# SLOVENSKI STANDARD
# SIST EN 50129:2026

**01-oktober-2026**

**Nadomešča:**
**SIST EN 50129:2019**
**SIST EN 50129:2019/AC:2019**

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**Železniške naprave - Komunikacijski, signalni in procesni sistemi - Signalno-varnostni elektronski sistemi**

Railway Application - Communication, signalling and processing system - Safety related electronic systems for signalling

Bahnanwendungen - Telekommunikationstechnik, Signaltechnik und Datenverarbeitungssysteme - Sicherheitsrelevante elektronische Systeme für Signaltechnik



Applications ferroviaires - Systèmes de signalisation, de télécommunication et de traitement - Systèmes électroniques de sécurité pour la signalisation

**Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z:** **EN 50129:2026**

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**ICS:**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 35.240.60 | Uporabniške rešitve IT v prometu | IT applications in transport |
| 45.020 | Železniška tehnika na splošno | Railway engineering in general |

**SIST EN 50129:2026** **en**

EUROPEAN STANDARD

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# EN 50129

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English Version

# Railway Application - Communication, signalling and processing system - Safety related electronic systems for signalling

Applications ferroviaires - Systèmes de signalisation, de télécommunications et de traitement - Systèmes électroniques de sécurité pour la signalisation

Bahnanwendungen - Telekommunikationstechnik, Signaltechnik und Datenverarbeitungssysteme - Sicherheitsbezogene elektronische Systeme für Signaltechnik

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This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by translation under the responsibility of a CENELEC member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has the same status as the official versions.



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European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique
Europäisches Komitee für Elektrotechnische Normung

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# European foreword

This document (EN 50129:2026) has been prepared by CLC/SC 9XA “Communication, signalling and processing systems” of CLC/TC 9X “Electrical and electronic applications for railways”.

The following dates are fixed:

- latest date by which this document has to be implemented at national level by publication of an identical national standard or by endorsement (dop) 2027-05-31
- latest date by which the national standards conflicting with this document have to be withdrawn (dow) 2029-05-31

This document supersedes EN 50129:2018 and all of its amendments and corrigenda (if any).

EN 50129:2026 includes the following significant technical changes with respect to EN 50129:2018.

Requirements and guidance have been added on the following topics:

— Clause 5: update of requirements and guidance on safety qualification tests;

— Clause 6: update of requirements and guidance on safety-related tools, cybersecurity;

— Clause 7: update of requirements and guidance on cybersecurity; a significant portion of 7.2 has been incorporated into Table 2;

— Annex C: update of insulation coordination requirements for better readability;

— Annex E: a new column has been added for Basic Integrity.

A more detailed comparison of changes between EN 50129:2018 and this document can be found in Annex G.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CENELEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

Any feedback and questions on this document should be directed to the users’ national committee. A complete listing of these bodies can be found on the CENELEC website.

# Introduction

This document defines requirements for the development and acceptance of safety-related electronic systems in the railway signalling field.

Safety-related electronic systems for signalling include hardware and software aspects. To develop complete safety-related systems, both aspects need to be taken into account throughout the whole life cycle of the system. The requirements for the overall safety-related electronic system and for its hardware aspects are defined in this document. Other requirements are defined in associated CENELEC standards.

General requirements for a consistent approach to the management of RAMS are given in EN 50126-1:2017 and EN 50126-2:2017. For safety-related systems which include software, additional requirements are defined in EN 50716:2023. Additional requirements for safety-related communication are defined in EN 50159:2010.

Cyberattacks can affect the safety of a system, but this document does not specify the cybersecurity requirements for the development, implementation, maintenance and operation of security policies, services, or systems. For cybersecurity, appropriate standards apply.

NOTE ISO/IEC and CEN/CENELEC publications that address cybersecurity in depth are EN ISO/IEC 27000 and ISO/IEC TR 19791. In the field of industrial automation and control systems, the EN IEC 62443 series have been defined. CLC/TS 50701:2023 addresses cybersecurity for the railway domain and was derived from the EN IEC 62443 series.

