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**Informacijska varnost, kibernetika varnost in varovanje zasebnosti - Merila za vrednotenje varnosti IT - 3. del: Komponente za zagotavljanje varnosti (ISO/IEC DIS 15408-3:2024)**

Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection - Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 3: Security assurance components (ISO/IEC DIS 15408-3:2024)

Informationssicherheit, Cybersicherheit und Schutz der Privatsphäre - Evaluationskriterien für IT-Sicherheit - Teil 3: Komponenten für die Vertrauenswürdigkeit der Sicherheit  
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Sécurité de l'information, cybersécurité et protection de la vie privée - Critères d'évaluation pour la sécurité des technologies de l'information - Partie 3: Composants d'assurance de sécurité (ISO/IEC DIS 15408-3:2024)

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### Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security —

#### Part 3: Security assurance components

*Sécurité de l'information, cybersécurité et protection de la vie  
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de l'information —*

*Partie 3: Composants d'assurance de sécurité*

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This document was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection*.

This fifth edition cancels and replaces the fourth edition (ISO 15408-3:2022), which has been technically revised.

The main changes are as follows: [oSIST prEN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2024](https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/ac5d4fef-c586-4b30-99b7-544ae8be70fc/osist-pren-iso-iec-15408-3-2024)

- the terminology has been reviewed and updated;
- a missing developer action element has been added (ADV\_SPM.1.7D).

A list of all parts in the ISO 15408 series can be found on the ISO website.

The catalogue of security assurance requirements defined in this document is provided in machine readable format (XML) at: <https://standards.iso.org/iso-iec/TBD>.

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## ISO/IEC DIS 15408-3:2024(en)

### Introduction

Security assurance components, as defined in this document, are the basis for the security assurance requirements expressed in a Security Assurance Package, Protection Profile (PP), a PP-Module, a PP-Configuration, or a Security Target (ST).

These requirements establish a standard way of expressing the assurance requirements for TOEs. This document catalogues the set of assurance components, families and classes. It also defines evaluation criteria for PPs, PP-Configurations, PP-Modules, and STs.

The audience for this document includes consumers, developers, technical working groups, evaluators of secure IT products and others. ISO/IEC 15408-1 provides additional information on the target audience of the ISO/IEC 15408 series, and on the use of the ISO/IEC 15408 series by the groups that comprise the target audience. These groups may use this document as follows:

- Consumers, who use this document when selecting components to express assurance requirements to satisfy the security objectives expressed in a PP or ST, determining required levels of security assurance of the TOE.
- Developers, who respond to actual or perceived consumer security requirements in constructing a TOE, reference this document when interpreting statements of assurance requirements and determining assurance approaches of TOEs.
- Evaluators, who use the assurance requirements defined in this document as a mandatory statement of evaluation criteria when determining the assurance of TOEs and when evaluating PPs and STs.

NOTE 1 This document uses bold type to highlight hierarchical relationships between requirements. This convention calls for the use of bold type for all new requirements.

NOTE 2 For security assurance requirements, special verbs relating to mandatory evaluation activities are presented in bold italic type.

## Document Preview

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