



IEC 62061

Edition 2.2 2026-03

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

CONSOLIDATED VERSION

Safety of machinery - Functional safety of safety-related control systems

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD	7
INTRODUCTION	9
1 Scope	10
2 Normative references	11
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations	12
3.1 Alphabetical list of definitions	12
3.2 Terms and definitions	14
3.3 Abbreviations	27
4 Design process of an SCS and management of functional safety	27
4.1 Objective	27
4.2 Design process	28
4.3 Management of functional safety using a functional safety plan	30
4.4 Configuration management	32
4.5 Modification	32
5 Specification of a safety function	33
5.1 Objective	33
5.2 Safety requirements specification (SRS)	33
5.2.1 General	33
5.2.2 Information to be available	33
5.2.3 Functional requirements specification	34
5.2.4 Estimation of demand mode of operation	34
5.2.5 Safety integrity requirements specification	35
6 Design of an SCS	36
6.1 General	36
6.2 Subsystem architecture based on top down decomposition	36
6.3 Basic methodology – Use of subsystem	36
6.3.1 General	36
6.3.2 SCS decomposition	37
6.3.3 Sub-function allocation	38
6.3.4 Use of a pre-designed subsystem	38
6.4 Determination of safety integrity of the SCS	39
6.4.1 General	39
6.4.2 PFH	39
6.5 Requirements for systematic safety integrity of the SCS	40
6.5.1 Requirements for the avoidance of systematic hardware failures	40
6.5.2 Requirements for the control of systematic faults	41
6.6 Electromagnetic immunity	42
6.7 Software based manual parameterization	42
6.7.1 General	42
6.7.2 Influences on safety-related parameters	42
6.7.3 Requirements for software based manual parameterization	43
6.7.4 Verification of the parameterization tool	44
6.7.5 Performance of software based manual parameterization	44
6.8 Security aspects	44
6.9 Aspects of periodic testing	45
7 Design and development of a subsystem	45

7.1	General.....	45
7.2	Subsystem architecture design	46
7.3	Requirements for the selection and design of subsystem and subsystem elements.....	47
7.3.1	General	47
7.3.2	Systematic integrity	47
7.3.3	Fault consideration and fault exclusion	50
7.3.4	Failure rate of subsystem element	51
7.4	Architectural constraints of a subsystem	54
7.4.1	General	54
7.4.2	Estimation of safe failure fraction (<i>SFF</i>)	55
7.4.3	Behaviour (of the SCS) on detection of a fault in a subsystem	57
7.4.4	Realization of diagnostic functions.....	59
7.5	Subsystem design architectures.....	59
7.5.1	General	59
7.5.2	Basic subsystem architectures.....	60
7.5.3	Basic requirements	61
7.6	<i>PFH</i> of subsystems	62
7.6.1	General	62
7.6.2	Methods to estimate the <i>PFH</i> of a subsystem	62
7.6.3	Simplified approach to estimation of contribution of common cause failure (CCF).....	63
8	Software.....	63
8.1	General.....	63
8.2	Definition of software levels	63
8.3	Software – Level 1	64
8.3.1	Software safety lifecycle – SW level 1	64
8.3.2	Software design – SW level 1	65
8.3.3	Module design – SW level 1.....	67
8.3.4	Coding – SW level 1	68
8.3.5	Module test – SW level 1	68
8.3.6	Software testing – SW level 1	68
8.3.7	Documentation – SW level 1.....	69
8.3.8	Configuration and modification management process – SW level 1.....	69
8.4	Software level 2	70
8.4.1	Software safety lifecycle – SW level 2	70
8.4.2	Software design – SW level 2	72
8.4.3	Software system design – SW level 2	73
8.4.4	Module design – SW level 2.....	74
8.4.5	Coding – SW level 2	75
8.4.6	Module test – SW level 2	75
8.4.7	Software integration testing SW level 2.....	76
8.4.8	Software testing SW level 2.....	76
8.4.9	Documentation – SW level 2.....	77
8.4.10	Configuration and modification management process – SW level 2.....	77
9	Validation	78
9.1	Validation principles.....	78
9.1.1	Validation plan.....	81
9.1.2	Use of generic fault lists	81