The aim of European railway duty holders and of European railway industry is to develop compatible railway systems based on common standards. Therefore cross-acceptance of safety approvals for systems, subsystems or equipment by the different national railway duty holders is needed. This document is the common European base for safety acceptance of electronic systems for railway signalling applications.

Cross-acceptance is aimed at the acceptance of generic products or generic applications that can be used for a number of different specific applications, and not at the acceptance of any single specific application. Public procurement within the European Community concerning safety-related electronic systems for railway signalling applications will refer to this document.

This document is concerned with the evidence to be presented for the acceptance of safety-related systems. However, it specifies not only those life cycle activities which need to be completed before the system acceptance phase, but also the additional planned activities to be carried out afterwards. In this way, safety justification will cover the whole life cycle.

This document is concerned with what evidence is to be presented. Except where considered appropriate, it does not specify who carries out the necessary work. The necessary work can be carried out by different people, in different circumstances or organisational structures, provided that independence of roles is respected.

This document consists of Clause 1 to Clause 8, which form the main part, and Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F and G . The requirements defined in Clause 5 to Clause 8 and in Annexes A, B, C and E are normative, whilst Annexes D, F and G are informative.

This document is in line with, and contains references to:

— EN 50126-1:2017, Railway Applications — The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) — Part 1: Generic RAMS Process,

— EN 50126-2:2017, Railway Applications — The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) — Part 2: Systems Approach to Safety.

This document is based on the system life cycle described in EN 50126-1:2017, EN 50126-2:2017 and is in line with the EN 61508 series. EN 50126-1:2017, EN 50126-2:2017, EN 50716:2023 and this document comprise the railway sector equivalent of the EN 61508 series so far as Railway Communication, Signalling and Processing Systems are concerned. Given that compliance with these documents has been demonstrated, there are no requirements in this document for further evaluation of compliance with the EN 61508 series.

# 1 Scope

This document is applicable to safety-related electronic systems (including subsystems and equipment) for railway signalling applications.

This document applies to generic systems (i.e. generic products or systems defining a class of applications), as well as to systems for specific applications.

The scope of this document and its relationship with other CENELEC standards are shown in Figure 1.

This document is applicable only to the functional safety of systems. It does not deal with other aspects of safety such as occupational health and safety of personnel or potential threats created by the technology regardless of their intended functions (e.g. presence of sharp edges, presence of electric voltage, presence of combustible material). Cybersecurity aspects of functional safety are addressed only to the extent consistent with the application of the relevant standards, where needed.

This document applies to all the phases of the life cycle of a safety-related electronic system, focusing in particular on phases from 4 (specification of system requirements) to 10 (system acceptance) as defined in EN 50126-1:2017.

Requirements for systems which are not related to safety are outside the scope of this document.

This document is not necessarily applicable to systems, subsystems or equipment which had already been accepted prior to the date of withdrawal (dow) of the standards conflicting with this document. However, so far as reasonably practicable, it is applicable to modifications and extensions to such systems, subsystems and equipment.

NOTE In the case of partial modifications, it can happen that the system can no longer be declared compliant with a single version of the standard, meaning that the modified part will be compliant with the current version and the unmodified parts will be compliant with the previous version.



This document is primarily applicable to systems, subsystems or equipment which have been specifically designed and manufactured for railway signalling applications. It is also applicable, to the extent of 6.2, to general-purpose or industrial equipment (e.g. power supplies, display screens, or other commercial off the shelf items) which is procured for use as part of a safety-related electronic system.

This document is aimed at railway duty holders, railway suppliers, and assessors as well as at safety authorities, although it does not define an approval process to be applied by the safety authorities.




