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**Financial services — Code-scanning payment security**

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**ISO/PRF 5201:2024(en)**

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This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 68, *Financial services*, Subcommittee SC 2, *Financial Services, security*.

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## Introduction

Code-scanning payment is a type of mobile payment service in which the payer uses a mobile device to present a payment code image to a payee for scanning or scans a payment code image presented by the payee.

This document focuses on the security aspects of code-scanning payment. This document is structured according to a risk-based analysis approach as specified in ISO 31000 and ISO/IEC 27005.

[Clause 5](#) sets up the scope and context of the security analysis by giving an overview of code-scanning payment. The basic framework is defined and the major roles are described. Some basic steps are mandatory for these types of payment services, but there are many variations in practice because flexibility is one of the major benefits of code-scanning payment. Various implementations can be roughly classified into two categories: payer-presented mode and payee-presented mode. The risk assessment (see [Clause 7](#)) and security requirements and guidelines (see [Clause 8](#)) are based on these two implementation modes.

[Clause 6](#) clarifies the security target objectives.

[Clause 7](#) is the risk assessment of code-scanning payment. Security risks are identified and categorized according to the implementation modes.

[Clause 8](#) presents the security principles, requirements and guidelines on how to impose countermeasures to control (mitigate or reduce) the risks identified in [Clause 7](#). Minimum security requirements are the security baseline for all code-scanning payment service providers. Security guidelines are categorized by implementation modes, which are the best practices recommended for the code-scanning payment service providers.

[Annex A](#) provides more details of the two implementation modes described in [Clause 5](#), including the payment transaction processes and payment code examples.

[Annex B](#) provides more details to support the risk assessment in [Clause 7](#).

[Annex C](#) provides common requirements on the approved algorithms and mechanisms for any cryptographic security measures used for code-scanning payment as defined in [Clause 8](#).





# Financial services — Code-scanning payment security

## 1 Scope

This document provides an overview, risk assessment, minimum security requirements and extended security guidelines for code-scanning payment in which the payer uses a mobile device to operate the payment transaction.

This document is applicable to cases where the payment code is used to initiate a mobile payment and presented by either the payer or the payee.

The following is excluded from the scope of this document:

- details of payer and payee onboarding;
- details of the supporting payment infrastructure, as described in [5.1](#).

## 2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO 11568, *Financial services — Key management (retail)*

ISO 16609, *Financial services — Requirements for message authentication using symmetric techniques*

ISO 19092, *Financial services — Biometrics — Security framework*

ISO 20038, *Banking and related financial services — Key wrap using AES*

ISO/IEC 9796 (all parts), *Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signature schemes giving message recovery*

ISO/IEC 9797 (all parts), *Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs)*

ISO/IEC 10118-1:2016/Amd 1:2021, *Information technology — Security techniques — Hash-functions — Part 1: General*

ISO/IEC 10118-3, *Information technology — Security techniques — Hash-functions — Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions*

ISO/IEC 14888 (all parts), *Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signatures with appendix*

ISO/IEC 18031, *Information technology — Security techniques — Random bit generation*

ISO/IEC 18033 (all parts), *Information security — Security techniques — Encryption algorithms*

ISO/IEC 19772, *Information security — Authenticated encryption*

NIST/FIPS PUB 202, *SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions*

### 3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <https://www.iso.org/obp>
- IEC Electropedia: available at <https://www.electropedia.org/>

#### 3.1

##### **code image**

symbolization of string constructed according to a defined format

EXAMPLE Code 128 as defined in ISO/IEC 15417 and QR code as defined in ISO/IEC 18004.

#### 3.2

##### **code-scanning**

recognize and reveal the content of a *code image* (3.1)

Note 1 to entry: Not including interpretation of the code content.

#### 3.3

##### **code-scanning payment**

*payment transaction* (3.10) initiated by *code-scanning* (3.2)

#### 3.4

##### **code service provider**

##### **CSP**

logical role that manages the *payment code* (3.12) for the *payer* (3.9) or the *payee* (3.8), including generating, distributing and (optionally) resolving

Note 1 to entry: The responsibility of this logical role can be split between several physical entities.