9.1.3	Specific fault lists	81
9.1.4	Information for validation	82
9.1.5	Validation record	82
9.2	Analysis as part of validation	83
9.2.1	General	83
9.2.2	Analysis techniques	83
9.2.3	Verification of safety requirements specification (SRS)	83
9.3	Testing as part of validation	84
9.3.1	General	84
9.3.2	Measurement accuracy	84
9.3.3	More stringent requirements	85
9.3.4	Test samples	85
9.4	Validation of the safety function	85
9.4.1	General	85
9.4.2	Analysis and testing	86
9.5	Validation of the safety integrity of the SCS	86
9.5.1	General	86
9.5.2	Validation of subsystem(s)	86
9.5.3	Validation of measures against systematic failures	87
9.5.4	Validation of safety-related software	87
9.5.5	Validation of combination of subsystems	88
10	Documentation	88
10.1	General	88
10.2	Technical documentation	88
10.3	Information for use of the SCS	90
10.3.1	General	90
10.3.2	Information for use given by the manufacturer of subsystems	90
10.3.3	Information for use given by the SCS integrator	91
Annex A (informative)	Determination of required safety integrity	93
A.1	General	93
A.2	Matrix assignment for the required SIL	93
A.2.1	Hazard identification/indication	93
A.2.2	Risk estimation	93
A.2.3	Severity (Se)	94
A.2.4	Probability of occurrence of harm	94
A.2.5	Class of probability of harm (CI)	97
A.2.6	SIL assignment	97
A.3	Overlapping hazards	99
Annex B (informative)	Example of SCS design methodology	100
B.1	General	100
B.2	Safety requirements specification	100
B.3	Decomposition of the safety function	100
B.4	Design of the SCS by using subsystems	101
B.4.1	General	101
B.4.2	Subsystem 1 design – “guard door monitoring”	101
B.4.3	Subsystem 2 design – “evaluation logic”	103
B.4.4	Subsystem 3 design – “motor control”	104
B.4.5	Evaluation of the SCS	104
B.4.6	PFH	105

B.5	Verification	105
B.5.1	General	105
B.5.2	Analysis.....	105
B.5.3	Tests	106
Annex C	(informative) Examples of $MTTF_D$ values for single components	107
C.1	General.....	107
C.2	Good engineering practices method.....	107
C.3	Hydraulic components.....	107
C.4	$MTTF_D$ of pneumatic, mechanical and electromechanical components.....	108
Annex D	(informative) Examples for diagnostic coverage (DC).....	110
Annex E	(informative) Methodology for the estimation of susceptibility to common cause failures (CCF).....	112
E.1	General.....	112
E.2	Methodology	112
E.2.1	Requirements for CCF	112
E.2.2	Estimation of effect of CCF	112
Annex F	(informative) Guideline for software level 1	115
F.1	Software safety requirements.....	115
F.2	Coding guidelines	116
F.3	Specification of safety functions.....	117
F.4	Specification of hardware design	118
F.5	Software system design specification.....	120
F.6	Protocols	122
Annex G	(informative) Examples of safety functions	125
Annex H	(informative) Simplified approaches to evaluate the PFH value of a subsystem	126
H.1	Table allocation approach	126
H.2	Simplified formulas for the estimation of PFH	128
H.2.1	General	128
H.2.2	Basic subsystem architecture A: single channel without a diagnostic function	128
H.2.3	Basic subsystem architecture B: dual channel without a diagnostic function	129
H.2.4	Basic subsystem architecture C: single channel with a diagnostic function	129
H.2.5	Basic subsystem architecture D: dual channel with a diagnostic function(s)	135
H.3	Parts count method.....	136
Annex I	(informative) The functional safety plan and design activities	137
I.1	General.....	137
I.2	Example of a machine design plan including a safety plan	137
I.3	Example of activities, documents and roles.....	137
Annex J	(informative) Independence for reviews and testing/verification/validation activities	142
J.1	Software design	142
J.2	Validation.....	142
Bibliography	144
Figure 1	– Scope of this document.....	11

