.

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Introduction

With the development of digitalization, intelligence and the networking of ships, an increasing number of control systems, communication and navigation systems, information management systems and equipment are constantly connected to the ship network to ~~achieve~~access external information ~~interaction~~. The hidden danger of shipborne equipment suffering from network threats is growing. Network security risk assessment uses scientific methods and means to systematically ~~analyze~~analyse the threats faced by ship borne systems and their existing vulnerabilities,~~-~~ assess the degree of harm that can be caused once the security time occurs, propose targeted countermeasures and measures, and control the risks at an acceptable level.

Based on the urgent need to enhance the awareness of network risk threats, this document brings together content from IEC 31010:2019, MSC-FAL.1/Circ 3. IACS Rec.171, IACS UR E26 and UR E27, to provide the elements of shipboard network security risk assessment and the basic criteria for assessment process, assessment preparation, security risk identification, security risk analysis and security risk assessment. ~~As a~~The recommended method of shipboard network security risk assessment~~,~~ which is specified in this document can help improve the ship's network security defence capability, and provide ~~the following~~ assistance to ~~the following~~ stakeholders, including:

a)   identifying onboard network security risks;

b)   evaluating ~~according to~~ the consequences and possibility of shipboard network security risks;

~~c)   establishing the priority of~~c) prioritizing shipboard network security risk disposal.

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Ships and marine technology — Assessment of onboard cyber safety

1 Scope

This document establishes the elements of onboard cyber risk assessment and ~~the~~specifies requirements for the assessment process, assessment preparation, risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation.

This document applies to the risk assessment of onboard cyber systems based on network technologies which mainly include bridge systems, cargo management systems, propulsion and machinery management and power control systems, access control systems, passenger or visitor servicing and management systems, passenger-facing networks, core infrastructure systems, administrative and crew welfare systems~~,~~ and communication systems.

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO 31000, *Risk management — Guidelines*

IEC 31010, *Risk management — Risk assessment techniques*

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

— ISO Online browsing platform: available at ~~https://www.iso.org/obp~~https://www.iso.org/obp

— IEC Electropedia: available at ~~https://www.electropedia.org/~~https://www.electropedia.org/

3.1
onboard cyber safety
situation where the hardware and software of the shipboard network system and the data in the system are protected from damage, alteration and leakage due to accidental or malicious reasons, and the system operates continuously, reliably and normally without interruption of network services

3.2
onboard cyber risk
combination of the likelihood and impact loss of a security incident

Note 1 to entry: In the onboard network system, damage can be caused to assets by taking advantage of the vulnerabilities that exist in the system and by adopting specific means to attack the onboard network so that the information in the onboard network is leaked, and the network functions are missing.

3.3
onboard cyber risk assessment

entire process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation

Note 1 to entry: An onboard cyber risk assessment is performed by establishing the value of information assets; identifying the existence (or potential existence) of applicable threats and vulnerabilities, existing controls and their impact on the identified risks; and determining potential consequences. Finally, derive risks are prioritized and ranked against the risk assessment guidelines in the environment creation.

3.4
onboard cyber risk identification
process of discovering, enumerating and describing the elements of *onboard cyber risks* (3.2)

Note 1 to entry: ~~Identifying~~This involves identifying risk sources, the scope of impact, incidents and their causes and potential consequences that can have an impact on the ship's voyage. This helps to determine what can occur in onboard cyber systems that will result in potential loss, and also gives insight into how (threat identification), where (asset identification), and why (vulnerability identification, existing control measures identification) the potential loss will occur.

3.5
onboard cyber risk analysis
analysis of the likelihood and impact loss of consequences for the security incident onboard

3.6
onboard cyber risk evaluation
risk metrics for accident scenarios encountered by the ship to assess the risk level of the accident situation

3.7
onboard cyber asset
existing resources that are valuable to the system onboard

3.8
onboard cyber threat
potential causes of damage to the shipboard network system or environmental factors causing damage to the shipboard network

3.9
onboard cyber security incident
events that have an actual or potential negative impact on shipboard systems, networks and computers or the information they process, store, or transmit, and that require response measures to eliminate their consequences

3.10
impact loss of consequences of incident scenarios
damage caused by a security event to the software, hardware, functions and data of the onboard system, resulting in interruption of system operations

Note 1 to entry: The severity of such loss depends primarily on the cost of restoring the system to normal operation and eliminating the negative impact of the security incident.

4 Elements and process of risk assessment

4.1 Relationship of elements

The basic elements of risk assessment include assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and security measures. The relationship of the basic elements is shown in Figure 1.


Figure 1 — Relationships of risk assessment elements

The core of the risk element is the asset, but assets are vulnerable. Security measures are used to make it more difficult for asset vulnerabilities to be exploited, to defend against external threats, and to achieve asset protection. Threats cause risk by exploiting vulnerabilities created by assets. When a risk is transformed into aan onboard cyber security incident, it has an impact on the operational status of the asset.

4.2 Process of risk assessment

Onboard cyber risk assessment shall comply with ISO 31000 and IEC 31010, which includes four processes: assessment preparation, risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation (see Figure 2).