#### 3.5

##### **eavesdropping**

unauthorized interception and interpretation of information-bearing emanations

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18013-3:2017, 3.5]

#### 3.6

##### **mobile device**

device that utilizes communication networks while in motion

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 24771:2014, 3.1.17]

#### 3.7

##### **mobile payment**

*payment* (3.10) involving a *mobile device* (3.6) and using a *payment instrument* (3.13) and associated infrastructures

[SOURCE: ISO 12812-1:2017, 3.29]

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### 3.8

#### **payee**

person or legal entity who is the intended recipient of funds which have been the subject of a *payment transaction* (3.10)

[SOURCE: ISO 12812-1:2017, 3.38]

### 3.9

#### **payer**

person or legal entity who authorizes a *payment transaction* (3.10)

Note 1 to entry: The payer can be a *payment service provider* (3.15).

[SOURCE: ISO 12812-1:2017, 3.39, modified —Note to entry added.]

### 3.10

#### **payment**

#### **payment transaction**

act of placing, transferring or withdrawing funds, irrespective of any underlying obligations between the *payer* (3.9) and the *payee* (3.8)

[SOURCE: ISO 12812-1:2017, 3.40]

### 3.11

#### **payment application**

application resident in the *payer's* (3.9) *mobile device* (3.6) which offers payment functionality

### 3.12

#### **payment code**

data string constructed according to a defined format or retrieved from a *code image* (3.1) used for the purpose of making *payments* (3.10)

Note 1 to entry: The symbolized form of a payment code is called a "payment code image". 5201

EXAMPLE The payment code to represent an account or an order. <https://standards.iteh.ai/iso/da4eccae-ea4f-4c5c-85a0-732148f58b37/iso-prf-5201>

### 3.13

#### **payment instrument**

personalized device and/or set of procedures agreed between the *payer* (3.9) and the institution and used by the payer in order to conduct a *payment transaction* (3.10)

EXAMPLE Credit transfer, card payment and electronic money.

[SOURCE: ISO 12812-1:2017, 3.43]

### 3.14

#### **payment scheme**

set of rules, practices, standards and/or implementation guidelines agreed between scheme participants for the functioning of payment services and which is separated from any infrastructure or payment system that supports its operation

[SOURCE: ISO 12812-1:2017, 3.44]

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### 3.15 payment service provider PSP

entity that provides payment services to a *payment service user* (3.16)

EXAMPLE Account servicing payment service provider (ASPSP), payment initiation service provider (PISP), acquirer.

### 3.16 payment service user PSU

natural person or legal entity making use of a payment service in the capacity of *payer* (3.9) or *payee* (3.8), or both

### 3.17 point of interaction POI

point at which *payer* (3.9) and *payee* (3.8) interact for the purpose of conducting a *payment transaction* (3.10)

EXAMPLE Point of sales (POS), vending machine, payment page on merchant website, quick response (QR) code on a poster, *mobile device* (3.6) of the merchant.

### 3.18 risk

qualitative or quantitative measure, or both, of possible harm to a specified asset in a given threat environment

Note 1 to entry: In the financial industry, assets include transaction financial value, payment systems integrity and information security and privacy.

### 3.19 risk assessment

systematic process of evaluating the potential *risks* (3.18) involved in a projected activity or undertaking

### 3.20 secure element SE

tamper-resistant platform in the *mobile device* (3.6) capable of securely hosting and executing applications and associated confidential and cryptographic data (e.g. key management)

[SOURCE: ISO 12812-1:2017, 3.50, modified — Example deleted.]

### 3.21 trusted execution environment TEE

aspect of the *mobile device* (3.6) comprising hardware and/or software which provides security services to the mobile device computing environment, protects data against general software attacks and isolates hardware and software security resources from the operating system

[SOURCE: ISO 12812-1:2017, 3.60]

## 4 Abbreviated terms

B2C business to customer  
IBAN international bank account number