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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

**LTE;**  
**Security of the Mission Critical (MC) service**  
**(3GPP TS 33.180 version 14.13.0 Release 14)**

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# Foreword

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# 1 Scope

The present document specifies the security architecture, procedures and information flows needed to protect the mission critical service (MCX). The architecture includes mechanisms to protect the Common Functional Architecture and security mechanisms for mission critical applications. This includes Push-To-Talk (MCPTT), Video (MCVideo) and Data (MCData). Additionally, security mechanisms relating to on-network use, off-network use, roaming, migration, interconnection, interworking and multiple security domains are described.

This specification complements the Common Functional Architecture defined in TS 23.280 [36], the functional architecture for MCPTT defined in 3GPP TS 23.379 [2], the functional architecture for MCVideo defined in 3GPP TS 23.281 [37] and the functional architecture for MCData defined in 3GPP TS 23.282 [38].

The MC service can be used for public safety applications and also for general commercial applications e.g. utility companies and railways. As the security model is based on the public safety environment, some MC security features may not be applicable for commercial purposes.

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# 2 References

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- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
- [2] 3GPP TS 23.379: "Functional architecture and information flows to support Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT); Stage 2".
- [3] 3GPP TS 22.179: "Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) over LTE; Stage 1".
- [4] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security".
- [5] 3GPP TS 33.310: "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)".
- [6] 3GPP TS 33.203: "3G security; Access security for IP-based services".
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- [39] 3GPP TS 23.002: "Network Architecture".
- [40] IETF RFC 2045: "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies".
- [41] IETF RFC 2392: "Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource Locators".
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- [43] IETF RFC 5116: "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption".

- [45] IETF RFC 7521: "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants".
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- [47] 3GPP TS 22.280: " Mission Critical Services Common Requirements; Stage 1".
- [48] Void.
- [49] 3GPP TS 24.379: "Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) call control; Protocol specification."
- [50] 3GPP TS 24.282: "Mission Critical Data (MCDData) signalling control; Protocol specification. "
- [51] IETF RFC 3711 Errata ID 3712, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid3712>.
- [52] IANA: "[Multimedia Internet KEYing \(MIKEY\) Payload Name Spaces](https://www.iana.org/assignments/mikey-payloads/mikey-payloads.xhtml)".

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## 3 Definitions and abbreviations

### 3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

**Authorised Identity:** An application identity given to an authorised user or network entity (e.g. MC Service ID) containing authorisation information.

**External KMS:** The KMS which is the root of trust for a specific External Security Domain.

**External Security Domain:** A security domain that the user is not a member of, but with which the user may communicate.

**Floor:** Floor(x) is the largest integer smaller than or equal to x.

**Home KMS:** The KMS that is the root of trust of the Home Security Domain.

**Home Security Domain:** The MCX user's primary security domain.

**Identity Management Domain:** The MC clients and MC functions that share an Identity Management Server (IdMS). To be specific, the MC clients request access tokens from the same primary IdMS, and the MC functions accept access tokens from this IdMS.

**KMS Certificate:** A certificate containing the security parameters for a security domain. This is required to support identity-based cryptography and differs from X.509 certificates used for traditional PKI. See Annex D.3.1 for details.

**KMS URI:** A unique identifier for a security domain, or equivalently, a logical KMS.

**MCX:** Mission critical services where "MCX" may be substituted with the term "MCPTT", "MCVideo", "MCDData", or any combination thereof.

**Partner domain:** A secondary MC domain which may support MC services for MC users who are home to a different MC domain. See also External Security Domain.

**Primary domain:** The "home" MC domain where MC users receive their primary identity management and MC services. See also Home Security Domain.

**Security Domain:** A security domain is a group of MCX users who share common security requirements and policies for their communications. From a technical perspective, users within a security domain share a KMS and KMS certificate. MCX users may be members of one or more security domains.

## 3.2 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

CMS	Configuration Management Server
CS	Crypto Session
CSB-ID	Crypto Session Bundle Identifier
CSC	Common Services Core
CSK	Client-Server Key
CSK-ID	Client-Server Key Identifier
GBA	Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
GMK	Group Master Key
GMK-ID	Group Master Key Identifier
GMS	Group Management Server
GUK-ID	Group User Key Identifier
IdM	Identity Management
IdMS	Identity Management Server
JSON	JavaScript Object Notation
JWS	JSON Web Signature
JWT	JSON Web Token
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KFC	Key For Control Signalling
KFC-ID	Key for Floor Control Identifier
KMS	Key Management Server
MBCP	Media Burst Control Protocol
MCData	Mission Critical Data
MCPTT	Mission Critical Push to Talk
MCVideo	Mission Critical Video
MCX	Mission Critical Services
MKFC	Multicast Key for Floor Control
MSCCK	MBMS subchannel control key
MSRP	Message Session Relay Protocol
MuSiK	Multicast Signalling Key
MKI	Master Key Identifier
NGMI	Next Generation Mobile Intelligence
NTP	Network Time Protocol
NTP-UTC	Network Time Protocol – Coordinated Universal Time
OIDC	OpenID Connect
PCK	Private Call Key
PCK-ID	Private Call Key Identifier
PKCE	Proof Key for Code Exchange
PSK	Pre-Shared Key
SEG	Security Gateway
SPK	Signalling Protection Key
SRTCP	Secure Real-Time Transport Control Protocol
SRTP	Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
SSRC	Synchronization Source
TBCP	Talk Burst Control Protocol
TGK	Traffic Generating Key
TrK	KMS Transport Key
UID	User Identifier for MIKEY-SAKKE (referred to as the 'Identifier' in RFC 6509 [11])
XPK	XML Protection Key

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## 4 Overview of Mission Critical Security

### 4.1 General

The mission critical security architecture defined in this document is designed to meet the security requirements defined in Annex A. The security architecture provides signalling and application plane security mechanisms to protect metadata and communications used as part of the MC service. The following signalling plane security mechanisms are used by the MC service:

- Protection of the signalling plane used by the MC Service, defined in clause 6.1 and 6.2.
- Protection of inter/intra domain interfaces, defined in clause 6.3.


The following application plane security mechanisms are used by the MC service:

- Authentication and authorisation of users to the MC Service, defined in clause 5.1.
- Protection of sensitive application signalling within the MC Service, defined in clause 9.
- Security of RTCP (e.g. floor control, transmission control) within the MC Service, defined in clause 9.
- Security of data signalling within the MCDATA Service, defined in clause 8.
- End-to-end security of user media within the MC Service. Defined in clause 7 for MCPTT and MCVideo services and defined in clause 8 for the MCDATA service.

Security mechanisms in the signalling and application plane are independent of each other, but may both be required for a secure MC system.

## 4.2 Signalling plane security architecture

Within a MC system, signalling plane security protects the interfaces used by the MC application. Figure 4.2-1 provides an overview of these interfaces.



**Figure 4.2-1: Signalling plane security architecture**

Signalling from the MC client is passed over both HTTP and SIP. The signalling plane security mechanisms for client to server interfaces and between network elements are defined in clause 6.

## 4.3 MC system security architecture

### 4.3.1 General

The MC system security architecture provides protection both between MC clients, between the MC client and the MC domain, and also between MC domains. MC system security on the client is bound to the MC user associated with the