Figure 2 – Integration within the risk reduction process of ISO 12100 (extract)	28
Figure 3 – Iterative process for design of the safety-related control system	29
Figure 4 – Example of a combination of subsystems as one SCS.....	30
Figure 5 – By activating a low demand safety function at least once per year it can be assumed to be high demand	35
Figure 6 – Examples of typical decomposition of a safety function into sub-functions and its allocation to subsystems	38
Figure 7 – Example of safety integrity of a safety function based on allocated subsystems as one SCS	39
Figure 8 – Basic subsystem architecture A logical representation	60
Figure 9 – Basic subsystem architecture B logical representation	60
Figure 10 – Basic subsystem architecture C logical representation	61
Figure 11 – Basic subsystem architecture D logical representation	61
Figure 12 – V-model for SW level 1.....	65
Figure 13 – V-model for software modules customized by the designer for SW level 1	65
Figure 14 – V-model of software safety lifecycle for SW level 2.....	71
Figure 15 – Overview of the validation process	80
Figure A.1 – Parameters used in risk estimation	93
Figure A.2 – Example proforma for SIL assignment process	99
Figure B.1 – Decomposition of the safety function	101
Figure B.2 – Overview of design of the subsystems of the SCS	101
Figure F.1 – Plant sketch	117
Figure F.2 – Principal module architecture design.....	120
Figure F.3 – Principal design approach of logical evaluation	121
Figure F.4 – Example of logical representation (program sketch)	122
Figure H.1 – Basic subsystem architecture A logical representation.....	128
Figure H.2 – Basic subsystem architecture B logical representation.....	129
Figure H.3 – Basic subsystem architecture C logical representation.....	129
Figure H.4 – Correlation of basic subsystem architecture C and the pertinent fault handling function	130
Figure H.5 – Basic subsystem architecture C with external fault handling function	131
Figure H.6 – Basic subsystem architecture C with external fault diagnostics	132
Figure H.7 – Basic subsystem architecture C with external fault reaction	132
Figure H.8 – Basic subsystem architecture C with internal fault diagnostics and internal fault reaction.....	133
Figure H.9 – Basic subsystem architecture D logical representation.....	135
Figure I.1 – Example of a machine design plan including a safety plan	137
Figure I.2 – Example of activities, documents and roles (1 of 2).....	139
Table 1 – Terms used in IEC 62061	12
Table 2 – Abbreviations used in IEC 62061.....	27
Table 3 – SIL and limits of <i>PFH</i> values.....	35
Table 4 – Required SIL and <i>PFH</i> of pre-designed subsystem	39
Table 5 – Relevant information for each subsystem	46

Table 6 – Architectural constraints on a subsystem: maximum SIL that can be claimed for an SCS using the subsystem	55
Table 7 – Overview of basic requirements and interrelation to basic subsystem architectures	62
Table 8 – Different levels of application software	63
Table 9 – Documentation of an SCS	89
Table A.1 – Severity (Se) classification	94
Table A.2 – Frequency and duration of exposure (Fr) classification	95
Table A.3 – Probability (Pr) classification	96
Table A.4 – Probability of avoiding or limiting harm (Av) classification	97
Table A.5 – Parameters used to determine class of probability of harm (Cl)	97
Table A.6 – Matrix assignment for determining the required SIL (or PL_r) for a safety function	98
Table B.1 – Safety requirements specification – example of overview	100
Table B.2 – Systematic integrity – example of overview	105
Table B.3 – Verification by tests	106
Table C.1 – Standards references and $MTTF_D$ or B_{10D} values for components	108
Table D.1 – Estimates for diagnostic coverage (DC) (1 of 2)	110
Table E.1 – Criteria for estimation of CCF Estimation of CCF factor (β)	113
Table E.2 – Criteria for estimation of CCF	114
Table F.1 – Example of relevant documents related to the simplified V-model	115
Table F.2 – Examples of coding guidelines	116
Table F.3 – Specified safety functions	118
Table F.4 – Relevant list of input and output signals	119
Table F.5 – Example of simplified cause and effect matrix	122
Table F.6 – Verification of software system design specification	123
Table F.7 – Software code review	123
Table F.8 – Software validation	124
Table G.1 – Examples of typical safety functions	125
Table H.1 – Allocation of PFH value of a subsystem	127
Table H.2 – Relationship between B_{10D} , operations and $MTTF_D$	128
Table H.3 – Minimum value of $1/\lambda_D F_H$ for the applicability of PFH equation (H.43)	133
Table J.1 – Minimum levels of independence for review, testing and verification activities	142
Table J.2 – Minimum levels of independence for validation activities	142

INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**Safety of machinery -
Functional safety of safety-related control systems**

FOREWORD

- 1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To this end and in addition to other activities, IEC publishes International Standards, Technical Specifications, Technical Reports, Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (hereafter referred to as "IEC Publication(s)"). Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested in the subject dealt with may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this preparation. IEC collaborates closely with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by agreement between the two organizations.
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This consolidated version of the official IEC Standard and its amendments has been prepared for user convenience.