**Figure 1 — Scope of the main CENELEC railway application standards**

## 2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

EN 50124-1:2017, *Railway applications - Insulation coordination - Part 1: Basic requirements - Clearances and creepage distances for all electrical and electronic equipment*

EN 50125-1:2014, *Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 1: Rolling stock and on-board equipment*

EN 50125-3:2003,[1] *Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 3: Equipment for signalling and telecommunications*

EN 50126-1:2017,[2] *Railway Applications - The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) - Part 1: Generic RAMS Process*

EN 50126-2:2017,[3] *Railway Applications - The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) - Part 2: Systems Approach to Safety*

EN 50159:2010,[4] *Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Safety-related communication in transmission systems*

EN 50716:2023, *Railway Applications - Requirements for software development*

EN IEC 60664-1:2020,[5] *Insulation coordination for equipment within low-voltage supply systems - Part 1: Principles, requirements and tests (IEC 60664-1:2020)*



## 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms



### 3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://www.iso.org/obp/

— IEC Electropedia: available at https://www.electropedia.org/

**3.1.1**
**accident**
unintended event or series of events that results in harm

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-02, modified – “that results in death, injury, loss of a system or service, or environmental damage” has been replaced with “that results in harm”.]

[1] As impacted by EN 50125-3/2003/corrigendum May 2010.
[2] As impacted by EN 50126-1:2017/A1:2024.
[3] As impacted by EN 50126-2:2017/A1:2024.
[4] As impacted by EN 50159:2010/A1:2020.
[5] As impacted by EN IEC 60664-1:2020/AC:2020-12 and EN IEC 60664-1:2020/A1:2025.

**3.1.2**
**audit**
systematic, independent, documented process for obtaining records, statements of fact or other relevant information and assessing them objectively to determine the extent to which specified requirements are fulfilled

Note 1 to entry: Whilst “audit” applies to management systems, “assessment” applies to conformity assessment bodies as well as more generally.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-902:2013, 902-03-04]

**3.1.3**
**basic insulation**
insulation that provides basic protection

Note 1 to entry: This concept does not apply to insulation used exclusively for functional purposes.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-195:2021, 195-06-06]

**3.1.4**
**Basic Integrity**
integrity attribute for a safety-related function with a tolerable functional failure rate equal to, or higher than (less demanding), $10^{-5}$ $h^{-1}$; or for a non-safety-related function

Note 1 to entry: In this document Basic Integrity requirements relate only to safety-related functions. If a non-safety-related function has been given Basic Integrity requirements on the basis of the process described in EN 50126-2:2017, no additional requirements are defined in this document.



[SOURCE: EN 50126-1:2017, 3.7, modified – Note 1 to entry has been added.]



**3.1.5**
**causal analysis**
analysis of the reasons how and why a particular hazard can come into existence

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-07]

**3.1.6**
**common cause failures**
failures of multiple items, which would otherwise be considered independent of one another, resulting from a single cause

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-03-18, modified – Notes 1 and 2 to entry have been deleted.]

**3.1.7**
**configuration**
structuring and interconnection of the hardware and software of a system for its intended application

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-12]

**3.1.8**
**consequence analysis**
analysis of events which are likely to happen after a hazard has occurred

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-14]

**3.1.9**
**cross-acceptance**
status achieved by a product that has been accepted by one authority to the relevant standards and is acceptable to other authorities without the necessity for further assessment

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-15]

**3.1.10**
**cybersecurity**
actions required to preclude unauthorized use of, denial of service to, modifications to, disclosure of, or damage to systems or informational assets

Note 1 to entry: Cybersecurity includes the concepts of identification, authentication, accountability, authorization, availability, and privacy.

Note 2 to entry: It is recognized that the term “cybersecurity” has a broader meaning in other standards and guidance, often including non-malevolent threats, human errors, and protection against natural disasters. Those aspects, except human errors degrading security controls, are not included in this document.

**3.1.11**
**DC fault model**
fault category that includes the following failure modes: stuck-at faults, stuck-open, open or high impedance outputs and short circuit between signal lines, and for integrated circuits short circuit between any two connections (pins)

**3.1.12**
**design**
activity applied in order to analyse and transform specified requirements into acceptable solutions



[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-16, modified – The end of the definition “design solutions which have the required Safety Integrity level” has been replaced with “solutions”.]



