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Foreword

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1 Scope

The present document specifies the security architecture, i.e., the security features and the security mechanisms for the 5G System and the 5G Core, and the security procedures performed within the 5G System including the 5G Core and the 5G New Radio.

2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

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- [2] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System".
- [3] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security".
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- [6] IETF RFC 4301: "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol".
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- [8] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System".
- [9] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G security; Security architecture".
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- [12] IETF RFC 5448: "Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA)".
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- [16] NIST Special Publication 800-38A (2001): "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation".
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- [33] 3GPP TS 38.474: "NG-RAN; F1 data transport".
- [34] 3GPP TS 38.413: "NG-RAN; NG Application Protocol (NGAP)".
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