IEC 62061 edition 2.2 contains the second edition (2021-03) [documents 44/885/FDIS and 44/888/RVD], its amendment 1 (2024-03) [documents 44/1020/FDIS and 44/1024/RVD] and its amendment 2 (2026-03) [documents 44/1074/FDIS and 44/1081/RVD].

In this Redline version, a vertical line in the margin shows where the technical content is modified by amendments 1 and 2. Additions are in green text, deletions are in strikethrough red text. A separate Final version with all changes accepted is available in this publication.

IEC 62061 has been prepared by IEC technical committee 44: Safety of machinery – Electrotechnical aspects. It is an International Standard.

This second constitutes a technical revision.

This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:

- structure has been changed and contents have been updated to reflect the design process of the safety function,
- standard extended to non-electrical technologies,
- definitions updated to be aligned with IEC 61508-4,
- functional safety plan introduced and configuration management updated (Clause 4),
- requirements on parametrization expanded (Clause 6),
- reference to requirements on security added (Subclause 6.8),
- requirements on periodic testing added (Subclause 6.9),
- various improvements and clarification on architectures and reliability calculations (Clause 6 and Clause 7),
- shift from "SILCL" to "maximum SIL" of a subsystem (Clause 7),
- use cases for software described including requirements (Clause 8),
- requirements on independence for software verification (Clause 8) and validation activities (Clause 9) added,
- new informative annex with examples (Annex G),
- new informative annexes on typical $MTTF_D$ values, diagnostics and calculation methods for the architectures (Annex C, Annex D and Annex H).

The language used for the development of this International Standard is English.

This document was drafted in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, and developed in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1 and ISO/IEC Directives, IEC Supplement, available at www.iec.ch/members_experts/refdocs. The main document types developed by IEC are described in greater detail at www.iec.ch/standardsdev/publications.

The committee has decided that the contents of this document and its amendments will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under webstore.iec.ch in the data related to the specific document. At this date, the document will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn, or
- revised.

INTRODUCTION

As a result of automation, demand for increased production and reduced operator physical effort, Safety-related Control Systems (referred to as SCS) of machines play an increasing role in the achievement of overall machine safety. Furthermore, the SCS themselves increasingly employ complex electronic technology.

IEC 62061 specifies requirements for the design and implementation of safety-related control systems of machinery. This document is machine sector specific within the framework of IEC 61508.

NOTE While IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1 are using different methodologies for the design of safety related control systems, they intend to achieve the same risk reduction.

This International Standard is intended for use by machinery designers, control system manufacturers and integrators, and others involved in the specification, design and validation of an SCS. It sets out an approach and provides requirements to achieve the necessary performance and facilitates the specification of the safety functions intended to achieve the risk reduction.

This document provides a machine sector specific framework for functional safety of an SCS of machines. It only covers those aspects of the safety lifecycle that are related to safety requirements allocation through to safety validation. Requirements are provided for information for safe use of SCS of machines that can also be relevant to later phases of the lifecycle of an SCS.

There are many situations on machines where SCS are employed as part of safety measures that have been provided to achieve risk reduction. A typical case is the use of an interlocking guard that, when it is opened to allow access to the danger zone, signals the safety related parts of the machine control system to stop hazardous machine operation. In automation, the machine control system that is used to achieve correct operation of the machine process often contributes to safety by mitigating risks associated with hazards arising directly from control system failures. This document gives a methodology and requirements to:

- assign the required safety integrity for each safety function to be implemented by SCS;
- enable the design of the SCS appropriate to the assigned safety (control) function(s);
- integrate safety-related subsystems designed in accordance with other applicable functional safety-related standards (see 6.3.4);
- validate the SCS.

This document is intended to be used within the framework of systematic risk reduction, in conjunction with risk assessment described in ISO 12100. Suggested methodologies for a safety integrity assignment are given in informative Annex A.

1 Scope

This International Standard specifies requirements and makes recommendations for the design, integration and validation of safety-related control systems (SCS) for machines. It is applicable to control systems used, either singly or in combination, to carry out safety functions on machines that are not portable by hand while working, including a group of machines working together in a co-ordinated manner.

This document is a machinery sector specific standard within the framework of IEC 61508 (all parts).

The design of complex programmable electronic subsystems or subsystem elements is not within the scope of this document. This is in the scope of IEC 61508 or standards linked to it; see Figure 1.

NOTE 1 Elements such as systems on chip or microcontroller boards are considered complex programmable electronic subsystems.