**3.1.13**
**diversity**
existence of two or more different ways or means of achieving a specified objective

Note 1 to entry: Diversity is specifically provided as a defence against common cause failures. It can be achieved by providing systems that are physically different from each other or by functional diversity, where similar systems achieve the specified objective in different ways.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-395:2014, 395-07-115, modified – The supplementary information has been moved to a new Note 1 to entry, which replaces the original Note 1 to entry.]

**3.1.14**
**double insulation**
insulation comprising both basic insulation and supplementary insulation

Note 1 to entry: In double insulation, each layer shall be able to be tested or analysed separately. In particular:

— the clearance distance shall be the basic distance. In addition, also the supplementary solid layer shall be dimensioned taking into account the same rated impulse voltage *($U_{Ni}$)*.

— the creepage distance shall be the sum of basic and supplementary distances. The basic distance shall be evaluated against the rated insulation voltage ($U_{Nm}$). In addition, also the supplementary distance shall be evaluated against the same $U_{Nm}$ . The $U_{Nm}$ shall not be apportioned.

Note 2 to entry: With respect to Note 1 to entry, for definition of rated insulation voltage and rated impulse voltage, see EN 50124-1:2017. Similar definitions can also be found in EN IEC 60664-1:2020.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-195:2021, 195-06-08 modified – Notes to entry 1 and 2 have been added.]

**3.1.15**
**electronic component**
**hardware component**
electronic device that cannot be taken apart without destruction or impairment of its intended use

EXAMPLE Resistors, capacitors, diodes, integrated circuits, hybrids, application specific integrated circuits, wound components and relays.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-904:2014, 904-01-09, modified – The preferred terms “electronic part” and “piece part” have been deleted and a new preferred term “hardware component” has been added.]

**3.1.16**
**equipment**
single apparatus or set of devices or apparatuses, or the set of main devices of an installation, or all devices necessary to perform a specific task

Note 1 to entry: Examples of equipment are a power transformer, the equipment of a substation, measuring equipment.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-151:2001, 151-11-25]

**3.1.17**
**error**
discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition



Note 1 to entry: An error can be caused by a faulty item, e.g. a computing error made by faulty computer equipment.

Note 2 to entry: A human error can be seen as a human action or inaction that can produce an unintended result.



[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-03-02, modified – Notes 1 and 2 to entry have been modified.]

**3.1.18**
**fail-safe**
able to enter or remain in a safe state in the event of a failure

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-01-10]

**3.1.19**
**failure**
<of an item> loss of ability to perform as required

Note 1 to entry: Qualifiers, such as catastrophic, critical, major, minor, marginal and insignificant, can be used to categorize failures according to the severity of consequences, the choice and definitions of severity criteria depending upon the field of application.

Note 2 to entry: Qualifiers, such as misuse, mishandling and weakness, can be used to categorize failures according to the cause of failure.

Note 3 to entry: “Failure” is an event, as distinguished from “fault”, which is a state.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-11-19, modified – “may” has been changed to “can” in notes to entry 1 and 2. Note 3 to entry has been added.]

**3.1.20**
**failure rate**
limit of the ratio of the conditional probability that the instant of time, T, of a failure of a product falls within a given time interval (t, t + Δt) and the duration of this interval, Δt, when Δt tends towards zero, given that the item is in an up state at the start of the time interval

Note 1 to entry: For applications where distance travelled or number of cycles of operation is more relevant than time, the unit of time can be replaced by the unit of distance or cycles, as appropriate.

Note 2 to entry: The term “failure rate” is often used in the sense of “mean failure rate” defined in IEV 192-05-07.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-21]

**3.1.21**
**fault**
<in a system> abnormal condition that could lead to an error in a system

Note 1 to entry: A fault can be random or systematic.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-11-20]

**3.1.22**
**fault detection time**
time interval between failure and detection of the resulting fault

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2024, 192-07-11, modified – The deprecated term “undetected fault time” as well as Figures 1 and 2 have been deleted.]



**3.1.23**
**function**
<of an item> specified action or activity which can be performed by technical means or human beings and has a defined output in response to a defined input



Note 1 to entry: A function can be specified or described without reference to the physical means of achieving it.

**3.1.24**
**functional safety**
part of the overall safety that depends on functional and physical units operating correctly in response to their inputs

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-351:2013, 351-57-06, modified – Note 1 to entry has been deleted.]

**3.1.25**
**harm**
injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014, 3.1]

**3.1.26**
**hazard**
<in railway> condition that can lead to an accident

Note 1 to entry: The equivalent definition in IEC 60050-903:2013, 903–01–02 refers to “harm” instead of “accident”.

Note 2 to entry: This means that there is at least one scenario in which the hazard, under credible circumstances, leads to an accident.

**3.1.27**
**hazard analysis**
process of identifying hazards and analysing their causes, and the derivation of requirements to limit the likelihood and consequences of hazards to a tolerable level

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-11-23]

**3.1.28**
**hazard log**
document in which hazards identified, decisions made, solutions adopted, and their implementation status are recorded or referenced

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-27]

**3.1.29**
**implementation**
activity applied in order to transform the specified designs into their realization

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-29, modified – “physical realization” changed to “realization”.]

**3.1.30**
**independence of roles**
freedom from involvement in the same intellectual, commercial or management entity

**3.1.31**
**independent safety assessment**
process to determine whether a system or product meets the specified safety requirements and to form a judgement as to whether the product is fit for its intended purpose in relation to safety

[SOURCE: EN 50126-1:2017, 3.33, modified – “the system/product” has been changed to “a system or product”. Note 1 to entry has been deleted.]



**3.1.32**
**maintenance**
combination of all technical and management actions intended to retain an item in, or restore it to, a state in which it can perform as required

Note 1 to entry: Management is assumed to include supervision activities.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-06-01]

**3.1.33**
**negation**
enforcement of a safe state following detection of a hazardous fault

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-38]

**3.1.34**
**negation time**
time interval which begins when the existence of a fault is detected and ends when a safe state is enforced

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-39]

**3.1.35**
**pre-existing item**
item that already exists and that was not developed specifically for the current project

**3.1.36**
**product**
<in railway> collection of elements, interconnected to form a system, a subsystem or an equipment, in a manner which meets the specified requirements

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-40, modified — The specific use “in signalling” has been made more general with “in railway”.]

**3.1.37**
**railway duty holder**
body with the overall accountability for operating a railway system within the legal framework

Note 1 to entry: Railway duty holder accountabilities for the overall system or its parts and life cycle activities are sometimes split between one or more bodies or entities. For example:

— the owner(s) of one or more parts of the system assets and their purchasing agents;

— the operator of the system;

— the maintainer(s) of one or more parts of the system.

Note 2 to entry: Typically the railway duty holders are railway undertakings and the infrastructure managers. Such splits are based on either statutory instruments or contractual agreements. Such responsibilities are defined at the earliest stages of a system life cycle.

[SOURCE: EN 50126-1:2017, 3.48]



**3.1.38**
**random failure integrity**
degree to which a system is free from hazardous random faults



Note 1 to entry: This definition can be read as “integrity from failures due to random faults”.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-45, modified – Note 1 to entry has been added.]

**3.1.39**
**random fault**
unpredictable occurrence of a fault

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-821:2017, 821-12-46]

**3.1.40**
**redundancy**
<in a system> provision of more than one means for performing a function

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192: 2015, 192-10-02, modified – Note 1 to entry has been deleted.]

**3.1.41**
**reinforced insulation**
insulation that provides a degree of protection against electric shock equivalent to double insulation

Note 1 to entry: Reinforced insulation can comprise several layers which cannot be tested singly as basic insulation or supplementary insulation.

[SOURCE: IEC 60050-195:2021, 195-06-09]

**3.1.42**
**reliability**
<of an item> ability to perform as required, without failure, for a given time interval, under given conditions