The main body of this sector standard specifies general requirements for the design, and verification of a safety-related control system intended to be used in high/continuous demand mode.

This document:

- is concerned only with functional safety requirements intended to reduce the risk of hazardous situations;
- is restricted to risks arising directly from the hazards of the machine itself or from a group of machines working together in a co-ordinated manner;

NOTE 2 Requirements to mitigate risks arising from other hazards are provided in relevant sector standards. For example, where a machine(s) is part of a process activity, additional information is available in IEC 61511.

This document does not cover

- electrical hazards arising from the electrical control equipment itself (e.g. electric shock – see IEC 60204-1);
- other safety requirements necessary at the machine level such as safeguarding;
- specific measures for security aspects – see IEC-TR TS 63074.

This document is not intended to limit or inhibit technological advancement.

Figure 1 illustrates the scope of this document.




Figure 1 – Scope of this document

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 60204-1:2016, *Safety of machinery – Electrical equipment of machines – Part 1: General requirements*

IEC 61000-1-2:2016, *Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 1-2: General – Methodology for the achievement of functional safety of electrical and electronic systems including equipment with regard to electromagnetic phenomena*

IEC 61508 (all parts), *Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems*

IEC 61508-2:2010, *Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems – Part 2: Requirements for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems*

IEC 61508-3:2010, *Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems – Part 3: Software requirements*

ISO 12100:2010, *Safety of machinery – General principles for design – Risk assessment and risk reduction*

ISO 13849 (all parts), *Safety of machinery – Safety-related parts of control systems*

ISO 13849-1:2015, *Safety of machinery – Safety-related parts of control systems – Part 1: General principles for design*

ISO 13849-2:2012, *Safety of machinery – Safety-related parts of control systems – Part 2: Validation*

3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations

3.1 Alphabetical list of definitions

Terms used throughout IEC 62061 are given in Table 1. Also included are some common abbreviations related to machinery safety.

Table 1 – Terms used in IEC 62061

Term	Definition number
application software	3.2.59
architectural constraint	3.2.46
architecture	3.2.45
average frequency of dangerous failure per hour (<i>PFH</i>)	3.2.29
average probability of dangerous failure on demand (<i>PF_D_{avg}</i>)	3.2.31
baseline (configuration)	3.2.67
bypass	3.2.17
common cause failure (CCF)	3.2.56
complex component	3.2.8
configuration management	3.2.66
continuous mode	3.2.28
dangerous failure	3.2.52
demand	3.2.25
diagnostic coverage (DC)	3.2.49
diagnostic test interval	3.2.50
embedded software	3.2.60
failure	3.2.51
fault	3.2.33
fault tolerance	3.2.34
full variability language (FVL)	3.2.61
functional safety	3.2.10
hardware fault tolerance (HFT)	3.2.35
hardware safety integrity	3.2.22
harm	3.2.12
hazard	3.2.11
high demand mode	3.2.27
integrator	3.2.13

Term	Definition number
limited variability language (LVL)	3.2.62
low complexity component	3.2.7
low demand mode	3.2.26
machine control system	3.2.2
machinery (machine)	3.2.1
mean repair time (MRT)	3.2.40
mean time to failure (<i>MTTF</i>)	3.2.37
mean time to dangerous failure (<i>MTTF_D</i>)	3.2.38
mean time to restoration (MTTR)	3.2.39
muting	3.2.16
pre-designed (SCS or subsystem)	3.2.5
probability of dangerous failure on demand (<i>PDF</i>)	3.2.30
process safety time	3.2.41
proof test coverage	3.2.48
proof test	3.2.47
protective measure	3.2.14
random hardware failure	3.2.57
ratio of dangerous failure (RDF)	3.2.55
risk	3.2.15
safe failure	3.2.53
safe failure fraction (SFF)	3.2.54
safe state	3.2.68
safety	3.2.9
safety function	3.2.18
safety integrity	3.2.21
safety integrity level (SIL)	3.2.24
safety-related control system (SCS)	3.2.3
safety-related software	3.2.63
security	3.2.69
(SCS) diagnostic function	3.2.19
(SCS) fault reaction function	3.2.20
subsystem	3.2.4
subsystem element	3.2.6
sub-function	3.2.36
systematic failure	3.2.58
systematic safety integrity	3.2.23
target failure measure	3.2.32
useful lifetime	3.2.42
validation (of the safety function)	3.2.65
verification	3.2.64
well-tried component	3.2.43
well-tried safety principles	3.2.44